Fiscal Theory Of The Price Level Research Articles

External Debt and Stabilizing Macroeconomic Policies

This paper investigates the dynamic effects of fiscal and monetary feedback policy rules in a small open economy with flexible exchange rates and risk premia on external debt. It is shown that equilibrium uniqueness and stability occur under locally Ricardian fiscal policies regardless of the degree of reaction of nominal interest rates to inflation, in contrast with closed-economy environments. Fiscal revaluation mechanisms of the type predicted by the fiscal theory of the price level are precluded by international parity conditions. As a result, locally non-Ricardian fiscal policies are destabilizing even under an accommodating monetary policy stance.

Monetary policy with interest on reserves

I analyze monetary policy with interest on reserves and a large balance sheet. I show that conventional theories do not determine inflation in this regime, so I base the analysis on the fiscal theory of the price level. I find that monetary policy can peg the nominal rate, and determine expected inflation. With sticky prices, monetary policy can also affect real interest rates and output, though higher interest rates raise output and then inflation. The conventional sign requires a coordinated fiscal–monetary policy contraction. I show how conventional new-Keynesian models also imply strong monetary–fiscal policy coordination to obtain the usual signs. I address theoretical controversies. A concluding section places our current regime in a broader historical context, and opines on how optimal fiscal and monetary policy will evolve in the new regime.

Monetary Policy with Interest on Reserves

I analyze monetary policy with interest on reserves and a large balance sheet. I show that conventional theories do not determine inflation in this regime, so I base the analysis on the fiscal theory of the price level. I find that monetary policy can peg the nominal rate, and determine expected inflation. With sticky prices, monetary policy can also affect real interest rates and output, though higher interest rates raise output and then inflation. The conventional sign requires a coordinated fiscal-monetary policy contraction. I show how conventional new-Keynesian models also imply strong monetary-fiscal policy coordination to obtain the usual signs. I address theoretical controversies. A concluding section places our current regime in a broader historical context, and opines on how optimal fiscal and monetary policy will evolve in the new regime.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions: Interdependent Policy Rule Coefficients

In this paper, we formulate and solve a New Keynesian model with monetary and fiscal policy rules whose coefficients are time-varying and interdependent. We implement time variation in the policy rules by specifying coefficients that are logistic functions of correlated latent factors and propose a solution method that allows for these characteristics. The paper uses Bayesian methods to estimate the policy rules with time-varying coefficients, endogeneity, and stochastic volatility in a limited-information framework. Results show that monetary policy switches regime more frequently than fiscal policy, and that there is a non-negligible degree of interdependence between policies. Policy experiments reveal that contractionary monetary policy lowers inflation in the short run and increases it in the long run. Also, lump-sum taxes affect output and inflation, as the literature on the fiscal theory of the price level suggests, but the effects are attenuated with respect to a pure fiscal regime.

Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interaction: Interdependent Policy Rule Coefficients

In this paper, we formulate and solve a New Keynesian model with monetary and fiscal policy rules whose coefficients are time-varying and interdependent. We implement time variation in the policy rules by specifying coefficients that are logistic functions of correlated latent factors and propose a solution method that allows for these characteristics. The paper uses Bayesian methods to estimate the policy rules with time-varying coefficients, endogeneity, and stochastic volatility in a limited-information framework. Results show that monetary policy switches regime more frequently than fiscal policy, and that there is a non-negligible degree of interdependence between policies. Policy experiments reveal that contractionary monetary policy lowers inflation in the short run and increases it in the long run. Also, lump-sum taxes affect output and inflation, as the literature on the fiscal theory of the price level suggests, but the effects are attenuated with respect to a pure fiscal regime.

Fiscal Foundations of Inflation: Imperfect Knowledge

This paper proposes a theory of the fiscal foundations of inflation based on imperfect knowledge and learning. The theory is similar in spirit to, but distinct from, unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and the fiscal theory of the price level. Because the assumption of imperfect knowledge breaks Ricardian equivalence, details of fiscal policy, such as the average scale and composition of the public debt, matter for inflation. As a result, fiscal policy constrains the efficacy of monetary policy. Heavily indebted economies with debt maturity structures observed in many countries require aggressive monetary policy to anchor inflation expectations. The model predicts that the Great Moderation period would not have been so moderate had fiscal policy been characterized by a scale and composition of public debt now witnessed in some advanced economies in the aftermath of the 2007-09 global recession.

Public Debt, Distortionary Taxation, and Monetary Policy

Since Leeper’s (1991, Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 129-147) seminal paper, an extensive literature has argued that if fiscal policy is passive, i.e., guarantees public debt stabilization irrespectively of the inflation path, monetary policy can independently be committed to inflation targeting. This can be pursued by following the Taylor principle, i.e., responding to upward perturbations in inflation with a more than one-for-one increase in the nominal interest rate. This paper analyzes an optimizing framework in which the government can only finance public expenditures by levying distortionary taxes. It is demonstrated that households’ market participation constraints and Laffer-type effects can render passive fiscal policies unfeasible. For any given target inflation rate, there exists a threshold level of public debt beyond which monetary policy independence is no longer possible. In such circumstances, the dynamics of public debt can be controlled only by means of higher inflation tax revenues: inflation dynamics in line with the fiscal theory of the price level must take place in order for macroeconomic stability to be guaranteed. Otherwise, to preserve inflation control around the steady state by following the Taylor principle, monetary policy must target a higher inflation rate.

