False Belief Tests Research Articles

Relations between mental verb and false belief understanding in Cantonese-speaking children

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children’s false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax in children’s false belief understanding. Independent tasks were used to measure verb meaning, complements, and false belief understanding such that the verbs in question were present only in the verb meaning test, and no linguistic devices biased toward false belief were used in the false belief test. We focused on (a) some mental verbs that obligatorily affirm or negate what follows and (b) sentential complements, the content of which is to be evaluated against the mind of another person, not reality. Results showed that only (a) predicted false belief understanding in a group of Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds, controlling for nonverbal intelligence and general language ability. In particular, children’s understanding of the strong nonfactive semantics of the Cantonese verbs /ji5-wai4/ (“falsely think”) predicted false belief understanding most strongly. The current findings suggest that false belief understanding is specifically related to the comprehension of mental verbs that entail false thought in their semantics.

Theory of mind (ToM) in children with autism or typical development: Links between eye-reading and false belief understanding

Previous research shows that high-functioning children with autism are slow to pass “litmus” false belief tests of ToM but how this may relate to other aspects of mindreading (e.g., discerning thoughts from facial expressions) is less clear, partly for methodological reasons. Thus the joint methodological and conceptual goals of this study were: (1) to devise and psychometrically validate a new, simplified eye-reading test for preliterate children with or without autism and (2) to use the new test to explore links of false belief understanding with eye-reading in children with autism and matched control groups. A false belief battery and the new eye-reading test were given to 87 Australians: 22 children with autism aged 6–13 and 65 typical developers in three control groups (11 age-matched primary-schoolers; 37 ToM-matched preschoolers and 17 adults). Results supported the new test’s psychometric validity and showed that, for children both with and without autism, false belief and eye-reading were significantly correlated. A hierarchical multiple regression showed this association was independent of age, gender and diagnosis. Although adults earned higher eye-reading scores overall, children equalled them on 44% of items. Implications of the findings for future use of the new test, and for explanations and interventions on behalf of ToM development in autism, were considered.

Everyday social and conversation applications of theory-of-mind understanding by children with autism-spectrum disorders or typical development

Children with autism-spectrum disorders (ASD) often fail laboratory false-belief tests of theory of mind (ToM). Yet how this impacts on their everyday social behavior is less clear, partly owing to uncertainty over which specific everyday conversational and social skills require ToM understanding. A new caregiver-report scale of these everyday applications of ToM was developed and validated in two studies. Study 1 obtained parent ratings of 339 children (85 with autism; 230 with Asperger's; 24 typically-developing) on the new scale and results revealed (a) that the scale had good psychometric properties and (b) that children with ASD had significantly more everyday mindreading difficulties than typical developers. In Study 2, we directly tested links between laboratory ToM and everyday mindreading using teacher ratings on the new scale. The sample of 25 children included 15 with autism and 10 typical developers aged 5-12 years. Children in both groups who passed laboratory ToM tests had fewer everyday mindreading difficulties than those of the same diagnosis who failed. Yet, intriguingly, autistic ToM-passers still had more problems with everyday mindreading than younger typically-developing ToM-failers. The possible roles of family conversation and peer interaction, along with ToM, in everyday social functioning were considered.

Representing metarepresentations: Is there Theory of Mind-specific cognition?

What cognitive mechanisms underlie Theory of Mind? Some infer domain-specific Theory of Mind cognition based the pattern of children diagnosed with autism failing the False Belief test but passing the False Photograph test. However, we argue that the False Belief test entails various task demands the False Photograph task does not, including the necessity to represent a higher-order representation (a metarepresentation), thus confounding the inference of domain-specificity. Instead, a general difficulty that affects representations of metarepresentations might account for the seeming domain-specific failure. Here we find that False-Belief failing False-Photograph passing children fail the Meta Photograph test, a new photograph-domain test that requires subjects to represent a metarepresentation. We conclude that people who fail the False Belief test but pass the False Photograph test do not necessarily have a content-specific Theory of Mind deficit. Instead, the general ability to represent representations and metarepresentations might underlie Theory of Mind.

