Financial Action Task Force Research Articles

Bitcoin, crypto-coins, and global anti-money laundering governance

Crypto-coins (CCs) like Bitcoin are digitally encrypted tokens traded in peer-to-peer networks whose money laundering potential has attracted the attention of regulators, firms and the wider public worldwide. This article assesses the effectiveness of the global anti-money laundering regime in balancing both the challenges and opportunities presented by these novel ‘altcoins’. Two main arguments are advanced. First, the implications that crypto-coins presently pose for global anti-money laundering efforts stem less from the threats of their illicit uses as digital currencies and more from the opportunities presented by their underlying blockchain technologies. Second, despite several shortcomings, the risk-based approach pursued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) strikes an effective balance between the existing threats and opportunities that crypto-coins currently present. Rather than a conclusive evaluation however this article stresses the need for continual monitoring and investigation of the wider ethical implications raised by CCs for global efforts to combat money laundering in an era of rapid technological change.

Governing illicit finance in transnational security spaces: the FATF and anti-money laundering

This article analyzes the global anti-money laundering (AML) regime from the perspective of security governance, examining the creation of a transnational security space by the FATF. Security is often mentioned as relevant context for AML measures, and the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) as its central institution. Yet, most analyses – implicitly or explicitly – present the FATF as an important banking regulator. Arguing that this perspective on the FATF is too limited, the article outlines the changing security context in which AML emerged as an important tool for governance. Unlike traditional ideas of international security, the idea of security governance emphasizes new forms of cooperation to ensure safety and security across multiple levels. Based on International Relations (IR) and criminological research, the article develops a framework with five dimensions of security governance: a comprehensive security concept, multi-purpose rationalization, public-private cooperation, multi-nodal governance, and transnational security spaces as a result. Unlike other efforts of global crime governance, the global AML regime provides a prime example of security governance in all of these dimensions. At the same time, the link to security also explains why the global AML regime expanded in some areas more than in others: AML is still a weak governance instrument for regulating financial crimes such as tax evasion or corruption, but it is a strong one for security-related crimes. While the FATF remains a special case in global governance, the creation of transnational security spaces in AML – caused by FATF activities – is likely to be a model for future security governance in other fields.

Client privilege, compliance and the rule of law: Swedish lawyers and money laundering prevention

Can, and will, lawyers police their clients? This article aims to shed light on the private front-line workers of the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering (FATF). The analysis is based on a study of how Swedish lawyers perceive and handle obligations to police clients within FATF style risk-based anti-money laundering/counter terrorism (AML/CTF) regulation. We find that the lawyers were reluctant to taking on the responsibility for AML/CTF, and that their front-line work was directed towards being compliant enough. Relatedly, we identify several practices of separation that serve to mediate between the conflicting aims and interests in the everyday of this form of private policing. Another finding is that the lawyers by and large position themselves as knowledgeable actors, and view risks of AML/CTF as knowable. Nevertheless, lawyers experienced a principle clash between being ‘not banks’, and being front-line workers for FATF. In particular, the lawyers perceived their role as front-line workers to be more complex due to their professional norms and ethics on client privilege, and what they saw as the proper role of lawyers, being in conflict with the obligation to report clients and their transactions. In concluding, we suggest that paying more attention to the everyday experience of front-line workers when devising regulatory tools may be a way to promote engagement in ‘true’ crime prevention on their part.

Colombia: Financial Sector Assessment Program-Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism

This report provides a summary of the anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) measures in place in Colombia as at the date of the onsite visit (June 5 to 22, 2017). It analyzes the level of compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Colombia’s AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened.

A Comparative Analysis of the Prepaid Card Laws/Regulations in Nigeria, the United Kingdom, the United States and India

