Fisheries In Iceland Research Articles

Economies of Scale and Perceived Corruption in Natural Resource Management: A Comparative Study between Ukraine, Romania, and Iceland

The aim of this paper is to enhance understanding of factors that undermine sustainable management of renewable resources by identifying and analyzing the main drivers and dynamics involved, with a focus on the role of corruption perceptions and its implications. To shed light on the research question, we chose to perform a comparative study of three different resource sectors in European countries that are ranked differently on the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, namely fisheries in Iceland, forestry in Romania, and arable soils in Ukraine. We conducted 40 in-depth semi-structured interviews with various stakeholders to explore assumptions on individual actions and behavior in the sectors. The interviews were analyzed using a qualitative coding procedure based on causal loop diagrams, a method from system dynamics. The results indicate that even though the cases are different, they share a similar outcome, in that privatization of the resource and consolidation of companies took place, along with perceived risk of both unsustainable resource management practices and corruption. Our findings suggest that the underlying similarities of the cases are that privatization occurred around the same time in early 1990s, when neoliberal economic ideology influentially held up the idea that private ownership meant better management. What followed was a transition to economies of scale that ultimately resulted in dominance of large vertically integrated companies in the sectors. The resulting inequalities between large and small actors in the renewable resource management systems serve to increase the risk for unsustainable management decisions as well as increase perceptions of corruption risks, especially amongst smaller actors in the sectors.

Derby versus ITQ: Iceland’s coastal fisheries explained and compared to its ITQ-managed fisheries

Iceland adopted a derby fishery strategy throughout its coastal fisheries, which opened for all vessels in 2009. For simplicity, this paper refers to these fisheries as coastal fisheries (strandveiðar), in which small vessels mostly catch cod (Gadus morhua) during the summer. This article describes the coastal fisheries and compares their results to those of other fisheries in Iceland, all of which are managed by an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system. The profitability and the rate of accidents are examined. According to observations of numerous fisheries around the world, the coastal fisheries are assumed to be much less profitable than other fisheries in Iceland – indeed, nonprofitable – because of the derby nature of the fisheries. The findings of this study validate this assumption: the coastal fisheries have been on average generating losses, while other fisheries in Iceland have been profitable. Moreover, it was hypothesized that the derby management system of the coastal fisheries might lead to the rate of accidents in the coastal fisheries being higher than others in Iceland because of incentives generated by the race to fish, which could result in coastal fishers disregarding safety. The findings did not support this; accidents in which a person was injured were uncommon in the coastal fisheries and were relatively less frequent than in other fisheries. However, reported incidents without personal injuries, which were mostly caused by mechanical failures, occurred comparatively more often in the coastal fisheries than in other Icelandic fisheries.

Evaluating management strategies for marine mammal populations: an example for multiple species and multiple fishing sectors in Iceland

A management strategy evaluation (MSE) is used to estimate success at achieving conservation goals for marine mammals while also aiming to minimize impacts on commercial fisheries. It is intended to improve understanding of US import rules that require countries exporting fish and fish products to the USA to adhere to marine mammal bycatch standards “comparable” to those used by the USA. The MSE framework is applied, for illustrative purposes, to export fisheries in Iceland that impact harbor porpoises (Phocoena phocoena), harbor seals (Phoca vitulina), and grey seals (Halichoerus grypus). Several management strategies are evaluated. The harbor porpoise population is estimated to be close to or above its maximum net productivity level (MNPL) and, according to the model, will continue to increase even if current levels of human-caused mortality are unchanged. In contrast, the grey seal and harbor seal populations are below MNPL, and bycatch mortality in the lumpfish (Cyclopterus lumpus) fishery will need to be reduced to allow them to recover to MNPL.

Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) Certification of Arctic Fisheries: Processes and Outcomes

Certification according to private sustainability standards (ecolabelling) has become an important addition to public fisheries management in recent years. The major global ecolabel in terms of comprehensiveness and coverage is the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) Fisheries Standard. Under the MSC Standard, the status of the fishery’s target stocks, its impact on the wider ecosystem and the effectiveness of its management system are assessed. Becoming and remaining certified requires continuous behavioural adaptation from fisheries through a fine-meshed system of conditions attached to certification. In this article, MSC certification of two clusters of fisheries in Arctic waters is discussed, one large- and one small-scale. In the Barents Sea cod and haddock fisheries, the main obstacle to certification has been the fisheries’ impact on endangered, threatened and protected (ETP) species and bottom habitats, and in order to remain certified beyond the first five-year certification period, the fishing companies have had to introduce a number of voluntary measures beyond what is required by law. In the local lumpfish fisheries in Greenland, Iceland and Norway, conditions attached to certification have been related to the effects of these fisheries on seabirds and marine mammals. Here essential parts of a management regime, such as biological reference points and harvest control rules, have come about as a direct result of MSC certification. MSC certification is no panacea, but it seems to have found a niche as a supplement to national legislation and international agreements.

Change in Atlantic cod migrations and adaptability of early land-based fishers to severe climate variation in the North Atlantic

ABSTRACTWe use biochemical, biological, archaeological, and historical analysis to examine relationships between Atlantic cod migration, sea temperature, and shifts in the distribution and occupancy of historical fishing sites in Iceland during the last millennium. Results support the hypothesis that the cooling climate of the North Atlantic during the period commonly referred to as the Little Ice Age coincided with changes in Atlantic cod migration patterns. Historical analysis shows a concomitant increase in reports of worsening Atlantic cod fishing and a severe decrease in domestic fishing, particularly in north Iceland. We conclude that Atlantic cod fisheries in Iceland originally thrived because of the proximity to cod migration routes. However, despite the mobility of local fishers, fluctuations in fish migrations, coupled with a harsher climate and increased competition for fishing grounds, resulted in a stagnation that lasted until the eventual modernization of the fishery in the mid-nineteenth century.

Negative effects of Kudoa islandica n. sp. (Myxosporea: Kudoidae) on aquaculture and wild fisheries in Iceland.

In the early 2000s, experimental rearing of spotted wolffish, Anarhichas minor, was started in Iceland. Health surveillance, carried out at regular intervals during the rearing period, revealed persistent and highly prevalent Kudoa infections of fish muscles which caused great financial losses due to post mortem myoliquefaction. In addition, during the traditional process of drying and smoking wild Atlantic lumpfish, Cyclopterus lumpus, the muscles from some fish almost completely disappear and the fish have to be discarded. To describe the etiological agent responsible for these conditions, spotted wolffish, Atlantic wolffish Anarhichas lupus, northern wolffish Anarhichas denticulatus and Atlantic lumpfish were caught off the Icelandic coast and examined for the presence of Kudoa. We describe a novel myxosporean, Kudoa islandica n. sp., using morphological and molecular data, and show with histopathology that it causes extensive myoliquefaction in three different wild fish hosts, which all are commercially valuable species in Iceland. Although some spore dimensions varied significantly between fish species, the molecular analyses showed that the same parasite was responsible for infection in all fish. The northern wolffish was not found to be infected. Although robustly placed in the Kudoa clade in phylogenetic analyses, K. islandica was phylogenetically distinct from other kudoids. A single myxosporean, K. islandica, is responsible for the infections in the somatic muscles of lumpfish and wolffish, causing extensive post mortem myoliquefaction. This myxosporean is likely to infect other fish species and it is important to study its life cycle in order to evaluate any threat to salmonid culture via the use of lumpfish as a biocontrol for sea lice.

Productivity development in Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish fisheries

This article analyses the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) performance of fisheries in Iceland, Norway and Sweden during the period 1973 to 2003. We measure TFP growth using real gross value added as output and capital input, labour input and a stock input index based on the major fish stocks. In developed neighbouring countries, we expect rapid diffusion of fishing technology innovations contributing to productivity convergence. In addition, innovations in the public regulation and the industrial organization may also have influenced productivity growth during the period. We find that Iceland had the highest annual TFP growth. Accounting for stock changes, it amounts to 3%, while the corresponding figures for Sweden and Norway are 2.8% and 0.8%, respectively. Despite best practice fishing technologies being widely available, we find no evidence of productivity convergence among the three countries.

