Ownership Structure Of Firms Research Articles

Family firms, banks and firm value: Evidence from Malaysia

PurposeThis paper examines the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value and how this relationship is moderated by ownership concentration at low and very high level on a sample of Malaysian family and non-family firms.Design/methodology/approachFor hypotheses testing, panel data analysis using the fixed effects model (FEM) is used because the FEM can address any endogeneity problems effectively (Chi, 2005). The panel data regression is conducted on both family firms and non-family firms.FindingsWe find that there is a significant negative relationship between the number of domestic banks engaged by family firms, operating in industries where these firms do not have absolute monopoly, and firm value. However, there is no evidence that this significant negative firm value effect is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. Furthermore, the significant positive moderating effect of ownership concentration on this relationship within family firms in such industries is evident only at low level of ownership concentration. Interestingly, at very high level of ownership concentration, this significant positive moderating effect becomes negative. There is no evidence that these significant moderating effects are stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms.Research limitations/implicationsThis research has focused only on family and non-family firms.Practical implicationsAn implication of this research is that there is a need for the capital market regulators to introduce appropriate policies to deter family firms from having a close relationship with domestic banks as well as monitor the number of domestic banks engaged by such firms. There may be policy implications for consideration by the Central Bank of Malaysia as well.Originality/valueThis research provides some insights to both academia and industry regarding the consequences of domestic banking relationship and different levels of concentrated ownership in family firms in an emerging market. These insights can help improve the corporate governance as well as ownership structure of Malaysian public-listed family firms which dominate the capital market. Our findings refute the argument by Peng and Jiang (2010) by demonstrating that corporate reputational effects may be a substitute for institutional deficiencies.

Technological innovations and firms’ productivity in new patent regime: Evidences from Indian pharmaceutical industry

Innovative firms enjoy more market benefits by conducting both technological (product and process) and nontechnological (organizational and marketing) innovations. This study aims to examine the relationship between technological innovations and firms’ productivity in Indian pharmaceutical industry in new patent regime. In particular, we analyze the direct impact of product and process innovation on the productivity of 168 Indian pharmaceutical firms over 2000–2013. Findings of this study reveal that technological innovations are positive source of firms’ productivity. However, this relationship varies with types of technological innovations and also ownership structure of firms. Moreover, this study also finds that the impact of technological innovation is stronger for multinational enterprises.

Agglomeration, Absorptive Capacity and Knowledge Governance

This paper considers the role of firm ownership structure, absorptive capac-ity and agglomeration on firm innovation in the Chinese context. A popular co-occurrence measure is used to measure local spillovers expected to take place between similar but different industries co-located together. Relying on a large panel of Chinese firms, this paper offers three main results: (i) privately-owned enterprises (POEs) are more efficient innovators than their state-owned enter-prise (SOE) counterparts; (ii) local spillovers from related industries enhance firm innovation, especially for firms with higher pre-existing learning abilities; and (iii) despite possessing relatively high levels of absorptive capacity, POEs maintain higher innovation performance compared to their SOE counterparts. These findings help confirm the absorptive capacity thesis, but also suggest that possessing relatively higher levels of absorptive capacity, in and of itself, is not always a sufficient pre-condition for firms to overcome all of the cognitive and technological barriers to leveraging external sources of knowledge. In line with theories of knowledge governance, one explanation for this finding is that private (government) operators develop higher (lower) quality governance procedures that ultimately enhance (hamper) their ability to successfully integrate external sources of knowledge even after developing a high level of absorptive capabilities.

Leader versus Lagger: How the Timing of Financial Reporting Affects Audit Quality and Investment Efficiency

This paper examines how the relative timing affects the quality of financial reports in a staggered reporting system. We show that the audit quality of the leader firm exceeds that of the lagger. Investment efficiency also differs systematically across firms depending on the relative reporting timing as well as the ownership structure of audit firms. Audit regulations mitigate misalignment of interests between auditors and investors, but also limit the effect of information spillover. We characterize optimal auditing standards and show, as regulatory tools, how and why imposing minimum audit quality requirements and adjusting auditors' legal liability complement and/or substitute. Overall, a staggered reporting system is shown to dominate a simultaneous reporting system in enhancing audit quality and investment efficiency through regulation.

