Abstract

ABSTRACT On 13 and 14 February 1941, a German and Italian maritime strategy conference, led by Großadmiral Erich Raeder, C-in-C of the Kriegsmarine (German Navy), and Admiral Arturo Riccardi, his equivalent in the Regia Marina (Italian Navy), occurred in Merano in order to coordinate the ongoing conduct of naval warfare. The Germans wanted more say in the conduct of the Mediterranean war. The Italians came with a shopping list, which included anti-aircraft guns, oil, raw materials, and technology. Some historians claim that the Italians were reluctant to hold a conference as they feared the Germans would intrude into their theatre of operations, but that after the Battle of Taranto they could no longer resist German pressure. However, an analysis of German and Italian documents shows otherwise. It also reveals that the true significance of Merano lies in the fact that the two navies finally began to draw together with a common understanding of who would do what in coming years, both together and individually. With the two admirals acting as senior diplomats, conveying their countries’ friendship and sense of common purpose and actively trying to find mutually agreeable solutions to difficulties, the conference went very well. Initiated, planned and run by naval liaison staff from both sides embedded within the other side’s command staff, and with a strong contribution from the embassies in both Berlin and Rome – with the military attachés functioning rather effectively in a diplomatic capacity – the Merano Conference is an excellent case study of military-diplomatic cooperation during wartime.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call