Allocation of Fishing Harvest Rights in Iceland and Norway - the Development since 1990

Unlike most western countries, marine fisheries in Iceland and Norway is still of some national significance. For more than two decades now, the two countries have managed their fisheries with complicated quota systems. The main rules of these two systems are explained in the article. However, the main purpose of the article is to describe how harvest rights in the two countries have been allocated since 1990. In both countries the principle of grandfathering the harvest rights has prevailed, i.e., the initial allocation has protected the professional interest of those that have already participated in the fisheries. Despite this, rules on the matter have not been engraved in stone since they have been dynamic and contingent on various amendments by the legislature and government. Basic rules on allocation have been stipulated in acts in Iceland, while in Norway they have mostly been based on regulations. Since harvest rights are transferable in Iceland, this, in principle, should make the harvest rights better protected than in Norway. However, when the matter is scrutinized, it becomes clear that the Icelandic parliament has in fact reallocated harvest rights on a recurrent basis. In Norway, rules on allocation of harvest rights have been relatively stable. This can be partly explained by the fact that the most important stakeholders in the Norwegian fisheries have in practice had important say on how the harvest rights have been allocated.

Allocation of Demersal Harvest Rights in Iceland

It is generally understood that since 1984 the Icelandic fishery man- agement system has been based on individual transferable quotas (ITQs), that licenses for commercial fishing in Iceland were allocated to owners of vessels according to their fishing activity for the period 1 November 1982 through 31 October 1983, and quota shares in the demersal fisheries (usually 70–80 % of the annual catch value) were allocated according to the catch history of vessels in the period 1 November 1980 through 31 October 1983. Several judgements have been based on these premises. The aim of this article is to illustrate that the Icelandic fishery management system has by no means been a 100 % ITQ system since 1984, and that alloca- tion of fishing licenses and quotas in the demersal fisheries in Iceland has been far more complicated than the aforementioned understanding would indicate. In fact since 1984 the Icelandic system has evolved more by trial-and-error than by design, and a substantial portion of the demersal quota shares have been reallocated. These reallocations should influence how the system is judged and evaluated.Keywords: fisheries management, ITQs, allocation of fishing rights, equality, property right, freedom of employmentCitation: Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 1, 2/2010 p. 299-318. ISSN 1891-6252

Advances in Property Rights Based Fisheries Management: An Introduction

The papers published in this special issue of Marine Resource Economics were initially presented at the Workshop on Advances in Property Rights Based Fisheries Management held in Reykjavik, Iceland, August 27-29, 2006. This workshop was organized by RSE, an Icelandic think tank, with financial support from the Ministry of Fisheries in Iceland, the Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners, and Iceland’s commercial banks Glitnir and Landsbanki Islands. On behalf of the RSE, I use this opportunity to thank these sponsors for their generous support. I also thank my co-editor, Professor Rognvaldur Hannesson, for his help with the peer review process. Finally, thanks are due to The MRE Foundation, as represented by the editor, Professor James Anderson, and the technical editor, Barbara Harrison, for its support of this project. Hopefully, it will not be seen as too much of a simplification to claim that economic science has generated three fundamental perspectives on the fisheries problem. One is the externality perspective. Another is the fisheries game perspective, and the third is the property rights perspective. These perspectives are by no means mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they complement each other. This does not mean that they are equivalent, however. One of them may be more illuminating or, more importantly, of greater help in improving fisheries than the others. The fundamental motivation for the workshop that generated the papers in this issue was that, at least when it comes to the practice of fisheries management, the property rights perspective is the most useful. It is widely agreed that the modern theory of fisheries economics was launched by Scott Gordon’s 1954 article in the Journal of Political Economy (Gordon 1954). Of course, this wasn’t the first analysis of the problem—scientific progress rarely evolves in that way. In the years preceding Gordon’s paper, an informal group of economists including A.D. Scott, J. Crutchfield, R. Turvey, and Gordon himself had been discussing the problems of fisheries along lines similar to the ones that Gordon made famous (Scott 1989, 1996, 2007). Besides, the Danish economist, Jens Warming, in a couple of articles in 1911 and 1931, forwarded essentially the same analysis (Warming 1911, 1931; Andersen 1983). There is little doubt that other precursors can be found by historians of economic thought. In his seminal contribution to the topic, Anthony Scott attempted to bring the role of property rights to the forefront (Scott 1955a). Unfortunately, Scott’s analysis was restricted to the case of a sole-owner fishery. While, on this basis, he essentially proved that property rights were central to the fisheries problem, this crucial point seems to have escaped most other researchers. Thus, my initial reading of Scott’s article, under expert guidance some 20 years later, indicated that the number of participating fishers was crucial for the fisheries problem, not property rights as

