Federal Economy Research Articles

Efficient Nash equilibria in a federal economy with migration costs

We consider a federation of two regions populated by identical individuals, in which interregional migration is costly. We define a federation as an economy in which migration may not be restricted by governments. We compare and contrast first-best efficiency (with migration controls) and federal efficiency (without migration controls). We show that first-best efficiency requires maximising total product net of migration cost, while federal efficiency does not. We also show that migration costs may lead to a discontinuous federal utility—possibility frontier and to discontinuous regional reaction functions. We establish that decentralised equilibrium allocations may not be first-best efficient but are federally efficient. We conclude by tying together well-understood results from the limiting cases of free mobility and immobility with our results for the intermediate case.

Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain: China's Internal Crisis and the American Intelligence Process, 1961-1962

In examining the developments leading to the war between the United States and Japan, the latter's signing of the Axis Pact in September 1940 accelerated the already deteriorating relations between the two countries, a downward spiral that had been quickening since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937. But from May to mid-July of 1940, the period when Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa was the Japanese prime minister, opportunities existed for Japan to gain American recogni tion of its hegemony in the Far East, including the recognition of Manchukuo. Because of Adolf Hitler's successes in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was willing to explore the possibility of a settle ment with the Japanese in the Pacific. Between May and July he per mitted official dialogues to consider a rapprochement between American and Japanese diplomats. During that time, the Japanese business community was orches trating a major effort to improve relations with the United States and obtain U.S. economic assistance for the industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo. Two projects were being carried out at the time, one by the Japan Economic Federation and the other by the industrialist who founded the Nissan business conglomerate, Ayukawa Yoshisuke, and his aides.1 These efforts reflected a strong support within the Japanese business community for a rapprochement with the United States by

Transport infrastructure in the Baltic States during the transformation to market economies

This paper presents a brief survey of the current condition of the three most important infrastructural systems for transport, namely rail, road and seaports, in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania following their breaking away from the governmental and economic federation of the former Soviet Union. The analysis focuses upon the capabilities and deficiencies of goods transport. The thesis will be presented that, as in the past, transit on an East-West axis between CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) states and Western Europe has the greatest economic significance, whereas the North-South connections — project ‘Via Baltica’ — are of predominantly political importance. In view of this thesis, the key function of the Baltic seaports within the transport network of the Baltic region will have to be deduced. A stock-taking shows the rail network to be the weakest of the three infrastructural systems examined, the most critical aspect being the poor condition of the railway embankments. On the whole, since roads are, obviously, in a better condition, powerful tendencies towards a ‘modal shift’ from rail to road transport seem inevitable. Considering these tendencies, the development of roadside facilities along the transit routes as well as the RO/RO and container facilities in the Baltic seaports has utmost priority in the current phase.

Scenarios for the Reorganization of the Economic Structure of Russia

The crisis in the Russian Federation's economy continues to worsen. While the decline of the GNP in 1990 was 2 percent compared with the preceding year, in 1991 it was 9 percent, and in 1992, 19 percent. The magnitude of the decline remained unchanged in the first half of 1993. Production in industry last year declined for 87 percent of basic types of products, which attests not only to the structural but to the universal nature of the decline.

EQUALISATION IN A FEDERAL ECONOMY WITH INTER‐STATE MIGRATION*

Australian Economic PapersVolume 32, Issue 61 p. 336-354 EQUALISATION IN A FEDERAL ECONOMY WITH INTER-STATE MIGRATION* JEFFREY D. PETCHEY, JEFFREY D. PETCHEY Australian National UniversitySearch for more papers by this author JEFFREY D. PETCHEY, JEFFREY D. PETCHEY Australian National UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: December 1993 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8454.1993.tb00068.xCitations: 11 † *I wish to thank Richard Cornes, Perry Shapiro, Graeme Wells, Robert Albon, Cliff Walsh, Jonathan Pincus and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume32, Issue61December 1993Pages 336-354 RelatedInformation

The State of the Economy and Prospects for the Immediate Future

The Russian Federation's economy approached the beginning of 1992 in a state of deep crisis that had taken on features of uncontrollability. In 1991 the gross national product (GNP) declined by 17 percent; industrial output, by 8 percent. Acute shortages in all commodity markets were accompanied by steadily rising rates of inflation: according to official data, wholesale prices in industry rose 3.4-fold during the year; retail prices, 2.5-fold. In November and December prices were no longer under the state's control.

Does fiscal policy matter in a federal economy?

