Fictional Entities Research Articles

Nomes Vazios e Entidades Ficcionais

The text here presented was translated from Vacuos Names and Fictional Entities, in Philosophical Troubles, Volume I: Collected Papers, Oxford Press, 2011, pp. 52-74.

MEME’ler destinasyon farkındalığı ve destinasyon seçimini etkileyebilir mi? Uyaran-organizma-tepki modeline dayalı bir çalışma

MEMEs are an image presented about real or fictional entities, brands, or destinations. It is an important issue what effect MEMEs, which are frequently used especially among the young generation, have on awareness and choice. This study investigated 1) the relationships between a MEME’s entertainment value, attitude toward the MEME, destination awareness, and intention to visit; 2) the mediating effect of attitude toward a MEME on the relationship between the MEME’s entertainment value and destination awareness and intention to visit; 3) the moderating effect of like intention and share intention on the relationship between attitude toward the MEME and destination awareness and intention to visit. Data were collected between 1 December 2022 and 7 March 2023 using convenience sampling, yielding 294 valid responses. A survey was used as a data collection tool. The analysis revealed significant positive relationships between a MEME’s entertainment value and attitude toward MEME, between attitude toward a MEME and destination awareness, between attitude toward a MEME and intention to visit, and between destination awareness and intention to visit. In addition, attitude toward the MEME partially mediated the effect of the MEME’s entertainment value on destination awareness and behavioral intention. Finally, share intention moderated the relationship between attitude toward the MEME and destination awareness.

Ficta and Amorphism: a Proposal for a Theory of Fictional Entities

Ficta and Amorphism: a Proposal for a Theory of Fictional Entities

The Paradox of the Future: Is it Rational to Feel Emotions for Future Generations?

According to some, there is a problem concerning the emotions we feel toward fictional entities such as Anna Karenina, Werther and the like. We feel pity, fear, and sadness toward them, but how is that possible? “We are saddened, but how can we be? What are we sad about? How can we feel genuinely and involuntarily sad, and weep, as we do know that no one has suffered or died?” (Radford, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1975). This is the paradox of fiction which is based on the assumption that emotions, to be genuine and rational, should be directed toward existent beings. But if beliefs about existence are necessary for us to be rationally moved by something, and such beliefs are lacking when we are moved by fiction (because we do not believe fictional characters and events to be real), then our capacity for an emotional response to fiction is irrational. Consequently, our emotional attitude toward future generations should be considered as irrational as well. But is this really the case? Are there good arguments to consider future and fictional entities as similar from this point of view? Or would it be better to distinguish the two? Is there such a thing as a paradox of the future? If so, how does it relate to the more famous paradox of fiction?

Beyond Fictionality: A Definition of Fictional Characterhood

While the nature of fictional characters has received much attention in the last few years within analytic philosophy, most accounts fail to grasp what distinguishes fictional characters from other fictional entities. In this paper, I propose to amend this deficiency by defining fictional characterhood. I claim that fictional characters are fictional intentional systems, a thesis that I label as FIST. After introducing FIST, I compare it to some rival definitions of fictional characters found in the literature, explaining why FIST is preferable. Finally, I briefly delve into the implications of FIST for other issues related to the nature of fictional characters.

Never/Nor: Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Hartley Coleridge in Poetry’s Transfictional Worlds

This essay examines the poetry of father and son poets Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) and Hartley Coleridge (1796–1849) with respect to the theme of transfictionality, a recent coinage in literary and especially fiction studies. While the term “transfictionality” has lately been used to refer to “the migration of fictional entities across different texts” (Ryan 365; Pearson 113), I suggest this term can also be applied more broadly to refer to texts that are at once mimetic and imaginary. Transfictional can also mean, I suggest, literary content that straddles the line between fact and fiction, i.e., between what is taken to be the 'real world' and an imaginary setting or ideal transmutation of apparently real content. The two Coleridges, Samuel Taylor and Hartley, both evidence a tendency to produce poetry that is transfictional in this sense, constructing Pantisocracy, an utopian intellectual colony in America, and Ejuxria, an imaginary kingdom based in the English Lake District, as examples of world-building activity that is not entirely based in either fact or fiction, but relies on the commingling of the two. By examining poetic writing that is transfictional as productive of both political and personal poetry, I hope to suggest in part both the transfictional nature of poetry's idealising tendencies, as well as its potential to be a form of world-building writing that should be seen as generically similar to (but still distinct from) narrative forms like prose fiction (especially Sci-Fi/Fantasy) and video games.

