Fine-tuning Argument Research Articles

Fine-Tuning and the Multiverse Argument Against Naturalism

The multiverse is often invoked by naturalists to avoid a design inference from the fine-tuning of the universe. I argue that positing that we live in a naturalistic multiverse (NM) makes it plausible that we currently exist in a problematic skeptical scenario, though the exact probability that we do is inscrutable. This, in turn, makes agnosticism the rational position to hold concerning the reliability of our reasoning skills, the accuracy of our sensory inputs, and the veracity of our memories. And that means that agnosticism is also the rational position to hold concerning all the beliefs derived from those sources, which includes nearly all of them. Consequently, there is an unacceptable skeptical cost to accepting a NM, thereby requiring a rejection of the NM as a counter to fine-tuning or a rejection of naturalism itself.

The fine-tuning argument against the multiverse

Abstract It is commonly argued that the fact that our universe is fine-tuned for life favors both a design hypothesis as well as a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis. The claim that the fine-tuning of this universe supports a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis has been forcefully challenged however by Ian Hacking and Roger White. In this paper we take this challenge even further by arguing that if it succeeds, then not only does the fine-tuning of this universe fail to support a multiverse hypothesis, but it tends to favor a single-universe hypothesis instead.

Horizon, homogeneity and flatness problems: do their resolutions really depend upon inflation?

AbstractThe horizon problem, encountered in cosmology, is derived as such for world models based on Robertson–Walker metric where homogeneity and isotropy of the universe is assumed to begin with and is guaranteed for all epochs. Actually, the only thing that happens in this scenario is that in such a universe, described by a single, time-dependent scale factor, which may otherwise be independent of spatial coordinates, the light signals in a finite time might not cover all the available space. Further, the flatness problem, as it is posed, is not even falsifiable. The usual argument offered in the literature is that the present density of the universe is very close to the critical density value and that the universe must be flat since otherwise in past at $$\sim 10^{-35}$$ ∼ 10 - 35 second (near the epoch of inflation) there will be extremely low departures of density from the critical density value (of the order $$\sim 10^{-53}$$ ∼ 10 - 53 ), requiring a sort of fine tuning. We show that even if the present value of the density parameter were very different, still at $$10^{-35}$$ 10 - 35 second it would differ from unity by the same fraction. Thus a use of fine tuning argument to promote $$k = 0$$ k = 0 model amounts to a priori rejection of all models with $$k \ne 0$$ k ≠ 0 . Without casting any aspersions on the inflationary theory, which after all is the most promising paradigm to explain the pattern of anisotropies observed in the cosmic microwave background, we argue that one cannot use homogeneity and flatness in support of inflation.

Evolution And Its Misinterpretation By The Scientific Community

Allah has created the heavens and the earth in stages as he declares in the Holy Quran. It is Allah Who creates, develops and sustains life, and ensures harmony and diversity in all things, living and non-living. The verses from the Quran make it obvious that the conditions required for God’s ultimate creation to exist and survive are only possible if the universe contains matter, energy, water, and other entities as they are. The total measure of these entities cannot be altered, which means the total energy and matter in the universe is constant. These values are actually the result of the fine-tuned universe, where any deviation from it will lead to its instability and hence its extinction. This balance is maintained by the eternal and extremely intelligent being through His commands, and these commands, by observers, are conceived as laws of nature or scientific laws. This universe is solely meant for the trial of the ultimate creation, hence puzzling, brain-teasing, and other sorts of entangled phenomena in the observable universe are inevitable. This kind of nature is intentionally imparted to the universe by God to test mankind (God’s ultimate creation). The definition of biological evolution in modern science is actually an illusion and hence a trial for humans, since God calls this universe by the word "Garoor," meaning illusion or unreal. In conclusion, the misinterpretation of evolution by the scientific community can be attributed to the lack of understanding of the true nature of human existence and the purpose of life on Earth. By examining religious scriptures, we can see that humans are sent on Earth for minor and major trials by God, with minor trials such as evolutionary theory and other incomplete sciences being part of this category. It is evident that God initially formed the shape of a human from stagnant dark mud and then preserved it in a dry state. He did not breathe life into the mould until all the necessary conditions for human existence on Earth were ensured. After God infused life or spirit into the mould of Adam (AW), He taught Adam (AW) the names of things. Thus, it can be inferred that life on Earth was created by God in stages, and these stages are designed in a way that life and the species on Earth may appear to disbelievers as a result of natural selection or random evolution. However, as Muslims, it is important to remember that everything we observe in the universe is intended to test us by God, so it is best to avoid engaging in vague discussions on this matter. Know well that the life of this world is but an amusement and diversion, and adornment and boasting to one another, and competition in increase of wealth and children. This worldly life is no more than play and amusement. But the Hereafter is indeed the real life, if only they knew.(The Quran 29:64)