Macroeconomic models typically specify an economy with only one level of government despite the fact that many major economies are federal states in which the nonfederal government sector controls a sizeable fraction of total government revenues and expenditures. In this paper we investigate the problems for macro-economic stability that arise should nonfederal governments choose to deficit finance disturbances to their budget positions. Our results show that deficit financing by nonfederal governments has serious consequences for stability regardless of whether the federal government adopts a policy of pure money or pure bond financing.

On Macro-Economic Instability under a Monetarist Policy Rule in a Federal Economy

The feasibility of a monetarist policy rule has been the subject of a good deal of research all of which has implicitly assumed a unitary state. In this paper, the question is re-examined for the case of a federal state with deficit financing non-federal govemments. The results of the paper indicate that the decision of non-federal governments to deficit finance significantly lessens the feasibility of the monetarist policy rule and that this conclusion is true regardless of the degree to which economic agents perceive government debt as comprising a part of net wealth.

The Political Economy of Federalism: A Critical Appraisal

In this paper I present a survey of the economic literature which is concerned with federal public finance. I argue that it is difficult to derive policy-relevant normative propositions about federal financial relations, but that it is possible to suggest means by which one could improve the efficiency of policy decisions. There is a review of the discussion of the Buchanan and Scott contributions of the 1950s and 1960s, and it is concluded that it is easier to discover significant questions than agreed answers. Practical considerations of geography, regional economy, and administrative separation of powers are then introduced. The argument is that the normative economic definition of equity and efficiency may have little relevance to the practical policy-question of forming and maintaining a federation. I conclude with a proposal for linking the attempt to solve questions of regional and national policy through a network of committees—one for each of the following areas: budget coordination, regional equalization, common standards, stabilization, and economic growth.

Wiseman on Federalism: A Critical Comment

In this paper I give a critical commentary on the paper by Wiseman, “The political economy of federalism: a critical appraisal”. Wiseman's paper has originality which has stood it well over time. I comment briefly on the equity-efficiency debate but concentrate on the aspects of political economy introduced by Wiseman. The opportunity is also used to give a brief view of subsequent developments in the literature, which have shown how far, in so many respects, Wiseman's emphasis on the “politics” of federalism has turned out to be correct.

The Political Economy of Federalism

This article introduces a theoretical framework and an econometric methodology for analyzing the increasingly important effects of the national government on the federal system. The framework is a synthesis of the dominant political and economic approaches to this issue: it attempts to capture key elements of the complex political and administrative processes that implementation research has identified in contemporary federalism, and to exploit formal models of local fiscal choice used to analyze the impact of federal grants on state and local spending and taxing. The vehicle for the synthesis is a principal-agent model which represents the federal system as a formal hierarchy extending from Congress and the president to subnational bureaucrats. An econometric analysis of two major federal grant programs in each state for the years, 1965-1979, demonstrates that 1) economic models alone cannot explain the effects of federal grants on subnational fiscal behavior; politics must be included, and 2) the political effects can be disaggregated into ideological and constituency-oriented demands made by Congress and the White House on federal grant agencies.

The political economy of constitutional federalism

Until very recently, most economic analyses of federalism have concentrated on the problems of policy design within a federal polity. Early writers' asked the composite question, 'does the existence of a federal form of government pose new questions to the science of public finance and, if so, how can these questions be answered within the structure of that science?' This enquiry led to a preoccupation with the horizontal equity aspects of federal policy which provided the foundation for the extensive literature devoted to the study of grants-in-aid and revenue sharing schemes. More recently, this basic question has been respecified and split into two: 'Does federalism matter?' and, conditional on an affirmative answer to this question, 'Under what circumstances will a federal structure be desirable?'2 The first of these questions need not detain us for very long. It has long been a commonplace that the outcomes of a social decision process depend not only upon the preferences of the agents involved and the relevant cost constraints, but also upon the particular decision making mechanism employed. Since federalism is, in part, a partial specification of a decision making process it will be the case that a federal society will produce outcomes different from those associated with an otherwise similar non-federal society. Federalism clearly matters in the sense that it influences social outcomes, and it is in this sense that the question is normally put. It is the second question, and a variety of approaches to answering it, that forms the primary focus of this paper. Alongside the economic literature there exists a tradition of political analysis which also originates in the work of Tocqueville and Mill.3 The broad trend of this political literature4 can be characterised as a movement away from the study of the operation of federal states, towards a more comparative and constitutional analysis of federalism which stresses the process

