First Oil Crisis Research Articles

The Making of Arab Stereotypes: Racist Portrayals in Political Cartoons during the 1970s Oil Crisis

The 1973 oil crisis, a period marked by tensions following the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent Arab oil embargo, was a pivotal, global event with far-reaching economic and political consequences. Political cartoons played a significant role in influencing public opinion and shaping Western perspectives about Arabs and the Muslim world during this time. Many of these depictions resorted to negative stereotyping and vilifying Arabs. This research examines these portrayals by analyzing sixty-eight political cartoons from twenty-nine Western newspapers and magazines. These depictions, conceptualized here, characterized Arabs as violent, arrogant, rich, and indifferent to humanity, contributing to the propagation of long-standing stereotypes. The cartoons also depicted oil as a weapon wielded by Arabs, reinforcing biased perspectives that contrast starkly with the complex reality of Arab societies. This study highlights the influential role of media in shaping public perspectives and underscoring the need for balanced, nuanced portrayals in media representations.

How small states break oil sanctions: Israel’s oil import strategy in the 1970s

ABSTRACT This article argues that small oil-importing states are particularly adept at circumventing oil sanctions and leveraging them to further expand their own markets. It points to the unique advantages and necessary preconditions that make small states successful in their search for ‘sanctions busters’ in the global oil market, especially when approaching countries that recently became oil exporters. Using declassified Israeli, British and US archival material, this article sheds light on how Israel capitalized on the 1973 Arab oil embargo to gain access to Ecuador’s market through its oil sector, but failed to repeat this success in Norway and the United Kingdom.

Commerce and Cultural Diplomacy: The British Council in Iran during the 1970s

This article examines UK cultural diplomacy in Iran during the 1970s. As the primary UK-based agency operating in this field, it pays particular attention to the British Council’s activities. The paper examines how escalating oil prices in the 1973–4 Arab Oil Embargo’s wake compelled the agency to move away from English language teaching provision and more towards cultural policies. Anthony Parsons, the UK Ambassador to Iran, helped frame these initiatives. Together, they organised the 1977 Festival of Britain in Tehran, which showcased high-brow British culture. The paper makes three key points. First, it illustrates the extent economic imperatives shape UK cultural diplomacy. Second, it reveals the UK Embassy and British Council’s reticence to interact with Iranians, with framing events like the Festival of Britain as purely commercial opportunities. Finally, the paper demonstrates how popular indifference, combined with the Iranian Revolution’s outbreak, undermined the UK’s cultural diplomacy campaign.

Between Panic and Feelings of Empowerment: Emotional Reactions to the First Oil Crisis and the Debate About a New International Economic Order

Abstract The 1973/74 oil crisis, comprising an Arab oil embargo targeting Western industrialized states and the quadrupling of global oil prices by OPEC, was followed by a major international debate on the establishment of a New International Economic Order in the years to come. This debate not only made it to the top of the international agenda given certain emotional reactions to and perceptions of the first oil crisis in different groups of countries: The successful oil revolution, as it was called by Arab elites, nurtured a sense of empowerment among OPEC representatives while it triggered fears among Western governments, making them more willing to listen to OPEC demands. At the same time, both oil and non-oil developing countries professed a strong feeling of solidarity allowing them to formulate a shared program of economic decolonization. It was exactly these emotional reactions to the oil crisis that enabled the conflict over the New International Economic Order to become such a prominent feature of the decade. Thus, the oil revolution was a game changer without which the North-South debate would have remained on the sidelines.

The Neglected Integration Crisis: France, Germany and Lacking European Co‐operation During the 1973/1974 Oil Shock

AbstractWhen does European co‐operation and (further) integration not happen in the face of a major integration crisis? When do France and Germany not emerge as regional stabilizers, forging and uploading bilateral compromises to the European level? By developing a combined theoretical framework based on liberal intergovernmentalism and leadership approaches, this article analyses the European Economic Community's (EEC) reaction to the 1973/1974 oil crisis. Despite some favourable conditions, differences in domestic energy markets and relations with Arab oil‐producing countries complicated member state co‐operation. In turn, divergent economic philosophies and foreign policy priorities prevented France and Germany from filling the European leadership vacuum. As a consequence, the EEC did not find a unified stance on the Arab oil embargo, subordinated itself to US‐American dominance and undermined its common market via export restrictions for oil. The findings suggest that without minimum convergent member state preferences or compensating regional leadership, European integration and today's European Union risk stalling or even disintegrating.

