Federal On-scene Coordinator Research Articles

Motor-Tanker Coimbra - The Million Gallon Gamble

ABSTRACT In January of 1942, the M/T COIMBRA, a British flag vessel, carrying 64,800 barrels of lubricating oil and fuel oil was torpedoed by the German submarine U-123. It sank 26 NM south of Shinnecock Inlet, NY. The vessel was classified by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) as a Remediation of Underwater Legacy Environmental Threats (RULET) vessel and was ranked the second highest pollution threat in the First Coast Guard District area of responsibility and the highest for U. S. Coast Guard Sector Long Island Sound. In 2015, Sector Long Island Sound started receiving pollution reports from the National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service (NESDIS) via NOAA of anomalies in the vicinity of the wreck location of M/T COIMBRA. The anomalies were later confirmed by U.S. Coast Guard overflights and surface sheen sampling as oil. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) determined that M/T COIMBRA posed a substantial threat to the environment and opened the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to complete an assessment and execute an oil removal operation from the vessel that was deteriorating on the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean for 77 years. The vast number of unknowns, government regulations, technological challenges, varying weather patterns, diverse marine fauna, and lack of historical records about non-U.S. flagged vessels complicated the response to this pollution threat. Establishing a diverse team of professionals comprised of federal, academic, and state specialists, a detailed statement of work was created, and a contractor was chosen to complete objectives established by the FOSC. As a result of the operation, the U.S. Coast Guard determined the following: - Types and quantity of oil onboard the subject vessel- Best practices for the oil removal from an historic wreck- The impacts of salt water on the riveted hull structures- Challenges of the oil removal from various historical ship construction types A total of 81 out of 87 wrecks on the RULET database remain unassessed and unexplored in the United States alone. RULET wrecks and other historical polluting wrecks around the world may present a significant threat to the environment. The COIMBRA project answers some of the questions that will make future cases of these polluting historical wrecks more cost effective and less time consuming. In the best-case scenario this project will serve as an example for establishment of the framework for future projects of this nature.

Update to U.S. National Response Team's Abandoned Vessels Authorities and Best Practices Guidance

Abstract The U.S. National Response Team promulgated an interagency guidance document entitled “Abandoned Vessel Authorities and Best Practices Guidance” (AVG) in 2014 to address a myriad of questions that the Federal On-Scene Coordinators and broader response community tend to face when mitigating threats caused by abandoned or derelict vessels. This document compiles information surrounding existing laws, policies, and best practices to inform and advise responders without bogging them down in “legalese” or forcing them to search from document to document to find all the relevant information. In the aftermath of the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season and associated responses, the National Response Team tasked its Preparedness Committee to reopen the 2014 AVG to ensure the document addressed the challenges that were brought to light amid the responses. The Committee chartered a working group to systematically review and update this document and incorporate the latest pertinent policy changes, including those from Federal Emergency Management Agency to ensure that it most thoroughly addressed the gamut of issues a responder may come up against in the arena of abandoned (or derelict, or displaced) vessel management. The updated AVG was completed and approved by the NRT in 2020 and is posted to the NRT website. Major updates include: Considerations for long-term storage and disposal;Clarification on foreign-flagged vessel nuances;Information for responders to consider regarding contaminants other than those covered under NCP/ESF constructs (e.g. if typical response authorities do not cover a scenario, what options might the responder still leverage);An additional section addressing nuances of managing multiple vessel casualties at once, either due to a natural disaster or an act or omission from a third party; andImportant differences between National Contingency Plan and Stafford Act funded/organized responses. This paper dives into the rationale for making changes, the benefits of additions made, the processes and methodologies for undertaking updates, and major elements of the AVG to provide a snapshot of the guidance it affords the reader.