Distortionary taxation in a federal economy

Distortionary taxation in a federal economy

Crime Control in California

Previous articleNext article No AccessCrime Control in CaliforniaLlad Phillips and Harold L. Votey, Jr.Llad Phillips Search for more articles by this author and Harold L. Votey, Jr. Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 4, Number 2Jun., 1975 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467535 Views: 14Total views on this site Citations: 32Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1975 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article: References, (Jan 2019): 453–702.https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-804417-9.16001-6Žarko Braković, Božidar Banović Efficiency of competent state authorities in detecting and approving criminal reports of violent property crime, Bezbednost, Beograd 61, no.33 (Jan 2019): 54–81.https://doi.org/10.5937/bezbednost1903054B Iljoong Kim, 변재욱 The Effects on Crime of Law Enforcement and Labor Market Characteristics in Korea: An Empirical Inquiry, KUKJE KYUNGJE YONGU 18, no.44 (Dec 2012): 55–89.https://doi.org/10.17298/kky.2012.18.4.003John L. Worrall, Tomislav V. Kovandzic Police levels and crime rates: An instrumental variables approach, Social Science Research 39, no.33 (May 2010): 506–516.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2010.02.001John L. Worrall Does Targeting Minor Offenses Reduce Serious Crime? A Provisional, Affirmative Answer Based on an Analysis of County-Level Data, Police Quarterly 9, no.11 (Aug 2016): 47–72.https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611103258929Mats Persson, Claes-Henric Siven Incentive and incarceration effects in a general equilibrium model of crime, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 59, no.22 (Feb 2006): 214–229.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.03.011John L. Worrall, Pamela Schram, Eric Hays, Matthew Newman An analysis of the relationship between probation caseloads and property crime rates in California counties, Journal of Criminal Justice 32, no.33 (May 2004): 231–241.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2004.02.003John L Worrall, Travis C Pratt On the consequences of ignoring unobserved heterogeneity when estimating macro-level models of crime, Social Science Research 33, no.11 (Mar 2004): 79–105.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0049-089X(03)00040-1Isaac Ehrlich Criminal Justice, (Jan 2017): 553–560.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_107Todd L. Cherry Financial penalties as an alternative criminal sanction: Evidence from panel data, Atlantic Economic Journal 29, no.44 (Dec 2001): 450–458.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02299333Silvia M. Mendes, Michael D. McDonald Putting Severity of Punishment Back in the Deterrence Package, Policy Studies Journal 29, no.44 (Nov 2001): 588–610.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2001.tb02112.xMark Gius The Economics of the Criminal Behavior of Young Adults., American Journal of Economics and Sociology 58, no.44 (Oct 1999): 947–957.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1999.tb03402.xHope Corman, Naci H. Mocan A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence and Drug Abuse in New York City, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1999).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.159028H. Naci Mocan, Hope Corman An Economic Analysis of Drug Use and Crime, Journal of Drug Issues 28, no.33 (Jul 1998): 613–629.https://doi.org/10.1177/002204269802800303Bruce L. Benson, David W. Rasmussen, Iljoong Kim Deterrence and Public Policy: Trade-Offs in the Allocation of Police Resources, International Review of Law and Economics 18, no.11 (Mar 1998): 77–100.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00059-8Kwabena Gymah-Brempong Race and Crime: What is the Connection?, (Jan 1997): 133–155.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6157-6_7THOMAS B. MARVELL, CARLISLE E. MOODY SPECIFICATION PROBLEMS, POLICE LEVELS, AND CRIME RATES*, Criminology 34, no.44 (Nov 1996): 609–646.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1996.tb01221.xIsaac Ehrlich Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, no.11 (Feb 1996): 43–67.https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.10.1.43Gary E. Marche The Production of Homicide Solutions., American Journal of Economics and Sociology 53, no.44 (Oct 1994): 385–401.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1994.tb02610.xDavid A. Ward, Mark C. Stafford, Louis N. Gray, Ben A. Menke Deterrence, Opportunity, and Choice, Journal of Applied Social Psychology 24, no.2020 (Oct 1994): 1777–1793.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1994.tb01574.xGary Marché Aggregation Biases and Economies of Scale in the Metropolitan Police Unit Production Function, Review of Social Economy 50, no.22 (Nov 2006): 215–233.https://doi.org/10.1080/759368615BRUCE L. BENSON, DAVID W. RASMUSSEN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ILLICIT DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND PROPERTY CRIMES, Contemporary Economic Policy 9, no.44 (Oct 1991): 106–115.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1991.tb00354.xTara Gray, Clark R. Larsen, Peter Haynes, Kent W. Olson Using Cost-Benefit Analysis To Evaluate Correctional Sentences, Evaluation Review 15, no.44 (Jul 2016): 471–481.https://doi.org/10.1177/0193841X9101500405Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong Demand for factors of production in municipal police departments, Journal of Urban Economics 25, no.22 (Mar 1989): 247–259.https://doi.org/10.1016/0094-1190(89)90038-7Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong Elasticity of Factor Substitution in Police Agencies Evidence From Florida, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 5, no.22 (Apr 1987): 257–265.https://doi.org/10.1080/07350015.1987.10509584Stephen L. Mehay, Rodolfo A. Gonzalez Outside Information and the Monopoly Power of a Public Bureau: An Empirical Analysis, Public Finance Quarterly 15, no.11 (Jan 1987): 61–75.https://doi.org/10.1177/109114218701500104John E. Chubb The Political Economy of Federalism, American Political Science Review 79, no.44 (Dec 1985): 994–1015.https://doi.org/10.2307/1956245 Harold L. Votey, Jr. Scandinavian Drinking-Driving Control: Myth or Intuition?, The Journal of Legal Studies 11, no.11 (Oct 2015): 93–116.https://doi.org/10.1086/467694Harold L. Votey Constructing a Quasi-Controlled Environment, Evaluation Review 5, no.11 (Jul 2016): 90–122.https://doi.org/10.1177/0193841X8100500105 Harold L. Votey, Jr. Detention of Heroin Addicts, Job Opportunities, and Deterrence, The Journal of Legal Studies 8, no.33 (Oct 2015): 585–606.https://doi.org/10.1086/467623Leslie Sebba Some Explorations in the Scaling of Penalties, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 15, no.22 (Aug 2016): 247–265.https://doi.org/10.1177/002242787801500209 Llad Phillips , Harold L. Votey, Jr. , and John Howell Handguns and Homicide: Minimizing Losses and the Costs of Control, The Journal of Legal Studies 5, no.22 (Oct 2015): 463–478.https://doi.org/10.1086/467559

