False Data Injection Research Articles

Iterative learning resilient consensus of uncertain nonlinear multi-agent systems vulnerable to false data injection attacks

This work investigates the iterative learning resilient consensus of uncertain nonlinear high-order multi-agent systems (MASs) against false data injection (FDI) attacks. First, in order to reduce the impact of FDI attacks on the nonlinear MASs, a novel coordinate transformation technique is proposed, which is composed of the states after being attacked, and the Nussbaum gain technique is adopted to address the problem of unknown attack gains resulting from FDI attacks. Then, by employing compromised state variables, a fuzzy adaptive iterative learning resilient control method is presented based on the composite energy function, where unknown nonlinear functions are handled using fuzzy logic systems. The presented approach can guarantee that the outputs of all followers precisely track the leader in a limited time interval while ensuring that all closed-loop signals are bounded. Finally, a numerical simulation is provided to demonstrate the efficacy of the designed control strategy.

Anomaly detection technique for securing microgrid against false data attacks

The development of microgrid automation depends on information and communication technologies, which are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Recent advancements in MGs enhance power systems' efficacy and reliability, but cybersecurity remains a significant concern, especially with false data injection attacks (FDIAs) posing serious threats. FDIAs can compromise measurement devices and tamper with State Estimation (SE), risking the seamless operation of MGs. To address this, this paper proposes an efficient Iterative Free Detection of False Data (IFDFD) scheme for detecting FDIAs in microgrid state estimation. The IFDFD scheme uses complex Micro Phasor Measurement Unit (μPMU) measurements and computes nodal power injections to detect FDIAs. Furthermore, the proposed scheme integrates an S-Estimator to eliminate noise errors caused by environmental factors and the component lifespan, making IFDFD robust against sophisticated attackers. The proposed IFDFD scheme has been tested and validated on the modified IEEE 14 bus test system, integrating Distributed Generations (DGs). False data was injected into the measurements to test the scheme's effectiveness. The efficacy of proposed IFDFD scheme has been validated by comparing it to existing method of FDIAs. The obtained result clearly validates the efficacy of the proposed IFDFD scheme.

Optimizing CNN-LSTM for the Localization of False Data Injection Attacks in Power Systems

As the informatization of power systems advances, the secure operation of power systems faces various potential network attacks and threats. The false data injection attack (FDIA) is a common attack mode that can lead to abnormal system operations and serious economic losses by injecting abnormal data into terminal links or devices. The current research on FDIA primarily focuses on detecting its existence, but there is relatively little research on the localization of the attacks. To address this challenge, this study proposes a novel FDIA localization method (GA-CNN-LSTM) that combines convolutional neural networks (CNNs), long short-term memory (LSTM), and a genetic algorithm (GA) and can accurately locate the attacked bus or line. This method utilizes a CNN to extract local features and combines LSTM with time series information to extract global features. It integrates a CNN and LSTM to deeply explore complex patterns and dynamic changes in the data, effectively extract FDIA features in the data, and optimize the hyperparameters of the neural network using the GA to ensure an optimal performance of the model. Simulation experiments were conducted on the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus test systems. The results indicate that the GA-CNN-LSTM method achieved F1 scores for location identification of 99.71% and 99.10%, respectively, demonstrating superior localization performance compared to other methods.

Defense strategy selection based on incomplete information game for the false data injection attack

With the rapid development and wide application of sensing devices and communication networks, the traditional power system has transformed into a cyber physical power system (CPPS) gradually. The constant interaction of information flow and power flow exposes the grid to potential cyber-attack risks. In this paper, the defense strategy selection approaches are proposed based on incomplete information game against false data injection attack (FDIA) in different scenarios. Firstly, the attack-defense tree model containing economic indicators and a measure of attack is established, and the expected revenues of both attacker and defender are calculated in detail. Secondly, the static Bayesian attack-defense game model in which the defender grasps incomplete information is constructed, considering two cases of low-tech attacker and high-tech attacker. Then, the zero-sum attack-defense game model in which the attacker masters incomplete information is structured, considering the changing attack space. Finally, the simulations are carried out on the IEEE 30-bus system, and the optimal defense strategies in the case of two incomplete information are obtained by solving the equilibrium point. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method is effective in cyber security defense system, and can provide guiding ideology and theoretical basis for operators to deploy defense measures.