Responder Needs Addressed by Arctic Maritime Oil Spill Modeling

There is a greater probability of more frequent and/or larger oil spills in the Arctic region due to increased maritime shipping and natural resource development. Accordingly, there is an increasing need for effective spilled-oil computer modeling to help emergency oil spill response decision makers, especially in waters where sea ice is present. The National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Office of Response & Restoration (OR&R) provides scientific support to the U.S. Coast Guard Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) during oil spill response. OR&R’s modeling products must provide adequate spill trajectory predictions so that response efforts minimize economic, cultural, and ecologic impacts, including those to species, habitats, and food supplies. The Coastal Response Research Center is conducting a project entitled Oil Spill Modeling for Improved Response to Arctic Maritime Spills: The Path Forward, in conjunction with modelers, responders, and researchers. A goal of the project is to prioritize new investments in model and tool development to improve response effectiveness in the Arctic. The project delineated FOSC needs during Arctic maritime spill response and provided a solution communicating sources of uncertainty in model outputs using a Confidence Estimates of Oil Model Inputs and Outputs (CEOMIO) table. The table shows the level of confidence (high, medium, low) in a model’s trajectory prediction over scenario-specific time intervals and the contribution of different component inputs (e.g., temperature, wind, ice) to that result.

Stakeholder Analysis for On-Scene Coordinators and Area Committees: A simplified multi-step technique to understand grassroots participation

ABSTRACTState and federal On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) and Area Committees acknowledge the benefits of engaging stakeholders to help support environmental protection goals and objectives. Whereas existing stakeholder management tools provide guidance to enable well-organized volunteerism during operational phases of oil spill response, incident lessons learned suggest there is less guidance on the broader stakeholder engagement process that occurs during planning and preparedness phases. The tendency to re-live conditions resulting in lessons re-learned indicate that tools designed to resolve those lessons are either ill-equipped to address the problem, not feasible to employ, are glossed over as someone else’s responsibility, are not incorporated into regional or area contingency plans, and/or are not integrated into incident command system design and functionality during drills and exercises.This paper provides OSCs and Area Committees a simplified multi-step technique to analyze and evaluate a range of stakeholders prior to conducting actual stakeholder engagement and well before stakeholders are engaged during a response. Although stakeholder engagement during response is critical and can benefit mutual goals, initiating these efforts during response is not optimal, especially when incident realities shift emphasis from grassroots capacity building to risk communications. Stakeholder engagement should begin well prior to a response with deliberate analysis of stakeholders as part of the planning and preparedness process.The multi-step technique may improve the efficacy of Area Contingency Plans, the primary conduit implementing National Contingency Plan aims of nongovernmental participation, by enhancing the design and functionality of stakeholder engagement. The outcomes achieved may help to deliver fundamental tenants of public policy and service— where problems are framed so that available solutions are fiscally, technically, and politically feasible, advance the common good, and include a broad array of stakeholders through proactive public participation.

One Gulf – Commitment to Preparedness

ABSTRACT: Anadarko Petroleum Corporation partnered with the U.S. Coast Guard Eighth District and the Mexican Navy (SEMAR Zone 1) in a multi-year Mexico-United States (MEXUS) exercise series. The MEXUS Plan is a Joint Contingency Plan between the United Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons or other Hazardous Substances. It provides standard operational procedures with respect to bi-national coordination in case of pollution incidents that may represent a threat to coastal waters or the marine environment of the border zone of both countries. The MEXUS Agreement and Plan were developed after the Ixtoc I well blowout in June 1979. This international agreement entered into force on 30 March 1981. Under the MEXUS Plan there are two regional annexes: Gulf (MEXUSGULF) and Pacific (MEXUSPAC). Each Annex incorporates regional resource and high-level strategic information to assist each country in communication and coordination during an incident that impacts both countries’ jurisdiction. The regional annexes are not tactical; tactical planning remains at the local level (Area Contingency Plans in the U.S.; Local Contingency Plans in Mexico), led by the respective Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC). For the U.S., the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead agency serving as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator; the Mexican Navy serves as the lead agency in Mexico. The U.S. Coast Guard has been working with the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) to update the MEXUS Plan, with a near final draft as of March 2017. The proposed changes incorporate several organizational changes that have occurred over the years while reiterating the core purpose as a communication and coordination plan. With the impending development of offshore leases in Mexico, coupled with efforts to update the MEXUS Plan, a tabletop exercise was conducted in 2016. This tabletop exercise allowed senior officials from federal and state agencies and industry representatives to openly discuss emerging scenarios and high-level strategies to identify gaps and shortfalls in existing plans, policies and procedures. To achieve this concept, both countries shared procedures and processes to allow for resources to operate in each respective country to minimize impact to natural resources and sensitive shoreline areas. In 2017, the lessons learned were incorporated in a multi-day exercise to demonstrate how industry, the U.S. Coast Guard and other agencies would manage a hypothetical offshore subsea well incident originating from the U.S. with resulting impacts in Mexican waters. This paper discusses the planning process and shares the lessons learned from both exercises in an effort to promote continued preparedness and improved response coordination. With the help of Mexican Association of Hydrocarbon Companies (AMEXHI), Mexico’s newly-formed national oil and gas industry association, these lessons learned will further help promote implementing Mexico’s new subsea containment and offshore response requirements.

