Feelings Of Hate Research Articles

War Experience versus Peaceful Life

The article addresses the specific nature of social and family conflicts of military men and the role of family social protection. Contradictions of the modern society, all its problems and complications have their effect on families and family life. Years of transformations happening in our country have broken the balance between the mental and the social, and with all the plainness exposed, limited functions and insufficient scope of the family social protection system performance. Private family life imposes on a former serviceman moral, psychological and social responsibility. It is expected that he should be like all the civil people capable of living in everyday life context and sharing family concerns. Families of military men share all the problems typical to any family. At the same time, the analysis of their relatives' problems demonstrates that the main problems in the families of former military men are psychological family conflicts, feelings of hatred, anger and aggressiveness towards the spouse. Role positions and role interrelations in the family are often distorted. Family work is the most traditional form of social and psychological work. Hence, social and psychological methods of work with families have been reviewed within the project Rehabilitation of the military men who have been involved in the local war conflicts.

Mental health, social functioning, and feelings of hatred and revenge of Kosovar Albanians one year after the war in Kosovo.

A cross-sectional cluster sample survey was conducted in June 2000 in Kosovo to assess the prevalence of mental health problems associated with traumatic experiences, feelings of hatred and revenge, and the level of social functioning among Kosovar Albanians approximately 1 year after the end of the war. Findings of the second cross-sectional survey were compared with those from our 1999 mental health survey in Kosovo. Included in the survey were 1399 Kosovar Albanians aged 15 years or older living in 593 randomly selected households across Kosovo. Twenty-five percent of respondents reported PTSD symptoms, compared with 17.1% in 1999. The MOS-20 social functioning score improved to 69.8 from 29.5 in 1999. In the 2000 survey 54% of men felt hatred toward the Serbs, compared with 88.7% in 1999.

Parents with Enduring Child Disputes: Multiple Pathways to Enduring Disputes1

The normative course of the divorce process is one of heightened anger and conflict, anxiety, diminished communication, and sadness or depression for one or both partners. Frequently caused by feelings of betrayal, abandonment, suspicion, and sharp disappointment, these emotions are often accelerated by the separation and the adversarial nature of the divorce. The majority of couples significantly diminish their anger and conflict in the first two to three years following divorce (Hetherington & Kelly, 2002; King & Heard, 1999; Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980). Most of these emotionally disengaged couples will provide parenting in a parallel fashion in each home, or will cooperatively parent their children (Hetherington, 1999; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992). In either instance, the parents and their children will generally experience low conflict in the ensuing years. A small percentage of parents, estimated to be between 8 to 12%, continue to engage in conflict in the years following divorce, with little if any diminution of anger and hateful feelings (King & Heard, 1999; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992).This relatively small group of chronically contentious and litigating parents utilise disproportionate resources and time of the courts, and their children are very likely to be exposed to emotional and physical interparental aggression (Johnston & Campbell, 1988; Johnston & Roseby, 1997).

Using 'citizenship' to deal with feelings of hate in psychiatry.

Clinicians' feelings of hate towards their patients may contribute to adverse clinical outcomes through unintended harm or intended abuse. Ideas of 'citizenship' may assist psychiatrists and other mental health professionals to deal with naturally arising feelings of hate, through engagement in dialogue with patients and colleagues, in a spirit of ethical encounter and fellowship.

“Betwixt the dark and the daylight”∗ of maternal subjectivity meditations on the threshold

Psychoanalysts have long looked to maternal experience to enhance our appreciation of what we may be feeling in our work. This tradition has drawn on psychoanalyst's construction of a particular kind of good‐enough mother who is typically muted in her subjectivity. Contemporary efforts are relying on more subjectively complex descriptions of mothering to make sense of the analyst's subjective experience. However, even recent portrayals of the maternal misapprehend the degree to which mothering strains the ability of all mothers to tolerate ambivalence and tend to simply replace previous idealizations with updated prototypes. The mother as currently constructed is valorized both for her resilience and for her ability to play easily with her feelings of hate and aggression toward her baby. The questions of how the mother feels about what she feels and what she does with how she feels are not addressed. Ironically, insights derived from an increased appreciation of the mutual affect and impact that characterizes the analytic relationship are often set aside in discussing maternal experience. Suggestions are made for ways in which maternal analytic metaphors need to be reconfigured in order to capture and incorporate more finely textured notions of maternal experience.

