Federal Judges Research Articles

Two Companies Ordered to Bargain With Unions

Management Report for Nonunion OrganizationsVolume 38, Issue 4 p. 2-8 News Two Companies Ordered to Bargain With Unions First published: 17 March 2015 https://doi.org/10.1002/mare.30046Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract The most powerful weapon labor law makes available against employers who commit unfair labor practices is an order to bargain with a union that has not even won a representation election. Both the National Labor Relations Board and federal judges may issue bargaining orders—as two companies recently found out. Volume38, Issue4April 2015Pages 2-8 RelatedInformation

The Unintended Consequences of Congressional Action: Judicial Conviction Rates after Congressional Sentencing Reform

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the United States Sentencing Commission, which had the responsibility to promulgate sentencing guidelines. These guidelines created a range of determinate sentences for all categories of federal offenses and were binding on all federal judges. In a curious aftermath of legislation designed to toughen the response of courts to crime, scholars have noticed that federal judges’ conviction rates have fallen since the 1980s (Leipold 2004). This unexpected trend raises the possibility that the outcome of the Sentencing Act is opposite of what Congress intended. When faced with mandatory sentencing guidelines, judges sometimes try cases in which they believe the defendant to be guilty, but the legally mandated sentence is too harsh given the circumstances. In these cases, judges may choose to acquit. Since these defendants would have been convicted in the absence of guidelines, aggregate conviction rates should be lower when guidelines are in effect than otherwise. We test these hypotheses with data on federal bench trials from 1970 to 2005. We find that federal judges’ conviction rates have fallen substantially and that the trend is attributable, at least in part, to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the resulting binding sentencing guidelines. We conclude that although the act allowed Congress to appear “tough on crime” to voters, the substantive result of the legislation was decidedly not tough on crime.

Federalism as Docket Control

On the twentieth anniversary of United States v. Lopez (1995), this Article revisits the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution. Much of what has been said about the federalism cases of the Rehnquist Court misses a fundamental aspect of those decisions — one with profound implications for making sense not just of the Rehnquist era but a large component of the Supreme Court’s work since the earliest days of the Republic. Focusing particularly on Lopez and the follow-up case of United States v. Morrison (2000), the Article offers a new perspective on what the Rehnquist Court was up to. We set forth a practical reading of Lopez and Morrison as cases about docket control. In both cases, we suggest, the Court was concerned with shielding the federal district courts from ever-expanding criminal and civil cases that resulted from new federal laws. The Article shows that from the Court’s perspective, docket control was not simply about keeping the caseloads of the district courts at a manageable level. Instead, quite apart from numbers, the Court was concerned with the particular types of cases Congress wanted the district courts to handle. Congress, the Justices feared, was undermining the prestige of the federal judiciary by blurring the distinction between state and federal judges and turning federal judges into petty magistrates. Docket control was thus about protecting the integrity of the third branch of government — a mechanism, in other words, that began in federalism but served also separation of powers. While we draw on a variety of sources in presenting our account, the Article relies heavily on a rich and surprisingly underused resource: the annual testimony by Supreme Court Justices before congressional committees in support of the Court’s annual budgetary requests. These hearings document candid comments by the Justices on a range of issues, including a deep concern with Congress’s treatment of the lower federal courts. Indeed, read with the benefit of hindsight, the hearings show the Justices shortly prior to Lopez and Morrison forecasting the outcomes in those cases and articulating an overlooked rationale underlying the decisions.Our account provokes a rethinking of the constitutional justification for Lopez and Morrison (and other federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court). The two cases, we show, represented the culmination of more than a century of efforts by the Supreme Court to safeguard the role of the judicial branch in our constitutional system. Doctrinally, Lopez and Morrison involved questions of the scope of congressional power and the degree of deference courts owe to Congress when it legislates. By centering on these issues, however, debate over the outcomes in Lopez and Morrison has overlooked a more basic justification for the Court’s rulings. When the Court acts to protect the judiciary — and particularly when it does so after repeated requests to Congress for help — it is on firmer constitutional ground than critics of Lopez and Morrison have recognized. At the time of Lopez and Morrison, the courts were under considerable stress and there was no indication that Congress — continuing to create new federal causes of action — would provide relief. Under those circumstances, the Court’s response, invalidating one criminal statute (in Lopez) and one civil cause of action (in Morrison), was less revolutionary than preservationist. The significance of our account extends beyond explaining a single episode in the history of the Supreme Court. Once cast in terms of docket control, Lopez and Morrison represent not a break — revolutionary or otherwise — but the culmination of a much longer history of over-burdened (and under-appreciated) federal judges pushing back against demands to perform tasks that would distract them from their core functions under the Constitution. Apart from the federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court, many cases — many landmark cases — are better understood in the new light of docket control. (Yes, we even offer a new reading of Marbury v. Madison.) While at first blush docket control may seem less exciting than other accounts of Supreme Court cases, it helps make sense of a good deal of what the Court does and it provides a new lens through which to examine and assess judicial decision-making.

