Field Of Game Theory Research Articles

Designing Games for Distributed Optimization

The central goal in multiagent systems is to design local control laws for the individual agents to ensure that the emergent global behavior is desirable with respect to a given system level objective. Ideally, a system designer seeks to satisfy this goal while conditioning each agent's control law on the least amount of information possible. This paper focuses on achieving this goal using the field of game theory. In particular, we derive a systematic methodology for designing local agent objective functions that guarantees (i) an equivalence between the resulting Nash equilibria and the optimizers of the system level objective and (ii) that the resulting game possesses an inherent structure that can be exploited in distributed learning, e.g., potential games. The control design can then be completed utilizing any distributed learning algorithm which guarantees convergence to a Nash equilibrium for the attained game structure. Furthermore, in many settings the resulting controllers will be inherently robust to a host of uncertainties including asynchronous clock rates, delays in information, and component failures.

English

The purpose of this research is to study how genetic algorithms (GA's) are applied in the field of Game Theory. GA's are effective approaches for machine learning and optimization problems. In this work, genetic algorithm is utilized to determine the behavior of an opponent in Prisoners’ Dilemma. The opponent behavior will be modeled by means of adaptive automaton. The basic problem of this study is the well-known Prisoner Dilemma. The primary purpose of this research is to determine the opponent behavior towards finding a better strategy to be followed by the player, since the best strategy to be followed depends on the opponent behavior. The results of our proposed model showed the capability of our model to identify the opponent model efficiently. Based on the provided knowledge about the opponent model, the dynamic strategy showed better results when compared to other well-known strategies.   Key words: Game Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma, genetic algorithms, adaptive automata.

Cooperation Model with Costly Punishment

In recent years the issue of costly punishment in systems where free-riding occurs has been a subject of extensive research in the field of game theory. This issue is present in many areas of human activities like paying taxes, using public transport, wireless Internet or P2P networks. It is one of the most common dilemmas in modern societies. In this work we present a simple model of cooperation with three possible strategies (cooperate, defect or punish). In the model players explore the available strategies according to their interactions with other players. We introduce two groups of parameters. The first group is sociological-like and it describes the social acceptance for the free riding behavior. The other group of parameters describes the economical aspects of the system - the cost and eciency of punishers. Using dierential equations approach, as well as an agent based model, we look for equilibrium properties of the system.

A collaborative platform for buyer coalition: Introducing the Awareness-based Buyer Coalition (ABC) system

A variety of buyer coalition schemes already exist in the current e-Commerce literature by which buyers form some sort of coalition in order to enjoy added discounts as a result of purchasing in larger bundles. One major problem in all existing schemes is that none of those schemes explicitly treat the coalition process as a collaborative business process; and as a result, the awareness and knowledge-sharing requirements are not explicitly recognized in the design process of the existing systems. This study proposes a conceptual framework for a buyer coalition system called the Awareness-based Buyer Coalition (ABC) system that allows a buyer to bid on the basis of various levels of awareness that s/he may have about other roles' actions/intentions. The study is an early attempt for explicitly considering awareness and knowledge-sharing requirements of various roles within the buyer coalition process. The theoretical foundations of the study are rooted in the fields of Game Theory, e-Commerce, and Knowledge Management. The research methodology adopted for the study is design science. Various existing buyer coalition algorithms were reviewed and their strengths and weaknesses identified in terms of addressing the information-sharing needs of collaborating buyers. Furthermore, the existing literature on Knowledge Management was reviewed in order to identify an appropriate process model for the proposed buyer coalition framework with specific emphasis on awareness and knowledge-sharing requirements of its collaborating actors. For validation of the proposed conceptual model simulation software was developed to demonstrate results of a variety of simulations for the proof of the concept.