Adaptive event-triggered security control for networked teleoperation systems.

An adaptive event-triggered security control method is proposed for networked robotic teleoperation systems subject to time-varying delays and false data injection (FDI) attacks. An event-triggered scheme is designed via the position and velocity signals of the master and slave robots, where the triggering thresholds can change adaptively with the system states. The position and velocity triggered signals and the feedback error between the operator and the environment forces are utilized to detect whether the transmitted signals suffered from FDI attacks. Then, a switching controller is designed, which is able to adopt the corresponding control strategy according to the corresponding detection result. The stability of the system and the convergence of the tracking errors are proved through Lyapunov functions, and the proposed method is validated through practical experiments. The proposed method is able to adaptively adjust the triggering frequency and effectively reduce the transmitted data, thus saving the network resources. Meanwhile, it can ensure the stability of networked teleoperation systems under time-varying delays and FDI attacks, as well as the position and force tracking performance.

Distributed Model Predictive Consensus of MASs Against False Data Injection Attacks and Denial-of-Service Attacks

Distributed Model Predictive Consensus of MASs Against False Data Injection Attacks and Denial-of-Service Attacks

Attack Detection and Mitigation Scheme of Load Frequency Control Systems Against False Data Injection Attacks

Attack Detection and Mitigation Scheme of Load Frequency Control Systems Against False Data Injection Attacks

Self-Healing Control of Nuclear Power Plants Under False Data Injection Attacks

The transition from analog to digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems introduces new threats caused by cyberattacks in the nuclear industry. This paper proposes a self-healing strategy to respond to a false data injection attack that targets digital I&C systems, which is a type of cyberattack commonly targeting nuclear power plants with the potential to cause serious physical impacts. This resilience strategy for self-healing control contains three components: (1) an anomaly detection model that can detect false data injection attacks, (2) a device-level control that utilizes inferred values to perform control under a detected false data injection, and (3) a system-level control that leverages another controller that is not under attack to lead the system back to a safe operation state when the device-level control is unavailable. Anomaly detection and device-level control use an autoencoder while system-level control utilizes reinforcement learning. The proposed self-healing resilience strategy is demonstrated with a generic pressurized water reactor (GPWR) simulator under false data injections, targeting the steam generator water level. The results show that the proposed strategy effectively leads the system back to a normal operation state under various false data injection cases.

Adaptive estimator-based nonsingular fast terminal sliding mode control of robotic manipulator systems under FDI attacks and actuator failure

This paper is focused on the adaptive estimator-based super-twisting nonsingular fast terminal sliding mode control of manipulator systems with false data injection (FDI) attacks and actuator failure. First, a novel mathematical model is established for the robotic manipulator systems with parameter perturbation, FDI attacks, actuator failure, external disturbance, and joint friction. As the dynamics of FDI attacks are often unknown or unpredictable, a novel adaptive fixed-time estimator-based defense method is designed to actively eliminate the negative effects induced by the FDI attacks. Meanwhile, an adaptive super-twisting nonsingular fast terminal sliding mode controller (NFTSMC) is designed to realize rapid convergence and desirable tracking precision. After that, the fixed-time stability of the manipulator systems are proved using the Lyapunov function. Finally, the comparative simulation verifies the superiority of the proposed control strategy over the current control methods.

A multi-agent deep reinforcement learning paradigm to improve the robustness and resilience of grid connected electric vehicle charging stations against the destructive effects of cyber-attacks

The rising deployment of electric vehicle charging stations (EVCS) in existing power grids and their integration with electric vehicles through communication systems are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks, such as false data injection (FDI) and uncertainties of communication system. This research introduces an EVCS evaluation from a techno-economic standpoint, utilizing the developed and data-oriented TSKFS&MADRL technique to identify and rectify inaccuracies stemming from cyber-attacks like FDI and communication system delays. This method aims to enhance the resilience of EVCSs against sabotage attacks by ensuring fast dynamic responses. Initially, the study models the potential targets of hackers, such as communication systems and transducer sensors, and employs the Euclidean norm theory, weighted least square error method, and residual error technique to identify cyber-attacks resulting from FDI through the comparison of measured data with reference values based on probability distribution functions. Subsequently, the network control and recovery requirements are facilitated by the proposed controller. The proposed approach application has been demonstrated in the IEEE 33 bus, showcasing a 7.33 % lower experimental operation cost compared to the RL method and 12.15 % lower than the CNN method. Additionally, the FDI detection time is observed to be 40 % quicker than alternative methods based on the experimental outcomes.