Exploring the Energy Saving Potential in Private, Public and Non-Motorized Transport for Ten Swedish Cities

Transport energy conservation research in urban transport systems dates back principally to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) “Arab Oil Embargo” (1973–1974) and the Iranian revolution (1979), when global oil supplies became threatened and costs rose steeply. Two subsequent Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003) highlighted the dangerous geo-political dimensions of Middle-Eastern oil. In latter times, the urgency to reduce global CO2 output to avoid catastrophic climate change has achieved great prominence. How to reduce passenger transport energy use therefore remains an important goal, which this paper pursues in ten Swedish cities, based on five scenarios: (1) increasing the relatively low public transport (PT) seat occupancy in each Swedish city to average European levels (buses 35%, light rail 48%, metro 60% and suburban rail 35%); (2) doubling existing PT seat occupancy in each Swedish city; (3) increasing existing car occupancy in each Swedish city by 10%; (4) decreasing existing energy use per car vehicle kilometer by 15%; (5) increasing existing modal split for daily trips by non-motorized modes to 50% in each city. A sixth “best-case scenario” is also explored by simultaneously combining scenarios 2 to 5. The data used in the paper come from systematic empirical research on each of the ten Swedish cities. When applied individually, scenario 2 is the most successful for reducing passenger transport energy use, scenarios 1 and 4 are next in magnitude and produce approximately equal energy savings, followed by scenario 5, with scenario 3 being the least successful. The best-case, combined scenario could save 1183 million liters of gasoline equivalent in the ten cities, representing almost a 60% saving over their existing 2015 total private passenger transport energy use and equivalent to the combined 2015 total annual private transport energy use of Stockholm, Malmö and Jönköping. Such findings also have important positive implications for the de-carbonization of cities. The policy implications of these findings and the strategies for increasing public transport, walking and cycling, boosting car occupancy and decreasing vehicular fuel consumption in Swedish cities are discussed.

Editor's Note

December 01 2020 Editor's Note Author and Article Information Online Issn: 1531-3298 Print Issn: 1520-3972 © 2020 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2020President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Journal of Cold War Studies (2020) 22 (4): 1–3. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_e_00963 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Editor's Note. Journal of Cold War Studies 2020; 22 (4): 1–3. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_e_00963 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsJournal of Cold War Studies Search Advanced Search This issue begins with an article by Michael De Groot discussing the impact of the 1973–1974 Arab oil embargo and the concomitant rise in global energy prices on the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Although the Soviet Union as an energy exporter stood to gain economically from the surge of prices, the crisis had broad negative consequences in CMEA, underscoring the flaws and inefficiencies of Soviet-style economies. Most of the East European countries in the 1970s had borrowed extensively from Western banks and governments, causing a large buildup in hard-currency debt. Because increases in Soviet energy production did not keep pace with the surge of debt-fueled demand from other CMEA countries, the Soviet Union decided to raise prices for CMEA importers, deepening the economic pressures they were facing in the early 1980s as payments on their foreign debts came due. The sharp increases in energy costs in the... You do not currently have access to this content.

Executive Perspectives

I am deep into the fifth decade of my relationship with SEG. I joined SEG as an applied-geophysics student in the early 1970s at the time of the Arab oil embargo. I served as SEG president in 1999–2000, as SEG Foundation chair in 2010, and I currently serve in the role of SEG associate executive director of strategic relations.