Probabilistic analysis of simulation-based games

The field of game theory has proved to be of great importance in modeling interactions between self-interested parties in a variety of settings. Traditionally, game-theoretic analysis relied on highly stylized models to provide interesting insights about problems at hand. The shortcoming of such models is that they often do not capture vital detail. On the other hand, many real strategic settings, such as sponsored search auctions and supply-chains, can be modeled in high resolution using simulations. Recently, a number of approaches have been introduced to perform analysis of game-theoretic scenarios via simulation-based models. The first contribution of this work is the asymptotic analysis of Nash equilibria obtained from simulation-based models. The second contribution is to derive expressions for probabilistic bounds on the quality of Nash equilibrium solutions obtained using simulation data. In this vein, we derive very general distribution-free bounds, as well as bounds which rely on the standard normality assumptions, and extend the bounds to infinite games via Lipschitz continuity. Finally, we introduce a new maximum-a-posteriori estimator of Nash equilibria based on game-theoretic simulation data and show that it is consistent and almost surely unique.

ALLOCATION RULES WITH OUTSIDE OPTION IN COOPERATION GAMES WITH TIME‐INCONSISTENCY

In game theory agents have the possibility to make binding agreements. The agents are assumed to determine their strategies based on intended but bounded rationality. The field of strategic games provides the possibility to an agent to understand the optimality of his behaviour. In coalition and network games stability, Pareto‐efficiency and fairness of agreements is investigated. The paper shows the relationship between the different fields of game theory in the case of 3 agents. On that basis it shows the ubiquity of time‐inconsistency in dynamic setting due to bounded rationality, deception and environment changes. The paper explains why allocation rules like the Shapley‐based Aumann‐Drèze‐value and the Myerson‐value for coalition structures must be modified in dynamic setting in order to consider the influence of excluded agents, the outside option. An accordingly modified allocation rule is introduced and investigated. It is shown that the “Aumann‐Drèze‐value” and the “Myerson‐value for coalition structures” remains relevant for the case that the switching of the partner is connected with high costs. It is shown through the example of enterprise cooperation in supply chains that low partner switching costs require the introduced allocation rule that considers the outside option. Santrauka Žaidimu teorijoje agentai turi galimybe sudaryti isipareigojančius susitarimus. Agentai, kaip yra mano‐ma, numato savo strategijas riboto racionalumo salygomis. Strateginiu žaidimu sritis sudaro galimybe agentui suvokti optimalios elgsenos krypti. Straipsnyje tyrinejamas ryšys tarp skirtingu žaidimu teo‐rijos sričiu tuo atveju, kai susitarimuose dalyvauja trys agentai. Atskleidžiamas neišvengiamas agentu elgsenos nesuderinamumas del riboto racionalumo, apgavysčiu bei aplinkos pokyčiu. Straipsnyje aiš‐kinama, kad žaidimu teorijos numatomos agentu susitarimu taisykles turetu būti modifikuotos siekiant ivertinti papildomu susitarimu alternatyvu galimybe.

Equilibrium, Games, and Pricing in Transportation and Telecommunication Networks

Network equilibrium models that have traditionally been used for transportation planning have penetrated in recent years to other scientific fields. These models have recently been introduced in the telecommunication networks literature, as well as in the field of game theory. Researchers in the latter fields are not always aware of the very rich literature on equilibrium models outside of their application area. On the other hand, researchers that have used network equilibrium models in transportation may not be aware of new application areas of their tools. The aim of this paper is to present some central research issues and tools in network equilibria and pricing that could bring closer the three mentioned research communities.

Optimization under Linear Side Conditions Using Inverse Monotone Matrices

Environmental problems belong to the main challenging problems of the 21 th century. There is a lack of new allocation principles for investments. Several approaches from the field of game theory concerning this topic may be found in [5] and [11], for example. Additionaly to that approaches the improvement of technical effectivity through cooperation (JI) is in the center of interest ([2], [8] and [9]). For that reason the TEM model was developed giving the possibility to combine this two intentions. In this paper such an allocation problem of the fund is solved for a special case. The fund is build from the cost game determined by the TEM model. The allocation problem leads to a new result in the area of the determination of NASH Equilibria and the optimization under linear side conditions. If we assume inverse monotony of the underlying matrices the actors can achieve the best possible individual result by solving a linear system which can be regarded as suitable solution to our problem in a public economy.