Some ways to understand people

Shaun Gallagher and Dan Hutto claim that those once bitter rivals, simulation theory and theory-theory, are now to be treated as partners in crime. It's true that the debate has become more nuanced, with detailed suggestions abroad as to how these two approaches might peaceably divide the field. And there is common ground between them, at least to the extent that they agree on what needs to be explained. But I see no fatal flaw in what they share. In particular, I reject the idea that most interpersonal understanding can be accounted for without the postulation of mechanisms for inferring beliefs and desires. I also query the claim that simulation mechanisms have a very limited explanatory scope, and argue for the existence of such mechanisms at sub-personal levels. I suggest that Gallagher and Hutto's strictures against false belief tests are unwarranted, and their conclusions about the role of narrative in interpersonal understanding are unfounded.

Narrative dependency and the false belief task in autism

Several studies have used a cognitive approach to teaching people with autism to pass false belief tasks with a broader aim of developing theory of mind abilities. However, these tasks have certain executive features that may influence performance on the tasks and the potential for generalization. The study examines the influence of narrative support and language level on the ability of children with autism to pass tests of false belief and control tasks of “false photo”. Thirty-four children with ASD, with a range of age and ability, were shown six video-recorded false belief stories and six matched false photo stories, half narrated and half not. Results showed that the children performed similarly on the tasks overall in narrated and unnarrated conditions. However, the narrative support aided responses to the control questions, highlighting the executive load in these tasks. Results showed a significant effect of verbal age on the children's performance on both sets of tasks.

The Curious Incident of the Photo that was Accused of Being False: Issues of Domain Specificity in Development, Autism, and Brain Imaging

We resume an exchange of ideas with Uta Frith that started before the turn of the century. The curious incident responsible for this exchange was the finding that children with autism fail tests of false belief, while they pass Zaitchik's (1990) photograph task (Leekam & Perner, 1991). This finding led to the conclusion that children with autism have a domain-specific impairment in Theory of Mind (mental representations), because the photograph task and the false-belief task are structurally equivalent except for the nonmental character of photographs. In this paper we argue that the false-belief task and the false-photograph task are not structurally equivalent and are not empirically associated. Instead a truly structurally equivalent task is the false-sign task. Performance on this task is strongly associated with the false-belief task. A version of this task, the misleading-signal task, also poses severe problems for children with autism (Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi, & Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005). These new findings therefore challenge the earlier interpretation of a domain-specific difficulty in inferring mental states and suggest that children with autism also have difficulty understanding misleading nonmental objects. Brain imaging data using false-belief, "false"-photo, and false-sign scenarios provide further supporting evidence for our conclusions.

The Boundaries of the Cognitive Phenotype of Autism: Theory of Mind, Central Coherence and Ambiguous Figure Perception in Young People with Autistic Traits

Theory of Mind, Weak Central Coherence and executive dysfunction, were investigated as a function of behavioural markers of autism. This was irrespective of the presence or absence of a diagnosis of an autistic spectrum disorder. Sixty young people completed the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ), false belief tests, the block design test, viewed visual illusions and an ambiguous figure. A logistic regression was performed and it was found that Theory of Mind, central coherence and ambiguous figure variables significantly contributed to prediction of behavioural markers of autism. These findings provide support for the continuum hypothesis of autism. That is, mild autistic behavioural traits are distributed through the population and these behavioural traits may have the same underlying cognitive determinants as autistic disorder.

Objects of Desire, Thought, and Reality: Problems of Anchoring Discourse Referents in Development