Composite sliding mode control for cyber‐physical systems with multi‐source disturbances and false data injection attack

AbstractThis paper investigates the sliding mode control problem for cyber‐physical systems subject to multi‐source disturbances and actuator false data injection attacks simultaneously. Firstly, a series of extended state observers are designed to estimate the unknown multi‐source disturbances. For the actuator false data injection attacks, a sliding mode observer is designed to online estimate the values of attacks. Then, by introducing the disturbance and attack estimations, a dynamic sliding manifold and a composite sliding mode controller are constructed. Under the proposed approach, the unknown disturbances and false data injection attacks can be timely estimated and compensated, which can improve the disturbance rejection ability and guarantee security of the cyber‐physical system. Lyapunov theory is utilized to prove the stability of the closed‐loop system. Finally, simulations of both the numerical example and application to a power converter system demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed composite sliding mode control approach.

Frequency control using fuzzy active disturbance rejection control and machine learning in a two‐area microgrid under cyberattacks

AbstractThere is a change in the traditional power system structure as a result of the increased incorporation of microgrids (MGs) into the grid. Multi‐area MGs will emerge as a result, and issues related to them will need to be addressed. Load frequency control (LFC) is a challenge in such structures, which are more complicated due to variations in demand and the stochastic characteristics of renewable energy sources. This paper presents a cascade fuzzy active disturbance rejection control technique to deal with the LFC problem. In order to tune different parameters of controllers, a newly developed heuristic algorithm called the Gazelle optimization algorithm (GOA) is also employed. Moreover, due to the fact that multi‐area MGs are regarded as cyber‐physical systems (CPSs), a relatively new concern for LFC problems is their resilience to cyberattacks such as false data injection (FDI) and denial of service (DoS) attacks. Therefore, this research also presents a novel machine learning approach called parallel attack resilience detection system (PARDS) to deal with the LFC problem in the presence of cyberattacks. The efficiency of the proposed strategy is investigated under different scenarios, such as non‐linearities in the power system or server cyberattacks.

Securing Bipartite Nonlinear Fractional-Order Multi-Agent Systems against False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) Considering Hostile Environment

This study investigated the stability of bipartite nonlinear fractional-order multi-agent systems (FOMASs) in the presence of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) in a hostile environment. To tackle this problem we used signed graph theory, the Razumikhin methodology, and the Lyapunov function method. The main focus of our proposed work is to provide a method of stability for FOMASs against FDIAs. The technique of Razumikhin improves the Lyapunov-based stability analysis by supporting the handling of the intricacies of fractional-order dynamics. Moreover, utilizing signed graph theory, we analyzed both hostile and cooperative interactions between agents within the MASs. We determined the system stability requirements to ensure robustness against erroneous data injections through comprehensive theoretical investigation. We present numerical examples to illustrate the robustness and efficiency of our proposed technique.

A new bi-level model for the false data injection attack on real-time electricity market considering uncertainties

State Estimation (SE) plays a critical role in various applications of power systems including the electricity market. False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) are capable of manipulating the power system SE process aiming to gain financial profits by the players. In this paper, the potential economic influences of FDIA on SE and consequently the Real-Time (RT) electricity market are examined. Therefore, a new bi-level optimization framework is proposed to realistically model the FDIAs from the attacker perspective. At the upper-level, the attacker intends to intelligently choose the most critical congested transmission lines and manipulate their associated meter readings to maximize the expected financial profitability. At the lower-level, the RT market-clearing model is formulated under the influence of FDIA. Considering the incomplete attacker's prior knowledge of the network topology i.e., connection/disconnection of transmission lines, the angles of the phase-shifting transformers, and the real-time load uncertainty, the proposed formulation is extended to a new bi-level scenario-driven stochastic model. The developed attack model, which must remain undetectable by the system operator in all scenarios, is solved using the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) approach. The correctness and effectiveness of the proposed optimization scheme have been validated in GAMS software using CONOPT and OQNLP solvers based on the IEEE 14-bus test system and also comparative results are presented to demonstrate the merits of the proposed formulation.