Tank Barge ARGO: A Case Study on the Employment of NCP Special Teams

Abstract On October 20, 1937 the Tank Barge ARGO sank during a fall storm on western Lake Erie. The barge was reported to be carrying 100,000 gallons of crude oil and 100,000 gallons of benzol and was thought to have sunk in Canadian waters. The ARGO was identified as a potential polluting wreck in NOAA’s Remediation of Underwater Legacy Environmental Threat (RULET) project and ranked as the greatest legacy underwater environmental threat on the Great Lakes. However, the exact location, condition, and disposition of the sunken barge and its cargo were a mystery for over 78 years. On August 28, 2015 the Tank Barge ARGO was discovered by the Cleveland Underwater Explorers in U.S. waters, beginning a three month response by the U.S. Coast Guard Federal On-Scene Coordinator to mitigate the substantial threat to the environment and public health posed by the ARGO’s cargo. Rife with challenges, the response included complex dive operations, hot tapping, chemical lightering and storage, environmental protection and monitoring and severe logistical constraints, all of which required an extensive incident management organization and utilized almost every “special team” under the National Contingency Plan. This case study summarizes the response to the Tank Barge ARGO and details how “special teams” were utilized by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator to safely and effectively respond to the environmental threat. Specifically, the capabilities of the National Strike Force, District Response Group and District Response Advisory Team, and Scientific Support Coordinator during this response are highlighted and offered as a best practice for other oil and hazardous substance responses.

Addressing the Uncertainty and Requirements for Oil Spill Response Consultations

ABSTRACT In the United States (U.S.), oil spill response planning, preparedness, and response requirements are dictated primarily by the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, a regulation that implements the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the Clean Water Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. At the planning stage, these regulations require the development of national, regional, and local response capabilities and promote overall coordination among responders. During a spill, these capabilities are utilized by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) to analyze whether response actions are likely to impact protected resources. The consultation process required under Federal statutes, charges the FOSC to consult with Federal, state, Tribal entities, and other Federal agencies to determine potential effects of response actions during an incident and to develop strategies to avoid, minimize, and mitigate those effects (40 CFR § 300.135(j); § 300.305(e); and § 300.322(a), 1994). Consultations should continue until response operations are concluded and may continue after operations are complete. Four key regulatory mandates that require an FOSC to initiate consultation during a response include:Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended requires consultation with US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) on federally listed species and designated critical habitats;Magnuson-Stevens Act requires consultation with NMFS on any action that may affect Essential Fish Habitats;National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended requires Federal agencies to consult with states, federally recognized tribes, and other stakeholders on potential impacts to historic and cultural resources; andTribal Consultations under Executive Order 13175 – Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments when federally recognized Indian Tribes and their interests are affected by a response. Consultation is also required under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act when Native American burial sites, human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, or items of cultural patrimony are identified on Federal or Tribal lands during a response and no pre-consultation plan of action has been developed.1 Consultation requirements are not universally understood, leading to uncertainty and inconsistencies across the response community and Trustees regarding when to initiate and how to conduct the consultations. This paper discusses the Federal consultation requirements and identifies areas of possible uncertainties in the consultation process throughout the pre-spill planning, response, and post-response phases of an incident. This paper will suggest resolutions and recommendations to further enhance the consultation process by the Federal spill response decision-makers and planning bodies.

Oil Spill Response Under the NCP and the NRF/Stafford Act - Incompatible Regimes?