Signed, Sealed but Never Delivered: Why Israel did not Receive Nixon's Promised Nuclear Power Plants

ABSTRACTIn the early 1970s, Israel was on the cusp of launching an ambitious nuclear power programme. It had technical nuclear experience and a pressing need to limit its dependency on imported oil and coal, and interest in nuclear powered water desalination. This nuclear vision enjoyed the support of the Nixon administration, which proposed in June 1974 to export reactors to both Israel and Egypt. But by the end of the decade, under the Carter administration, the plan was all but gone. What was the original US and Israeli rationale behind the reactor deal? How did this initiative relate to other developments such as the Indian nuclear explosion, the Arab oil embargo and the peace talks with Egypt? How important was the Carter administration's policy shift in determining the outcome of the initiative? This paper will address these questions by analysing newly declassified documents from several US and Israeli archives.

Guest Editorial: Innovation Will Drive Shale Survival

Guest editorial That which does not kill us, makes us stronger.—Friedrich Nietzsche, 1889 The petroleum industry has seen up and down cycles. In the past, they have been driven by politics, such as in the case of the Arab oil embargo, or supply and demand imbalances, driven primarily by unrest and recessions. The creation of OPEC dampened the latter. But this time it is different. Shale, a new, abundant source of oil and gas has more than halved oil prices. It has kept prices low for nearly 3 years, and threatens to do so for many more. This threat will be realized if the industry can be profitable at sustained prices below $40/bbl. History informs us that this is likely. The last long-lived drop in activity roughly spanned the decade from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. The rig count was more than halved from 1984 levels for well over a decade. This trailed the oil price drop, which nearly halved from 1980 to 1985, and stayed that low for over a decade. For the industry to survive, oil companies needed lower production costs and the service companies still needed to make a profit at low activity levels. This is precisely the situation today in shale oil and gas. On that occasion, the industry responded with innovation in technology and, to a lesser degree, in business models. This too will happen today. Horizontal Wells and More Horizontal wells, possibly the single greatest productivity improvement innovation in the business, came into their own during that earlier downturn. They had been known for decades, but this period produced additional key enablers for economic construction. Desktop 3-D seismic interpretation allowed for placement in the most productive portions of reservoirs. Polycrystalline diamond composite (PDC) bits improved drilling rates. Measurement while drilling (MWD) gave crucial position information on the fly. Later, MWD systems allowed formation evaluation, which was prohibitive with conventional logging methods in hole angles greater than 60 degrees. At this point, drillers knew where to be, and where they were, in 3-D and geologic space.

Japan’s Middle East Policy, 1972–1974: Resources Diplomacy, Pro-American Policy, and New Left

ABSTRACTCommentators generally accept that the Yom Kippur War and subsequent oil crisis crystallised Japan’s overtly pro-Arab stance. This analysis challenges that view—even after the oil embargo, Japan’s Middle Eastern policy was both discretely and, at times, blatantly pro-American. Admittedly, the Japanese government had a seemingly ambiguous attitude towards the Arab–Israeli conflict and on-going conflict between oil-producing countries and oil companies; however, responsible for formulating the Arab–Israeli policy, the Foreign Ministry preferred to follow American leadership in the region for reasons of national security and Cold War imperatives. The Foreign Ministry’s response to the 1972 Lod Airport Massacre, a radicalised Japanese New Left terrorist attack, revealed a determination to gain international credibility by more actively supporting the West. Lod buttressed the influence of the pro-American contingent in the government; and the 1973 Arab oil embargo did not undermine their position. Although the Cabinet eventually issued a public statement supporting the Arab cause to satisfy the Japanese public, the pro-American contingent succeeded surreptitiously in bringing the Cabinet together to uphold the American-led petroleum order as well as United States leadership in Cold War politics.

The French connection machine

It was the late 1970s. Former French presidents Charles de Gaulle and George Pompidou had recently died. The Arab oil embargo caused energy prices to quadruple for a time. Marseille remained gripped by drug lords. And France had to face the fact that its telephone network was one of the worst in the industrialized world. Fewer than 7 million telephone lines served 47 million French citizens, and the country’s elite felt that the domination of U.S. firms in telephone equipment, computers, databases, and information networks threatened their national sovereignty. Or at least it damaged their cultural pride.

(Keynote) Bioinspired Photoelectrode Assemblies for Solar Water or CO2 Splitting: At the Crossroads?