Defence and Coping: The `Outsider' in the Group

This paper is based on clinical observations of how groups generate defence and coping mechanisms toward members who perceive themselves as totally different from the others and move towards an `outsider' position, expressing serious intentions of leaving the group. The individual background to this dynamic process is a severe narcissistic problem. The group process activates a conflict between intense needs and wishes for emotional exchange, for being recognized, held, integrated and loved, and fear of fusion with the group and loss of individuality. In such situations splitting phenomena and strong feelings of hate and aggression occur The group oscillates between integration and expulsion, identification with the `outsider' and projective defence of aggression. The concept of `coping' in such situations is discussed with respect to S.H. Foulkes's concept of `ego training in action'.

The Topology of the Subject

"Resilience," "inflexibility," "opacity" apparently constitute a universal condition of the objectification of both the external world, the body, and consciousness. Usually it is easy and simple for me to identify my thoughts, my feelings, my desires, my will, and my speech. But to understand what serious theoretical difficulties lie behind the illusory simplicity of these intuitions, let me point out that psychopathology abounds in descriptions of special, unusual, unfamiliar, states of alienation of thoughts, feelings, recollections, desires, and wishes. For example, I may, to my surprise, experience a feeling of hate for something I had been used to loving; or strange desires, ideas, or recollections may enter my head. But true alienation of mental states, manifested in syndromes of depersonalization, derealization, mental automatism, obsessions, etc., is also possible. We encounter a number of contradictions as we ponder the phenomenon of alienation of consciousness.

Destructive Hostility

We were involved as forensic experts in the case of the serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer. We discuss the scene and victim autopsy findings, with a brief consideration of the basic emotion of hostility. These findings support the thesis that at the basis of this serial killer's behavior were primary unconscious feelings of hate that he had channeled into a sadistic programmed destruction of 17 young men. The interview of the serial killer, the photographic scene documentation, and the autopsy findings stress the ambivalent homosexuality of the killer, his sexual sadism, his obsessive fetishism, and his possible cannibalism and necrophilia.

The underside of psychotherapy: Confronting hateful feelings toward clients.

The underside of psychotherapy: Confronting hateful feelings toward clients.

On Hate in Love Relationships: The Narcissism of Minor Differences Revisited

Among the many reasons that feelings of hate develop in love relationships is the need to find and to exaggerate differences in order to maintain a sense of separateness. Freud's notion of the "narcissism of minor differences" provides a framework within which to understand this need to find disappointing differences in one's beloved. Developmental antecedents of this concern about defining and preserving one's separateness can be identified in both oedipal and preoedipal periods.

Något om Oscar Levertin

In this paper, the author first traces the interconnections between two of the oldest Jewish families of Sweden, viz. his own, and that of the noted poet and critic Oscar Levertin (1862–1906). In the rest of the paper two themes in Levertin’s writing are explored. From early manuscripts, written while Levertin still was a high school student, and until the mature poems, short stories and essays he wrote toward the end of this life, the city of Stockholm was one of his major motives. In Levertin’s best short story, “Kalonymos”, the Stockholm motive is combined with the second motive explored in this paper, viz. Levertin’s commitment to and identification with the Jewish people and its tragic fate through the ages. Throughout his life Levertin suffered from feelings of alienation, and in his last years he reproached himself for having expressed feelings of hate and vengeance in the Jewish poems of his Legender och visor (1891).

The Conclusion of Richard Wright's Native Son

Both Max's courtroom speech in Richard Wright's Native Son and his final scene with Bigger have been grievously misunderstood. The numerous critics of the novel have regarded Max's speech as a Communist “party-line oration” whose propaganda is poorly related to the rest of the book. Rather, Max seeks desperately to avert the cataclysmic end toward which he sees American society heading by striving to have wrongs redressed. Bigger, however, finds a meaning in his life by accepting his feelings of hate. This is not a defeat for him, as critics have asserted. Hatred of the oppressor is a natural, human emotion which, used as the motor power of an idea driving toward a goal, can transform both the individual and society. As Max says, “The job in getting people to fight and have faith is in making them believe in what life has made them feel. . . .” This is the belief Bigger finally acquires. With this belief comes a sense of comradeship with those whites such as Jan who have earned such comradeship in action.