Ownership Structure of Franchise Chains: Trade-Off Between Adaptation and Control

This study provides a new explanation of the ownership structure of franchise firms by highlighting a trade-off between adaptation and control under increasing uncertainty. Franchise chains are formed to reduce transaction costs by combining franchisee outlets as an adaptation mechanism and company-owned outlets as a control mechanism. We argue that under low to moderate uncertainty, franchisors prioritize local responsiveness to profit opportunities by operating a lower proportion of company-owned outlets (PCO); by contrast, under high environmental uncertainty, franchisors prefer more central control through a higher PCO to coordinate interdependent local market outlets better. Hence, the franchisor must find an optimal PCO by balancing the PCO decreasing effect of higher local adaptation with the PCO increasing effect of higher central coordination under increasing uncertainty. Therefore, we posit a U-shaped relationship between the PCO and environmental uncertainty. Data from German and Swiss franchise systems provide support for the study’s hypotheses.

The determinants of cash flow sensitivity of cash: The family ownership effect

This paper investigates firms’ cash flow sensitivity of cash (CFSC) in a European setting. We examine the differing effects of financial constraints and income and substitution effects on CFSC in the context of the family ownership structure. When examining the shareholders’ behavior within the ownership structure of family firms, we find a positive CFSC level for our full sample. Our results show a significant connection between the family ownership structure and CFSC’s determinant factors: the higher (lower) sensitivity for the firms with more (less) financial constraints suggests that family firms are financially less constrained than non-family firms. Additionally, contrary to prior literature, we find income and substitution effects have a nonnegative effect on CFCS. We explain this finding from a productivity shocks perspective related to the financial crisis, which occurs during our analysis period.

Historical Origins of Firm Ownership Structure: The Persistent Effects of the African Slave Trade

This paper uses evidence from the historical African slave trade to extend prior theory linking modern firm ownership structure to institutions and social capital. We argue that institutions and so...

Ownership structure and profitability of listed firms in an emerging market

Motivated by the agency theory and the need to examine the effect of separation of ownership and management, this study examines the determinants of profitability in different firm ownership structures and how different ownership structures impact the profitability of listed firms between 2003 and 2013, using pooled annual data of 23 Ghanaian listed firms. Employing a number of static models (OLS, Random Effects and 3 Stage Least Squares), we find evidence that while profit determinants vary for listed firms given their ownership structures, ownership structures also affected profitability differently. Specifically, for listed firms, profitability was determined by capital intensity, liquidity, financial risk, age and GDP; for non-family owned listed firms, profitability was determined by capital intensity, liquidity, market share and age; for foreign-owned firms, profitability was determined by capital intensity, liquidity, age and GDP; and for non-foreign ownership, profitability was determined by capital intensity, liquidity, financial risk, growth, age and GDP. When we examine the impact of ownership structure on profitability and find that family-owned listed firms make 30% less profits compared to nonfamily owned ones, whilst foreign-owned firms make 13% more profits than non-foreign owned ones. These findings confirm the agency theory which posits that separation of ownership and management, though may lead to agency problems, can positively affect profits. The study recommends that family-owned listed firms should consider diluting ownership in order to grow more profits.

Corporate governance factors as predictors of earnings management

Unlike developed markets, emerging markets like India have greater imperfections, have information asymmetry, and are particularly different in terms of accounting transparency, corruption, and corporate governance (CG). Also, concentrated ownership structure of Indian firms is more conducive for opportunistic earnings management (EM). There has been high incidence of financial frauds and EM in India particularly through related party transactions. The CG regulations were revised and enhanced in the year 2014 but increasing cases of financial frauds and CG violations indicate insufficiency of CG laws in the country. Linking CG to financial information in a context where investor protection laws are still evolving is important. The contributions of the present study are: first, it assesses earnings quality (EQ) as a key outcome of EM to confirm, in the Indian context, one of the two opposing perspectives of EM, namely opportunistic and informational. Second, it creates empirical evidence on those firm attributes and CG mechanisms which can predict EQ for investors in India. Third, it provides inputs on the effectiveness of the revised regulations in controlling EM, and finally, it puts forward theoretical rationale for EM and CG practices in India.

