Fidesz Party Research Articles

Recapturing the Past: The Role of Historical Memory in Polish and Hungarian Populism

Collective memory is a driving force in populist and nationalist politics. The emotional appeals of a shared history, particularly relating to notions of victimhood and resistance, are deeply influential in national identity formation. In this essay, Hungary’s Fidesz party and Poland’s Law and Justice party (PiS) are explored in relation to their tendency to manipulate history to construct self-serving collective memories. Both Fidesz and PiS successfully employ selective interpretations of historical events to not only mobilize support but also to quell dissent, employing emotive appeals and moral justifications deeply rooted in the national psyche. In order to combat the illiberal and anti-democratic tendencies of populist manipulations of collective memory, this essay argues that strong civil societies and the promotion of alternative narratives of collective memory are necessary. Editorial Note: This final version of this piece was to be titled "The Past Reimagined: The Role of Historical Memory in Polish and Hungarian Populism". Due to an editorial error, a draft title was published in the print edition. In the spirit of continuity between the print and online edition, we have kept the title of the print edition's in the online version, but have included this note to explain the discrepancy. Our apologies to the author for the error.

From Liberal Democracy to Illiberal Populist Autocracy: Possible Reasons for Hungary’s Autocratization

The paper looks for the main reasons of how was the Hungarian government of the Fidesz Party lead by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán able to within 13 years undermine the independent checks on their power so that it could convert what had looked like a stable but imperfect democracy into an autocracy? After listing the most obvious reasons the paper looks particularly at, how much is the way of a mostly elite-driven democratic transition using the tools of ‚legal constitutionalism‘and ‚undemocratic liberalism‘without real historical traditions of a liberal democratic constitutional culture and with the regionally determined value system is to blame. This also leads to the question, how to allocate the responsibility for the backsliding between the elites and the citizens, influenced and often manipulated by the leaders.

What Went Wrong In Hungary

Abstract: Why did Hungarian democracy have a harder time developing and rooting itself than democracy in other countries? The answer lies in the overlapping institutions and incentives that create democratic resilience. Hungary's political elites never finished their constitutional transition from communism to democracy by agreeing on a new democratic constitution. The 1998 elections polarized Hungarian politics around competing conceptions of democracy in ways that made it hard to reach consensus on a shared constitutional arrangement. Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party rose to power in the late 1990s by offering a strong state that would protect Hungarian society from the threat of social liberalism and foreclose a potential return of communism. Orbán returned to power in 2010, on the heels of the global financial crisis, and began centralizing and entrenching power by deft manipulation of democratic institutions. The case of Hungary tells us what to look for in anticipating democratic failure and serves as a cautionary tale for the EU.

The roots of Euroscepticism: Affective, behavioural and cognitive anti‐EU attitudes in Hungary

AbstractThis paper has put forward a new indicator based on the “ABC‐model” of attitudes designed to capture individual‐level Euroscepticism. We constructed a composite anti‐EU score based on affective, behavioural and cognitive sub‐indices. The study analyses data from a representative, countrywide Hungarian public opinion research. Looking for the drivers of anti‐EU attitudes, we took an integrative approach linking various theories of voting behaviour, Euroscepticism and populism studies. Our research showed that subjective well‐being significantly reduces anti‐EU attitudes. We found some empirical support for the “left behind thesis” in the Hungarian context, as severe economic grievances and fear of losing social status explained anti‐EU attitudes. Authoritarian traits turned out to be a major driver of Euroscepticism in Hungary. We proved that cosmopolitan values reduce affective and cognitive anti‐EU attitudes, but foreign experience and some international ties significantly correlated with anti‐EU stance. We confirmed that being a supporter of the governing Fidesz party and sharing culturally right‐wing political views significantly increase anti‐EU attitudes. We also revealed that partisanship's effect is strengthened by affective polarization and political interest.

