Abstract

ABSTRACTCommentators generally accept that the Yom Kippur War and subsequent oil crisis crystallised Japan’s overtly pro-Arab stance. This analysis challenges that view—even after the oil embargo, Japan’s Middle Eastern policy was both discretely and, at times, blatantly pro-American. Admittedly, the Japanese government had a seemingly ambiguous attitude towards the Arab–Israeli conflict and on-going conflict between oil-producing countries and oil companies; however, responsible for formulating the Arab–Israeli policy, the Foreign Ministry preferred to follow American leadership in the region for reasons of national security and Cold War imperatives. The Foreign Ministry’s response to the 1972 Lod Airport Massacre, a radicalised Japanese New Left terrorist attack, revealed a determination to gain international credibility by more actively supporting the West. Lod buttressed the influence of the pro-American contingent in the government; and the 1973 Arab oil embargo did not undermine their position. Although the Cabinet eventually issued a public statement supporting the Arab cause to satisfy the Japanese public, the pro-American contingent succeeded surreptitiously in bringing the Cabinet together to uphold the American-led petroleum order as well as United States leadership in Cold War politics.

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