Divine psychology and cosmic fine-tuning

Abstract After briefly outlining the fine-tuning argument (FTA), I explain how it relies crucially on the claim that it is not improbable that God would design a fine-tuned universe. Against this premise stands the divine psychology objection: the contention that the probability that God would design a fine-tuned universe is inscrutable. I explore three strategies for meeting this objection: (i) denying that the FTA requires any claims about divine psychology in the first place, (ii) defining the motivation and intention to design a fine-tuned universe into the theistic hypothesis, and (iii) providing arguments that the relevant probability is not terribly low. While I reject the first two, I conclude, in line with the third, that considerations about life's objective value establish that it is not absurdly improbable that God would design a fine-tuned universe, whether one regards the FTA as an inference merely to a cosmic designer, or to theism proper. Accordingly, the divine psychology objection fails.

News from the Swampland — constraining string theory with astrophysics and cosmology

Our current best guess for a unified theory of gravitation and quantum field theory (string theory) generically predicts a set of requirements for a consistently quantized theory, the Swampland criteria. Refined versions of these criteria have recently been shown to be in mild tension with cosmological observations. We summarize the status of the current impact of and constraints on the Swampland conjectures from cosmology, and subject a variety of dark energy quintessence models to recently released cosmological datasets. We find that instead of tightening the tension, the new data allows for slightly more freedom in the Swampland criteria. We further demonstrate that if there is no theoretical argument made to prevent interactions of the moduli fields with the electromagnetic sector, a novel fine-tuning argument arises from the extremely tight current constraints on such interactions. Finally, we conclude with a cautionary tale on model-independent reconstructions of the Swampland criteria from expansion rate data.

On Walter Bradley, "The Fine Tuning of the Universe: Evidence for the Existence of God?" (PSCF 70, no. 3 [2018]: 147–60); and Terry Gray, "Pronuclear Environmentalists: An Introduction to Ecomodernism" (PSCF 73, no. 4 [2021]: 195–201)

On Walter Bradley, "The Fine Tuning of the Universe: Evidence for the Existence of God?" (PSCF 70, no. 3 [2018]: 147–60); and Terry Gray, "Pronuclear Environmentalists: An Introduction to Ecomodernism" (PSCF 73, no. 4 [2021]: 195–201)

Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief

It is one thing to hold that merely statistical evidence is sometimes insufficient for rational belief, as in typical lottery and profiling cases. It is another thing to hold that merely statistical evidence is always insufficient for rational belief. Indeed, there are cases where statistical evidence plainly does justify belief. This project develops a dispositional account of the normativity of statistical evidence, where the dispositions that ground justifying statistical evidence are connected to the goals (= proper function) of objects. There are strong intuitive motivations for doing this. For we can turn almost any case of non-justifying merely statistical evidence into a case of justifying merely statistical evidence by adding information about the dispositions and goals of the objects involved. The resulting view not only helps us understand when and why merely statistical evidence is normatively significant, but it also helps us understand how statistical evidence relates to more standard forms of evidence (perceptual, testimonial). The emerging view also has surprising applications, as it imposes limitations on the epistemic value of fine-tuning arguments for theism as well as undermines a standard class of case-based arguments for moral encroachment.

Analyzing the Multiverse with Bayesianism

Multiverse is a popular concept embraced by many scholars, including physicists who support the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. However, the necessity of adding many extra entities to the traditional single universe is debatable. Bayesianism, which contends to utilize degrees of belief to measure our credence, is a suitable tool to be introduced in this debate. This paper discusses the reason for believing in the multiverse and utilizes Bayesianism, claiming that we should believe in the multiverse due to the fine-tuned constants. The fine-tuned universe and Bayes’ Rule are introduced, then the inverse gambler’s fallacy is explained to object to the reasoning of the multiverse. Subsequently, however, the paper raises examples and Bayesian calculations to argue that the multiverse is good reasoning. Finally, the paper concludes that the multiverse is good reasoning by using ‘selection effects’ to distinguish it from the inverse gambler’s fallacy.