Rule of Law Backsliding and Memory Politics in Hungary

Introduction of the institutional framework of constitutional democracy and transitional justice in Hungary – Liberal constitutionalism as a victim of the authoritarian efforts of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party after the 2010 parliamentary elections – The legal governance of history contributing to the backsliding of democracy and the rule of law – Use of memory politics for the newly established authoritarian regime’s own political purposes – Transitional justice measures to help reconcile society and consolidate democracy – The current Hungarian government’s attitude towards public discussion of history

Populist party-producer group alliances and divergent developmentalist politics of minimum wages in Poland and Hungary

In the advanced peripheral economies of East-Central Europe, right-wing populist parties have increasingly politicized the dualism between larger, export-competitive foreign-owned enterprises and smaller, inward-oriented and less productive domestically owned firms. By focusing on the two most-similar cases of right-wing populist governments in the region—namely, Hungary and Poland, this paper documents a striking attempt by Poland’s Law and Justice party to use increases in the minimum wage and social security contributions as a developmentalist tool that should force domestically owned firms to achieve greater efficiency and technological upgrading. In sharp contrast, Hungary’s Fidesz party has systematically compensated minimum wage increases with cuts in employer social contributions and has refrained from assigning developmentalist aims to labor cost increases. Both parties have cultivated a cross-class electoral base and have faced electoral trade-offs in emphasizing minimum wage increases. Yet we argue—and show through a comparative historical analysis—that variation in their policy approaches stems from their distinct, electorally motivated, alliances with influential producer groups and the distinct policy quid pro quos they have struck with those groups, namely, organized labor for Law and Justice and organized business for Fidesz.

Relation between the Winning of Fidesz Party with the Number of Incoming Asylum Seekers in Hungary

The migrant crisis that occurred back in 2015 has sparked various political turbulence in European countries. One of the highest “first-time application” countries is Hungary. But as the number of asylum seekers grows, the Hungarian government considered itself overburdened and thus decided to take action to limit the inflow number of asylum-seekers. This situation gives Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his Fidesz Party a way to keep campaigning for anti-immigrant policy which he believes will gain massive support. This journal uses a mixed-research method to find out the relation between the winning Fidesz Party with the number of incoming asylum seekers in Hungary. The analysis will be based on a regression process to determine the correlation between the votes that caused the Fidesz Party to win the last five general elections of Hungary with the quantity of asylum seekers in Hungary during the election year and supported by data observed from literature research.

Investigative Journalism in the Era of a Crisis of Democracy: The Example of Hungary

The subject of the article is the functioning and role of investigative journalism in Hungary in the conditions of the tendency to move from liberal democracy towards autocracy, which has been observed for over two decades. This leads to the restriction of civil liberties in various areas of social life, including the sphere of activity of the independent media, which are obviously perceived by the rulers as an obstacle in appropriating the state and achieving goals contrary to the interests of citizens. Under the rule of Viktor Orbán, the leader of the Fidesz party, since 2010 a plan to monopolize the circulation of information and subordinate the media and advertising market to the ruling party has been consistently implemented. Internet sites of investigative journalism are the only enclaves of independent journalism, identified with the concept of the “fourth power.” Three such portals were analyzed, pointing to their economic basis, the methods of conducting and the subject of their investigations, and the effectiveness in publicizing irregularities in the conduct of the rulers and businessmen associated with power.

‘Illiberal Democracy’ after Post‐Democracy: Revisiting the Case of Hungary

AbstractIn taking stock of the ruling Fidesz party's project of ‘illiberal democracy’ in Hungary, this article first develops considerations based on Claude Lefort's democratic theory for critiquing ‘illiberal democracy’ and post‐democracy alike, situating the former in an early 2010s post‐democratic moment characterised by the emergence of a neoliberal crisis management regime in the Eurozone. ‘Illiberal democracy’ and ‘market‐conforming democracy’ are both problematic from this standpoint insofar as they subordinate the key Lefortian dimension of democratic contestation to either the primacy of the markets or a reified conception of the ‘national interest’ as represented by a single party. The analysis then traces the development of ‘illiberal democracy’ and its construction of key signifiers such as the ‘national interest’ in programmatic speeches made by Viktor Orbán, from its beginnings in the post‐democratic moment to subsequent crisis conjunctures in which it has redefined itself against ever newer threats.

헝가리의 비자유민주주의와 경제위기 프레이밍

This study analyzes the rising support of Fidesz, a national-conservative political party that declared Hungary an illiberal democratic state in 2014. Although objectives of Fidesz are in opposition with the core values of the European Union (EU), Fidesz has succeeded in re-elections for four consecutive terms with overwhelming approval ratings until the 2022 general election. Despite the Fidesz Party’s high approval ratings, evidence shows that many Hungarian patrons favor democratic principles engraved in the EU rules and norms. This seeming contradiction is the result of the public’s growing concerns in resolving the economic crisis more than upholding liberal ideals. Fidesz kept framing a series of challenges such as global economic crisis, refugee crisis, the war in Ukraine in terms of economic threat and won discursive war with opposition parties.