The Assessment: Games and Coordination

Coordination problems arise in a multitude of economic interactions. Recent advances in the field of game theory have shed new light on these problems and the ways in which they might be analysed. This issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy first examines some of the theoretical dimensions to this literature, as well as some empirical and experimental insights. It goes on to apply some of these ideas to a number of important policy areas, including macroeconomic policy coordination, public good provision, and problems of political coordination. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Sharing the Income of a Museum Pass Program

Museum passes which give visitors access to several museums, are becoming more and more frequent. One of the problems encountered is the sharing of the proceeds. We recommend a fair and easily implementable sharing rule that takes into account the relative contribution of each individual museum to the joint pass program. This rule is based on theoretical arguments drawn from the field of game theory. We also show that other commonly used rules may lead to counterintuitive and inconsistent results, or provide bad incentives.

Sharing the Income of a Museum Pass Program

Museum passes which give visitors access to several museums, are becoming more and more frequent. One of the problems encountered is the sharing of the proceeds. We recommend a fair and easily implementable sharing rule that takes into account the relative contribution of each individual museum to the joint pass program. This rule is based on theoretical arguments drawn from the field of game theory. We also show that other commonly used rules may lead to counterintuitive and inconsistent results, or provide bad incentives.

Bi-Directional Optimality Theory: An Application of Game Theory

Optimality Theory catches on in linguistics, first in phonology, then in syntax, and recently also at the semantics/pragmatics interface. In this paper we point to some parallels between principles employed in optimality theoretic interpretation, and notions from the well-established field of Game Theory. Optimality theoretic interpretation can be defined as what we call an 'interpretation game', and optimality itself can be viewed as a solution concept for a game. More in particular, optimality can be characterized in terms of the game-theoretical notion of a 'Nash Equilibrium'.

Value Systems: The Moral and Eudaemonic Components by John E. Guendling

388 BOOK REVIEWS Value Systems: The Moral and Eudaemonic Components. By John E. Guendling. Chicago: Adams Press, 1973. Pp. 151. In this privately published work John Guendling has 1!-ttempted to integrate conceptions from sociology, economics, and political science into a review of the two traditionally basic value systems "the right " and the " good " or in other language " doing things out of duty " in contrast to "doing things for a pay-off." In the first of his four essays, "Morality and the Game of Life," he develops problems of moral discourse in the context of the analogy of life as a game. Many o~ his sentences illuminate subtle implications of this age-old and widely employed image. His writing indicates wide familiarity with current research and documentation in this area of inquiry as well as in the field of game-theory. In essay II, "Changing Games: A Theory of Societal Development," the author offers a metatheory and a theory as a set of steps to be followed in any attempt to modify a social structure. His third essay, "Casuistry, Explication and Saving the Appearances," reviews the proposition that might makes right under the light of diverse rubrics drawn and formulated from political theory. It is in his fourth essay, "Toward a Socialist Theory of Morality," that the argument of the book reaches its clearest and most explicit proposal. By an application of the economic polarity of scarcity and abundance he advocates creativity as present in a socialistic political and economic system to beget cooperation among men for the welfare of the disadvantaged. Whereas monopolistic capitalism maintains structures through the exploitation involved in deprivation, socialism has the potential of bringing a more equitable distribution of goods by cooperative contributions by members of the society. The author does not succeed in convincing the reader because he neglects to provide any detailed suggestions about how the change and redistribution of goods would come about. The aim of this monograph which started out as an elucidation of the distinction between "fair " and " successful " became increasingly confused as the discussion proceeded through the four essays. The style burdens the reader, demanding much effort for a modicum of light. It is hard to select what audience he intends to address by his writing. The verbal creations and the extended sentences of Mr. Guendling do not help to advance the insights in the discussion toward this necessary and useful goal of integration of thoughts from the behavioral sciences with moral theory. Reading numerous pages for the occasional unit of understanding is a higher price than one should be expected to pay for intellectual exercise. GEoRGE L. CoNcORDIA, O.P. ProvidenctJ College Providence, Rhode Island ...