Indian Federalism Research Articles

How Indian foreign policy negotiates federalism: a case study of the role of the constituent states

India’s centre-heavy federalism suffered dual downturns in the 1990s, with the tides of globalization and economic liberalization challenging the sanctity of borders and the incidence of coalition politics increasing the salience of regional equations and demands. But Indian foreign policy in the 1990s remained the almost exclusive preserve of the Centre, ruled by several coalitions of political parties like the National Front (1989-1996), United Front (1996-1998). As Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s popular yet controversial regime is poised at the middle of its second term in 2022 (beginning in 2019), the continued showcasing of the Centre’s leadership in foreign policy decisions, high-profile bilateral and multilateral engagements, bold collisions with uneasy neighbours, are only matched with the unilateralism exhibited within the borders. Given the oft-reported instances of acute voices of assertions by the states on various issues ranging from illegal and forced migration, resource-sharing, or economic development involving neighbouring countries, a stock-taking is needed, to explore how genuinely federal is India’s foreign policy. In other words, the role of the constituent states in leveraging influence and bargaining for their due share of active involvement as stakeholders, merits critical academic intervention. When tested against real cases, two observations can be made. The dynamics shaping federalism and foreign policy may not just involve the Centre and the states but involve local/regional factors and influences from across international borders as well. Second, there is no causal link between the nature of the government in power at the Centre, Union-state political equations, and the imperatives across the borders between provinces and neighbouring countries. This study examines three case studies; West Bengal, Assam, and the Northeast, to reveal that foreign policy operates within the constitutionally designed structures of federalism in India by negotiating recurrent complexities of politics and deceives regional stakeholders or states with narratives of inclusiveness.

Book review: Mahendra Prasad Singh, Federalism in India

Mahendra Prasad Singh, Federalism in India. Delhi: SAGE, 2022, 294 pp., ₹1,295.

"Judicial Discretion in Balancing Political Objectives and Constitutional Principles: An Examination of Precedents like State of Rajasthan v. Union of India in the Context of Indian Federalism"

"Judicial Discretion in Balancing Political Objectives and Constitutional Principles: An Examination of Precedents like State of Rajasthan v. Union of India in the Context of Indian Federalism"

Governance Interface: The Index in Modi's India

AbstractIn Modi's India, a host of indices perform transparency, efficiency, and good governance but leave undeclared the political shifts they are bringing about. Dramatized in real-time dashboards, policy briefs, press reports, and social media posts, these technocratic numbers arbitrarily rank administrative units and place them in a competitive relation with each other within Indian federalism. As technical device, aesthetic projection, and mediating interface, the index is a node in “maximum governance,” an emergent apparatus of governance that renders development as the site of a pernicious combination of centralizing state power and neoliberal entrepreneurship.

Book review: Mahendra Prasad Singh, Federalism in India

Mahendra Prasad Singh, Federalism in India. New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2021, 294 pp., $55.00 (Hardback).

Cooperative federalism VIS-À-VIS government policies in India

This study is an assessment to understand the current nature of Indian Federalism. The country has various forms of government and works in their respective fields and powers. This article explores the concept and meaning of federalism. Further, it also expresses the policies related to federalism followed by respected governments within the purview of India. The study considers the works of governments, governing powers, and the overall implementation of Central Sponsored Schemes regarding the administration of policy on the part of state governments. It is important to research as there is limited information about the same and it also includes the survey within the country. The object of this research is to determine the actual condition of federalism in the country with special reference to central sponsored schemes. And what else it requires to be better in the same components. The research might help for the betterment of working of the government policies mentioned therein.

How Indian foreign policy negotiates federalism: a case study of the role of the constituent states

India’s centre-heavy federalism suffered dual downturns in the 1990s, with the tides of globalization and economic liberalization challenging the sanctity of borders and the incidence of coalition politics increasing the salience of regional equations and demands. But Indian foreign policy in the 1990s remained the almost exclusive preserve of the Centre, ruled by several coalitions of political parties like the National Front (1989-1996), United Front (1996-1998). As Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s popular yet controversial regime is poised at the middle of its second term in 2022 (beginning in 2019), the continued showcasing of the Centre’s leadership in foreign policy decisions, high-profile bilateral and multilateral engagements, bold collisions with uneasy neighbours, are only matched with the unilateralism exhibited within the borders. Given the oft-reported instances of acute voices of assertions by the states on various issues ranging from illegal and forced migration, resource-sharing, or economic development involving neighbouring countries, a stock-taking is needed, to explore how genuinely federal is India’s foreign policy. In other words, the role of the constituent states in leveraging influence and bargaining for their due share of active involvement as stakeholders, merits critical academic intervention. When tested against real cases, two observations can be made. The dynamics shaping federalism and foreign policy may not just involve the Centre and the states but involve local/regional factors and influences from across international borders as well. Second, there is no causal link between the nature of the government in power at the Centre, Union-state political equations, and the imperatives across the borders between provinces and neighbouring countries. This study examines three case studies; West Bengal, Assam, and the Northeast, to reveal that foreign policy operates within the constitutionally designed structures of federalism in India by negotiating recurrent complexities of politics and deceives regional stakeholders or states with narratives of inclusiveness.

