False Belief Reasoning Research Articles

Culturally embedded schemata for false belief reasoning

I argue that both language acquisition and cultural and social factors contribute to the formation of schemata that facilitate false belief reasoning. While the proposal for an active role of language acquisition in this sense has been partially advanced by several voices in the mentalizing debate, I argue that other accounts addressing this issue present some shortcomings. Specifically, I analyze the existing proposals distinguishing between “structure-oriented” views (with the most relevant representative in de Villiers and de Villiers in Complements enable representation of the contents of false beliefs: the evolution of a theory of theory of mind. Language Acquisition, Foster-Cohen, 2009; de Villiers in Int Rev Gen Linguistics 117(11):1858–1878, 2007; de Villiers in Why language matters for theory of mind. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 186–219, 2005), that stress the role of language as a set of rules providing syntactic input and providing a representational format, and “cultural/social-oriented views”, that stress the role of social interaction (among others Nelson in Why language matters for theory of mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005; Hutto in Folk psychological narratives: the sociocultural basis of understanding reasons. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008b). Starting from the analysis of these views, I defend my own account of the role of language acquisition in aiding false belief reasoning. I argue that language acquisition plays a pivotal role in the formation of schemata used by pre-schoolers to pass the false belief task. I propose a specific learning mechanism for exploiting linguistic information that taps into specific cognitive abilities, thus making a very concrete suggestion about the role of linguistic input in specific cultural contexts for the development of false belief skills.

Altered Connectivity During a False-Belief Task in Adults With Autism Spectrum Disorder

BackgroundDeficits in social communication are one of the main features of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Adults with ASD show atypical brain activity during false-belief understanding, an aspect of social communication involving the ability to infer that an individual can have an incorrect belief about a situation. Our study is the first to investigate whether adults with ASD exhibit differences in frequency-specific functional connectivity patterns during false-belief reasoning. MethodsWe used magnetoencephalography to contrast functional connectivity underlying false-belief understanding between 40 adults with ASD and 39 control adults. We examined whole-brain phase synchrony measures during a false-belief task in 3 frequency bands: theta (4–7 Hz), alpha (8–14 Hz), and beta (15–30 Hz). ResultsAdults with ASD demonstrated reduced theta-band connectivity compared with control adults between several right-lateralized and midline regions such as the medial prefrontal cortex, right temporoparietal junction, right inferior frontal gyrus, and right superior temporal gyrus. During false-belief trials, they also recruited a network in the beta band that included primary visual regions such as the bilateral inferior occipital gyri and the left anterior temporoparietal junction. ConclusionsReduced theta-band synchrony between areas associated with mentalizing, inhibition, and visual processing implies some difficulty in communication among these functions in ASD. This impairment in top-down control in the theta band may be counterbalanced by their engagement of a beta-band network because both the left anterior temporoparietal junction and beta-band oscillations are associated with attentional processes. Thus, adults with ASD demonstrate alternative neural mechanisms for successful false-belief reasoning.

The neural basis of belief-attribution across the lifespan: False-belief reasoning and the N400 effect

The current study examined how social cognition – specifically, belief-state processing – changes across the lifespan, using a large sample (N = 309) of participants aged 10–86 years. Participants completed an event-related brain potential study in which they listened to stories involving a character who held either a true- or false-belief about the location of an object, and then acted in a manner consistent or inconsistent to this belief-state. Analysis of the N400 revealed that when the character held a true-belief, inconsistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than consistent outcomes. In contrast, when the character held a false-belief, consistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than inconsistent outcomes, indicating that participants interpreted the character's actions according to their own more complete knowledge of reality. Importantly, this egocentric bias was not modulated by age in an early time window (200–400 msec post-stimulus onset), meaning that initial processing is grounded in reality, irrespective of age. However, this egocentric effect was correlated with age in a later time window (400–600 msec post-stimulus onset), as older adults continued to consider the story events according to their own knowledge of reality, but younger participants had now switched to accommodate the character's perspective. In a final 600–1000 msec time window, this age modulation was no longer present. Interestingly, results suggested that this extended egocentric processing in older adults was not the result of domain-general cognitive declines, as no significant relationship was found with executive functioning (inhibitory control and working memory).