Abstract: Our objectives in this article are to bring some theoretical order into developmental sequences and simultaneities in children’s ability to appreciate multiple labels for single objects, to reason with identity statements, to reason hypothetically, counterfactually, and with beliefs and desires, and to explain why an ‘implicit’ understanding of belief occurs before an ‘explicit’ understanding. The central idea behind our explanation is the emerging grasp of how objects of thought and desire relate to real objects and to each other. To capture this idea we make use of the notion of discourse referents, as did Perner and Brandl (2005), to explain the developmental link between understanding beliefs and alternative naming. We present confirming evidence of the prediction from this analysis that children should have comparable problems with understanding identity statements. We explain the precociously correct answers in ‘implicit’ false belief tests based on indirect measures in the following way: From infancy children are able to keep track of other people’s experiences, to reason about counterfactual circumstances, and to reason about goal‐directed (rational) action depending on given circumstances. Indirect tasks reduce the bias to use actual circumstances for reasoning about goal directed action compared to the traditional task, which leads to more correct answers. An emerging metarepresentational understanding helps overcome these biases and enables not only correct action prediction but also the explanation of erroneous actions. The common metarepresentational element explains why false belief tasks and the alternative naming task are mastered at the same time as children understand identity statements.

Social maturity and theory of mind in typically developing children and those on the autism spectrum

Results of several studies using the Vineland scale to explore links between social behavior and theory of mind (ToM) have produced mixed results, especially for children on the autism spectrum. The present pair of studies developed a psychometrically sound, age-referenced measure of social maturity to explore these issues further. In Study 1, 37 typically developing preschoolers took a battery of standard false belief tests of ToM and were rated by their teachers on a newly developed age-referenced social maturity scale with 7 items. In Study 2, a further group of 43 children aged 4 to 12 years (13 with autism, 14 with Asperger's disorder and 16 with typical development) took part in the same procedure. In Study 1, ToM was found to predict typical preschoolers' social maturity independently of age and verbal maturity. In Study 2, children with autism scored below age-matched and younger typical developers in both ToM and social maturity. Those with Asperger's disorder did well on ToM but poorly on social maturity. Study 2 replicated Study 1's finding (for typical children and for the full sample) that ToM was linked with social maturity independently of age and verbal ability, although the link was not independent of autism diagnosis. Teachers are capable of rating children's social behavior with peers as advanced, on-time or delayed for their age. Suggestive links between these ratings and ToM require further investigation, especially among children on the autism spectrum.

How Do Young Children Process Beliefs About Beliefs?: Evidence from Response Latency

Abstract: Are incorrect judgments on false belief tasks better explained within the framework of a conceptual change theory or a bias theory? Conceptual change theory posits a change in the form of reasoning from 3 to 4 years old while bias theory posits that processing factors are responsible for errors among younger children. The results from three experiments showed that children who failed a test of false belief took as long to respond as those who passed, and both groups of children took longer to respond to belief questions than to questions about prior states of reality. These results seem to support the bias theory.

Mental playmates: Siblings, executive functioning and theory of mind

This study assessed the theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF) abilities of 124 typically developing preschool children aged 3 to 5 years in relation to whether or not they had a child‐aged sibling (i.e. a child aged 1 to 12 years) at home with whom to play and converse. On a ToM battery that included tests of false belief, appearance‐reality (AR) and pretend representation, children who had at least 1 child‐aged sibling scored significantly higher than both only children and those whose only siblings were infants or adults. The numbers of child‐aged siblings in preschoolers' families positively predicted their scores on both a ToM battery (4 tasks) and an EF battery (2 tasks), and these associations remained significant with language ability partialled out. Results of a hierarchical multiple regression analysis revealed that independent contributions to individual differences in ToM were made by language ability, EF skill and having a child‐aged sibling. However, even though some conditions for mediation were met, there was no statistically reliable evidence that EF skills mediated the advantage of presence of child‐aged siblings for ToM performance. While consistent with the theory that distinctively childish interaction among siblings accelerates the growth of both ToM and EF capacities, alternative evidence and alternative theoretical interpretations for the findings were also considered.

Do Children with Autism have a Theory of Mind? A Non-verbal Test of Autism vs. Specific Language Impairment

Children with autism have delays in the development of theory of mind. However, the sub-group of children with autism who have little or no language have gone untested since false belief tests (FB) typically involve language. FB understanding has been reported to be intact in children with specific language impairment (SLI). This raises the possibility that a non-verbal FB test would distinguish children with autism vs. children with SLI. The present study tested two predictions: (1) FB understanding is to some extent independent of language ability; and (2) Children with autism with low language levels show specific impairment in theory of mind. Results confirmed both predictions. Results are discussed in terms of the role of language in the development of mindreading.