AREAL FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE APPLE INDUSTRY IN THE NAGANO BASIN

This paper deals with the roles of areal functional units and their hierarchical structure of the apple industry in the Nagano basin by applying the method of areal functional organization. The cultivation of apple in the Nagano basin was begun in the early Meiji era. But the rapid expansion of apple growing areas was first seen after the Second World War. In 1968 the total cultivated area of apple of bearing ages reached 5, 504 hectares. Apple orchards are mainly located on natural levees and alluvial fans. The average size of apple orchards per farm household is quite small (28 ares). As the number of farmers cultivating apple and the yield of apple increased, the farmers have organized various cooperative associations. Cooperative spraying was begun in 1951 in order to make up for the shortage of agricultural labor and to control insect and disease infestations. At the present time there are 217 spraying cooperative groups in the Nagano basin. Spraying cooperative groups, in terms of area and participating membership, are mostly associated with the buraku (traditional rural communities). Cooperative irrigation has been practiced since 1960. The scale of each cooperative irrigation facility i s small except cooperative irrigation facilities in Obuse Town and Nagano City. There are 75 irrigation cooperative groups in the Nagano basin. Packing and shipping cooperative groups had been already organized in the late Meiji era. But the present 104 packing and shipping cooperative groups were newly reorganized after the Second World War. Although some packing and shipping cooperative groups are associated with one buraku, most of them are composed of several buraku Reorganization of the present agricultural cooperative assosiations took place after 1948. Today, there are one or more agricultural cooperative assosiations in each of the official administrative units in the study area. Keizairen (Nagano Prefecture Economic Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives) is essentially an administrative organization handling the marketing of the fruits rather than matters related more directly to the cultivation and handling of apple. In the Nagano basin, it is estimated that Keizairen handles about 60% of the total sale of apple in 1968. Approximately 93% of the apples handled by Keizairen goes into the market as fresh fruits. Shinren (Nagano Prefecture Credit Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives) is also an administrative organization, and is to take care of financial affairs as to the apple industry. Combining the function and area of each organization, it can be identified as an areal functional unit. The following table illustrates the hierarchical structure of areal functional units as to the apple industry in the Nagano basin.