A Fidesz társadalmi bázisának változása 1998-2022 között

The governing Fidesz party is undoubtedly the most successful political organisation in the modern political history of Hungary. Coming back into power in 2010, Fidesz has completed fundamental constitutional reform (including the voting system), and has gradually attracted a wider share of the Hungarian electorate. In this study, a wide range of social indicators were used for each election year between 1998 and 2022 to measure the relationships between party support and the possible social background of those who support the current regime. The main question was if the Fidesz electorate could be described by certain social indicators and if so, what was the dimension in that regard in the time period under investigation. Based on our quantitative analysis, the popularity of the party can be characterized by socio-economic indicators, though significant changes can be observed in this respect, since the party first won elections in 1998. This constant shift in the socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics of those right-wing voters is mainly in line with international trends, ones that have been described by a wide range of scholars with regard to western societies.

Masking the Strangulation of Opposition Parties as Pandemic Response: Austerity Measures Targeting the Local Level in Hungary

AbstractWhile a large literature studies the various tools of autocratic survival, targeting opposition actors with austerity measures in electoral autocracies is hitherto understudied. This paper argues that the COVID-19 pandemic has provided a rare opportunity for Hungary’s Fidesz party to disarm opposition parties via cutting off resources of municipalities led by opposition mayors and eliminating any remnants of local governments’ fiscal autonomy. Analysing original data from government decrees on local transfers, this study contributes to the existing literature by conceptualising fiscal strangulation as part of electoral authoritarian regimes’ toolbox to discredit opposition parties and their ability to govern locally.

Stany nadzwyczajne w konstytucji Węgier z 2011 r. a praktyka ich stosowania

After Viktor Orbán came to power, a new constitution of Hungary was adopted in 2011, which includes a separate section devoted to the states of emergency. In this time a constitutional state of danger was introduced in Hungary in the face of the covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and the war in Ukraine in 2022, and in the case of the migration crisis in 2015, a state of crisis was introduced regulated by law. The aim of the article is to present the types of states of emergency in Hungary and the practice of their application during the rule of the Fidesz party based on the analysis of legal acts regulating the issue of extraordinary measures. The main thesis assumes that the government of Orbán used the extraordinary situation in the country not only to fight the threat, but also to strengthen its already strong position in the Hungarian political system.

A paisagem simbólica de um regime iliberal: glorificando o período entre guerras na Budapeste pós-2010

Abstract: Since 2010 the Fidesz party, led by Viktor Orbán, has gradually eroded democratic institutions in Hungary using methods commonly applied by illiberal and authoritarian regimes. Previous studies explored how memory politics play a crucial role in maintaining the populist rhetoric, essential for Fidesz rule. This article aims to shed light on the spatial representation of Fidesz power in urban space. Drawing on the literature of symbolic space appropriation in general and the memory politics of Fidesz in particular, I analyze the transformation of two emblematic, centrally located squares in the capital of Hungary: Liberty and Kossuth Square. I argue that the interventions/transformations of these squares inscribe the re-evaluated and distorted “official” narratives of national history into the landscape, turning these places into a hallmark of the populist and illiberal character of Fidesz’ rule.

A Commentary on the So-Called Defense of Christian Europe: The Fidesz Party’s Response to the Migration Crisis in Hungary

Abstract This essay examines the issue of migration in Hungary since 2015, focusing in particular on the way in which Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz government have mobilized populist fears of a migrant invasion as a key trope in their efforts to construct an illiberal state, and how in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis in Afghanistan, they have continued to capitalize on populist (mis)conceptions of the so-called migrant crisis in the lead-up to the 2022 elections. Beginning with a description of Fidesz as a populist radical-right party, the essay examines Orbán’s response to the migration crisis in summer 2015 and concludes with an analysis of official Fidesz social media posts over a two-week period in September 2021. Confident in its self-proclaimed historical mission, Fidesz has used the perceived migrant crisis not only to argue that the liberal policies of the European Union are a threat to the future of European culture and civilization, but also to position itself as the protector of Hungary, and of Christian Europe more generally.