Catch-quota balancing in multispecies individual fishing quotas

Individual fishery quotas (IFQs) are an increasingly prevalent form of fishery management around the world, with more than 170 species currently managed with IFQs. Yet, because of the difficulties in matching quota holdings with catches, many argue that IFQs are not appropriate for multispecies fisheries. Using on-the-ground-experience with multispecies IFQ fisheries in Iceland, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, we assess the design and use of catch-quota balancing mechanisms. Our methodology includes a mix of interviews with fishery managers, industry representatives, and brokers, literature review, and data analysis. We find that a combination of incentives and limits on use rates for the mechanisms provide sufficient flexibility to the quota owner without the fishery manager incurring excessive levels of overexploitation risk. Contrary to some opinions, these programs are evidence that it is possible to implement IFQ programs for multispecies fisheries and that they can be profitable and sustainable.

Methods for Environmental and Economic Accounting for the Exploitation of Wild Fish Stocks and their Applications to the Case of Icelandic Fisheries

The paper discusses methods for estimating the value of commercially exploited fish stocks and the cost of exploiting them. Methods which are recommended in the System of National Accounting (SNA) satellite system and the System for Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting (SEEA) and relevant for this task are discussed. The paper questions the relevance of some of these methods. It argues for the integration of economic accounting for wild fish stocks with estimation of efficient management of them. Using biological and economic data makes it possible to produce consistent estimates of the value of fish stocks and the cost of exploiting them. These estimates are useful for national accounting and for guiding management of fisheries. This method allows estimation of the cost of inefficiency of fisheries management besides estimation of the cost of depletion. The different methods are illustrated using data on commercial fisheries in Iceland and the fish stocks that they exploit. It is shown that even if all methods are based on market valuation and use only objective data they lead to very different outcomes.

Optimal Feedback Controls: Comparative Evaluation of the Cod Fisheries in Denmark, Iceland, and Norway

The economic efficiencies of the Danish, Icelandic, and Norwegian cod fisheries are examined. For this purpose, nonlinear aggregate models of these fisheries are constructed. Comparing the calculated optimal harvest and biomass quantities with the actual fisheries provides a measure of the degree of efficiency in these fisheries. The comparisons confirm that the cod harvesting policies of these countries have been hugely inefficient in the past. It appears that inefficiency has been increasing over the last three to four decades, even after TAC regulations replaced open access, indicating that the management policies adopted by all three countries have failed to cure overfishing.

Closing the open sea: Development of fishery management in four Icelandic fisheries

The article outlines the development of Iceland's fishery rights and the extension of its territorial waters between the 1950s and the mid‐1970s, whereby Iceland gained exclusive control and use of the marine resources of the waters within 12, later 50, and ultimately 200 nautical miles around the island. The article concentrates on four of Iceland's main fisheries: shrimp, herring, capelin and cod. These four fisheries are discussed separately and in depth, presenting the beginnings and growth of the industry and detailing the development of management practices and the corresponding legislation and regulatory measures. Iceland's initial concern was to gain control over the marine resources surrounding the island, but once this was achieved, the focus of attention shifted to managing first the economic and soon also the ecological aspects of its tremendous resource. Informed mainly by indigenous expertise, Iceland's concern was to limit overfishing, manage its fisheries sustainably both from the economic and ecological points of view, and find the best ways to distribute the revenues from the marine harvest.The article looks at each of the four fisheries to clarify how the individual transferable quota (ITQ) system came into being, how initial quota holdings were allotted, and analyses the circumstances under which the ITQ system became the management tool of choice.For each fishery, the process of regulatory evolution was quite unique. At the same time, there is a common pattern to all the fisheries, which may be summarized as follows. Firstly, serious attempts to reform management practices only got underway when the fishery had collapsed or was close to collapse. Secondly, stakeholders invariably started the process of regulation by limiting access to the fishery. Thirdly, a variety of rules were implemented to allocate rights to participate in the fishery to additional entrants once membership had been closed. Finally, prior to the invention of the ITQ system, prices were used to manage fisheries in Iceland. It may be concluded that the management of fisheries by ITQs may be a historical accident, rather than the end point of a logical evolution.