The authentic virtual influencer: Authenticity manifestations in the metaverse

Virtual influencers (VI) are fictional entities operated by third parties (freelance creators, digital agencies, or brands). Despite their increasing popularity, the way people approach these often human-looking yet entirely fictitious creations, and whether they view them as ‘authentic’, remains unclear. Existing conceptualizations of authenticity in the VI literature do not offer sufficient depth and richness to understand this complex phenomenon. Building on the Entity-Referent Correspondence Framework of Authenticity, this paper aims to explore different manifestations of authenticity in the context of VIs. We draw on interviews with consumers (64) and industry experts (11) to unveil different perspectives. Our findings demonstrate how the three types of authenticity—true-to-ideal (TTI), true-to-fact (TTF) and true-to-self (TTS)—apply to and manifest in a virtual influencer context. We conclude with theoretical contributions, with particular attention to the uncanny valley theory, managerial recommendations, and areas for future research.

‘In Contemplation only’: Revisiting the Debate between the Chalcedonians and Anti‐Chalcedonians on the Reality of the Natures of Christ

AbstractAlthough a theological exchange of ideas between Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Christians flourished at the end of the twentieth century, the ecumenical achievements of these discussions have been met with notable objections and critiques by theologians. This article focuses on one key notion that was highlighted for having been left unresolved in the ecumenical discussions, namely the concept of the difference of the natures of Christ ‘in contemplation only’ (ἐν ϑεωρίᾳ μόνῃ). The essay revises the traditional Chalcedonian perspective with regard to the interpretation of difference in contemplation, which considers it to be based on the assumption of a real distinction between the natures after Incarnation. The argument shows that this view was intended to form a response to the anti‐Chalcedonian notionalist interpretation, according to which the natures are only conceptually differentiated. By reconstructing the philosophical background of some notable sixth‐century Chalcedonian theologians, along with Cyril of Alexandria as the main theological source for the anti‐Chalcedonians, the essay will suggest that they bear the influence of opposing philosophical perspectives on conceptualization. The argument will show how some of the theological differences between the Chalcedonians and Cyril follow closely opposing attitudes in ancient philosophy towards fictional entities and conceptual constructivism. The conclusion will advocate that future ecumenical dialogues should take into account the relevance of these epistemological differences.

Can fictionalists have a genuine emotional response to religious discourse?

ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to suggest that the fictionalist’s emotions toward religious discourse could be better supported than the current literature allows. By ‘fictionalist’ I mean those of whom interpret religious discourse as useful fiction. The threefold structure of the article will argue that: (1) the concept of aliefs has been falsely equated with the concept of imagining, (2) the fictionalist ought to adopt a hybrid theory of emotions rather than a cognitive appraisal and, (3) if (1) and (2) are accepted, then key issues concerning the genuineness and appropriateness of emotions toward fictional entities can be overcome. I will conclude that something significant is at stake here, and that is whether or not the fictionalist’s emotions are deemed ‘real’ or not. Thus, to provide the best defence of the fictionalist’s emotions is to: (A) separate that which has been lumped together, that is: quasi emotions and alief-evoked emotions (B) argue for the hybrid account of emotions and, (C) defend the genuine and appropriate nature of fictional emotions.

Children-Robot Friendship, Moral Agency, and Aristotelian Virtue Development.

Social robots are increasingly developed for the companionship of children. In this article we explore the moral implications of children-robot friendships using the Aristotelian framework of virtue ethics. We adopt a moderate position and argue that, although robots cannot be virtue friends, they can nonetheless enable children to exercise ethical and intellectual virtues. The Aristotelian requirements for true friendship apply only partly to children: unlike adults, children relate to friendship as an educational play of exploration, which is constitutive of the way they acquire and develop virtues. We highlight that there is a relevant difference between the way we evaluate adult-robot friendship compared to children-robot friendship, which is rooted in the difference in moral agency and moral responsibility that generate the asymmetries in the moral status ascribed to adults versus children. We look into the role played by imaginary companions (IC) and personified objects (PO) in children’s moral development and claim that robots, understood as Personified Robotic Objects (PROs), play a similar role with such fictional entities, enabling children to exercise affection, moral imagination and reasoning, thus contributing to their development as virtuous adults. Nonetheless, we argue that adequate use of robots for children’s moral development is conditioned by several requirements related to design, technology and moral responsibility.