PURPOSE – This paper compares the prepaid card laws/regulations in Nigeria, the United Kingdom, the United States and India with the aim of determining the best approach to regulating prepaid cards: that is the approach that promotes financial inclusion and also makes the product less attractive for money laundering. DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH – This paper relies mainly on primary and secondary data drawn from the public domain. It also relies on documentary research. FINDINGS – This paper makes the following findings and recommendations: I. Nigeria has the best approach to regulating providers of prepaid cards. Nigeria’s approach could foster financial inclusion and at the same time mitigate the money laundering risks associated with prepaid cards. Nigeria’s approach is not too strict like the Indian approach and it is not too relaxed like the United Kingdom and the United States approach. Operators, including mobile/telecommunications operators, wishing to operate money transfer schemes in Nigeria are allowed to do so with approval from the Central Bank of Nigeria and in strict conjunction with licensed deposit-taking banks or financial institutions. The UK, US and India are recommended to adopt Nigeria’s approach. II. The United Kingdom and the United States have the best approach to regulating agents of prepaid cards. Both countries require prepaid card providers to maintain a current list of agents and make it available to the relevant authorities upon request. The approach allows regulatory agencies to effectively monitor and supervise prepaid card agents. India and Nigeria are advised to clarify their approach regarding the regulation of prepaid card agents. The prepaid card Laws/Regulations of those countries should be modified to specify if the agent of a prepaid card provider is required to be licensed or registered by a competent authority or if the prepaid card provider (the principal) is required to maintain an updated list of agents which must be made accessible to a designated competent authority, when requested. The new changes will afford regulatory authorities the opportunity to effectively monitor and supervise prepaid card agents. III. India’s approach to thresholds would preclude most individuals in the intended target market from accessing basic financial products as most people typically do not have residential addresses that could be confirmed by reference to formal documentation. India should adopt the ‘risk-based approach’ and not the ‘wholesale de-risking approach’. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS – Given their low-risk characteristics, closed-loop cards, specifically cards which do not allow reloads or withdrawals, remain outside the scope of this paper. ORIGINALITY/VALUE – Although there have been researchers who adopted the comparative approach like Jean J Luyat and Will Cain, the comparative approach adopted by those researchers was not detailed enough and also was not aimed at seeking to answer the research question in section 1 of this paper. Both writers focused on only the aspect of Financial Inclusion making the whole research a one sided approach. Jean J Luyat focused on ‘how regulation had an impact on the development of prepaid cards in Japan and Europe’. He was able to discover that prepaid cards were growing rapidly in Japan but not gaining acceptance as a payment method in the European Union (EU) and France. He aligned such growth in Japan to different factors including regulation. He stated that Japan had a simple and flexible regulatory framework compared to the EU and France which have a complex regulatory system with strict prudential requirements. Nothing was said about the money laundering aspect of such regulation and neither was anything said about thresholds and other optional recommendations canvassed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The Electronic Money Directive referred to by Jean J Luyat has already been repealed and a second Electronic Money Directive is in place. A comparative approach is adopted in this research seeking to compare the approach in Nigeria with that of the UK, the United States and India. Each of these countries adopted different approaches. The results are to help answer the research question in Section 1 of this paper. The countries were selected on the basis on how strict their regulatory regime is. India’s regulatory regime is the strictest while the United Kingdom and the United States are the most lenient. Nigeria is caught in between Strict/Lenient.

Re-thinking FATF: an experimentalist interpretation of the Financial Action Task Force

Most explanations of the Financial Action Task Force argue that material coercion plays a key role in the consolidation and diffusion of the global anti-money laundering regime. This paper looks carefully at the decision-making within FATF and argues that, at its most impactful, FATF operates in line with the principles of “experimentalist governance.” Experimentalism emphasizes broad, participatory standard setting, contextualized implementation, intensive but diagnostic monitoring, and routinized updating in light of experience. The paper discusses the differences between the more common understandings of FATF before laying out the principles of experimentalist governance. It outlines the experimentalist form of FATF decision-making. It then provides evidence of experimentalist decision-making in three important aspects of FATF: the evolution of blacklisting; the role of monitoring; and the continuing implementation of the risk-based approach.

The regime that FATF built: an introduction to the Financial Action Task Force

This article serves to introduce this special issue of Crime, Law, & Social Change on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). It provides a primer on the history and purpose of FATF and lays out some of the central debates over FATF and the anti-money laundering (AML) regime. Finally, as a way of giving readers an overview of the articles in the special issue, it proposes a series of themes that academics and practitioners should consider in future research and work with FATF.

Global financial governance and the informal: limits to the regulation of money

The list of predicate crimes for the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has evolved and grown over its twenty-five year existence. The evolution of this list reflects shifting concerns among the central actors in the organisation, as well as representing a response to any ‘displacement’ activity undertaken by those seeking to avoid these forms of governance. When the scope for cooperation and compliance with the FATF Forty Recommendations was extended beyond the organisation’s membership this governance regime encountered business sectors and financial practices not readily amenable to its objectives. This paper considers the causes and consequences for the situation, as developing economy states attempt to comply with the global governance expectations of the FATF when a significant portion of the domestic economy operates ‘informally’. A frame of reference is provided, with a definition for the informal economy and the concept of displacement as used in research on criminal activity. The focus here is with the nature of the cash economy operating beyond the scope of financial surveillance with implications for the comprehensive effectiveness of the global financial governance regime. The context of informal financial practice and its separation from the regulatory structures of the state leads to a conclusion that global financial governance is limited in practice to the domain of the formal economy.