From Aesthetic Virtues to God:

I argue that the aesthetic theoretical virtues of beauty, simplicity, and unification, as well as the evidential virtue of explanatory depth, can transform theistic-friendly personal cause (PC) arguments—like the kalām cosmological argument (KCA) and the fine-tuning argument—into stand-alone arguments for monotheism. The aesthetic virtues allow this by providing us with the grounds to rationally accept a perfect personal cause (i.e., God) as the best PC to believe in given the success of some PC argument. Using the KCA as an example, I argue that, once the KCA is accepted and a PC believed in, then a theory that posits a perfect PC as the cause of the universe is more beautiful, simpler, and has more unification and explanatory depth than the imperfect PC normally posited by the KCA’s standard conceptual analysis. And the same would hold true for any imperfect PC. Thus, once a PC argument has been accepted, the perfect PC theory is preferable to hold over any other PC theory. Finally, I address various objections to this reasoning.

Harmony in a panpsychist world

Experiences tend to be followed by states for which they provide normative reasons. Such harmonious correlations cry out for explanation. Theories that answer or diminish these cries thereby achieve an advantage over theories that do neither. I argue that the main lines of response to these cries that are available to biological theorists—theorists who hold (roughly) that conscious subjects are generally biological entities—are problematic. And I argue that panpsychism—which holds (roughly) that conscious subjects are ubiquitous in nature—provides an attractive response to these explanatory cries. Taken together, these considerations underwrite a kind of ‘psychophysical fine-tuning’ argument in support of panpsychism, one that is reminiscent of cosmological fine-tuning arguments in favor of multiverse hypotheses.

İnce-Ayarlanmışlık Argümanı ve Çoklu Evrenler

İnce-ayarlanmışlık kanıtı, Tanrı’nın varlığı lehine ileri sürülen ve evrene dair bilgimizin artmasıyla ortaya konan, tasarım argümanının kozmolojik ince-ayara dayandırılan bir versiyonudur. Son yüzyılda elde edilen bilimsel veriler, evrende yaşamın varolabilmesi için, doğa yasaları, doğa sabiteleri ve evrenin başlangıç koşulları gibi parametrelerin çok hassas bir aralıkta olması gerektiğini ortaya koymaktadır. İnce-ayarlanmışlık argümanının iddiası, söz konusu parametrelerin bu kesinlikte ve hassaslıkta oluşunun, şans veya çoklu evrenler gibi hipotezlerden ziyade tasarım hipoteziyle anlamlı ve tutarlı bir şekilde açıklanabileceğidir. Biyolojik tasarıma, doğadaki düzen ve amaçlılığa vurgu yapan klasik tasarım argümanından farklı olan ince-ayarlanmışlık argümanı, tasarım argümanını bir adım ileri taşıyarak, doğadaki düzen ve amaçlılığa da zemin hazırlayan kozmik yasalar ve parametrelere dayanması bakımından teistik görüş lehine Tanrı’nın varlığını destekleye güçlü bir argüman olarak kabul edilmektedir. Biz bu çalışmamızda tasarım argümanın güncel bir versiyonu olan ince-ayar argümanının iddiasını ortaya koymaya çalışıp, bu argümana karşı geliştirilen en popüler itirazlardan biri olan çoklu evrenler itirazını ele alacağız. Şans hipoteziyle ilişkili olan çoklu evrenler itirazının âlemdeki ince-ayarlı parametreleri anlama konusunda tatmin edici bir açıklama ortaya koymak konusunda neden başarılı bulmadığımızı ortaya koymaya çalışacağız.

Критика позитивных теистических аргументов в полемике теизма и атеизма

In the article the author analyzes the arguments of the theist W.L. Craig for the existence of the omnipotent, all-good, timeless God of classical theism as well as counter-arguments of W. Sinnot-Armstrong. W.L. Craig used five arguments, they are Kalam cosmological argument, fine-tuning argument, objective moral values argument, argument from the testimonies of the gospels and argument from religious experience. Craig seeks to show that when we take all these arguments together, they increase the probability of the existence of the God of classical theism. Sinnot-Armstrong, in turn, criticized all these arguments and seeks to show with varying levels of credibility that every Craig’s argument can be refuted within the framework of an atheistic approach. He exposes the argument from the existence of objective moral values to the most detailed criticism, while speaking from the position of moral realism and Platonism. Sinnot-Armstrong criticized fine-tuning argument least convincingly. He accepted the fact that there is no good atheistic response to this argument, but he used usual rhetorical attacks against theism. He uncritically repeated the model of the war between science and religion. As a result of the analysis of the controversy between Craig and Sinnot-Armstrong, the author of the article comes to several conclusions. Firstly, atheism is combined with various metaphysical attitudes, from naturalism to Platonism. Secondly, an atheist may hold different views on the problem of free will between determinism and indeterminism. Thus, since atheism is very heterogeneous in itself, most of the Sinnot-Armstrong counter-arguments are not universally applicable to atheists.