Federal Grants and Resource Allocation

Previous articleNext article No AccessFederal Grants and Resource AllocationA. D. ScottA. D. Scott Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 60, Number 6Dec., 1952 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/257313 Views: 7Total views on this site Citations: 17Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1952 The University of Chicago PressPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:K. Shanmugam, K. R. Shanmugam Equalisation Transfers Based on Spending Needs and Fiscal Capacity of State Governments in India, Margin: The Journal of Applied Economic Research 16, no.22 (May 2022): 139–165.https://doi.org/10.1177/09738010221074595Alain Marciano How Buchanan’s concern for the South shaped his first academic works, Public Choice 183, no.3-43-4 (Mar 2020): 247–271.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00800-xPetr Janský, Miroslav Palanský Fiscal decentralization and equalization transfers in Georgia: evidence from municipality-level data, Post-Communist Economies 32, no.11 (Aug 2019): 54–76.https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2019.1640992Lars Hultkrantz, Emelie Värja, Susanna Larsson-Tholén Political and economic determinants of expenditure on day services for persons with intellectual disabilities or autism, European Journal of Social Work 21, no.22 (Feb 2017): 207–221.https://doi.org/10.1080/13691457.2017.1286295David Albouy Evaluating the efficiency and equity of federal fiscal equalization, Journal of Public Economics 96, no.9-109-10 (Oct 2012): 824–839.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.015PASCALE DURAN-VIGNERON When Transparency Goes Against Efficiency: Fiscal Equalization in a Context of Firm and Household Mobility, Journal of Public Economic Theory 14, no.11 (Jan 2012): 99–130.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01535.xYannis Psycharis Public Spending Patterns, (Jan 2008): 41–71.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2086-7_3Yiannis Psycharis Public Spending Patterns: The Regional Allocation of Public Investment in Greece by Political Period, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2008).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1269940Albert Breton, Angela Fraschini Competitive Governments, Globalization, and Equalization Grants, Public Finance Review 35, no.44 (Aug 2016): 463–479.https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142106296413Roger Hewett, Charles A. Holt, Georgia Kosmopoulou, Christine Kymn, Cheryl X. Long, Shabnam Mousavi, Sudipta Sarangi A Classroom Exercise: Voting by Ballots and Feet, Southern Economic Journal 72, no.11 (Jul 2005): 253–263.https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2005.tb00700.xIain McLean Fiscal Federalism in Australia, Public Administration 82, no.11 (Mar 2004): 21–38.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0033-3298.2004.00381.xJ Wiseman The Political Economy of Federalism: A Critical Appraisal, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 5, no.44 (Jul 2016): 383–410.https://doi.org/10.1068/c050383Yves Rabeau Bien-êre social ou bien-être provincial: vers une refonte du programme de péréquation, Canadian Public Administration/Administration publique du Canada 29, no.22 (Jun 1986): 237–258.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.1986.tb00524.xAlan P. Hamlin Federalism, Horizontal Equity, and the Optimal Grant, Public Finance Quarterly 13, no.22 (Aug 2016): 115–131.https://doi.org/10.1177/109114218501300201John Riew MIGRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY*, Journal of Regional Science 13, no.11 (Apr 1973): 65–76.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9787.1973.tb00378.xJAMES A. WILDE GRANTS-IN-AID: THE ANALYTICS OF DESIGN AND RESPONSE, National Tax Journal 24, no.22 (Mar 2021): 143–155.https://doi.org/10.1086/NTJ41791751Richard Bird, François Vaillancourt Expenditure-Based Equalization Transfers, (): 259–289.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-48988-9_11

The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach

The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach

Japan's "New Economic Structure"

NIANY Western commentators have interpreted Japan's New Economic Structure as a scheme imposed on the great, monopolistically organized business combines (The Zaibatsu) against their wishes by extremist army leaders. It is frequently asserted that under it, business has been regimented and its economic power taken away by a hostile militarist government. Such an interpretation of the New Economic Structure might perhaps have been valid if the plan formulated by the Cabinet Planning Board under Naoki Hoshino in September 1940 had gone into effect. But before the Hoshino plan was made known to the public, seven leading economic organizations, among them the powerful Japan Economic Federation (composed of cartel leaders), denounced it as communistic and accused it of denying capital voice in management. Hastily, Hiranuma and the leaders of the army registered their opposition to the plan, which they declared wrecked the old structure.' The defeat of the Hoshino plan was accompanied by a purge of anti-business elements in the Government. Hoshino was forced out as head of the Cabinet Planning Board and other officials connected with the plan ousted.2 After putting the Hoshino plan aside, the Cabinet took up the various schemes submitted by business organizations and, on December 7, 1940, approved a New Economic Structure plan, which became an Imperial Ordinance in August 1941. As finally promulgated, the New Economic Structure was largely a compromise between the plans submitted by the Japan Economic

The Effects of Federal Economy on the Geological Survey

The Effects of Federal Economy on the Geological Survey

The Effects of Federal Economy on the Geological Survey

The Effects of Federal Economy on the Geological Survey