Water Federalism, Tribunalization of Water Justice and Hydro-Politics: India’s Inter-State River Water Disputes Act at 65 Years

India’s water federalism is at a crossroads. It is a unique two-tier system that has the constitutional and enabling provisions for water management and inter-state water dispute resolution as its base. These support the tribunal system that adjudicates inter-state river water disputes and administers water justice. More than six decades have elapsed since its establishment. At the same time, during this period, the per capita water availability has fallen drastically. India is now one of the world’s most water-stressed countries. Water disputes between States are becoming more animated and highly volatile. This article examines water federalism in India in terms of two questions: 1) Should water be transferred from the State List to the Concurrent List? 2) Should India persist with the tribunal system or replace it with the judicial process at the Supreme Court level? The first assumes importance as India persists with the river linking project. The second is relevant because the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act is almost 65 years old. In 2016, India’s Supreme Court re-wrote the law, and, more recently, the Union Government sought to revamp the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act through amendments. All these impel the need to re-look the idea of water federalism as it operates in India in its entirety.

India’s Cooperative Federalism during Covid-19 Pandemic

The role of cooperative federalism in India in dealing with the challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic and its effects such as economic crisis and large-scale human migration, among others, is put to test. The initial stages of the pandemic response highlighted the unitary tilt in the Indian federal structure. At the later stages of this crisis, cooperative federalism also appears to be visible. Nevertheless, the lack of cooperation between the States, and the Centre’s failure to facilitate horizontal federalism without invoking any intergovernmental agency for the purpose has made the lives of migrant workers miserable. An intergovernmental institution such as Inter-Sate Council (ISC) could have been used as a common forum for the Centre and the States for the purpose of both vertical and horizontal cooperative federalism. The pandemic has also brought to the fore the importance of India’s grassroots level of government, though, unfortunately, their potential remains underutilised.

Article 282 and Centrally Sponsored Schemes: Implications on Fiscal Federalism in India

India is a quasi-federal country which implies that on one hand when the States require autonomy and flexibility in working, on other hand it also required an interdependence between the Centre and the state, thereby giving birth to the idea of cooperative federalism. The constitution of India has clearly given a framework demarcating the power, functions and responsibilities of each level of government and there are a few provisions which aim at cooperative federalism. Article 282 of the Indian Constitution is one such provision which empowers both the Centre as well as the State to provide grants for public purpose. The paper seeks to examine the issues and challenges faced by the fiscal federalism in India. The paper also delves into the constitutional provision to understand and identify the use of Article 282. The current debate with respect to the state autonomy in matters of finances and prioritizing the need of the states compel the analysis of Article 282 with reference to the Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS). The paper thus aims to give a comprehensive analysis of Article 282 and its use and implications on fiscal federalism in India.

Revocation of special status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; a new dimension to asymmetrical federalism in India

Revocation of special status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; a new dimension to asymmetrical federalism in India

Review. Federalism in India: Questions about state capacity and national policy

Review. Federalism in India: Questions about state capacity and national policy

Concept of federalism in India and the USA

Concept of federalism in India and the USA

Model of Cooperative and Competitive Federalism in India: The Goods and Services Tax Law, Challenges in the 21st Century and the Way Forward

Model of Cooperative and Competitive Federalism in India: The Goods and Services Tax Law, Challenges in the 21st Century and the Way Forward

Revisiting Indian federalism: An overview of contemporary issues and challenges

Revisiting Indian federalism: An overview of contemporary issues and challenges

The limits of constitutionality? Centrally Sponsored Schemes in law and policy

ABSTRACT This paper examines Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) as a means of Union-State fiscal transfers in light of Article 282 of the Constitution. CSS are programmes designed and funded by the Union government on subjects in the State and Concurrent Lists, to be implemented by various State governments. In this paper, I argue that CSS permit the Union to exercise a high degree of control over the use of finances by the States. In effect, therefore, the Union’s spending power to frame CSS can intrude on States’ powers to frame and execute programmes on subjects that ought properly to be in their exclusive competence. I argue that even though CSS are constitutional under Article 282, they nevertheless have important practical consequences for Indian federalism

COVID-19 and Federalism in India: Capturing the Effects of State and Central Responses on Mobility.