CFDI: Coordinated false data injection attack in active distribution network

AbstractThe active distribution network (ADN) can obtain measurement data, estimate system states, and control distributed energy resources (DERs) and flexible loads to ensure voltage stability. However, the ADN is more vulnerable to cyber attacks due to the recent wave of digitization and automation efforts. In this article, false data injection (FDI) attacks are focused on and they are classified into two types, that is, type I attacks on measurement data and type II attacks on control commands. After studying the impact of these two FDI attacks on the ADN, a new threat is revealed called coordinated FDI attack, which can maximize the voltage deviation by coordinating type I and type II FDI attacks. From the attacker's perspective, the scheme of CFDI is proposed and an algorithm is developed to find the optimal attack strategy. The feasibility of CFDI attacks has been validated on a smart distribution testbed. Moreover, simulation results on an ADN benchmark have demonstrated that CFDI attacks could cause remarkable voltage deviation that may deteriorate the stability of the distribution network. Moreover, the impact of CFDI attacks is higher than pure type I or type II attacks. To mitigate the threat, some countermeasures against CFDI attacks are also proposed.

A novel passive-active detection system for false data injection attacks in industrial control systems

With the increasing occurrence of incidents causing significant damage due to attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), people pay attention to the cyber security of ICSs. This study improves existing active detection mechanisms and proposes an integrated passive-active detection system to detect False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA) for ICS. Since it is challenging to detect FDIA in current operational practices, the method presented in this research not only compares passive received system data with predefined rules to detect attacks but also launches active detection by controlling actuators to find attackers and achieve comprehensive detection of FDIA targeting ICS. This work dynamically adjusts the frequency of launching active detection through risk assessment, aiming to minimize the impact on operational efficiency during low-risk periods and reduce the time required for detecting attacks during high-risk periods. The experimental results show that using the proposed system, when false data differs by 10 % from accurate data, the detection rate can reach 99.9 %, which is 22.5 % higher than active detection by the random launch method when false data differs by 5 % from accurate data, the detection rate can reach 95.4 %, which is 18.2 % higher than active detect by randomly launch method, and even if false data only differs by 3 % from accurate data, the detection rate can reach 92.9 %, which is 16.5 % higher than active detect by randomly launch method.

Event-based secure control for cyber-physical systems against false data injection attacks

This paper mainly studies an event-based secure control problem for cyber-physical systems against false data injection (FDI) attacks. First, a dynamic event-triggered transmission protocol is established to schedule the transmitted data from the sensor to the controller. Subsequently, an imperfect FDI attack model is constructed considering the real network environment, which would bypass the traditional residual-based detection methods. To overcome this drawback, an attack detection strategy based on secure history information is designed, which effectively mitigates the negative impact of uncertainty on the detection results. Based on the detection results, an event-based secure linear quadratic Gaussian control scheme is designed, which can guarantee system performance and reduce the communication load effectively. Finally, a simulation experiment verifies that the proposed control method outperforms other algorithms in the literature, and the detection accuracy is increased by 91% to 98%.

Fully Distributed Hierarchical ET Intrusion- and Fault-Tolerant Group Control for MASs With Application to Robotic Manipulators

This paper studies group synchronization tracking problem for a class of high-order multi-agent systems (MASs) with nonidentical and unknown direction faults (NUDFs) under multiple cyber attacks (i.e., denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and false data injection attacks (FDIAs)). Be motivated by this, a fully distributed hierarchical (cyber layer and physical layer) Zeno-free event-triggered (ET) intrusion-and fault-tolerant controller is presented based on Nussbaum-type gain technique, where a positive inter-event time exists in the state-dependent asynchronous ET mechanism (ETM). The constructed virtual cyber layer realizes the interaction among different agents so as to avoid the interaction in physical processes and thus reduce the error propagation. This two layer controller greatly increase the flexibility of the controller design compared with single-layer control strategies. In addition, a novel Nussbaum function stability lemma (Lemma lem4lem4) is developed for the first time. Based on this lemma, the fully distributed adaptive controller can adjust the direction of the input to match the fault direction with the help of Nussbaum function. Finally, a robotic manipulator example demonstrates the effectiveness and merit of the proposed control scheme. <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Note to Practitioners</i> —In industrial processes, NUDFs and cyber attacks often occur in many different systems, which usually lead to performance degradation or even serious accidents. Typically, NUDFs affect the performance of chemical and industrial processes, circuits, and sensors. Meanwhile, in driverless vehicle platoon, attackers change the control signal through the wireless network, and then issue emergency braking commands, etc. Therefore, this paper designs a fully distributed hierarchical ET intrusion-and fault-tolerant scheme for high-order MASs that are usually used to model ship dynamics, robotic manipulators, and quarter-car active suspension. The control scheme gives solutions to the problem of NUDFs, multiple cyber attacks, and network bandwidth limitations at different layers, and effectively integrates the physical and cyber layers to achieve group synchronization. Meanwhile, a new event-triggered mechanism under the framework of group synchronization is developed to save communication resources. Robotic manipulator simulation studies verify the validity of the proposed scheme.

