For a volume or conference on political economy, we might note that Professor Arnold's paper does not explicitly employ the theories of political economy. It is not developed upon a public choice model. There is no rationality model exposed, developed, or tested. Nor is it on one of the grand topics of political economy, such as class. Further, there is no mountain of data for us to chew upon, so as to better digest our theoretical ideas. Rather, it is representative of informal work done by political scientists which is relevant to the tasks of political economists. Indeed, Professor Arnold's work raises substantial questions for us. The paper fits within our substantive concerns regarding equilibria in the cyclic logrolling processes (Bernholz, 1978; Oppenheimer, 1979; Fiorina, 1978; Shepsle, 1978; Weingast, 1978). Professor Arnold's work is an extension of the logrolling, pork barrel subject which has fascinated so many of us. His characterization of the politician as election oriented is consistent with that of most formal models. Finally, there is a persistent concern with inefficiency and suboptimality that appeals to us. With this in mind, let us consider his paper. As he promises, his paper "explore[s] how the federal government makes decisions about the geographical allocation of expenditures" (p. 107). 1 Professor Arnold does not treat the entire subject, but rather focuses on particular aspects of the government's decisions regarding geographical distribution of largesse. He hones in on: (1) the methods by which these decisions may be made; (2) the political repercussions of these decisions; and (3) (his-real subject) the hypothesis that the amount (or severity) of the political consequences are a function of the decision method employed and the substantive nature of the program. Professor Arnold is ovenmpressed w~th the subject's tmportance: "With the federal government spending nearly a quarter of national output, one cannot ignore the differential geographic effects of that spending, any more than one couldignore its differentialeffects by income or race." (p. 107) But, certainly,with geographical, rather than racial mobility of individuals in the economy, differential racial allocations are not easily overcome, yet many people can switch residences from one area to another. Thus, it is at least not self-evident that the moral qualifies of the questions have equal claim. But the subject clearly has interest to us both on its own and as it informs us regarding governmental behavior in general for theoretical purposes.