Judges in Vice-Regal Roles

The Australian federation is built upon an enduring respect for the independence of the judicial arm of government. This is reflected in the principle that the judiciary should be kept separate from the legislature and executive. A practice seemingly at odds with these values is the appointment of senior judges to vice-regal offices. Despite this, the practice has attracted scant academic attention, and has never been challenged in the courts. In this article we examine the conferral of vice-regal roles on serving federal, state and territory judges. We ask, first, whether such appointments ought to continue to be made and, secondly, whether they are constitutionally permissible. The judge, by the way, was the King; and, as he was wearing his crown over the wig … he did not look at all comfortable, and it was certainly not becoming. – Lewis Carroll, ‘Alice's Adventures in Wonderland’.1

Judges in Vice-Regal Roles

The Australian federation is built upon an enduring respect for the independence of the judicial arm of government. This is reflected in the principle that the judiciary should be kept separate from the legislature and executive. A practice seemingly at odds with these values is the appointment of senior judges to vice-regal offices. Despite this, the practice has attracted scant academic attention, and has never been challenged in the courts. In this article we examine the conferral of vice-regal roles on serving federal, state and territory judges. We ask, first, whether such appointments ought to continue to be made and, secondly, whether they are constitutionally permissible.

Interparty Judicial Appointments

Empirical studies of judges’ ideological voting call for a theory according to which the ideology of the judges can be measured. This Essay calls into question the assumption that undergirds the measure that currently dominates the legal, economic, and political science literature — the assumption that the ideology of a lower federal court judge is largely predicted by the ideologies of the nominating President and the relevant state’s Senators who are of the same political party as the President. The Essay relies upon a natural experiment to examine this question empirically. Between 1977 and 1998, when New York was represented in the Senate by one Democrat and one Republican who had an agreement to divide appointments to the district courts in the state: The Senator who shared party affiliation with the President would be allocated three of every four appointments, while the “out-of-party” Senator would be allocated the rest. The Essay employs a novel dataset — consisting of all federal district judges appointed to the federal bench in New York during the time period in question, and the Senator who recommended each nominee to the nominating President. If the dominant theory — that the party of the recommending Senator affects judicial decision-making — holds, then one would expect the theory’s explanatory power to be at its apex where Senators of different parties recommend judges at the same time to the same President. Yet, using median prison sentence length as a proxy for ideology in decision-making, the empirical analysis finds no evidence that senatorial ideology has a statistically significant effect on district judge decision-making. At the same time, it finds that indeed the nominating President’s ideology does have a statistically significant effect. The findings are instead consistent with the minority view of lower federal court judges’ ideological leanings — that a lower federal court judge’s ideology is in large part a function solely of the nominating President’s ideology.

Courting the President: How Circuit Court Judges Alter Their Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court

We examine whether circuit court judges sacrifice policy purity for career goals. We compare the behavior of contender judges–those most likely to be elevated to the Supreme Court–during vacancy periods with their behavior outside vacancy periods. We also examine the behavior of noncontender judges during those same times. The data show that during vacancy periods, contender judges are more likely to vote consistently with the president's preferences, to rule in favor of the United States, and to write dissenting opinions. Noncontender judges fail to evidence such behavior. These findings provide empirical support for the argument that federal judges adapt their behavior to specific audiences, and provide new avenues for research into judges' goals and the role of audiences in judicial decision making.

Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme Court as Super-Legislature

I defend and explore three claims in this lecture. First, there is very little actual “law” in federal constitutional law in the United States, especially with respect to cases that end up at the U.S. Supreme Court: there, the Court operates as a kind of super-legislature, albeit one with a limited jurisdiction, essentially making decisions based on the moral and political values of the justices, and not on the basis of legally binding standards. This is, in part, a jurisprudential thesis about what counts as “legally binding standards,” one that I shall defend by reference to the most plausible account of the nature of law, the legal positivist theory developed by H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz. Second, the absence of law in so many parts of federal constitutional law means that the quality of moral and political judgment exercised by judges is of decisive importance in how they fulfill their role and thus should be the overriding factor in the appointment of federal appellate judges, especially Supreme Court Justices. That brings me to my third claim, namely, that all political actors know that the U.S. Supreme Court often operates as a super-legislature, and thus that the moral and political views of the Justices are decisive criteria for their appointment. This almost banal truth is, however, rarely discussed in the public confirmation process, but is common knowledge among political and legal insiders. To be sure there is media speculation about the political predilections of the nominees, but their actual moral and political views are treated as off limits in the real confirmation process. This anti-democratic secrecy is, in my view, deeply wrong and must be replaced with a realistic acknowledgment of the role of the Supreme Court as a political actor of limited jurisdiction. I will illustrate these claims by discussing a number of important public law cases, recent and not-so-recent, including New York v. U.S., Heller, Hobby Lobby, Shelby County, and others.

Writing the Book of Judges

AbstractThis is part 1 of a two-part series detailing the selection and confirmation processes of lower federal court judges during President Obama’s first 6 years. Our attention in part 1 is on Obama’s lower federal court appointments during the 113th Congress, specifically on the selection processes. We then examine the backgrounds and attributes of those confirmed during the 113th, looking at the appointees to the district and appeals courts separately. Confirmation processes are the main focus of part 2 of our study, where we discuss the lead-up to the nuclear option, the “fallout” from its invocation, and the renewed emphasis on the Blue Slip system as a tool of the minority party in the Senate. We conclude by taking a deeper look at the administration’s historic contribution to enhancing diversity on the federal bench across the district and circuit courts and, as well, make a similar assessment of the impact of the Obama appointments on the partisan makeup of the federal bench on the district courts and across the appellate circuits.

The Hierarchical Influence of Courts of Appeals on District Courts

AbstractWhat factors explain when federal trial court judges will be influenced and constrained by their direct superiors in the judicial hierarchy? To empirically test this hierarchical relationship, this study utilizes an original database of cases terminated in 29 federal district courts from 2000 to 2004 and a research design that naturally incorporates hierarchical interactions through a focus on cases that were appealed to the U.S. courts of appeal and later reversed and remanded. After controlling for litigant, judge, political, and case characteristics, the results indicate that the likelihood of a district court case having an altered outcome after circuit court intervention is greatly affected by the content and context of the supervising circuit panel’s opinion. These results have implications for the function and constraining ability of the judicial hierarchy and provide new insight into how judging significantly differs by court level.

Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in US Courts

I use two newly collected data sets to demonstrate that black federal district judges are consistently overturned on appeal more often than white district judges, with a gap in reversal rates of up to 10 percentage points. This gap is robust and persists after taking into account previous professional and judicial experience, educational background, qualification ratings assigned by the American Bar Association, and differences in appellate panel composition. In total, I find that approximately 2,800 additional cases authored by black judges have been reversed over the last 12 years. This study is among the first to explore how higher-court judges evaluate opinions written by judges of color, and it has clear implications: despite attempts to make the judiciary more reflective of the general population, racial disparities in the legal system appear to persist.