False belief reasoning in pronoun resolution during on-line sentence processing

False belief reasoning in pronoun resolution during on-line sentence processing

Neural correlates of theory-of-mind are associated with variation in children's everyday social cognition.

ABSTRACTTheory of mind (ToM), the capacity to reason about others’ mental states, is central to healthy social development. Neural mechanisms supporting ToM may contribute to individual differences in children’s social cognitive behavior. Employing a false belief functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm, we identified patterns of neural activity and connectivity elicited by ToM reasoning in school-age children (N = 32, ages 9–13). Next, we tested relations between these neural ToM correlates and children’s everyday social cognition. Several key nodes of the neural ToM network showed greater activity when reasoning about false beliefs (ToM condition) vs non-mentalistic false content (control condition), including the bilateral temporoparietal junction (RTPJ and LTPJ), precuneus (PC) and right superior temporal sulcus. In addition, children demonstrated task-modulated changes in connectivity among these regions to support ToM relative to the control condition. ToM-related activity in the PC was negatively associated with variation in multiple aspects of children’s social cognitive behavior. Together, these findings elucidate how nodes of the ToM network act and interact to support false belief reasoning in school-age children and suggest that neural ToM mechanisms are linked to variation in everyday social cognition.

Accelerating the Development of Second-Order False Belief Reasoning: A Training Study With Different Feedback Methods.

One-hundred-six 5-year-olds' (Mage =5;6; SD=0.40) were trained with second-order false belief tasks in one of the following conditions: (a) feedback with explanation; (b) feedback without explanation; (c) no feedback; (d) active control. The results showed that there were significant improvements in children's scores from pretest to posttest in the three experimental conditions even when children's age, verbal abilities, or working memory scores were controlled for. The training effect was stable at a follow-up session 4months after the pretest. Overall, our results suggest that 5-year-olds' failures in second-order false belief tasks are due to lack of experience and that they can be helped over the threshold by exposure to many stories involving second-order false belief reasoning, including why questions.

Publication standards in infancy research: Three ways to make Violation-of-Expectation studies more reliable

The Violation-of-Expectation paradigm is a widespread paradigm in infancy research that relies on looking time as an index of surprise. This methodological review aims to increase the reliability of future VoE studies by proposing to standardize reporting practices in this literature. I review 15 VoE studies on false-belief reasoning, which used a variety of experimental parameters. An analysis of the distribution of p-values across experiments suggests an absence of p-hacking. However, there are potential concerns with the accuracy of their measures of infants’ attention, as well as with the lack of a consensus on the parameters that should be used to set up VoE studies. I propose that (i) future VoE studies ought to report not only looking times (as a measure of attention) but also looking-away times (as an equally important measure of distraction); (ii) VoE studies must offer theoretical justification for the parameters they use, and (iii) when parameters are selected through piloting, pilot data must be reported in order to understand how parameters were selected. Future VoE studies ought to maximize the accuracy of their measures of infants’ attention since the reliability of their results and the validity of their conclusions both depend on the accuracy of their measures.

Oxytocin receptor gene variants are associated with emotion recognition and resilience, but not with false-belief reasoning performance in healthy young Korean volunteers.

A growing body of literature has indicated that oxytocin is associated with several domains of social cognition and behavior. Nevertheless, the effects of oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) polymorphisms on social phenotypes remain unclear. Therefore, we aimed to explore the genetic influence of OXTR variants on social cognition (social perception and theory of mind) and resilience in healthy individuals. We examined the influence of 10 common OXTR variants on social cognitive abilities, including facial emotion recognition and theory of mind, and trait resilience in 264 unrelated, healthy participants. We found a significant association between the A-C haplotype at rs237887-rs2268490 and facial affect recognition. In addition, the single marker rs2254298 was significantly associated with participants' scores on the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale. In contrast, variations in OXTR did not affect participants' performance on the false-belief reasoning task. Single makers or haplotypes at OXTR may contribute to individual differences in facial emotion recognition and psychological resilience.