A Thomistic Analysis of the Concept of Repression

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXV OCTOBER, 196~ No.4 A THOMI$TIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF REPRESSION A KEY idea in the theory of psychoanalysis is the idea of repression, the concept of a dynamic and unwitting expulsion of certain images, ideas and affects from the consciousness of the mind. From one point of view, repression is invoked to account for the existence of unconscious thoughts and motivations; from another, it is conceived as a primary agent of neurotic states and of behavior which is more or less pathological; and from still another, it it allotted an important role in normal psychological growth and development. From any of these points of view, it is a phenomenon worthy of close study. The evidence concerning repression is tqday so varied and extensive that its existence can no longer be reasonably doubted. Nevertheless, the concept has not been universally accepted by psychologists, outside of the psychoanalytic schools, and possibly to some extent because there are still problems to be solved in understanding precisely what repressiOn Is. 468 464 MICHAEL STOCK It is not likely that many descriptions of repression will be found in text books of scholastic psychology, and this is unfortunate . The psychoanalytic investigations and descriptions of repression are, after some years of refining and re-defining, worthy of serious attention. This present article will attempt to summarize the salient features of the theory of repression, and show how it might fit into a scholastic development of psychology, and, in particular, into the psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas. I. DEsCRIPTION oF REPRESSION FROM PsYcHOANALYTIC LITERATURE . A. The General Idea of Repression. Repression belongs generically to the category of psychological reactions which in psychoanalytic literature_ are called mechanisms of defence. The context in which mechanisms of defence are discussed is mental anguish, which is variously termed mental pain or psychological tension or anxiety. Given a state of mental distress, distinct from physical pain, the mind might adopt, or perhaps we should say, experience, a psychological response whose aim is to escape from the disagreeable situation. The various psychological respon!les (about ten are generally recognized) are the mechanisms of defence, among which repression holds a unique place. There are many ordinary kinds of responses which people might employ to diminish mental distress. They might try to work it off, or to dist:.;act themselves with pleasures, or go to sleep, or talk it over with a friend-these are not mechanisms of defence. The term is restricted to largely spontaneous and indeliberate psychological reactions which work almost like reflexes (hence the term ' mechanism ') and which in fact succeed in one way or another in overcoming mental pain. One of the more commonly recognized mechanisms of defence is projection. By this reaction, a person who is experiencing a disagreeable feeling of hatred for another, escapes the sense of guilt by attributing the hate to the other; he begins to believe A THOMISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF REPRESSION 465 that he is hated. Another defence mechanism is reaction formation : a person overcomes disagreeable feelings of hate by overcompensating expressions. of kindness and benevolence, and vehement protestations (to himself and others) of his good will. A third mode of defending against an unwanted feeling of hate towards another is to turn it against oneself, to let it expend its force in self-recriminations. All of these mechanisms have one thing in common-they distort a feeling or attitude and make it unrecognizable to its possessor. Repression, which is like them in being an attempt to escape a disagreeable feeling, differs in its mode of operation. It does not distort 11 feeling, image or idea; it simply expels it from consciousness. It is crucial to the concept of repression to understand that it does not annul or annihilate the feeling or idea that it expels. It simply removes it from the sphere of awareness. It is a negating action vis-a-vis internal perception, a blocking off or inhibiting of consciousness concerning some mental phenomenon . The phenomenon persists afterwards in...

Parents and Children in the Light of Dynamic Psychology

Parents should be looked upon primarily as objects of the first emotional experience of the child in relation to his environment. Obviously, in children deprived of their parents, other people often occupy this important position and we think of them as substitutes. There is an important difference here between the first child and subsequent ones: the first one is born into a world consisting of two significant humans, while the world of the others contains one or a few additional individuals. Some basic feelings gradually develop in the child in relation to parental figures and they may be enumerated as: 1) love, 2) hatred and hostility, 3) guilt, 4) emotional conflict, and 5) identification. Parents are the first people who gratify the child's basic needs and in this way provide him with evidence of their love and stimulate similar reactions in return. They also are the first to frustrate the child's desires by their more or less rigid system of rules and prohibitions and in this way stimulate the first feelings of hatred, resentment and hostility. These neg. ative feelings and their physical expression are again strongly disapproved by the parents, and in this way the feeling of guilt is created and learned by the child. The child's desires and prohibitions oppose each other to create conflict. Such conflict may also be the product of inconsistent demands and expectations. The conflicts engendered in this fashion are probably the most harmful since they regularly disrupt the learning