ABSTRACT This paper examines oil pollution response during disaster situations when the Stafford Act is invoked by the President and the National Response Framework provides funding under ESF-10. The interrelationship between the National Contingency Plan (NCP), created by various pollution statues (Clean Water Act/CWA, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability/CERCLA, Oil Pollution Act/OPA) and the National Response Framework (NRF), created to deal with declared disasters under the Stafford Act, is becoming more fractious as time passes and the financial scope of disasters grows. The paradigm that existed when Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005 was not in evidence when Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy made landfall in the fall of 2012. The NCP envisions oil and chemical spill response in the context of a single spill, ideally with a known responsible party (RP), who takes action to respond to the spill. That RP is liable for costs and damages resulting from the spill. Action commences when the spill occurs and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) determines that federal action is required. If the federal funds (Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund/OSLTF, CERCLA/SUPERFUND) are used, the federal government seeks cost recovery afterwards. The NRF envisions the federal government acting like a “no-fault insurance” regime, providing federal resources/funds to states when their capabilities are overwhelmed and their citizens require immediate succor. FEMA action commences when the State requests and the President approves aid. The states agree to a cost share – not to exceed 25% of Federal funding. There is no private party liability when actions are complete. The Homeland Security Act established the NRF, and operationally subsumes the NCP under it. However, the Homeland Security Act does not address what fund (Stafford or the pollution funds) will be used when a declared disaster occurs. Furthermore, the Stafford Act structure (State requests, Presidential approvals, Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Coordinating Officer (FEMA FCO) appointment, area surveys, mission assignments) becomes sclerotic in a large incident when compared to the much more nimble NCP process (spill, FOSC decision, immediate funding). The effect for Coast Guard (CG) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) field responders is to lean forward with NCP processes to protect the public. FEMA, faced with dwindling resources, observes this tendency and declines to provide disaster funding when the other federal funds “can be used”. The paper proposes a new paradigm for the “Makris-Suiter” Agreement of 1998 between EPA and FEMA. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.

National Contingency Plan Phase II Activities: A Problem Analysis & Decision Framework for Understanding & Evaluating Oil Pollution Threats from Sunken Ships Off California

ABSTRACT The National Contingency Plan (NCP) provides an assessment framework through which to manage pollution threats in the United States. Although the NCP delivers an assessment framework for evaluating Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act (CERCLA) threats through formalized Site Assessments, Feasibility Studies, and Remedial Investigations, the NCP falls short of delivering a similar iterative process through which to evaluate non-emergent oil pollution threats. Recent experience with two historical wrecks in California (SS MONTEBELLO and M/V FERNSTREAM) suggest an opportunity to develop a problem analysis and decision framework enabling assessment/response (A&R) teams to evaluate more fully the nature of a problem, as well as the relative efficacy of alternative courses of action available to the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC). Using those two experiences as case studies, promising practices are distilled and adapted thru a formal policy analytic process to develop a problem analysis and decision framework for non-emergent oil threats. The intent is to bolster the utility of the NCP's Operational Response Phases for Oil Removal with emphasis on Phase II activities, and to provide FOSCs, Area Committees and Regional Response Teams a more robust evaluation tool.

M/V JOHN B. CADDELL

Hurricane Sandy hit the East Coast of the United States on October 29th, 2012, caused over $63 billion in damage, destroyed thousands of homes, left over 8 million people without electrical service, and killed at least 131 people in eight states. Amongst the damage was the unique case of the grounded Tank Vessel, JOHN B. CADDELL on New York's Staten Island. The CADDELL posed a distinctive challenge to pollution mitigation and eventual vessel removal efforts, being stateless/ownerless, and commanded high profile media/public attention. Responders used a variety of creative methods to ensure the surrounding environment was not further affected by the grounded vessel, including the authorized use of solidifying agents. This poster describes the procedures used to determine vessel disposition and explores the innovative use of solidifiers in this particular case. Determining final disposition of the vessel involved an extensive process of multi-agency cooperation and coordination. Leveraging the existing authorities of the New York's Sheriff's Department to dispose of abandoned vessels, the Coast Guard was able to work with local, state and federal partners to implement a removal plan. Additionally, National Strike Force and Coast Guard Sector New York personnel utilized the cutting edge technology of solidifying polymer agents to effectively reduce the amount of contaminants onboard the vessel. As per the Area Contingency Plan, the Regional Response Team-Region 2 (RRT-2) was activated, and was used to brief Federal and State member agencies on the planned protective use of a solidifier by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator during cleanup efforts. RRT-2 was provided a current situational brief, objectives, and a proposed application plan. RRT-2 concurred with the utilization plan, and contributed some additional recommendations, which enhanced cleanup operations conducted under the ESF-10 Mission Assignment from New York State.