Council for Accreditation of Counseling and Related Educational Programs (CACREP) at Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs)

Historically Black colleges and universities, (HBCUs) have been educating African Americans and other students of color for over 100 years (Brown, Donahoo, & Bertrand, 2001). Unlike other institutions, HBCUs were founded on and continue to be united by the distinct mission of positioning, preparing, and empowering African American students to succeed in what many perceive to be a hostile society (Brown, Donahoo, & Bertrand, 2001, p. 559). In comparison to predominantly White institutions (PWIs), past research suggests that HBCUs have been the primary higher education institutions for African Americans (Allen, Epps, & Haniff, 1991; Garibaldi, 1984). Stated differently, Roebuck and Murty (1993) found that HBCUs were the undergraduate institution to 75% of all African Americans with earned doctorates, 80% of all African American federal judges, and 85% of all African American medical doctors. Based on this trend, it can be assumed that HBCUs educate African American counselors at a higher rate than PWIs. Therefore, if HBCU counselor education programs are not accredited by the Council for Accreditation of Counseling and Related Educational Programs (CACREP), the largest counseling accrediting agency, what are the reasons?According to CACREP (2009), at the time of the larger study, there were 25 HBCU counselor education programs without CACREP accreditation and five that were accredited by CACREP. These five were North Carolina Agricultural and Technical University, North Carolina Central University, Jackson State University, South Carolina State University, and Southern University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (CACREP, 2009). These institutions of higher learning are public and state-supported and are among the largest HBCUs in the country.The establishment of CACREP was preceded by more than two decades of extensive preparation of standards development and adoption including Standards for the Preparation of Secondary School Counselors in 1967, Standards for the Preparation of Elementary School Counselors in 1968, and Guidelines for Graduate Programs in Student Personnel Work in Higher Education also in 1968 (Sweeney, 1992). Leaders of the Association for Counselor Education and Supervision (ACES) were responsible for beginning the discussion on the importance of establishing standards for the preparation of counselors and counselor educators and since 1981, CACREP has accredited graduate-level counseling programs in more than 200 colleges and universities (CACREP, 2008).Bobby and Kandor (1992) surveyed counselor education professionals to determine if a particular set of standards was a hindrance to seeking and achieving CACREP accreditation. The two researchers found that the cost of the accreditation process, a fear of decreased enrollment, and a belief that the standards were too prescriptive were common perceptions among the participants (Bobby & Kandor, 1992). Holcomb-McCoy, Bryan, and Rayhill (2002) studied professional school counselors to determine to what extent they rate the CACREP school counseling standards as important to their actual work as school counselors. The participants rated each of the standards to be nearly equally important, except for the knowledge and skill requirements as they relate to program development, implementation, and evaluation. The findings imply that survey participants did not perceive this standard to be as important to their work as professional school counselors (Holcomb-McCoy, Bryan, & Rayhill, 2002).McGlothin and Davis (2004) studied mental health and professional school counselors, as well as counselor educators on the perceived benefit of the 2001 CACREP core curriculum standards. Their findings coincided with the findings of earlier studies that analyzed the benefit of the CACREP core curriculum (Bobby & Kandor, 1992; Cecil & Comas, 1986; Vacc, 1992). The overall 2001 CACREP core curriculum standards that were perceived to be most beneficial were human growth and development and helping relationships. …

Is It Law or Something Else?: A Divided Judiciary in the Application of Fraudulent Transfer Law under § 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code

In Part I of this Note, I will provide a general overview of leveraged buyouts. The discussion of how and why LBOs are implemented is particularly relevant to the application of fraudulent transfer analysis. In Part II, I will discuss fraudulent transfer law as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. In Part III, I will discuss which transfers within the LBO should be attacked under fraudulent transfer law and why; this section will focus on the various stakes of the parties involved in the leveraged buyout transaction. I will provide an overview of the specific factors that bankruptcy and federal appellate judges may or may not consider in applying § 546(e). Part IV will then more thoroughly define § 546(e) and its application to fraudulent transfer analysis. In Part V, I will describe the split of interpretation of § 546(e) as demonstrated by an empirical study. In Part VI, I will discuss the formal legal rules for the disagreement among the bankruptcy and federal appellate judges. Finally, in Part VII, I propose several explanations for the remarkably divided application of the statute.

