Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin. xix + 524 pp. New York: Basic Books, 2010. ISBN- 13 978-0465002399. $29.95. The overarching concept of this book is intriguing. middle of Europe in middle of twentieth century, writes Snyder, the Nazi and Soviet regimes murdered some fourteen million people. The place where all of victims died, bloodlands, extends from central Poland to western Russia, through Ukraine, Belarus, and Baltic States (vii-viii). These people were not victims of war but were killed through a policy. They were not soldiers but women, children, and aged (viii). Snyder thus analytically interlocks two most murderous regimes of first half of 20th century by identifying an East European space. In so doing--25 years after Historikerstreit, in which German historians fought bitterly over singularity of Shoah he repudiates uniqueness of German murder of Jews and instead situates Holocaust in a spatially circumscribed history of violence. Yet pitfalls of this brilliant concept are apparent from outset: if spatially defined domain fails to hold empirically, entire concept falters. Ever since arrival of spatial turn in history, it has seemed promising to write a history of 20th-century state violence through prism of East European where most of Stalinist and Nazi mass murders actually took place. Both Nazi and Stalinist hit squads acted in this space; both regimes occupied this part of Europe; and both regimes had grand plans of how they were going to integrate--and exploit--these regions in their empires. Yet it should be stated right away that Snyder does not present any new empirical research in this book but rather takes a fresh look at existing scholarship from perspective of his spatial conception, bloodlands. His main concern is not to identify causes of mass murder or to provide explanations for Holocaust but rather to compose a synoptic picture of practices of mass murder or, put differently, a panorama of violence in Eastern Europe. Snyder starts with a short sketch of Hitler's and Stalin's respective rise to power among ruins of Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. Both Hitler and Stalin drew radical conclusions from collapse of Old Europe, but with very different aims in mind. If Stalin saw only chance for Soviet Union's survival and for consolidation of power of Bolsheviks in rapid industrialization, even if against will of its own population, Hitler devised a racist vision of a Grosseuropa under German domination, which would provide East European living space (Lebensraum) for German master race. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Stalin had long eliminated all rivals and was undefeated leader of Soviet Union. And while Nazi regime killed about 10,000 people in concentration camps and prisons before outbreak of World War II in 1939, Stalinist leadership had already allowed millions to die from hunger and had shot about one million people. Here we already encounter one of major problems of this book. By focusing on Stalin's crimes, millions of people who died during Russian Civil War, and especially famine of 1921-22, get no attention at all. True, Snyder mentions these victims in passing (11), but he does not go into any depth, probably because they fit into neither his temporal nor his spatial framework. These people died in bloodlands and in many other parts of former tsarist empire. For violent policies of Bolsheviks in general and Stalinist leadership in particular, experience of Civil War was formative, and Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 also in many ways constituted a reliving of famine that had preceded it by ten years. A history of Soviet violence has to be able to include Civil War and 1921-22 famine; if it cannot, its analytical framework is in peril. …
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