MANAGING THE RESOURCE CONSULTATION PROCESS: A CASE STUDY FROM THE JIREH GROUNDING RESPONSE

ABSTRACT The grounding of the 202-foot freight vessel JIREH, which occurred on June 21, 2012 on the Mona Island Natural Reserve in Puerto Rico, triggered a three month long response in what is arguably the most environmentally sensitive location in Puerto Rico and much of the Caribbean. Prior to, during, and after the response, the Federal On-Scene Coordinator worked closely with United States Government and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico agencies to ensure all natural and historic resource consultation mandates required under Federal law were initiated properly. This paper explores how the Endangered Species Act, Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, and National Historic Preservation Act consultation requirements were applied before the JIREH response through development of the Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands Area Contingency Plan, during the response through multiple informal Emergency Consultations, and post-response through Formal Consultations. This examination will serve to highlight, through the lens of the JIREH response, the complexities of pre-planning for resource consultations, the challenges experienced by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator during an event, and provide recommendations to ensure resource consultation requirements are applied consistently and transparently in the future.

CHALLENGES OF AN NCP RESPONSE TO THE TSUNAMI OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA IN 2011

ABSTRACT On March 11, 2011, Japan was struck by a powerful earthquake that resulted in tsunami damage. In addition to the destruction within Japan, several ports in northern California were also affected. Two harbors in California suffered major vessel and infrastructure casualties which resulted in large amounts of oil and hazardous substances in the water from various sources. The agencies responding to these harbors found themselves with several challenges: (1) assessing and responding to a rare and enormous event that had the potential to effect the entire west coast; (2) organizing the tactical operations and logistical support for the two most effected locations which were 430-miles apart; and (3) assessing and mitigating unknown safety hazards in the water and then determining an appropriate funding source. Damage reports from various cities, including Richmond, Fort Bragg and Crescent City, followed over the next few hours. Response teams deployed to mitigate the greatest threats, though some of threats weren't immediately obvious. The response became a two-branch operation, focused on Santa Cruz and Crescent City, each with distinctive problems and separated by a difficult distance, with a central Incident Command Post (ICP) directing the response. The pollution potential and economic significance was far greater in the northern city, leading the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) to create an Area Command. This eventually evolved into a single remote ICP. While only considered a type-3 event, Federal On-Scene Coordinator Representatives (FOSCRs) were strained to their limits on Advanced ICS knowledge, financial management, and interagency salvage. In this event, the Coast Guard struggled with, but succeeded in dealing with, a catastrophe that no one on the West Coast had dealt with in almost 50 years.

Response V = Response Victory

The success of pollution response hinges on public perception. If the community and stakeholders perceive a response as successful, it is deemed successful. The challenge for spill responders, then, is managing perception, ideally through a robust campaign to convey the response “story” in a way that gives the public a clear view of the response work. The “Response V” is a concept that provides the structure upon which such a campaign can be built. Starting with standard ICS framework, it is comprised of two essential elements for success – operational excellence on one side of the “V” and outstanding perception management on the other. Responders do well on the Operational side, with years of experience using proven methods, combined with systems that seek better ways to perform. The other side of “V” has not yet been fully developed during spill response. The need for information has changed within recent years, as have distribution channels, to a breadth and pace that often far exceeds current response organizations' ability to meet demands. Federal On-Scene Coordinators, as well as their Unified Command (UC) partners, face stronger pressures to grasp a situation within minutes and report it up their chain of command, taking time away from their focus on response. Complimentary is the pressure to gather accurate incident information and convey it to the public. If response managers do not start communicating immediately, others will, and likely with inaccurate and lasting misperceptions. During an incident, the responsibility for perception management lies primarily with the Joint Information Center (JIC). Part of the “Response V” concept promotes a number of elements to expand the current JIC model, including: clear, established relationships with Liaison Officer staff; creation of a Public Volunteer Officer to liaise with the Volunteer Unit; creation of a Public Opinions Officer to ensure external perspectives are monitored and conveyed to the UC. Other elements of the “Response V” JIC expansion include:Phone banks with trained staff to quickly answer questions with accurate information.Teams of trained people continually communicating through social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) with accurate, credible information.Field teams to videotape and narrate response activities, streaming them to a UC-approved website.Information centers for the public to get “hands on” incident information.Fully integrated teams of JIC and Liaison staff to manage VIPs, community meetings and outreach.