The governance of the financial action task force: an analysis of power and influence throughout the years

The international fight against money laundering illustrates changes in global governance as a result of the increasingly cross-border nature of crime and the need it creates for all involved to cooperate. The economic priorities and security concerns that surround it contributed to the strong evolution of global governance in this area and the status of anti-money laundering as a shared problem. The creation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), its expansion and cementation throughout the years, is a good example of the many forces working together to responding to the demands of emerging criminal threats and trends. It offers a good illustration of how relationships in global governance have influenced FATF’s priorities and action and ultimately the way in which illicit financial flows are tackled. This analysis offers an overview of FATF’s network across time taking into account the role of states, international organisations, and the private sector in the decision-making processes. It argues that Great Powers – a small, but aligned, group of states of global economic relevance – are responsible for FATF’s direction and the international efforts against illicit financial flows. It suggests, however, that unlike what could be expected, their power is declining following the rise of private sector influence through resourceful, organised and transnational actions e.g. on information sharing.

The money laundering risks and vulnerabilities associated with MMM Nigeria

PurposeThis paper aims to help build awareness with the regulatory, enforcement and customs authorities as well as reporting entities about money laundering risks and vulnerabilities of the Mavrodi Mondial Movement (MMM) scheme, and how to mitigate them.Design/methodology/approachThe research took the form of a desk study, which analyzed various documents and reports such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) typologies reports in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013 and 2014 on new payment methods (NPMs) which focused on the potential for NPM to be misused by criminals; the identification of risk factors which can significantly differ from one new payment product or service to another, depending on functionality; and risk mitigants which can be tailored to a particular new payment product or service to address its specific risk profile.FindingsThis paper presents the following findings and recommendations: high-risk customers such as politically exposed persons (PEPs) could exploit the non-face-to-face feature of MMM by using the identity of low-risk customers (e.g. pensioners) to open MMM accounts. The Bitcoin funding option may present a higher money laundering risk than Bank wire, MasterCard, Visa Debit and Interac. The electronic nature of Bitcoins provides in principle a good foundation for effective record keeping and the monitoring of transactions. The money laundering risks associated with Goldmoney are very minimal when compared to Bitcoin. MMM Nigeria is therefore recommended to adopt Goldmoney as its preferred method of online payment for MMM transactions.Originality/valueWhile most publications on MMM are focused on fraud, this paper focuses on the money laundering risks and vulnerabilities associated with the MMM scheme.

Legitimacy of the Summer 2017 GCC crisis and Qatar’s AML framework

PurposeIn June 2017, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ended diplomatic ties with Qatar. There is a legitimate concern about the accusation levied on Qatar. This paper aims to analyse the progress Qatar’s financial system has made with respect to its anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) regulations, which further serves as the country’s effort to combating the financing of terrorism (CTF). The paper further wishes to advance the discussion by considering the legitimate goals of the aforementioned bodies and their discourse on creating national and international obligations towards reducing terrorist financing through robust AML frameworks.Design/methodology/approachThe paper analyses Qatar’s legislative and regulatory overhaul following the Financial Action Task Force’s Mutual Evaluation Report. Qatar had distinctively strengthened its approach against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The paper takes an ex ante approach by understanding Qatar’s “strategic deficiencies” before the FATF’s mutual evaluation. Subsequently, the paper studies independent international evaluations of Qatar’s AML/CTF legislation and regulation.FindingsThe paper finds Qatar in significant compliance to the recommendations of the various international bodies, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Basel AML Index, IMF’s financial sector reviews, United Nations and independent reports on AML progress from regulatory bodies around the world. None of these organizations present obligatory rules but have set and determined and international standard for AML/CTF laws.Originality/valueThe primary aim is to draw parallels between Qatar’s regulatory AML and CTF efforts through the country’s compliance with international initiatives, such as the FATF guidelines, Basel AML Index, IMF’s financial sector reviews, United Nations and independent reports on AML progress from regulatory bodies around the world.