Discretionary Policy Interactions and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: A SVAR Analysis on French Data

The theory of the price (FTPL; Woodford, 1995 and 2001) marks the revival of interest for fiscal policy, after the long blackout that followed the crisis of Keynesian economics. Among the causes of this revival, an important role was played by the dramatic drop in US public debt during the Clinton presidency. The reduced stock of bonds in the hands of households led researchers to re-investigate the relationship between consumption, the government intertemporal budget constraint, wealth effects and monetary policy. As we will argue below, the attempts to give empirical support to the FTPL - that had its theoretical precursors in the work of Leeper (1991) and Sims (1994) among others -, have been rather unsuccessful so far, so that its main merit lies in the fact that it brought back into the debate the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy and its effects on the level of activity and on prices (...).

Learning the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: Some Consequences of Debt Management Policy

This paper examines how the scale and composition of public debt can affect economies that implement a combination of “passive” monetary policy and “active” fiscal policy. This policy configuration is argued to be of both historical and contemporary interest in the cases of the U.S. and Japanese economies. It is shown that higher average levels and moderate average maturities of debt can induce macroeconomic instability under a range of policies specified as simple rules. However, interest rate pegs in combination with active fiscal policies almost always ensure macroeconomic stability. This finding suggests that in periods where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is a relevant constraint on policy design, a switch in fiscal regime is desirable.

Learning the fiscal theory of the price level: Some consequences of debt-management policy

This paper examines the consequences of the scale and composition of the public debt in policy regimes in which monetary policy is ‘passive’ and fiscal policy ‘active’. This configuration of policy is argued to be of both historical and contemporary interest, in economies such as the US and Japan. It is shown that higher average levels and moderate average maturities of debt can induce macroeconomic instability for a range of policies specified as simple rules. However, interest-rate pegs combined with active fiscal policies almost always ensure macroeconomic stability. This suggests that in periods where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is a relevant constraint on policy design, a switch in fiscal regime is desirable.

Policy rules under the monetary and the fiscal theories of the price-level

Price-level determination requires co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policy to ensure a unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE). This paper derives a number of implications for simple interest rate rules resulting from various fiscal strategies. We show that fiscal choices under either the monetary theory of the price-level (MTPL) and the fiscal theory of the price-level (FTPL) can challenge widely accepted principles of monetary policy. Specifically, we show that a fiscal rule that responds aggressively to output and inflation may force the monetary authorities to adopt significantly more aggressive output and inflation stabilization policy than suggested by the Taylor Principle. We also show how when monetary policy is severely constrained, the fiscal policy maker can act to stabilise the economy. Some policy conclusions in light of the lower zero bound for monetary policy and debt stabilization are drawn.

Exchange Rate Crises and Fiscal Solvency

This paper combines insights from generation one currency crisis models and the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) to create a dynamic FTPL model of currency crises. The initial fixed‐exchange‐rate policy entails risks due to an upper bound on government debt and stochastic surplus shocks. Agents refuse to lend into a position for which the value of debt exceeds the present value of expected future surpluses. Policy switching, usually combined with currency depreciation, restores fiscal solvency and lending. This model can explain a wide variety of crises, including those involving sovereign default. We illustrate by explaining the crisis in Argentina (2001).

Interest rate rules and global determinacy: An alternative to the Taylor principle

A well‐known determinacy condition on interest rate rules is the “Taylor principle,” which states that nominal interest rates should respond more than 100 percent to inflation. Unfortunately, notably because interest rates must be positive, the Taylor principle cannot be satisfied for all interest rates, and as a consequence global determinacy may not prevail even though there exists a locally determinate equilibrium. We propose here a simple alternative to the Taylor principle, which takes the form of a new condition on interest rate rules that ensures global determinacy. An important feature of the policy package is that it does not rely at all on any of the fiscal policies associated with the “fiscal theory of the price level,” which has so far been the main alternative for determinacy.

Facing a Break Point in Global Inflation Transmission?