Wildlife Response Management during a Federal Incident

The last days of August 2012 brought Hurricane Isaac's wind and water energy to south Louisiana impacting many parishes with destruction of property and leaving behind severe flooding, making response difficult in some locations. After search and rescue efforts ensuring safety of the people in the areas had been completed, surveys by boat and aircraft began to reveal impacts to wildlife from petroleum product of unknown origin. As in past natural disaster response activations, wildlife professionals expected oil impacted animal cases to remain minimal; however, there was confirmation from some response crews on site that there were in fact affected animals. Given that there was no named Responsible Parties, the United States Coast Guard (USCG), as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC), took the lead in activation of the Oil Spill Response Organizations (OSROs) and the wildlife personnel to conduct recovery and rehabilitation efforts in coordination with the State of Louisiana. All costs associated with these activities were covered by the National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC), which is managed by the USCG as promulgated under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). Wildlife Response Services, Inc. (WRS) supported by Matrix New World Engineering, Inc. (Matrix), was mobilized on September 2, 2012 to set up a Wildlife Rehabilitation Center (Center) in Belle Chase, Louisiana. The Center was set up in the Bricor Trucking Warehouse and the team had the Center operational the morning of September 3, 2013and received its first animal in the afternoon of that same day. During the response the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) was responsible for oiled wildlife recovery and transport to the Center. Over the course of the response 7 live animals were cared for, most of which were cleaned and eventually released back into the wild. The Hurricane Isaac response demonstrated the leadership of the USCG in organizing oiled wildlife recovery and rehabilitation jointly with LDWF and WRS, as well as with the OSROs. This is a model for responses to future natural disasters.

ABANDONED VESSEL AUTHORITIES AND BEST PRACTICES GUIDANCE- A REVIEW OF NRT WORK

ABSTRACT Abandoned and derelict vessels are a problem in almost every U.S. port and waterway, and these vessels can have significant impacts on the coastal environment and economy, including oil pollution, marine debris, and wildlife entrapment. They become hazards to navigation, illegal dumping of waste oils and hazardous materials and general public health hazards. Pollution response, including removal and disposal of these vessels can be complex and costly. As a result, many abandoned vessels are left in place unless they are obstructing or threatening to obstruct navigation, or threatening a pollution discharge. Faced with a growing number of abandoned vessels and costly interventions, the National Response Team (NRT) held a session on abandoned vessels during the 2011 Co-Chairs meeting in Dallas, TX. Representatives from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) gave presentations about the scope of the problem and the need for national guidance for Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs). Based on issues presented and discussed during the session, the NRT Executive Secretariat agreed an interagency best practices document was needed. An Abandoned Vessel Response Workgroup was established, co-chaired by the USCG and NOAA, and was tasked with identifying: 1) best practices used for responding to abandoned vessels; 2) the regulatory and policy authority of each agency with a nexus to abandoned vessels; and 3) the roles and responsibilities of each agency pursuant to those authorities. This paper summarizes the report on authorities and best practices.

Response to Heavy, Non-Floating Oil Spilled in a Great Lakes River Environment: A Multiple-Lines-Of-Evidence Approach for Submerged Oil Assessment and Recovery

ABSTRACT The Enbridge Line 6B pipeline release of diluted bitumen into the Kalamazoo River downstream of Marshall, MI in July 2010 is one of the largest freshwater oil spills in North American history. The unprecedented scale of impact and massive quantity of oil released required the development and implementation of new approaches for detection and recovery. At the onset of cleanup, conventional recovery techniques were employed for the initially floating oil and were successful. However, volatilization of the lighter diluent, along with mixing of the oil with sediment during flooded, turbulent river conditions caused the oil to sink and collect in natural deposition areas in the river. For more than three years after the spill, recovery of submerged oil has remained the predominant operational focus of the response. The recovery complexities for submerged oil mixed with sediment in depositional areas and long-term oil sheening along approximately 38 miles of the Kalamazoo River led to the development of a multiple-lines-of-evidence approach comprising six major components: geomorphic mapping, field assessments of submerged oil (poling), systematic tracking and mapping of oil sheen, hydrodynamic and sediment transport modeling, forensic oil chemistry, and net environmental benefit analysis. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) considered this information in determining the appropriate course of action for each impacted segment of the river. New sources of heavy crude oils like diluted bitumen and increasing transportation of those oils require changes in the way emergency personnel respond to oil spills in the Great Lakes and other freshwater ecosystems. Strategies to recover heavy oils must consider that the oils may suspend or sink in the water column, mix with fine-grained sediment, and accumulate in depositional areas. Early understanding of the potential fate and behavior of diluted bitumen spills when combined with timely, strong conventional recovery methods can significantly influence response success.