False belief and relative clauses in Autism Spectrum Disorders

Previous studies have suggested sentential complementation is the crucial ingredient of language that relates to false-belief (FB) reasoning, while the role of relative clauses (RCs) is less clear. Nevertheless, under the hypothesis that clausal embedding has a meta-representational effect, arguably implied in FB, one expects a link between FB and not only complementation but also relativization. Seventeen children with ASD (6 to 16 years, mean age 9;2) were assessed for RCs and FB. Comprehension of RCs significantly predicted FB performance, while none of the controlled factors played a predictive role (comprehension of simple sentences, vocabulary, morpho-syntax and working memory). Findings suggest that clausal embedding, common to both sentential complements and RCs, serves as a bootstrap for FB reasoning.

Is Implicit Theory of Mind a Real and Robust Phenomenon? Results From a Systematic Replication Study

Recently, theory-of-mind research has been revolutionized by findings from novel implicit tasks suggesting that at least some aspects of false-belief reasoning develop earlier in ontogeny than previously assumed and operate automatically throughout adulthood. Although these findings are the empirical basis for far-reaching theories, systematic replications are still missing. This article reports a preregistered large-scale attempt to replicate four influential anticipatory-looking implicit theory-of-mind tasks using original stimuli and procedures. Results showed that only one of the four paradigms was reliably replicated. A second set of studies revealed, further, that this one paradigm was no longer replicated once confounds were removed, which calls its validity into question. There were also no correlations between paradigms, and thus, no evidence for their convergent validity. In conclusion, findings from anticipatory-looking false-belief paradigms seem less reliable and valid than previously assumed, thus limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from them.

Mental Rotation in False Belief Understanding

This study examines the spontaneous use of embodied egocentric transformation (EET) in understanding false beliefs in the minds of others. EET involves the participants mentally transforming or rotating themselves into the orientation of an agent when trying to adopt his or her visuospatial perspective. We argue that psychological perspective taking such as false belief reasoning may also involve EET because of what has been widely reported in the embodied cognition literature, showing that our processing of abstract, propositional information is often grounded in concrete bodily sensations which are not apparently linked to higher cognition. In Experiment 1, an agent placed a ball into one of two boxes and left. The ball then rolled out and moved either into the other box (new box) or back into the original one (old box). The participants were to decide from which box they themselves or the agent would try to recover the ball. Results showed that false belief performance was affected by increased orientation disparity between the participants and the agent, suggesting involvement of embodied transformation. In Experiment 2, false belief was similarly induced and the participants were to decide if the agent would try to recover the ball in one specific box. Orientation disparity was again found to affect false belief performance. The present results extend previous findings on EET in visuospatial perspective taking and suggest that false belief reasoning, which is a kind of psychological perspective taking, can also involve embodied rotation, consistent with the embodied cognition view.

False Belief Reasoning in Adults with and without Autistic Spectrum Disorder: Similarities and Differences.

A central diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is the qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction and a prominent hypotheses that tried to explain this impairment is the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit hypotheses. On a behavioral level the critical test for having a ToM, the understanding of false beliefs (FB), is often used for testing ToM abilities in individuals with ASD. Investigating the neural underpinnings several neuroimaging studies revealed a network of areas involved in FB reasoning in neurotypical individuals. For ASD individuals the neural correlates of false belief processing are largely unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and an adapted unexpected transfer task, that makes it possible to distinguish between the computation of diverging beliefs and the selection of a belief-associated response, we investigated a group of adult high-functioning individuals with ASD (N = 15) and an age and IQ matched group of neurotypical adults (NT; N = 15). On the behavioral level we found no group differences. On the neural level, results were two-fold: In the story phase, in which participants had to compute whether the character's belief is congruent or incongruent to their own belief, there were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with ASD. But, in the subsequent question phase, participants with ASD showed increased activity in the bilateral anterior prefrontal cortex, the left posterior frontal cortex, the left superior temporal gyrus, and the left temporoparietal area. These results suggest that during the story phase in which the participants processed observable actions the neural correlates do not differ between adult individuals with ASD and NT individuals. But in the question phase in which participants had to infer an unobservable mental state results revealed neural differences between the two groups. Possibly, these subtle neural processing differences may contribute to the fact that adult ASD individuals are able to master explicit false belief tasks but fail to apply their strategies during everyday social interaction.