Political Influence and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Party-Building Reform in China

We focus on the recent Dangjian (“party-building”) reform, a major measure taken by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to strengthen its leadership position in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We hypothesize that, given the unique governance and ownership structure of Chinese firms, there is a trade-off between the political costs and benefits of the mitigated agency problems. We report negative investor reactions to privately-owned enterprises (POEs) after the Dangjian reform announcements, consistent with the hypothesis that strengthening party control over business is harmful to business efficacy and firm value. We also find evidence that the increased risks of political influence due to the reform undermine the value of SOEs that are considered more independent of political power (i.e., those under corporate pyramids or cross-listed on a foreign market). In addition, the market reacted negatively when firms incorporated the provision to adopt the party’s cadre management principle, which allows the CCP to intervene in firm management.

Toward an Empirical Investigation of the Pecking Order Theory: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

The financing method of Chinese listed firms has been studied for a long time, but with inconclusive indications. This paper thus adopts Chinese listed firms’ data from 2003 to 2015 to investigate the pecking order theory by testing the relationship between financing deficit and long-term debt to capital ratio. The empirical analysis documents a positive relationship between financing deficit and changes in the long-term debt ratio, which indicates, to some extent, that the pecking order theory is justified in these firms. Moreover, we find that the market timing effect exudes a substantial negative impact on the pecking order theory, resulting in the listed firms having a considerable incentive to use equity financing when their market value is high. Furthermore, the dynamics of the state ownership structure of Chinese firms adheres to the pecking order theory, suggesting that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) prefer to use long-term debt financing. Finally, the ownership concentration ratio also verifies the pecking order theory, implying that controlling shareholders’ preferred financing method is long-term debt. In general, our empirical analysis shows that stock market performance has a strong impact on capital structure, SOEs have easier access to long-term debt financing, and Chinese listed firms with greater concentrated ownership structure are more prone to use long-term debt.

Relative earnings and firm performance: Evidence from publicly-listed firms in China, 2005–2012

This paper studies the relationship between three measures of relative earnings and firm performance based on data of 664 listed manufacturing companies in China over the period 2005–2012. It finds that a firm’s financial performance was (1) negatively associated with the capital to labor earnings ratio in the firm; (2) negatively associated with regional average wage relative to the firm’s average wage; and (3) positively associated with the earnings of high-level managers relative to ordinary workers. It also finds that the effects of relative earnings on firm performance differed across regions, industry characteristics and firm ownership structures, and over different time periods.

In search of determinants of FDI backward spillovers: a meta-analysis

Drawing on a unique dataset of 694 estimates from 24 studies on foreign direct investment backward productivity spillovers in China, our prime objective is to investigate determinants of backward spillovers from foreign direct investment using Bayesian Model Averaging based Meta-Analysis. Our results suggest that backward spillovers vary across firm attributes, including the ownership structure of foreign firms, the origin of foreign firms, market orientation of foreign firms, the ownership structure of local firms and the technological levels of local firms. For instance, export-orientated foreign firms generate largest benefits of backward spillovers for the domestic economy among firm attributes.

Corporate Law, Government Intervention and Corporate Ownership Structure

Abstract We compare the influence of legal and political factors on the corporate ownership structure of Chinese listed companies. We find that: (1) the improvement of corporate law quality and the less government intervene on firms lead to a decrease in corporate ownership concentration; (2) compared with the provincial corporate law performance, the effects of the provincial government intervention on the concentration of ownership is relatively significant; (3) the impact of government intervention on corporate ownership structure of state-owned firms are larger than that of private firms, whereas the impact of provincial corporate law implementation performance is more significant in samples of private firms. The policy implications are that most China’s SOE reform measures have yet not cure the crux. The success of the reform may primarily depends on the re-examination and restructure of the political institutions.

Diversidade de Gênero nos Conselhos Administrativos e sua Relação com Desempenho e Risco Financeiro nas Empresas Familiares

Resumo Este trabalho analisa a influência da participação feminina sobre o desempenho e risco financeiro das empresas, considerando uma amostra composta por 218 empresas, listadas e negociadas na B3 (Bovespa), nos períodos de 2010 a 2016. O estudo analisa também a influência da participação feminina em empresas de controle familiar. Utilizando painel com efeitos aleatórios e as variáveis dummy de controle familiar e percentual de presença feminina no conselho de administração, o estudo procurou analisar como essas variáveis e suas interações podem afetar o desempenho financeiro das empresas. Embora a representatividade feminina tenha crescido mais de 50% nos últimos anos, tal participação, no entanto, no conselho de administração das empresas brasileiras ainda é minoritária, próxima de 9% do total pesquisado. A estrutura de propriedade em mãos familiares é bastante relevante, com a percentagem de 63%. Os resultados sugerem uma relação positiva da participação feminina e a variável Q de Tobin, utilizada como proxy para geração de valor, porém essa relação é mais fraca nas empresas familiares. Outro resultado encontrado é que a volatilidade, aqui tomada como proxy de risco, é reduzida em empresas de controle familiar.

