It is standardly assumed that theories of meaning for natural languages will be compositional. That is, a theory of meaning for a language, E, will consist of a characterization of the semantic features of some set of primitive components of E, along with rules for recursively determining the semantic features of the more complex expressions of E. The main line of support for the compositionality of a theory of meaning, and more importantly for the existence of compositional theories of meaning, arises from the following considerations. First, speakers can comprehend an infinite or at least an indefinitely large number of sentences. In order to explain how we manage to understand indefinitely many sentences we must assume that we have a compositional understanding. That is, we are able to understand indefinitely many sentences because our understanding of sentences is a matter of our understanding parts of sentences. Second, it is generally accepted that a theory of meaning should characterize the explicit or implicit knowledge that is applied in understanding. So a semantic theory will explain the meanings of sentences by explaining the meanings of parts of sentences. That is, if we are going to explain (semantic) language understanding, we will need a compositional theory of meaning. As part of an ambitious attempt to persuade us that a theory of meaning is not feasible, Stephen Schiffer [2] has challenged this 'productivity' argument for a compositional theory of meaning by presenting a hypothetical case of a language understander whose means of understanding languages supposedly fails to support compositionality. He has also provided an argument that is supposed to show that it is possible for us to explain a (hypothetical) mentalese (i.e. language of thought) without the need for a compositional theory of mentalese. As I will show, though, his cases fail to address the central concern of the productivity argument, namely the explanation of infinite understanding through finite means, and are therefore unsuccessful attacks on our commitment to a compositional theory of meaning.
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