Do bilingual and monolingual preschoolers acquire false belief understanding similarly? The role of executive functioning and language

Bilingual children often show advanced executive functioning (EF) and false belief (FB) understanding compared to monolinguals. The latter has been attributed to their enhanced inhibitory control EF, although this has only been examined in a single study which did not confirm this hypothesis. The current study examined the relation of EF and language proficiency on FB reasoning in bilingual and monolingual preschoolers to answer two questions: (1) Are there differences in bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ FB, language proficiency, and EF? If so, (2) is there a differential role for language proficiency and EF in predicting FB reasoning in these two groups? Thirty-two Spanish–English bilinguals and 33 English monolinguals (three to five years old) were compared. While monolinguals outperformed bilinguals on language proficiency, after controlling for this, bilinguals outperformed monolinguals on FB reasoning, and marginally on EF. General language ability was related to FB performance in both groups, while short-term memory and inhibitory control predicted FB only for monolinguals.

False-belief reasoning from 3 to 92 years of age.

False-belief reasoning, defined as the ability to reason about another person’s beliefs and appreciate that beliefs can differ from reality, is an important aspect of perspective taking. We tested 266 individuals, at various ages ranging from 3 to 92 years, on a continuous measure of false-belief reasoning (the Sandbox task). All age groups had difficulty suppressing their own knowledge when estimating what a naïve person knew. After controlling for task-specific memory, our results showed similar false-belief reasoning abilities across the preschool years and from older childhood to younger adulthood, followed by a small reduction in this ability from younger to older adulthood. These results highlight the relative similarity in false-belief reasoning abilities at different developmental periods across the lifespan.

Calling for Careful Designs for the Evaluation of Interactive Behavioral Measures on Early False-Belief Reasoning.

With the introduction of the interactive false-belief paradigm, Buttelmann et al.(2009) proposed that already infants track another person's beliefs in order to infer her or his goal and help accordingly. This view has been challenged by Allen (2015) who argued that is not the experimenter's mental states but the social situation the test was embedded in that influenced participants' performance.

Indirect task instructions better reveal theory-of-mind impairment, independent of executive dysfunction, in schizophrenia

Theory of mind (TOM) impairments associate significantly with executive deficits in schizophrenia, consistent with the proposal that executive abilities can limit TOM task performance, and confounding identification of those patients who would benefit most from targeted mentalising interventions. 50 schizophrenia patients and 30 healthy controls completed an executive battery and four TOM tasks that were alike with regards generating overt measures of causal false-belief reasoning, but differed with regards using indirect (vs. more direct) instructions. Only the TOM tasks that used indirect instructions to elicit spontaneous false-belief inferences revealed impairment, independent of executive dysfunction, in the schizophrenia patients.

Cognitive control explains the mutual transfer between dimensional change card sorting and first-order false belief understanding: A computational modeling study on transfer of skills

Abstract While most 3-year-olds fail both in the false belief task of theory of mind and Dimensional Change Card Sorting task of cognitive control, most 4-year-olds are able to pass these tasks. Different theories have been constructed to explain this co-development. To investigate the direction of the developmental relationship between false belief reasoning and cognitive control, Kloo and Perner (2003) trained 3-year-olds on the false belief task in one condition and on the Dimensional Change Card Sorting task in another condition. They found that there is a mutual transfer between the two tasks, meaning that training children with the Dimensional Change Card Sorting task with feedback significantly improved children’s performance on the false belief task and vice versa. In this study, we aim to provide an explanation for the underlying mechanisms of this mutual transfer by constructing computational cognitive models. In contrast to the previous theories, our models show that the common element in the two tasks is two competing strategies, only one of which leads to a correct answer. Providing children with explicit feedback trains them to use a strategy of control instead of using a simpler reactive strategy. Therefore, we propose that children start to pass the false belief and cognitive control tasks once they learn to be flexible in their behavior depending on the current goal.