Estimating illegal and unreported catches from marine ecosystems: a basis for change

AbstractTo evaluate the impacts of fishing on marine ecosystems, the total extraction of fish must be known. Putting a figure on total extraction entails the difficult task of estimating, in addition to reported landings, discards, illegal and unmandated catches. Unreported catches cast various types of shadow, which may be tracked and estimated quantitatively. Some shadows of unreported catches are reviewed, for example, an innovative, well‐funded NGO publicizes illegal catch in the Southern Ocean. For various reasons, official figures often have the implicit but unacceptable assumption that such categories are null. We present an estimation procedure based on adjustment factors taken from observer reports, correspondents and published information that track changes in a regulatory regime, and hence reflect incentives and disincentives to misreport. Monte Carlo simulations address uncertainty using multiple sources of information to provide upper and lower estimates. Once in place, this method provides preliminary estimates that may be refined without disruption. The method is demonstrated for fisheries in Iceland and Morocco. We use a ‘by‐species’ approach for Icelandic cod and haddock, while the Moroccan catch is divided into demersal and pelagic categories. Results suggest that Icelandic cod catches may have been underestimated by between 1 and 14% at different times, and haddock by between 1 and 28%. Underestimation of Moroccan catches appears to have been as much as by 50%. These case studies show that it is possible to obtain estimates of misreporting, even when direct data are lacking. Our method encourages transparency because sources of information are presented so that uncertain values are easily identified, offering a basis for comment, collaboration and refinement in estimating illegal and unreported fishing.

Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries

From the 1950s to the mid-seventies, Iceland's efforts in international diplomacy were largely devoted to convincing other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within 12, then 50 and finally 200 nautical miles around the island. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, Icelandic politicians have devoted considerable time and effort to the debate on how to organise the utilisation of these resources and in what way the revenues from this harvest should be distributed. This paper gives a short account of the development of regulatory reforms in four types of Icelandic fisheries. None of these reformatory processes can be said to be a replica of any of the other processes. It seems apparent on the face of things that each reformatory process is unique and distinct from the others, except in its final outcome, the rule of the ITQs. However, this conclusion may be too short sighted. From the earliest history of regulatory reforms, it is evident that the ITQ system which eventually came into being was not the intended outcome. There is a common pattern for all the fisheries, however. First of all, serious attempts to reform management practices start when the fishery has collapsed or is close to collapse. Secondly, the first thing that stakeholders do is close the club that has access to the given fishery. Thirdly, a variety of rules are implemented to allocate participation rights when the club of participants has been closed. Fourthly, prior to the invention of the ITQ system, prices were used to manage fisheries in Iceland. It may be that management of fisheries by ITQs rather than through some form of taxes or fees has historical rather than logical roots.

An icelandic fisheries model

A model has been developed for the Ministry of Fisheries in Iceland which is being used as a decision support tool in fisheries management. With this model predictions can be made about catches of cod and other demersal species several years ahead. Furthermore earnings and costs in the fisheries are calculated. The starting point is the size of the fish stocks in the beginning of the planning period together with the size and classification of the fishing fleet. Changes in the fleet composition are among the control variables. Emphases are on details such as geographical distribution of the catches. The model is used by the Ministry, both in short term management regarding quota systems and for long term investment planning. Results suggest that in the long run the fishing fleet is now far too big. Parameters for the model are obtained from an intensive data base on catches of every boat for every month in the last decade, disaggregated by species and landing harbour. Parallel to this model and a new method of stock size estimation was developed. The current model was preceded by an optimization model which was not politically accepted! The paper touches on the problems of technical consultation on a sensitive political issue.

An Icelandic fisheries model

A model has been developed for the Ministry of Fisheries in Iceland which is being used as a decision support tool in fisheries management. With this model predictions can be made about catches of cod and other demersal species several years ahead. Furthermore earnings and costs in the fisheries are calculated. The starting point is the size of the fish stocks in the beginning of the planning period together with the size and classification of the fishing fleet. Changes in the fleet composition are among the control variables. Emphases are on details such as geographical distribution of the catches. The model is used by the Ministry, both in short term management regarding quota systems and for long term investment planning. Results suggest that in the long run the fishing fleet is now far too big. Parameters for the model are obtained from an intensive data base on catches of every boat for every month in the last decade, disaggregated by species and landing harbour. Parallel to this model a new method of stock size estimation was developed. The current model was preceded by an optimization model which was not politically accepted! The paper touches on the problems of technical consultation on a sensitive political issue.