Hazards of the Courtroom: Acts of Violence Against Judges

Threats of violence and actual violence inflicted on federal and state judges by litigants are no longer an aberration but are becoming quite common place. Statistical estimates reveal that over 700 reported threats were received by the United States Marshall’s office in 2005; however, this number does not include the total threats or acts of violence made against all federal, state, and local court officials. Judges are innocent victims against whom threat and actual acts of violence have been committed. In order to prevent violence against judges, understanding why a litigant may lash out against a judge. This paper traces the diverse origins of violence against judges and identifies the various precipitating variables that may trigger such acts against judges.

Inconsistency and Angst in District Court Resolution of Social Security Disability Appeals

This study of federal court decisionmaking sheds new insight on the links among judicial outcomes, judicial ideology and demographic factors. We ask whether characteristics of a jurist other than ideology, including age, race, gender and work experience, can affect results in the context of the nation’s most frequently litigated administrative law dispute – social security disability claims. Over ten thousand social security disability cases are resolved each year in the federal court system. As a consequence, almost every district court judge and magistrate decides a significant number of such appeals from claimants each year. Social security cases by and large are similar, turning most frequently on claims of mental illness and muscular skeletal pain. There is ample room for discretion among ALJs and federal judges in determining whether or not an applicant is entitled to benefits when the claim turns on the amount of pain or on the presence of debilitating mental illness. Thus, this is the first study to assess and compare the decisionmaking of virtually all district court judges (and magistrates) resolving nearly identical challenges. The results are remarkable both in what they showed and did not show. We reach three principal conclusions. First, decisionmaking patterns among district court judges and magistrates both reveal the same kind of inconsistencies that plague ALJ adjudication more generally. Inspector General reports and testimony before Congress have focused on the variance in ALJ grant rates as reasons to reform the SSA adjudication system. Thus, while ALJs have been attacked repeatedly for such inconsistencies, district court decisionmaking fares little better. The results of an SSDI appeal may turn more on the hap of which judge or magistrate is slated to review the appeal more than on the merits of the case. Second, if the cases are similar, the question arises as to what explains the difference in outcomes. Again, the results are striking in that the different outcomes cannot be explained by the sociological factors that others have investigated. No correlation can be drawn between results and the race, gender, seniority, and prior job experience of the jurist. Nor can they be explained by geography or the percentage of disabled within the region. And, there was only a modest correlation between judicial ideology as measured by the politics of the appointing judge and the judicial decision – conservative judges tended to uphold more appeals. In other words, sociological factors evidently played far less of a role in deciding SSDI and SSI cases that one would have expected.Third, although the sociological attributes did not explain much of the variation in resolution of the cases, we noted a substantial correlation between remand rates and the circuit in which the judges and magistrates sat. Remand rates from both judges and magistrates in the Tenth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, for instance, were almost double those from judges and magistrates in the First and Fourth Circuits. To be sure, we cannot discount the possibility that personal beliefs – not captured in the attributes we tested for – play a significant role in district court and magistrate decisionmaking. Nonetheless, the statistics strongly suggest that the doctrine or “culture’ within a particular judicial circuit makes a substantial difference in such decisionmaking.

Some of the Math in the November 8, 2014 Draft of 'Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals,' Including the Bottom-Line Statistical Analysis, is Incorrect

A recent working-paper draft examines the randomness of assignments of U.S. federal judges to three-judge appellate panels. The working paper raises important concerns about the judicial system and has attracted considerable popular interest. However, the draft makes some incorrect statements and relies on an unsound analysis. We briefly note these issues.

The Accidental Abstention Doctrine: After Nearly 30 Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings Claims to State Court Under Williamson County Has Yet to Be Made

