Abstract The Russian oil industry has undergone fundamental changes since the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its bureaucratic administrative structure, dominated by its various Branch Ministries. The monopoly in the Soviet oil industry has now been replaced by a number of “oil companies”, some of which are very powerful, the best known of them being Lukoil. These “joint stock companies” are the product of a reform aimed essentially at implanting, out of all the numerous organisational arrangements developed in the West, the model of the vertically integrated private firm. Beyond the legal reforms in the Russian oil industry sector, however, the nature of the organisational model that has actually emerged in Russia begs several questions. Many entities, which are complex and highly diversified, are involved in this industry. There are, of course, the many privatised structures in which the banks sometimes carry a considerable amount of weight. There are also some vertically integrated organisations, but the degree of integration is variable and their method of centralisation is based on a specific form of economic logic. It should not be considered, however, that these “actors” are similar to capitalist-type private enterprises, whose behaviour is regulated by the demands of international competition. Reform of property rights has not been sufficient to create true private enterprise in Russia. This assertion is borne out by several elements, including the Russian economic situation itself. Financial-industrial groups in the oil industry have, first and foremost, to organise and adapt themselves to deal with the essentially non-monetary relationships such as barter, interentreprise credit and non-payment, which are becoming more and more dominant in the Russian economy today, as the recent financial crisis shows. Thus, beyond the change in formal organisation that the various methods of privatisation show, the way in which the industry behaves is still regulated to a significant extent by planned economic relationships and not by efficiency and profitability strategies based on reducing costs. On the other hand, the “survival” strategies are based on the willingness to maximise exports, this being based on a “quantitative production development” logic. They are written into the particular kind of compromise arrived at between the State, the banks, the regions, the workers and the oil joint stock companies, which could be summarised in the following equation: foreign currency in exchange for non-payments and for preserving jobs in the oil industry's holding companies. The financial crisis in Russia has clearly shown how fragile this system is, and has to some extent shattered the compromise already weakened by developments in international markets. The decrease in foreign currency revenue, brought about by the fall in international oil prices, has clearly shown the structural weaknesses in an oil industry that is still conspicuously beset by heavy production costs, costs that are proving a serious hindrance to its competitiveness. The future of the industry must be in serious doubt if, despite the reforms introduced, it does not continue along the path of major restructuring.