The Evolution of the EU Law Against Criminal Finance: The 'Hardening' of FATF Standards within the EU

This Article examines the recent evolution of the EU anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) legislative framework, focusing especially on the relationship between the main international standards in the field and the newest EU legislation. It suggests that international soft law norms—in particular the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Standards—have had a decisive influence on the latest development of legislation at the EU level and within its member states. It further argues that mainly the preventive component of the AML/CTF legislation will be strengthened by the EU instruments adopted in mid-2015. However, this Article concludes that the adoption of global soft standards has posed significant challenges to the EU legislative framework. The arguments are developed in four parts. The Article first highlights the main regulatory prescriptions that stem from the study of the phenomenology and the economics of AML/CFT regulation and underpin the current international regulatory paradigm. Second, it explores the evolution of the main international instruments in the field with a special focus on the role played by the FATF Recommendations. It also illustrates the relation between these instruments and the adoption of the new EU AML/CFT legislation from two different, but complementary, angles: (i) noting that the current international AML/CFT framework has a multidisciplinary approach, the Article focuses on the framework’s repressive component and assessing the limits of the EU criminal approach against money laundering and terrorist financing; and (ii) examining the recent EU preventive legislation and addressing the main challenges posed to the EU legislative framework when attempting to accommodate global standards, especially regarding tensions with fundamental freedoms and human rights protected within the European Union.

Comprehensive cross-border declaration system as money-laundering prevention mechanism

PurposeThis study aims to discuss the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Special Recommendation IX (SR IX) and the importance of complying with the recommendation, which focuses on cross-border declaration or disclosure with the objective to detect and prevent illicit cross-border transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs). This study also looks into compliance ratings of Asia Pacific Group (APG) 40 countries on the FATF SR IX.Design/methodology/approachThis study reviews the mutual evaluation reports issued by APG on money laundering from 2006 to 2012. Based on the mutual evaluation reports, this study also looks into recommendations and comments given by respective panels. The compliance ratings together with panel’s recommendations and comments compiled in this study will be helpful to relevant authorities for future improvement.FindingsComplying to FATF SR IX helps relevant authorities in detecting and preventing illicit from cross-border transportation of cash and BNIs. Out of 40, only two countries received compliant rating, which shows the need of improvement to ensure that the country is compliant on FATF SR IX.Research limitations/implicationsThis study is limited to the panel’s reviews and recommendations on mutual evaluation report and only focuses on FATF SR IX.Originality/valueThis paper analyzes the compliance characteristics of countries based on their FATF mutual evaluation report. It highlights the comments and recommendation for future improvement to ensure that these countries will comply with FATF SR IX.

Designated non-financial businesses and professions

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to highlight vulnerabilities in Australia’s anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) regime through Australia’s non-compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on the regulation of designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs). It is intended that through examination of the justifications for and against AML/CTF regulation of DNFBPs, the paper will provide support for the position that Australia’s AML/CTF regime should incorporate regulation of DNFBPs.Design/methodology/approachThe paper presents findings from research conducted in 2015 that focused on some of the principal arguments for and against the extension of Australia’s AML/CTF regime to DNFBPs. Review and consideration of the merits of these arguments is undertaken to support the conclusion that AML/CTF regulation should be extended to DNFBPs, in line with the FATF recommendations.FindingsThe current exemption of many DNFBPs from AML/CTF regulation perpetuates vulnerabilities within Australia’s AML/CTF regime; until this is addressed, criminals will continue to exploit these vulnerabilities and the regulated AML/CTF sector will continue to shoulder an unfair burden of Australia’s AML/CTF response.Practical implicationsThis paper provides an objective assessment of factors for and against the regulation of DNFBPs in Australia. It may be of value to government policymakers, regulators, financial institutions and DNFBPs.Originality/valueThis paper complements existing research on this subject and provides a specific focus on some of the main arguments for and against the extension of Australia’s AML/CTF regime to specific DNFBPs.

Criminality and suspicious activity reports

PurposeThis paper aims to suggest alternative suspicious activity analyses to improve the focus of financial institution reporting to law enforcement and to identify some limitations in the current practice.Design/methodology/approachThis paper employs the consideration of US and Financial Action Task Force policies and text sources of suspicious activity reporting in the anti-money laundering context in light of how the reports are used. Furthermore, there is consideration of confidentiality and privacy constraints on public and private sector in assessing strategies to make the reporting process more effective and aiding the discovery and investigation of crime.FindingsThe current suspicious activity reporting process takes advantage of the business acumen of financial institutions to identify unusual or unexplained behavior that may assist law enforcement in criminal investigations and prosecutions. It is successful in that regard. However, the process has not been tuned to identifying criminal behavior through systematic feedback. As an alternative to feedback, analysis of criminal organizations vis-à-vis the transactions that flow through a reporting institution is suggested as a means to creating better tuning. The analysis could be accomplished either by law enforcement or by select institutions; but in either case, hurdles of confidentiality and/or privacy would have to be overcome.Originality/valueCreating a process for law enforcement and/or reporting institutions to map known criminal activity on a transaction set would allow a new assessment of the role of financial institutions in this regard, and may allow policymakers to reassess whether the financial institutions’ efforts currently required would be more productive if redirected to focus more on criminal as opposed to merely suspicious activity.