Mental Theorizing about Fictional Characters

Abstract Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to others and predict their behavior. Mindreading is commonplace in our daily lives, as well as our engagements with fictions. In this paper, I provide an account of how we mindread fictional entities that draws upon a version of theory-theory (TT). TT states that we attribute mental states through a process of inference-drawing from tacit folk psychological knowledge about mental states and information about our current environment and then conclude that the target must think or feel a certain way. Philosophers of art seldom argue in favor of TT. My opinion is that TT does not appeal to those trying to explain fictional mindreading because it does not explicitly make use of the imagination or imaginary mental states. Moreover, TT faces several standard objections that philosophers of art have taken to heart. Most significantly, it is argued that TT proposes an overly complex cognitive architecture and does not capture the phenomenology of our mindreading experience. To combat such worries, I supplement the traditional account of TT with an account of social referencing. Social referencing is a heuristic model of how we quickly understand our social surroundings. I argue that this updated version of TT can adequately account for the challenges faced by standard TT and can readily explain how we mindread fictional entities.

Rorty deflazionista

The aim of this paper is to propose a reconstruction of Richard Rorty’s philosophy of mind aimed at showing both its systematic structure and the originality of some outcomes, not adequately underlined by critics. My starting point is an early paper, titled Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental, in which Rorty takes sides on the venerable question of the mark of the mental. I will show that Rorty defends a weak view on the above question and that his idea, according to which a particular concept of incorrigibility provides the most promising way of distinguishing the mental from the physical, has a deep influence on Philosophy and the Mirror of the Nature. In the last part of the paper, I will underline the consequences of Rorty’s peculiar idea of the mental on the specific problem of fictional entities, showing how his position could be seen as a form of deflationism which in some ways seems compatible with the positions recently engaged by Crane.

Kwame Gyekye’s Critical Dialogue with Kant’s Ethics and its Political Consequences

In his philosophical exploration of Kants philosophy Gyekye focuses on his ethics. His theory of a moderate communitarianism, which recognizes the importance of individual rights, is based on Kant. In his concept of the person, Gyekye, in Kant’s tradition, presumes the individual’s moral autonomy, freedom, free will and the ability to choose without underestimating the importance of community for the development of personality. Kant’s theorems of human autonomy, freedom and dignity constitute his concept of natural law and thus human rights, to which Gyekye refers in his reasoning. Gyekye introduces Kant’s theorem of the autonomous subject into the philosophical debate on communitarianism. According to Gyekye, individual rights ought to be exercised based on responsibility for the community. Gyekye associates the primacy of society over individual law with the danger of tyranny in the political sphere. Through visions, ideas, ideals, and practices that exceed established communal frameworks, individuals make a decisive contribution to social changes and innovations. This allows for societal advancements at the different levels of communal life. The autonomous character of the individual is also basis for Gyekye’s political concept of a ‘meta-national’69 society and ‘nation-building’.70 Gyekye regards the individual as the essential political point of reference, not socalled ‘ethnicities’, which he characterizes as fictional entities. Gyekye aims to solve problems of multi-ethnic states, which cause internal and interstate tensions and conflicts both in the still relatively young states of Africa and in other parts of the world due to the increase in migration between cultures. It turns out that Kant’s theorems play an important role in the philosophy of Gyekye as a form of cultural borrowing in an intercultural dialogue that places Kant’s ideas in an African communitarian framework and transforms them decisively in a process of appropriation, offering a moral and political vision not only for Africa but for the world.

Is What Mickey Mouse Says Impossible? Informant Reality Status and Children’s Beliefs in Extraordinary Events

ABSTRACT As children get older, they become better able to discriminate between impossible and improbable statements and they realize that improbable events can occur in reality while impossible ones cannot. However, when children hear about extraordinary events from fictional entities (e.g., popular characters from children’s media), they may be more likely to doubt that the events can occur in reality. The current studies examine how an informant’s reality status and familiarity influence children’s belief in statements about improbable and impossible events. Across two studies, children ages 4, 6, and 8 (N = 362) heard impossible and improbable statements from an unfamiliar person, a familiar character, or an unfamiliar character (Study 1) or a real or pretend person (Study 2) and judged whether each statement could happen in reality. As in previous studies, older children were more likely than younger children to believe improbable events could occur. Additionally, for both types of statements, children’s judgments about the possibility of the events were similar regardless of the informant. These results suggest that when children hear extraordinary statements described by fictional characters, they pay more attention to the content of the statement than to the source.