National Strike Force Development of a SMART Monitoring System using the Turner Designs C-3 Submersible Fluorometer

ABSTRACT: The US Coast Guard National Strike Force (NSF) is a critical national asset comprised of a unique, highly trained cadre of professionals who maintain and rapidly deploy with specialized equipment and incident management skills in support of Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSC) and Lead Agency/Incident Commanders. Rapid collection and reporting of real-time, scientifically-based information is important for assisting the FOSC and Unified Command with operational decision-making during oil dispersant operations. The NSF has been using the Turner Design 10-AU Field Fluorometer since the early 1990s. This system is cumbersome compared to new technology, time-consuming to calibrate and has become increasingly costly and difficult to maintain due to its age. This poster describes the collaborative research and development efforts of the NSF, whose goal was to purchase and develop a new customizable submersible in-situ fluorometry system.

Dispersant Use Approval: Before, During and After Deepwater Horizon

Abstract Throughout the 1990s, the energy industry worked closely with Regional Response Teams (RRT) to establish pre-authorization areas and processes to allow the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FO...

SS Princess Kathleen and Ex-USS Chehalis-Guideposts to Wreck Oil Removal

Abstract On the morning of September 7th, 1952, the 369-foot SS Princess Kathleen, a Canadian Pacific Railroad vessel built in 1925, grounded and sank near Lena Point, north of Juneau, Alaska. At the time of her grounding, she was loaded with an estimated 155,000 gallons of bunker fuel oil. The SS Princess Kathleen now rests on a slope beneath the water, 53 feet at the bow and 134 feet at her stern. Nearly sixty years after her sinking, the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, under the guidance of the National Contingency Plan, has partnered together with the State of Alaska in a unified effort to remove the pollution threat posed by the SS Princess Kathleen from pristine Alaskan waters. At the same time, nearly 7,000 miles away in the South Pacific, a similar threat is mitigated from the Ex-USS Chehalis, a retired U.S. Navy gasoline tanker that sank as a result of a shipboard explosion in 1949. The two cases, when compared side by side, show striking similarities, yet each maintains itself as an individual suc...

NOAA NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARIES AS RESOURCE TRUSTEES IN THE UNIFIED COMMAND: GOOD OR BAD?

ABSTRACT The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is a federal trustee within the National Contingency Plan (NCP) in addition to providing scientific and technical support to the Incident Command System (ICS) during a response. NOAA is also the home of the National Marine Sanctuary Program (NMSP), a system of 14 marine protected areas that encompass 150,000 square miles of coastal and oceanic waters. NOAA is increasing its capacity for addressing a significant incident through participating in and leading spill response exercises. One of the most intense aspects of those experiences is often the discussion of the role of NOAA as a trustee and whether they should be part of the Unified Command (UC). While the NCP outlines the expectations of Regional Response Team (RRT) members from the Department of the Interior and the Department of Commerce (NOAA), it provides the Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) considerable flexibility in determining whether to include trustees within the UC or working with the Liaison or through the Environmental Unit. A recent Technical Assistance Document from the National Response Team speaks directly to this issue and provides RRT'S more specific guidance. There are some RRT'S that feel strongly that the only trustee in the UC should be the states. NOAA and the DOI believe that they should be afforded the same considerations in the marine and coastal environment as trustees or landowners in the terrestrial environment. Both the Safe Sanctuaries 2005 in Florida and the Safe Seas 2006 in California provided a forum for dialogue on this issue. In both instances, the FOSC did engage the trustees in the UC. It is not always necessary or appropriate for NOAA to participate as a member of the UC. In some situations it could be more effective to participate in other capacities within the ICS and NOAA may not be the trustee with the most significant resources at risk. When participating in a UC, it is incumbent upon the NOAA representative to work with other members of the UC to manage the response under a single, collaborative approach.