In response to the rapidly spreading COVID-19 pandemic, governments resorted to containment and closure measures to reduce population mobility and ensure social distancing. Initially, India’s state governments enacted varying social-distancing policies until the Central government overrode states to impose a nationwide lockdown on 24th March. This paper examines the relative impact of state- and central-level social-distancing policies on changes in mobility, comparing the periods before and after the national lockdown. A district-level panel dataset is formed, compiling data on social-distancing policies and changes in population mobility patterns. Panel regressions reveal that the incremental effect of each social-distancing policy varied across states in the pre-24th March period. The national lockdown led to much larger, though varying, reductions in mobility across all states. Overall, states which were able to achieve higher compliance in terms of reducing mobility in the pre-lockdown phase performed better in the national lockdown.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41287-021-00463-4.

Constitutionality of Disaster Management Act, 2005 on the Touchstone of Federalism During Covidǧ19 in India

As per 7th Schedule of Constitution of India, 1950 there is sub-division of three lists namely Union list, State list and Concurrent list, which gives a detailed insight of powers of law making with both Centre and State in our country. Due to this both Centre and State have their exclusive domain wherein they can exercise their law-making power. During this exercise of power, which has been so specifically demarcated, can there be dispute of any kind? Answer is yes, Centre has often encroached upon exclusive domain of State subject matters by passing laws on such subject(s). The prominent example of it is the exercise of power under the Disaster Management Act, 2005 which came to be invoked by Centre for issuing guidelines binding on States in light of prevention of global pandemic being COVID-19. Public health and sanitation are a specific field of legislation under Entry 6 of List II, implying that States have exclusive power to legislate upon matters wherein public health is an issue, however despite of that Central Government laid down an array of guidelines during the COVID-19 pandemic directing States to enforce those guidelines. In this article, the main focus will be regarding constitutionality of those guidelines issued by Centre and the interpretation laid down by the Judiciary in regards to similar incidents. Furthermore, the history of enactment of Disaster Management Act, 2005 and how the powers exercised under the guise of it, will be analyzed in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion in relation to the present issue. Moreover, upon this premise of issuance of guidelines by Centre under the DMA Act, 2005, the Indian Federalism would be discussed upon the touchstone of judgements delivered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in said regard and by briefly comparing same with other federal jurisdictions such as United States. The entire Paper will be a blend of descriptive, historical, comparative and analytical approach.

Metamorphic Moment of the Indian Polity: Anatomizing the Evolution and Changing Dynamics of the Indian State against the Protean Nature of Cooperative Federalism

The elusive and paradoxical nature of Indian polity has been evident in the amalgamation of Western patterns of bureaucratic organization, participatory politics with indigenous practices and institutional framework that had an organic growth on the Indian soil. While post-colonial India was characterized by the incorporation of democratic political ethos and structural architecture, Westminster model of parliamentary government and representative legal institutions, it did not imply the exact replication of the British architectonic system of advanced industrial democracy. As the Indian political process is subjected to dramatic transmutations and cyclical changes, it has eventually acquired a mass character and vibrancy with the exuberant participation of marginalized and underprivileged political formations and social groups in the political arena, coupled with the regionalization of the polity, altering the terms of political domination and sowing the seeds of an increasingly complex mechanism of negotiation, competitive bargaining, alliance and coalition-building, in a cooperative federalist arrangement. The principle objective of this paper is to put an emphasis on the role of the Indian state, the transformation of Indian federalism and the political process, while holistically encapsulating the development and multidimensional patterns associated with the Indian political system, tracing the departure from the heyday of the Congress system and Nehruvian civic nationalism to the crystallization of a majoritarian edifice, propelled by Hindu Nationalism.

The Working of Cooperative and Collaborative Federalism in India: Understanding Intergovernmental Relations

A federal constitution is based on at least two levels of governments— federal/union and provincial/state—which are generally constitutionally assigned exclusive as well as concurrent dominions, in addition to the residual powers. Consequently, union–state coordination is indispensable to negotiate and devise joint policies in field of shared jurisdictions. Moreover, such coordination is also essential for exclusive jurisdiction apparently because in the eras of ‘cooperative federalism’ and ‘collaborative federalism’, the federal government frequently utilises its usually bigger revenues to introduce centrally sponsored schemes of development and social policies with approval of state governments. These schemes may be entirely or partially financed by the union and executed by the states. Besides, residual powers or new policy areas that may emerge also need union–state cooperation, even though they are judicially adjudicated to go to any of the two levels of government. In an era of intergovernmental and global interdependence, functional link of governance may require cooperative action by different levels of governments besides the civil society organisations.