Power grid network security: A lightweight detection model for composite false data injection attacks using spatiotemporal features

The stability of power systems is paramount to industrial operations. The deleterious inherent characteristics of false data injection attacks (FDIA) have drawn substantial interest due to their severe threats to power grids. Contemporary detection systems face numerous challenges as attackers employ various tactics, such as injecting complex elements into measurement data and formulating quick attack strategies against critical nodes and transmission lines in the power grid network topology. Conventional models often fail to adapt to the intricacies of practical situations because they focus predominantly on detecting individual components. To overcome the above predicaments, this paper proposes a lightweight detection model integrating deep separable convolutional layers, squeeze neural networks, and a bidirectional long short-term memory architecture named DSE-BiLSTM. The acquisition process of network topological characteristics is accomplished through variable graph attention autoencoder (VGAAE). This approach leverages the effectiveness of the graph convolution (GCN) layer to acquire each node’s topological feature and the graph attention (GAT) module to identify and extract the topological features of critical nodes. Furthermore, the topology information obtained by the both techniques is embedded in one-dimensional vector space in the same form as measurement data. By combining the output of VGAAE with meter measurements, the feature fusion of temporal and spatial modalities is realized. DSE-BiLSTM with optimal hyperparameters achieves an F1-score of 99.56% and a row accuracy (RACC) of 93.10% on the conventional dataset. The experimental results of FDIA detection with composite datasets of IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems show that the F1-score and RACC of DSE-BiLSTM remain above 84.51% and 83.56% under various attack strengths and noise levels. In addition, as the power grid network scales up, noise level’s effect on detection performance decreases, while attack strength’s effect on recognition capability increases. DSE-BiLSTM can effectively process the composite data of spatiotemporal multimodes and provides a feasible solution for the localization and detection of FDIA in realistic scenes.

Artificial intelligence-based approach for islanding detection in cyber-physical power systems

Modern power grids, functioning as a cyber-physical system (CPS), accommodate high penetration level of distributed generations (DGs) to ensure sustainability. Achieving sustainability through grid-scale DGs, however, increases the likelihood of islanding occurrences, which jeopardizes a major parameter of CPS implementation: security. This paper proposes an artificial intelligence-based approach for detecting islanding in modern power grids. The method utilizes measured voltage and frequency to develop a fuzzy center of gravity (COG)-based equivalent model of the system. The model is derived by combining data collected from phasor measurement units (PMUs) with fundamental dynamical equations that govern power system dynamics. In this model, the system is represented using a set of fictitious reactances calculated using goal programming, which are then utilized to connect the COG to the local centers of inertia (COIs). By having a set of fictitious reactances for various operating points fed into a fuzzy model, one could develop an online model to calculate the fictitious reactances with high accuracy and speed at specific snapshots. By incorporating the maximum allowable phase differences between areas into the COG model to ensure transient stability, one could enhance the developed model to be robust against cyber-physical contingencies and cyber-attacks, albeit at the expense of a slight reduction in accuracy. The calculated fictitious reactances, represented in terms of local frequencies throughout the system, serve as valuable indicators for detecting islanding. By classifying the calculated fictitious reactances using support vector clustering over a period of time, islanding could be detected with high accuracy. Furthermore, incorporating the COG concept with the clustering based on fictitious reactances makes it possible to detect false data injection in an area of the system. The efficacy of the proposed method is assessed using simulated data from the renewable integrated 73-bus IEEE test system.