Ownership Structured Firms in Malaysia: Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Fees

The political economy shaped the ownership structure of corporations in Malaysia. The rapid growth of the economy has not diluted the concentrated ownership structure in the Malaysian firms. Malaysia has its own unique feature of ownership structured firms which can be divided into politically connected (PCON) firms, institutional ownership and managerial ownership (INST&MGRL) firms, and family ownership (FAMILY) firms. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether PCON, INST&MGR and FAMILY firms are associated with higher audit fees. This study also examines the association between audit committee characteristics IND, DIL and EXP and audit fees based on the revamped Bursa Listing Requirements in 2008, which focus on audit committee characteristics. Using data from 567 firm-year observations from years 2008 to 2010, we find that PCON firms pay higher audit fees than INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms. Further, the association between audit committee IND, DIL and EXP audit fees is positive and significant for PCON firms. Suggesting that the government intervention is expected to produce better governance and improve the firm’s business performance. This is because the government has given much attention and initiatives to ensure that these firms perform in an effective way and assist the government to improve the economic growth.

Do financial regulations have impacts on ownership structure of P2P firms?

ABSTRACT We assess the impacts of ownership structures on China’s P2P lending platforms. We classify data into private and non-private groups, and we use the information such as turnovers and net inflows to capture firm performance. The findings suggest that investors prefer non-private to private P2P platforms before and after related financial regulations. Private platforms thus increase their interest rates to attract borrowers, which surges systematic risks. Such results are especially dominant for P2P platforms in non-BSGS cities, indicating the difficultly private platforms compete against financial regulations.

Agglomeration, absorptive capacity and knowledge governance: implications for public–private firm innovation in China

ABSTRACT This paper considers the role of firm ownership structure, absorptive capacity and agglomeration on firm innovation in the Chinese context. A popular co-occurrence measure is used to measure local spillovers expected to take place between similar but different industries co-located together. Relying on a large panel of Chinese firms, this paper offers three main results: (1) privately owned enterprises (POEs) are more efficient innovators than their state-owned enterprise (SOE) counterparts; (2) local spillovers from related industries enhance firm innovation, especially for firms with higher pre-existing learning abilities; and (3) despite possessing relatively high levels of absorptive capacity, POEs maintain higher innovation performance compared with their SOE counterparts. These findings help confirm the absorptive capacity thesis, but also suggest that possessing relatively higher levels of absorptive capacity, in and of itself, is not always a sufficient precondition for firms to overcome all the cognitive and technological barriers to leveraging external sources of knowledge. In line with theories of knowledge governance, one explanation for this finding is that private (government) operators develop higher (lower) quality governance procedures that ultimately enhance (hamper) their ability to integrate successfully external sources of knowledge, even after developing a high level of absorptive capabilities.

The Ownership Structure of Private Firms: Concentration and Persistence

We find that ownership changes much less over time in private firms than in public firms. The average largest shareholder in private (public) Norwegian firms keeps the same stake in 82% (14%) of two consecutive years. In private firms past ownership dominates ownership determinants proposed in the literature, and the estimated relationship depends heavily on whether the economic model and the econometric technique capture the strong ownership persistence. This evidence suggests that lower share liquidity increases ownership duration, and that feed-back from economic outcomes to ownership structure is a less severe problem for identification when the firm's shares are illiquid.

Optimal ownership structure and monitoring in entrepreneurial firms

We model the agency problem existing in an entrepreneurial firm between its founder and an outside investor and characterize the optimal corporate governance design. The analysis describes the relationship between two mechanisms: the level of monitoring exerted by the outside investor (short-run) and the ownership structure designed by the founder (long-run). Our results suggest that the optimal corporate governance design resembles a multiple large shareholders (MLS) structure in which a large investor counterbalances the power of the controlling owner. We derive testable implications regarding the separation between control and cash-flow rights and other firm-specific elements influencing the optimal governance structure.