In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 185 (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that a property owner must sue for damages in court to ripen a Fifth Amendment takings claim for federal adjudication. Two decades later, in San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, the Court acknowledged what had long been clear to aggrieved litigants: Far from ripening a federal takings claim, complying with Williamson County’s state procedures rule normally extinguishes such claims, through the operation of ordinary principles of preclusion. Instead of coining a requirement, the Williamson County Court had accidentally created a de facto abstention doctrine.This article traces the origin and history of the Williamson County decision. A sharp conflict had arisen among the circuit courts of appeals over the propriety of abstaining in regulatory takings cases. The Ninth Circuit relegated such claims to court while retaining jurisdiction under Pullman abstention, while the Fourth Circuit dismissed them outright under Burford abstention. Rather than resolving this conflict – of which it did not seem to be aware – the Williamson County Court overlaid it with a new doctrine that allowed federal judges to waive their Article III jurisdiction over Fifth Amendment takings claims without meeting any of the stringent conditions required to abstain under either Pullman or Burford.Ironically, 11 years after Williamson County was handed down, the Court tightened its formal abstention requirements even more, foreclosing the dismissal of claims for damages under any abstention theory. Yet federal takings claimants continue to meet this fate every day, under the guise of Williamson County’s so-called ripeness requirement. This article concludes that the state-procedures rule is a doctrinal anomaly that cannot be justified. The Court has given a series of signals that it is backing away from the accidental abstention doctrine, and may soon jettison this poorly thought out bar to federal jurisdiction over Fifth Amendment takings claims.

Questioning the U.S. Supreme Court's Legalistic Qualified Immunity Approach and Suggestions for a Better Approach

In the May 2014 decision of Plumhoff v. Rickard, the U.S. Supreme Court squarely endorsed its prior decision in Brosseau v. Haugen, which epitomizes the more legalistic line of the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence. Under the Brosseau-Plumhoff approach, federal judges are instructed to consider the liability of individual § 1983 defendants based upon whether or not the defendant’s alleged conduct had previously been held to be unlawful by federal appellate court precedent. This article makes the case that the Brosseau-Plumhoff standard is not equal to the task of evaluating the liability of individual § 1983 defendants, many of whom are low-level state and local governmental officers who almost certainly do not read federal appellate court decisions. As such, the Brosseau-Plumhoff approach moves the qualified immunity analysis away from factors which are actually relevant to officers on the job and into a legalistic after-the-fact debate among lawyers and judges which provides a poor basis for determining the financial liability of individual defendants.

The Application of Effect Rules at Establishing Jurisdiction by US Courts and Enlightenments to People’s Courts in PRC

Since 1984, the case Jones v. Calder was brought to Supreme Court, and the plaintiff had successfully convinced the Supreme Court that the California district court, based on the effect caused by the out-of-state defendant, is competent to exercise jurisdiction over the case. From the insight of Supreme judges, although the defendant is not within the territory of California, the effect resulted from the Florida defendant’s defamation to the California is constituted as the “Minimum contacts”. And also, such intentional effect did not contradict the traditional “notion of fair play and substance justice”. When it comes to the contacts with the forum state, it is hold by the Supreme Court that the Florida defendant is expected to be sued at California for the reason that the action taken by defendant is aimed to striking plaintiff’s career and vilifying her reputation. Put it in another way, the effects occurred in California by defendant’s actions were within defendant’s expectations, and it is also expected that the defendant had expected to be sued at the plaintiff’s forum state. The import of establishing effect-test is to redress aggrieved parties as soon as possible. Since effect-test had been introduced in tort cases, to a great extent, this test provide guidance for judges to exercise jurisdiction to the out-of- state conduct by non-resident. However, it has to mention that the application, especially in the era of Internet, seems to be various. With the explosive growth of e-commerce trades and frequent communication through Internet, effect-test had been invited into the e-commerce world by federal judges to decide jurisdiction to cases like intellectual property infringement, defamations out of the state. When taking effect-test, courts focus on the facts presented in the case to satisfy the “the minimum contacts” with the forum state. But cases alike were concluded with different decisions. So the diverse decisions based on similar facts inspire me to explore what drives the judges to apply effect-test? The article maintains that a certain merit lays a solid foundation for the decisions made by federal courts. And also confirms that overall interest of the forum state is considered by the federal courts to apply effect-test. Further, it is the overall interest of the forum state that promotes the federal courts to manipulate effect-test to decide the competence to a certain case, since in such case, some purely subjective facts allow room for a large amount of discretion of judges.

Plan B morning after pill.

The decision to make available over the counter Plan B morning after pills to girls of any age by Federal Judge Edward Korman is not only imprudent but dangerous for young girls. There have been fe...