What's domain-specific about theory of mind?

Twenty years ago, Baron-Cohen and colleagues argued that autistic performance on false belief tests was explained by a deficit in metarepresentation. Subsequent research moved from the view that the mind has a domain-general capacity for metarepresentation to the view that the mind has a domain-specific mechanism for metarepresentation of mental states per se, i.e., the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM). We argue that 20 years of data collection in lesion patients and children with autism supports a more parsimonious view closer to that of the 1985 paper. Lower-level domain-specific mechanisms—e.g., tracking gaze, joint attention—interacting with higher-level domain-general mechanisms for metarepresentation, recursion, and executive function can account for observed patterns of deficits in both autism and neurological patients. The performance of children with autism or orbitofrontal patients on ToM tests can be explained more parsimoniously by their deficits in lower-level domain-specific mechanisms for processing social information. Without proper inputs, the intact capacity for metarepresentation by itself cannot make correct ToM inferences. Children with autism have no impairment in false photograph tests because their metarepresentational capacity is intact and they have no impairment in inputs required for such tests. TPJ patients have equivalent deficits on ToM and non-ToM metarepresentational tasks, consistent with a failure in domain-general processing. If deficits on ToM tasks can result from deficits in low-level input systems or in higher-level domain-general capacities, postulating a separate ToM mechanism may have been an unnecessary theoretical move.

Understanding False Belief as Generalized Operant Behavior

The current work reports 2 experiments that investigate the development of false belief from the perspective of Relational Frame Theory. The true and false belief test protocol used across both experiments contained a range of tasks that involved responding in accordance with the 3 perspective-taking frames of I-YOU, HERE-THERE, NOW-THEN, and in accordance with logical NOT. Experiment 1 involved the presentation of a protocol containing 10 true/false tasks to participants of 5 age groups ranging from 3 to 30 years old. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except that the number of tasks presented in the protocol was increased to 60 and novel participants were employed. The results of both experiments indicated a developmental trend in which accuracy on the protocol appeared to increase as a function of age. Furthermore, the fact that neither study indicated a statistically significant effect for trial type suggested that responding to both true and false belief may involve overlapping behavioral processes. The findings are discussed in terms of their implications for Relational Frame Theory, behavior analysis, and the mainstream developmental literature on understanding true and false belief.

Nicaraguan Sign Language and Theory of Mind: the issue of critical periods and abilities

Previous studies in the literature report that deaf individuals who experience late access to language perform poorly on false belief tests of Theory of Mind (ToM) compared with age-matched deaf and hearing controls exposed to language early. A group of 22 deaf Nicaraguans (aged 7 to 39 years) who learned Nicaraguan Sign Language (ISN) at different ages were tested on a false belief and a nonverbal cartoon retell task designed to elicit talk about the contents of character's mental states. Access to sign language by 10 years of age with possible advantages in language fluency was a strong predictor of performance on both the false belief task and mental state narrative task. However, a comparison of performance on the two tests indicated that children and adults who learned sign after the age of 10 were still able to demonstrate a more general ability to use mental state expressions in narratives. Results are discussed in terms of late access to language and critical periods for the parallel development of Theory of Mind and language. The findings point to age 10 years as a crucial period when lack of language exposure can lead to long-lasting deficits in false belief abilities. Late exposure to sign language does not, however, rule out all aspects of the ability to consider others' mental states. This paper also highlights the need to take into consideration a variety of communication responses when evaluating deaf children's ToM reasoning.