Fine-tuning and Humean laws: fine-tuning as argument for a non-governing account of laws rather than for God or multiverse

Many physics parameters need to be precisely set in order for life to exist in our universe. Or so says the fine-tuning argument. That the actual values are just right for life, the argument concludes, is a fact in need of deep physical or metaphysical explanation. Perhaps, the story goes, the parameter values settings are a matter of divine design. Or perhaps they result from a selection effect given our place in the “multiverse”. However, a very different approach to the problem is possible. One may argue that the fine-tuning is an artefact of theorizing: it is explicable as the precise balancing act necessary for compact, systematic representation in science. Given such an explanation and drawing on earlier work from a number of sources, this essay shows how fine-tuning is best understood as evidence for a non-governing conception of laws rather than for design or multiverse.

Creator Of the Universe Adjusted the Dark Energy/Dark Matter Ratio and Baryons to Be Function In Π And Eπ: Predicted and Deciphered by Sayeed’s Theorem

The fine tuning of the universe was adjusted by Allah – the Creator. This article deciphered the dark energy (DE), dark matter (DM) and baryonic matter (BM) pattern ambiguity as a one of the physics mysteries. In this article and for the first time, the ratio of the dark energy/dark matter and baryons are predicted by Sayed`s theorem to be function in π and eπ. The previous published measurements and estimations have been showing different values and variations. It is predicted that the ideal and optimum (DE/DM) ratio is equal to the constant π; called Sayed El-mongy (DE/DM) ratio; symbolized as (sAM). While, the ratio (DE/DM+BM) is to the constant e. The value of (DE/DM) multiplied by (DE/DM+BM) was found to be eπ. The typical predicted values of dark energy, dark matter and baryons are 71.314093%, 22.7% and 3.538% respectively. The remainder 2.450907% could be due to undiscovered and any other form of matter (OM) including neutrinos and antimatter. The comparison of the predicted values with the world range and published data was also carried out and given with the % discrepancy. It was observed that the closest values to the predicted (DE/DM) Sayed ratio (π) are with the difference of 0.35508198% for SWIN and 1.02083609% for WAMP respectively.

Against Indifference Objections to the Fine-Tuning Argument

Critics of the Fine-Tuning Argument for Theism have recently argued that even if the universe is fine-tuned for life, certain features of the universe are still surprising given theism, because God should be indifferent between those features and their contraries. In the first section of this paper, I summarize this sort of Indifference Objection to the Fine-Tuning Argument. In the second section, I explain why contrary to initial appearances, these objections fail. In the third section, I present the Argument from Compatibility, which attempts to turn the tables by arguing that the paradigmatic features are more surprising given atheism than they are given theism.

Review of “Against Indifference Objection to the Fine-Tuning Argument”

Review of “Against Indifference Objection to the Fine-Tuning Argument”

A classical way forward for the regularity and normalization problems

Bayesian epistemology has struggled with the problem of regularity: how to deal with events that in classical probability have zero probability. While the cases most discussed in the literature, such as infinite sequences of coin tosses or continuous spinners, do not actually come up in scientific practice, there are cases that do come up in science. I shall argue that these cases can be resolved without leaving the realm of classical probability, by choosing a probability measure that preserves “enough” regularity. This approach also provides a resolution to the McGrew, McGrew and Vestrum normalization problem for the fine-tuning argument.

On Friederich’s New Fine-Tuning Argument

The most common objection to the Fine-Tuning Argument for the Multiverse is that the argument commits the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy. Simon Friederich has recently composed an interesting version of this fine-tuning argument that avoids this fallacy and better-matches important scientific instances of anthropic reasoning. My thesis in this paper is that this new argument, while it may avoid the fallacy, contains a disputable premise concerning the prior probabilities of the hypotheses at issue. I consider various ways to modify the argument to avoid this problem, but I argue that plausible replacements render other lines unjustified. I also briefly compare ‘indexical’ fine-tuning arguments such as Friederich’s, according to which our universe permits life, to ‘existential’ fine-tuning arguments, according to which some universe or other permits life. I conclude that while Friederich is correct that the new fine-tuning argument avoids the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy, the argument nevertheless depends on an unjustified premise, and this is further reason for proponents of fine-tuning arguments for the multiverse to employ existential arguments rather than indexical arguments.

Scientism and Secularism: Learning to Respond to a Dangerous Ideology

Scientism and Secularism: Learning to Respond to a Dangerous Ideology