As title of my article suggests, I am concerned to determine what Christians can contribute to literary studies that non-Christian critics cannot. It is not unusual today for some literary scholars to assume because they are Christians work they do is also Christian. But I will argue that most of time when we are doing literary critical work, our Christianity makes little, if any, principled difference to our scholarly activity and, more strongly, cannot make any theoretical difference unless we are willing to adopt theophanic models of reading. Religion's return to Academy is marked by conferences, special issues of journals and magazines, books, articles, and curiosity from scholars who are themselves indifferent to religion as a form of personal commitment. Outside Academy, has become a platitude to comment upon rise in church attendance after 9/11, prominence of on national political scene, and centrality of Islam and Christianity in global south and east. These and other signs suggest that is quite possible to explain return of religion to English by reference to events that have occurred outside it: English has returned to religion because world around has. But there may be some more properly academic reasons for new importance of Christianity in literary studies: erosion of rationalist and scientistic foundation of academic enterprise. It is no longer clear that there are two distinct categories of knowledge: rational, scientifically verifiable beliefs (perspicuous and available to who correctly apply their innate rational faculties and appropriate methods) and faith-based beliefs (acculturated and requiring superstitious leaps of faith to be compelling). Instead many, if not most, scholars now work under assumption that there are simply beliefs that guide rest of a person's commitments, of which are perspicuous to person who holds but which are not innate or guaranteed by faculty of human reason. As a result of rejection of first category of knowledge, many recent epistemological conceptions repudiate long held belief that religious conviction happens in a way distinct from other kinds of complex conviction. What follows from this move toward antifoundationalism (the epistemology most often referred to simply as postmodern) is that central role of conviction to academic enterprise comes to foreground and Christianity as well as other religions no longer seem at an epistemic disadvantage for having been based upon / belief. For instance, Catholic theologian and scholar of Indian Buddhism Paul Griffiths, in a review of Stanley Hauerwas's 2001 Gifford Lectures (subsequently published as With Grain of Universe), explains that the [by some philosophical foundationalists/modernists] for justification (or vindication or support) of conviction from any source other than itself is misplaced (74) and this is because Christian conviction is not epistemologically guilty until proven innocent; is, rather, epistemologically innocent until proven guilty. And in this is like every other complex conviction (Marxism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and so on) about nature of human persons and world in which we find ourselves (74). Griffiths asserts that it is ... an ordinary feature of human conviction that those who hold particular complex convictions may defensibly continue to do so without having or being able to give epistemic for them (emphasis mine, 74). Griffiths's point is that there is nothing about religion that makes its rejection of epistemologists' demand for independent epistemic support more difficult because there are no such things as foundations, that is, no grounds which are not themselves beliefs. Griffiths concludes that we are all sectarians, which is to say that we inhabit a form of life whose central commitments neither can nor need be validated or justified or vindicated independently of assuming true. …