Kuwait’s Administrative Risk-based Model for the Prevention of Money Laundering: Costs and Benefits of Compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (fatf) Standards

During the period from 2013-2015, Kuwait adopted the new administrative risk-based anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (aml/cft) regulatory framework. This article analyses the costs and benefits of the compliance of the new framework with the fatf’s standards, focusing on the structural changes: (1) a move from a hybrid-prosecutorial to a fully-fledged administrative model of financial intelligence unit; (2) adoption of the risk-based approach to the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (ml/tf); and (3) the increase in reporting obligations and preventive measures. The main argument advanced in the article is that while the new framework is highly compliant with fatf standards and will maintain the already low level of ml/tf in Kuwait, in comparison with the pre-2013 anti-money laundering regulations, the costs of compliance for reporting parties and clients are higher, and outweigh the benefits. The article suggests how to respond to this and other challenges.

Who's the Legislator Anyway? How the Fatf's Global Norms Reshape Australian Counter Terrorist Financing Laws

This article focuses on the Australian implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations, so-called ‘soft law’ instruments, which represent the international standards in Counter Terrorist Financing (CTF) but which force legislators to conform. The article will fill the gaps existing in the literature today by focusing on the origins and motives of broad CTF legislation in Australia, then detailing each of the FATF's CTF Recommendations and the ways in which they are implemented in Australia. This approach differs significantly from other literature in the field, which deals solely with Australian implementation of one of the FATF's components. The current paper's examination will reveal the CTF regime in Australia, a decade after the FATF's first CTF Mutual Evaluation Report on Australia, and its decisive influence.

Identification of Money Laundering based on Financial Action Task Force Using Transaction Flow Analysis System

Identification of Money Laundering based on Financial Action Task Force Using Transaction Flow Analysis System

Beneficial Ownership Legislation and Geographic Targeting Orders

This paper is updated to include the Geographic Targeting Order issued by FinCEN in November 2018. Over the last twenty years or so, state and Federal legislators have proposed a variety of beneficial ownership laws, to target money laundering and other illegal activities. Commencing in 2016 and most recently in November 2019, that effort has expanded into the real estate transaction market. “Geographic Targeting Orders” sounds ominous and, depending on your political views, may be especially so when coupled with the federal Department of Treasury agency – the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”). What is the government doing now, and who is it targeting? This paper discusses proposed (but not yet enacted) beneficial ownership legislation in the United States and looks at foreign issues, such as the International Financial Action Task Force and its anti-money laundering requirements. This paper then discusses geographic targeting orders instituted in the United States by FinCEN, most recently in November 2019, which attempt to identify money laundering transactions in real estate in certain (but definitely not all) regions of the United States. The areas targeted include major metropolitan areas in California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New York, Texas, and the state of Washington. The transactions focused on are non-bank financed real estate transactions exceeding certain thresholds which are completed without bank financing through cash or check transactions, or where funds are transferred by wire. FinCEN advises that of the reports received in the first 18 months, 30 percent have involved persons who previously had suspicious activity reports lodged against them.

Recent changes to the AML/CFT law in Malaysia

PurposeThe aim of this paper is to examine some of the recent changes to the old anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing law, which is now known as the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001. The paper will highlight the newly consolidated money laundering offences and the newly created offences including structuring of transactions or “smurfing”. Also, the transgression of cross-border movement of cash and negotiable instruments and tipping off about a money laundering disclosure will be assessed.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses a doctrinal legal research and secondary data, with the new AML/CFT legislation as the primary source. For comparative analysis, legislations in the UK, Australia and New Zealand are also examined. Secondary sources include case law, articles in academic journals, books and online databases.FindingsThe review of the AML/CFT law is timely and indicates the Malaysian government’s efforts to adhere to international standards set by the financial action task force. However, it is imperative that the Malaysian government addresses the remaining instrumental and normative deficiencies in the AML/CFT law to ensure that the recent legal changes are sufficiently comprehensive to prevent and regulate money laundering and terrorist financing within Malaysia.Originality/valueThis paper is a useful source of information for legal practitioners, academicians, law enforcement, policymakers, legislators, researchers and students.