The solar assisted splitting of water received great impetus as a legitimate research discipline as a result of the world energy crisis and the Arab oil embargo, and also from the initial reports of Fujishima, Honda, and their co-workers on the use of irradiated titanium dioxide. In the first part of the talk, the water splitting reaction and other reactions of technological interest will be discussed from the point of view of thermodynamics and kinetics. Approaches based on the use of electrodes and photoelectrodes as well as those based on the use of colloidal suspensions will be compared and contrasted. Ideas on how we can learn from the intricate self-assembled architectures that Nature has evolved over millions of years, will be discussed with specific examples The talk will then turn toward a discussion of the progress made with the generation of hydrogen as a renewable fuel and the notion of storing sunlight via chemical bonds (fuels). This will include work in the author’s laboratory on the use of carbon and oxide semiconductor nanocomposites for driving catalytic processes of interest both in the dark and under irradiation of the oxide semiconductor component. Incorporation of bioinspired components such as flavins in these assemblies will be described. The reactions of interest here include dioxygen reduction and the reduction of carbon dioxide to fuels such as methanol. The role of the nanocomposite components and their complementary functionality within the material architecture will be discussed within the context of systems that Nature has evolved. Other complex oxides and their preparation from solution combustion synthesis will also be elaborated. Finally the talk will turn toward the very recent work in the author’s laboratory on the solar photoelectrosynthesis of methanol from CO2. This process was driven on hybrid CuO/Cu2O semiconductor nanorod arrays for the first time at potentials ~800 mV below the thermodynamic threshold value and at Faradaic efficiencies of ~95%. Subsequent studies have developed flow reactors as well as new electrode materials. The presently unknown aspects of this process as well as its "dark" process counterpart, especially details on how atomic hydrogen adds to the CO2 molecule along with scission of the carbon-oxygen double bond and even formation of carbon-carbon double bonds (in the formation of ethylene), will be discussed in the light of the new role that renewable hydrogen can play in the future.

Re-assessing the economic and analytical tools that measure and optimize households’ energy-efficiency improvements

Since the Arab oil embargo of 1973, technologies associated with residential energy efficiency have developed from applications unfamiliar to building and remodeling contractors to recognizable techniques required by building codes. Codes specify minimum levels of energy efficiency, and installing energy-efficiency measures that go beyond code specifications have economic and environmental ramifications. Commonly used decision-making tools regarding energy-efficiency improvements for consumers are described, along with some of the pitfalls associated with these analytical methods. The purpose of this paper is to provide an argument for expanding the evaluation techniques related to energy-efficiency improvement upgrades within the home. An alternative method of evaluating energy-efficiency upgrades is proposed, which incorporates measures beyond simply monthly cost savings such as growth in house price attributed to energy-efficient upgrades.

Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock, 1973–1974

<i>Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock, 1973–1974</i>

Comments: The Embargo at 40

Editor's column Forty years ago, the global oil market faced shortages, price shocks, and unanswered questions about security of supply. The global oil landscape is drastically different today, and many of the changes grew out of the events that occurred 4 decades ago. The most dramatic recent change is the growth in US production, revitalized by shale and tight oil output. The United States has drastically reduced its reliance on imported oil and is predicted to soon be the largest producer in the world, surpassing Saudi Arabia and Russia. US oil production has grown more than 50% in the past 5 years, and petroleum imports have fallen from a high of 60% in 2005 to 35% today, according to IHS CERA. That 35% figure is the same as in 1973, when the so-called Arab oil embargo jolted the US and other developed countries into realizing the significance of their dependence on oil supplies from the Middle East and the political and economic ramifications of that reliance. In addition to oil, US natural gas production has risen by a third since 2005, and shale gas now accounts for more than 40% of total gas output. Long thought a reliable future customer of natural gas, the US is now retrofitting import terminals into gas export facilities. The 1973 oil embargo—along with consumer governments’ reactive policies such as price controls—helped create gasoline shortages and political panic. It also spawned the encouragement of technological innovation and the opening of new frontiers for oil exploration and production. Developments in the North Sea, Alaska, deepwater US Gulf of Mexico and west Africa, and Canadian oil sands, as well as the growth of other non-OPEC production followed. Since 1973, OPEC production has remained relatively flat at 30 million BOPD, while non-OPEC production has doubled from 27 million BOPD. The crisis also led to increased consumption efficiency and research into alternative forms of energy. After the oil crisis, the leading consuming countries created the International Energy Agency to help guide the need to increase energy security and developed initiatives, such as the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to guard against shortages and potential price spikes. While OPEC members and national oil companies (NOCs) have lost market share since that time, they still own the vast majority of the world’s reserves and are much less beholden to private international oil companies (IOCs). NOCs have become much more technically and financially savvy, calling the shots inside their countries and competing head to head outside their countries. NOCs no longer have to rely on large operators to develop their resources. They have the ability to manage projects and apply the latest technology, or can seek help from the large service companies, which are increasingly offering one-stop shop project expertise.