Cerebral Vibrations and Thought

I.—“I believe,” says Professor Tyndall, “that all the great thinkers who have studied the subject are ready to admit the following hypothesis, that every conscious act, whether in the domain of the senses, of thought, or of emotion, corresponds to a certain definite molecular state of the brain; that this relation of the physical to consciousness invariably exists, so that, given the state of the brain, we may deduce from it the corresponding thought or feeling; or given the thought or feeling, we may deduce from it the state of the brain. But how to make this deduction ? At bottom it is not a case of logical deduction; it is, in fact, a case of empirical association. It may be replied that very many of the deductions of science have this empirical character; such is that by which it is affirmed that an electric current circulating in a given direction will make the magnetic needle deviate in a definite direction. But the two cases differ in this, that if the influence of the current upon the needle cannot be shown, it can at least be imagined, and that we have no doubt whatever that ultimately the problem will be mechanically resolved, while we cannot even picture to ourselves the passage from the physical state of the brain to the corresponding facts of feeling. Let it be admitted that a definite thought corresponds simultaneously to a definite molecular action in the brain. Well, we do not possess the intellectual organ, we have not even the rudiment apparently of the organ, which would enable us to pass by reasoning from one phenomenon to the other. They are produced together, but we know not why. If our intelligence and our senses were perfect enough, vigorous enough, enlightened enough to enable us to see and to feel the actual molecules of the brain; if we could trace all the movements, the groupings, the electric discharges, if they exist, of these molecules; if we knew perfectly the molecular states which correspond to this or that state of thought or of feeling, we should be still as far as ever from the solution of the problem: what is the connection between this physical state and the facts of consciousness? The abyss which exists between these two classes of phenomena will be always intellectually impassable. Let us admit that the feeling of love, for instance, corresponds to a spiral movement of the molecules of the brain to the right, and the feeling of hate to a spiral movement to the left, we should know that when we love, a movement is produced in one direction, and that when we hate, a movement is produced in another direction; but the why would remain still unanswered.”∗

Cerebral Vibrations and Thought

I.—“I believe,” says Professor Tyndall, “that all the great thinkers who have studied the subject are ready to admit the following hypothesis, that every conscious act, whether in the domain of the senses, of thought, or of emotion, corresponds to a certain definite molecular state of the brain; that this relation of the physical to consciousness invariably exists, so that, given the state of the brain, we may deduce from it the corresponding thought or feeling; or given the thought or feeling, we may deduce from it the state of the brain. But how to make this deduction ? At bottom it is not a case of logical deduction; it is, in fact, a case of empirical association. It may be replied that very many of the deductions of science have this empirical character; such is that by which it is affirmed that an electric current circulating in a given direction will make the magnetic needle deviate in a definite direction. But the two cases differ in this, that if the influence of the current upon the needle cannot be shown, it can at least be imagined, and that we have no doubt whatever that ultimately the problem will be mechanically resolved, while we cannot even picture to ourselves the passage from the physical state of the brain to the corresponding facts of feeling. Let it be admitted that a definite thought corresponds simultaneously to a definite molecular action in the brain. Well, we do not possess the intellectual organ, we have not even the rudiment apparently of the organ, which would enable us to pass by reasoning from one phenomenon to the other. They are produced together, but we know not why. If our intelligence and our senses were perfect enough, vigorous enough, enlightened enough to enable us to see and to feel the actual molecules of the brain; if we could trace all the movements, the groupings, the electric discharges, if they exist, of these molecules; if we knew perfectly the molecular states which correspond to this or that state of thought or of feeling, we should be still as far as ever from the solution of the problem: what is the connection between this physical state and the facts of consciousness? The abyss which exists between these two classes of phenomena will be always intellectually impassable. Let us admit that the feeling of love, for instance, corresponds to a spiral movement of the molecules of the brain to the right, and the feeling of hate to a spiral movement to the left, we should know that when we love, a movement is produced in one direction, and that when we hate, a movement is produced in another direction; but the why would remain still unanswered.”∗