Results of the parliamentary elections in Hungary and prospects for Russian-Hungarian relations

The article examines the results of the parliamentary elections in Hungary held on April 03, 2022. The results of the leading political parties in the elections of 2018 and 2022 are compared, and all the leading Hungarian political parties that were represented in parliament in the period from 2018 to 2022 are characterized. The results of the activities of the Hungarian government headed by the leader of the FIDESZ party V. Orban, formed following the results of the 2018 elections. The reasons for maintaining the rating of this government and its influence on the course of the election campaign are revealed. It is considered how the coronavirus pandemic and the government's actions to overcome its consequences affected the course and results of the election campaign. The assessment of the activities of the main opposition parties of this country is given. The course of the election campaign and its main topics are considered, as well as the positions of those political parties and their coalitions that were elected to parliament following these elections: the FIDESZ-GS coalition and the Christian Democratic People's Party (CDNP), the United for Hungary coalition consisting of the Jobbik Party, the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Dialogue for Hungary Party, the Democratic Coalition party, the Green Party of Hungary and the Momentum Party, as well as the nationalist party Our Motherland. The positions of the leading political parties of the country on their attitude to the FIDESZ party and its leader V. are presented. Orban. The state of Russian-Hungarian relations is analyzed. A forecast is given of how the election results will affect relations between Russia and Hungary.

On the Way to Limited Competitiveness: Political Consequences of the 2011 Electoral Reform in Hungary

AbstractThis article tests the effects of a new electoral system in Hungary that was introduced by the governing FIDESZ party in 2011. We are especially concerned with the shape of single‐member district (SMD) level electoral competition following a significant transformation that tends to be viewed as serving FIDESZ's goal of preserving its constitutional majority. The results show not only transformation of Hungarian electoral politics between 2010 and 2018 elections but also the fact that the return of bipolarization is far from reality in Hungarian electoral politics. On one hand, the reform resulted in an increased number of districts with clear dominance of the two strongest parties nationally, but on the other hand, this trend was connected to asymmetrical bipartism, with clear advantage of the FIDESZ. Furthermore, there was a persistently high number of SMDs where the competition took place between the FIDESZ and one of the third‐place parties.

Understanding Europe's Populist Right: The State of the Field

Over the past decade right-wing populism has achieved unprecedented popularity across much of Europe. The first intimations came in 2010 when Viktor Orbán's Fidesz Party won a super-majority in alliance with Christian Democrats, gaining the power to reshape Hungary's legal framework. While the eurozone crisis then sparked the rise of left-wing anti-establishment movements across Mediterranean Europe, elsewhere populism exploded on the right. In the 2014 European parliamentary elections centrists lost seats to parties on the margins, and Fidesz extended its grip over Hungary. Over the next three years Law and Justice won elections in Poland with a campaign steeped in religion and euroscepticism; the United Kingdom shocked the world by voting to leave the European Union; Marine Le Pen of the National Front demolished conventional candidates in the first round of the French presidential elections; the anti-immigrant Lega joined a ruling coalition in Italy; and in Germany, Europe's largest country, the nationalist Alternative for Germany (Alernativ für Deutschland; AfD) entered parliament as the third largest party.

What is democratic backsliding?

What is democratic backsliding?

2022 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN HUNGARY

The Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2022 for the fifth time in the recent history of the country brought victory to the FIDESZ party, including the fourth with a constitutional majority of 2 /3 of parliamentary mandates. At the same time, during the current election campaign in Hungary, the system of preliminary election of a single candidate (by the type of primaries) among opposition parties and movements was tested for the first time. However, this did not save the multi-party coalition from another failure. Nevertheless, the recent elections have further strengthened the trend towards the formation in Hungary, as in a number of other Central European countries, of a two-party political system with a small layer of a «third force». The surprise of the elections was the passage to Parliament of the extreme nationalist party «Our Fatherland», which partially broke away from the Jobbik party after the 2018 elections. Now, within the walls of parliament, former right-wing radical party members will meet with the renewed Jobbik party, which performed in the last elections in a coalition with left-liberal forces. This campaign took place against a very unfavorable international background – the war in Ukraine and increased pressure on Hungary from Brussels and from neighboring states that do not agree with the aspirations of the Orban cabinet to prevent the use of Hungarian territory for military purposes. This circumstance made the task extremely difficult for Viktor Orban, the permanent leader of the FIDESZ party since its foundation, and at the same time played in favor of the opposition, as another reason for criticism of the foreign policy pursued by the Prime Minister, a significant element of which since 2011 has been the strengthening of pragmatic relations with Russia.