Dreamworlds, Storyworlds: Narrative Proliferation and the Case of Stjörnu-Odda draumr

Dreamworlds, Storyworlds: Narrative Proliferation and the Case of <i>Stjörnu-Odda draumr</i>

Du Châtelet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics

There is a tension in Emilie Du Châtelet’s thought on mathematics. The objects of mathematics are ideal or fictional entities; nevertheless, mathematics is presented as indispensable for an account of the physical world. After outlining Du Châtelet’s position, and showing how she departs from Christian Wolff’s pessimism about Newtonian mathematical physics, I show that the tension in her position is only apparent. Du Châtelet has a worked-out defense of the explanatory and epistemic need for mathematical objects, consistent with their metaphysical nonfundamentality. I conclude by sketching how Du Châtelet’s conception of mathematical indispensability differs interestingly from many contemporary approaches.

The Logic of Impossible Scenarios in Hurtado de Mendoza’s Tractatus de Trinitate

Abstract Since the late thirteenth century, the counterfactual Filioque debate, i.e., the question whether the Son and the Holy Spirit were distinct persons in the Trinity if the Holy Spirit only proceeded from the Father and not also from the Son, was an interesting context for developing the methodology of extreme thought experiments and the logic of conditionals with impossible antecedents and paradoxes of implication. In the mid-1620s, Puente Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641) introduced a strongly critical approach towards the scientific merits of positing certain types of impossible scenarios while joining this traditional debate in his Tractatus de Trinitate. He argued that the counterfactual Filioque problem is (at best) a needless detour and (at worst) either shifts to unreliable discussions of properties of fictional entities or is outright trivial for logical reasons. The present article offers a modern edition of the ninth disputation of Hurtado’s Tractatus de Trinitate and analyses logical and methodological aspects of Hurtado’s position in the counterfactual Filioque debate.

Fictional Creations

Abstract Many people assume that fictional entities are encapsulated in the world of fiction. I show that this cannot be right. Some works of fiction tell us about pieces of poetry, music, or theatre written by fictional characters. Such creations are fictional creations, as I call them. Their authors do not exist. But that does not take away that we can perform, recite, or otherwise generate actual instances of such works. This means we can bring such individuals actually into existence, as the works they are. I conclude that the assumption about encapsulation is untenable, unless an exception is made for types.

Technological Practices of Embodiment Reflected in Jeanette Winterson’s Fictional Framing of Posthuman Subjects

Focusing on The PowerBook and The Stone Gods, this article explores the ways in which Jeanette Winterson articulates the interconnections between consciousness and memory, delineates their role in identity formation and reveals how posthuman subjects’ practices of embodiment work to undermine both heteronormative and anthropocentric worldviews. The technologically inscribed bodies of the characters portrayed in these two novels, together with Winterson’s rhizomatic conceptualization of space and her vertical figuration of time, allow for the time-travelling endeavours of e-storyteller Ali/x and of Robo-sapiens-cum-Robo-head Spike. Such fictional entities prompt investigations into the essence of social-material encounters, of subject-object interdependence, of matter-energy vitality, of interaction and intra-action, of reflexive thought and of self-configuration.

On the Lateral Readings of Fiction: Anti-Existentialism in Camus’ Stranger

ABSTRACT This paper pursues three goals: First, to develop a lateral reading of Camus’ Stranger. A lateral reading is characterized by the displacement of the central conflict. In the case of The Stranger, I argue that the central conflict in the novel lies in the relation between the author and the protagonist, not, as direct readings would have it, in the relation between the protagonist and his predicament. Second, to spell out more precisely why it should be read as an anti-existentialist novel. Here I argue that a lateral reading shows that the foundational existentialist opposition between telling and living is ironically dismantled by the very lateral structure of the novel. Third, to develop the notion of a lateral reading with a view to its potential advantages. Here, I point out that literalism involves positionalism and dynamicism. Positionalism refers to the reduction of fictional entities to their role in relation to each other. Dynamicism refers to the resulting view that those roles are further reducible to forces. I conclude that the lateral reading, with its commitments to positionalism and dynamicism is a model generalizable to the analysis of other fictional works.