On the morning of 9/11, Americans across the country witnessed al Qaeda's terrorist attacks as appalling images that provoked shock at the slaughter, grief for the victims, and furor toward the perpetrators. Islamist radicals had succeeded in striking an intensely visceral blow. Even though the destruction was great, it once again became brutally clear that the power of terrorist violence derives not primarily from the physical damages it inflicts, but from the states of mind it provokes. This realization dominates our definitions of terrorism, which usually stress its intention to achieve victory by engendering fear. American reactions to 9/11, however, illustrate that we need to recognize the centrality of another emotion--outrage. While accepting the importance of fear in terrorist schemes, this article insists that to understand the dynamics of terrorism we should also grant that many of its most important gains come not by instilling fear but by inciting outrage. reinterpretation offered in these pages grew out of teaching the history of terrorism in university classrooms for almost a decade. It begins by reexamining some of the basics--the definition, diversity, and dynamics of terrorism--to arrive at a better understanding of the ways in which actions of relatively few terrorists can generate such intense moral outrage. As an example of the tactical manipulation of such outrage, the focus shifts briefly to the efforts of the Provisional IRA to provoke a violent overreaction by British troops on Bloody Sunday in 1972 and to benefit from the fatal shots the soldiers fired that day. article then presents testimony supporting the hypotheses that 9/11 was meant to be similarly provocative and that al Qaeda succeeded by drawing the United States into an ill-considered war in Iraq. article finally hazards the opinion that war ensued not simply because of the mind-set of the Bush administration but also because of the unsatisfied wrath of the American people. Yet as in the case with so many journeys, the greater value of this intellectual expedition comes not from reaching its end point but in what it discovers along the way. Defining in Terms of Fear Common definitions of terrorism almost always stress fear. noted authority Bruce Hoffman, in his Inside Terrorism, exemplifies this: We may ... define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.... It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider 'target audience. (1) James M. Poland echoes the same emphasis in his much-read, Understanding Terrorism: Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience. (2) Official definitions repeat this formula; the current Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended to 15 February 2012, defines terrorism as: The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political. (3) Without denying the coercive force of fear, it is still critical to realize that, within the context of those forms of terrorism that most concern the United States today, outrage can be a more important consequence of terrorist acts. parameters of this article do not allow a full examination of the complex relationship between fear and outrage; certainly the same action can lead to either reaction, and fear can be an element in stimulating outrage. It may be best to consider them as opposite poles along a continuum of response. Simply put, fear has more to do with paralysis than with assertion, and the measures it promotes are mainly protective and defensive; the terrorist engenders fear in the hopes of compelling compliance. …
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