Five-Year-Olds' Systematic Errors in Second-Order False Belief Tasks Are Due to First-Order Theory of Mind Strategy Selection: A Computational Modeling Study.

The focus of studies on second-order false belief reasoning generally was on investigating the roles of executive functions and language with correlational studies. Different from those studies, we focus on the question how 5-year-olds select and revise reasoning strategies in second-order false belief tasks by constructing two computational cognitive models of this process: an instance-based learning model and a reinforcement learning model. Unlike the reinforcement learning model, the instance-based learning model predicted that children who fail second-order false belief tasks would give answers based on first-order theory of mind (ToM) reasoning as opposed to zero-order reasoning. This prediction was confirmed with an empirical study that we conducted with 72 5- to 6-year-old children. The results showed that 17% of the answers were correct and 83% of the answers were wrong. In line with our prediction, 65% of the wrong answers were based on a first-order ToM strategy, while only 29% of them were based on a zero-order strategy (the remaining 6% of subjects did not provide any answer). Based on our instance-based learning model, we propose that when children get feedback “Wrong,” they explicitly revise their strategy to a higher level instead of implicitly selecting one of the available ToM strategies. Moreover, we predict that children’s failures are due to lack of experience and that with exposure to second-order false belief reasoning, children can revise their wrong first-order reasoning strategy to a correct second-order reasoning strategy.

Syntactic Recursion Facilitates and Working Memory Predicts Recursive Theory of Mind.

In this study, we focus on the possible roles of second-order syntactic recursion and working memory in terms of simple and complex span tasks in the development of second-order false belief reasoning. We tested 89 Turkish children in two age groups, one younger (4;6–6;5 years) and one older (6;7–8;10 years). Although second-order syntactic recursion is significantly correlated with the second-order false belief task, results of ordinal logistic regressions revealed that the main predictor of second-order false belief reasoning is complex working memory span. Unlike simple working memory and second-order syntactic recursion tasks, the complex working memory task required processing information serially with additional reasoning demands that require complex working memory strategies. Based on our results, we propose that children’s second-order theory of mind develops when they have efficient reasoning rules to process embedded beliefs serially, thus overcoming a possible serial processing bottleneck.

A Bayesian Framework for False Belief Reasoning in Children: A Rational Integration of Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory.

Two apparently contrasting theories have been proposed to account for the development of children's theory of mind (ToM): theory-theory and simulation theory. We present a Bayesian framework that rationally integrates both theories for false belief reasoning. This framework exploits two internal models for predicting the belief states of others: one of self and one of others. These internal models are responsible for simulation-based and theory-based reasoning, respectively. The framework further takes into account empirical studies of a developmental ToM scale (e.g., Wellman and Liu, 2004): developmental progressions of various mental state understandings leading up to false belief understanding. By representing the internal models and their interactions as a causal Bayesian network, we formalize the model of children's false belief reasoning as probabilistic computations on the Bayesian network. This model probabilistically weighs and combines the two internal models and predicts children's false belief ability as a multiplicative effect of their early-developed abilities to understand the mental concepts of diverse beliefs and knowledge access. Specifically, the model predicts that children's proportion of correct responses on a false belief task can be closely approximated as the product of their proportions correct on the diverse belief and knowledge access tasks. To validate this prediction, we illustrate that our model provides good fits to a variety of ToM scale data for preschool children. We discuss the implications and extensions of our model for a deeper understanding of developmental progressions of children's ToM abilities.