Telling the story of theory of mind: Deaf and hearing children's narratives and mental state understanding

Theory of mind (ToM) was examined in late‐signing deaf children in two studies by using standard tests and measures of spontaneous talk about inner states of perception, affect and cognition during storytelling. In Study 1, there were 21 deaf children aged 6 to 11 years and 13 typical‐hearing children matched with the deaf by chronological age. In Study 2, there were 17 deaf children aged 6 to 12 years and 17 typical‐hearing preschoolers aged 4 to 5 years who were matched with the deaf by ToM test performance. In addition to replicating the consistently reported finding of poor performance on standard false belief tests by late‐signing deaf children, significant correlations emerged in both studies between deaf children's ToM test scores and their spontaneous narrative talk about imaginative cognition (e.g. ‘pretend’). In Study 2, with a new set of purpose‐built pictures that evoked richer and more complex mentalistic narration than the published picture book of Study 1, results of multiple regression analyses showed that children's narrative talk about imaginative cognition was uniquely important, over and above hearing status and talking of other kinds of mental states, in predicting ToM scores. The same was true of children's elaborated narrative talk using utterances that either spelt out thoughts, explained inner states or introduced contrastives. In addition, results of a Guttman scalogram analysis in Study 2 suggested a consistent sequence in narrative and standard test performance by deaf and hearing children that went from (1) narrative mention of visible (affective or perceptual) mental states only, along with FB failure, to (2) narrative mention of cognitive states along with (1), to (3) elaborated narrative talk about inner states along with (2), and finally to (4) simple and elaborated narrative talk about affective/perceptual and cognitive states along with FB test success. Possible explanations for this performance ordering, as well as for the observed correlations in both studies between ToM test scores and narrative variables, were considered.

The Abstracts of the 15th Australian Language and Speech Conference

DeVilliers and DeVilliers (2000, 2005) propose that deaf and hearing children acquire a theory of mind (or the understanding that human behaviour is the product of psychological states like true and false beliefs) as a consequence of their linguistic mastery of a rule of syntax. Specifically, they argue that the syntactic rule for sentential complementation with verbs of speech (e.g., “say”) precedes syntactic mastery of complementation for cognition (e.g., “think”) and both of these developmentally precede and promote conceptual mastery of a theory of mind (ToM), as indexed via success on standard false belief tests. The present study examined this proposition in groups of primary-school-aged deaf children and hearing preschoolers who took false belief tests and a modified memory for complements test that included control questions. Guttman scaling techniques indicated no support either for the prediction that syntactic skill precedes ToM understanding or for the earlier emergence of complementation for “say” than for “think”. Methodological issues and implications for deaf children's ToM development are discussed.

Guessing versus choosing – and seeing versus believing – in false belief tasks

Three‐ and 4‐year‐old children were tested using videos of puppets in various versions of a theory of mind change‐of‐location situation, in order to answer several questions about what children are doing when they pass false belief tests. To investigate whether children were guessing or confidently choosing their answer to the test question, a condition in which children were forced to guess was also included, and measures of uncertainty were compared across conditions. To investigate whether children were using simpler strategies than an understanding of false belief to pass the test, we teased apart the seeing‐knowing confound in the traditional change‐of‐location task. We also investigated relations between children's performance on true and false belief tests. Results indicated that children appeared to be deliberately choosing, not guessing, in the false belief tasks. Children performed just as well whether the protagonist gained information about the object visually or verbally, indicating that children were not using a simple rule based on seeing to predict the protagonist's behaviour. A true belief condition was significantly easier for children than a false belief condition as long as it was of low processing demands. Children's success rate on the different versions of the standard false belief task was influenced by factors such as processing demands of the stories and the child's verbal abilities.

Knowing that I didn't know: preschoolers' understanding of their own false belief is a predictor of assents to fictitious events

The present study examines the relation between children's theory of mind abilities and their tendency to assent to fictitious events when questioned repeatedly across interviews. Children between the ages of 3 and 6 years were interviewed individually either four or seven times about a fictitious and a real staged event, and in addition given a false belief test as well as a fantasy-reality distinction test. Children's performance on the false belief task addressing the understanding of their own false belief was a better predictor for assents to false events than was understanding the false belief of another person, age, number of interviews and performance on a fantasy-reality distinction task. Children's memory for a staged event showed that repeated questions across interviews was related to a decrease in correct assents to having experienced a staged event, an increase in wrong yes-responses about touch and erroneously mentioning names of children who had not been present during the staged event. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.