A reassessment of the 1967 Arab oil embargo

The 1967 war had more influence on the Arab–Israeli conflict than any other factor, and yet the Arab states did not make use of their most efficient weapon. Most of the research on the Six Day War which has touched on the oil embargo blames the embargo's failure on the lack of Arab unity rather than on the inability to set oil policies. Indeed, many researchers believe that the disagreements within the Arab world before the war prevented the oil-producing states from cooperating with their counterparts, such Egypt and Syria, that took part in the war against Israel, and that the embargo therefore did not stand a chance of succeeding. This article seeks to refute the received wisdom that the 1967 oil embargo was a failure because of the lack of Arab unity. By contrast, the success of the 1973 oil embargo was not, as is widely argued, due to Arab unity but to the nature of the oil market at the time.

The Effects Of The U.S. Price Control Policies On OPEC: Lessons From The Past

In 1973-1974, the U.S. faced the so-called Energy Crisis due to the Arab oil embargo and a quadrupling of world crude oil prices by OPEC. This led the U.S. to use a Price Control policy in the domestic energy market. The effects of such policy are explored and well documented. However, the responses of OPEC producers to such a policy need further attention. This paper examines the effects of these price controls on OPECs extraction path and the relation between the harm function and the change in OPEC production. The results show some evidence that OPEC did respond differently to price controls applied by the U.S. For some periods it cut production, while in other periods production levels increased. The results also show some evidence regarding Wirl (2008) that OPEC includes political support as part of its objective function when it comes to oil extraction.

Energy Policy: Past or Prologue?

The United States was remarkably complacent about energy policy until the Arab oil embargo of 1973. Since then, we have relied on unnecessarily costly regulations and poorly designed subsidies to mandate or encourage particular forms of energy production and use. Our presidents have quested after an elusive technological “silver bullet.” Congress has elevated parochial interests and short-term political advantages over national needs. Despite the thousands of pages of energy legislation enacted over the past four decades, Congress has never demanded that Americans pay a price that reflects the full costs of the energy they consume. Given our nation's economic fragility, our difficult fiscal situation, and the daunting challenges of achieving energy security and limiting climate change, we can no longer afford second- and third-best policies. This essay discusses the failures of the past and how we might avoid repeating them.

The Power of Oil: Edward Heath, the ‘Year of Europe’ and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’

This article focuses on Anglo-American relations during, what US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger termed, the ‘Year of Europe’. In particular, Anglo-American interaction leading up to, and during, the Washington Energy Conference (11–13 February 1974) is examined. By doing this, subtle nuances in the foreign policy of Edward Heath, British Prime Minister, 1970–1974, can be better appreciated. Traditionally viewed by commentators as varying between lukewarm and antagonistic towards the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, this article highlights that Heath was more than capable with working closely with Washington when he believed British interests were best promoted by doing so. Heath showed throughout the Arab oil embargo of 1973–1974 an ability to work in close cooperation with Washington. Indeed, Heath demonstrated that he was prepared to sacrifice his wider European ambitions in order to secure this. This was largely driven by Heath's overriding concern that US support was imperative to prevent the outbreak of ‘beggar thy neighbour’ oil policies that he concluded would result if the European Economic Community approach, predominantly driven by French thinking, was endorsed.