The paper addresses the issue of the co-movements of national inflation dynamics with a common factor of a global dynamic. Based on the previous work of Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005) on global inflation the authors look at the more recent development in particular after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in July 2007. As a working hypothesis they try to find out if there is already sufficient empirical evidence available in the data that the massive liquidity pumped into the global financial system by central banks around the world together with the massive fiscal deficit spending of governments to cushion the recession could lead in the medium-term to an inflationary shock. Such rare events occurred in the past five decades only three times. We test especially after updating the data from 2004 until 2008/2009 depending on the data availability if there are already indications that inflationary pressures are building-up refuting expectations of many experts that the current global recession will increase the pressures on the global prices towards a global deflation. The combination of a coordinated reflationary monetary policy together with the fiscal stimulus packages already setup by governments around the globe should according to the fiscal theory of the price level tend to increase the joint-impact of these monetary expansions by the central banks and the governments towards a strong and rapid turn-around in the global price dynamics. Using an approach first established by Corsetti and Roubini (1991) we test for fiscal sustainability of the fiscal deficit positions in the OECD member countries. Further more we look at the impacts unsustainable fiscal policies have on the common factor of global inflation. The key question following from this is that after setting this process of an acceleration of global inflation into motion it could be hard to get the Gini back into the bottle. The experience of stagflation in the late 1970s and early 1980 are a warning sign that reflationary policies could lead to a significant overshooting in the reflationary macroeconomic impulse created around the globe.

Deficit sustainability and inflation in EMU: An analysis from the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

Price determination theory typically focuses on the role of monetary policy, while the role of fiscal policy is usually neglected. From a different point of view, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level takes into account monetary and fiscal policy interactions and assumes that fiscal policy may determine the price level, even if monetary authorities pursue an inflation targeting strategy. In this paper we try to test empirically whether the time path of the government budget in EMU countries would have affected price level determination. Our results point to the sustainability of fiscal policy in all the EMU countries but Finland, although no firm conclusions can be drawn about the prevalence of either monetary or fiscal dominance.

Public Debt, Money Supply, and Inflation: A Cross-Country Study

This paper provides comprehensive empirical evidence that supports the predictions of Sargent and Wallace's “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” that an increase in public debt is typically inflationary in countries with large public debt. Drawing on an extensive panel data set, we find that the relationship holds strongly in indebted developing countries, weakly in other developing countries, and generally does not hold in developed economies. These results are robust to the inclusion of other variables, corrections for endogeneity biases, relaxation of common-slope restrictions, and are invariant over subsample periods. We estimate a vector autoregression to trace out the transmission channel and find the impulse responses consistent with the predictions of a forward-looking model of inflation. Wealth effects of public debt could also affect inflation, as posited by the fiscal theory of the price level, but we do not find supportive evidence. The results suggest that the risk of a debt-inflation trap is significant in highly indebted countries and pure money-based stabilization is unlikely to be effective over the medium term. Our findings stress the importance of institutional and structural factors in the link between fiscal policy and inflation.

Implementability of the Non-Ricardian Optimal Fiscal Policy

Dealing with out-of-equilibrium behaviors of economic agents is necessary to fill in the gaps in the controversy surrounding the admissibility of the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL). Incorporating Nash equilibrium into the theory serves this purpose. It turns out that under certain conditions, strategic interaction between a non-Ricardian benevolent government and households with tit-for-tat moves leads to an equilibrium consistent with the FTPL, where the non-Ricardian optimal fiscal policy is not globally viable. Implementability of the non-Ricardian policy depends on the stochastic properties of government expenditure, especially its variance.

THE FISCAL THEORY OF THE PRICE LEVEL PUZZLE: A NON-RICARDIAN VIEW

The fiscal theory of the price level says that the price level can be made determinate if the government uses fiscal policies such that government liabilities explode unless the price in the first period is at the “right” level. The policy implications are disturbing, as they call for rather adventurous fiscal policies. We show that these disturbing policy implications are specific to the “Ricardian” models that have been used to develop the theory. By moving to non-Ricardian models, we see that price determinacy is consistent with reasonable fiscal policies.

Fiscal and Monetary Anchors for Price Stability: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

The paper presents a model of fiscal dominance with borrowing constraints, and provides evidence for a large number of sub-Saharan African countries on the relative importance of fiscal and monetary determinants of inflation. Based on the dynamic response of inflation to different shocks, including nominal public debt, results show that a number of SSA countries were characterized throughout the period 1980-2005 either by chronic fiscally dominant regimes, with weak or no response of primary surpluses to public debt; or by a consistent adoption of a monetary dominant regime. However, a number of countries were also characterized by lack of a clear monetary and fiscal policy regime. The study also finds that changes in nominal public debt affect price variability via aggregate demand effects, suggesting that fiscal outcomes could be a direct source of inflation variability, as predicted by the fiscal theory of the price level.

Infinite-maturity public debt and the fiscal theory of the price level

The fiscal theory of the price level asserts that the price level is determined by the ratio of outstanding public nominal debt into the present value of real primary budget surpluses of the government. We here argue that price determinacy, in general, fails when at least part of the public debt takes the form of securities of infinite maturity. Indeed, price determinacy requires non-Ricardian fiscal plans and a predetermined nominal debt of the government. As no equilibrium restriction prevents the occurrence of a speculative bubble on infinite-maturity public debt, the initial nominal debt of the government is indeterminate and so is the price level under canonical specifications of non-Ricardian fiscal plans.