Fairness Norms Research Articles

Norms of Cooperation

A longstanding tradition in the social sciences contrasts instrumental rationality and social norms as alternative ways of explaining action. Rational choice theory defines action as the outcome of a practical inference that takes preferences and beliefs as premises. An explanation in terms of norms depicts a socialized actor whose behavior is not outcome oriented, since when acting in accordance with a norm one does not engage in a rational calculation nor does one pay very much attention to the consequences. Attempts at bridging the gap have either tried to establish that social norms are rational, in the sense of being efficient means to achieve individual or social welfare, or that it is rational to conform to norms, thus reducing compliance to utility maximization. The first reductionist strategy makes a typical post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, since the mere presence of a social norm does not justify inferring that it is there to accomplish some social function. Besides, it does not account for the fact that many social norms are inefficient, as in the case of discriminatory norms against women and blacks, or are so rigid as to prevent the fine-tuning that would be necessary to successfully accommodate new cases. Even if a norm is a means to achieve a social end, such as cooperation, retribution, or fairness, usually it is not the sole means. Many social norms are underdetermined with respect to the collective objectives they may serve, nor can they be ordered according to a criterion of greater or lesser efficiency in meeting these goals. Such an ordering would be feasible only if it were possible to show that one norm among others is the best means to attain a given social objective. Often, though, the objectives themselves are defined by means of some norm. Consider as an example norms of revenge; until not long ago, a Sicilian man who "dishonored" another man's daughter or sister had to make amends for the wrong by marrying the woman or pay for his rashness with his own life. The objective was to restore the family's lost

Enacting networks: The feasibility of fairness

Abstract Network analysis has ignored the process of network enactment. Yet there are many fairness norms, such as reciprocity, that are oriented toward the timing of encounters as much as toward their structure. The difficulties involved in enacting a network within the bounds of such fairness norms can constrain what kinds of network structures are sustainable. In this paper, these difficulties are assessed across networks varying in size, density and differentiation using a computer program that searches for fair network enactments. In one application, the results help explain actual fairness properties of National Football League season schedules (1960–1987), such as the decrease in home-away game alternation after the 1969 merger between AFL and NFL and the threshold that was reached in 1977 and not substantially exceeded since. In another application, null expectations for short-run exchange imbalances (between giving and taking) are generated for networks where a long-run generalized norm of reciprocity strictly holds. A strong faith in the long run is needed in large, moderately dense, undifferentiated networks because eliminating the short-run imbalances can be infeasible. The pursuit of fairness is limited as much by the means of network designers as by their intentions.

Iran/contra and the defeat of accountability

Is Accountability a standard that transcends time and culture? Does it retain any meaning for an electronically mediated society? Older norms of fairness, reciprocity and of individual responsibility appeared to be inadequate ethical guides during the Iran/Contra Hearings. This article highlights the testimony of Oliver North in order to challenge the universality of Accountability as a criterion of legitimate conduct.

Wage Bargaining and Norms of Fairness - a Theoretical Framework for Analysing the Norwegian Wage Formation

The focus of this article is on wage formation in Norway in the seventies and eighties Our main question is whether the institutional frames for wage negotiations in Norway are compatible with the new factors and topics which have become increasingly important during the last two decades The new situation is partly due to a more complex structure concerning the character and number of unions taking part in the negotiations But most important is the change in the arguments which are used to legitimate wage claims. None of the traditional economic approaches towards wage bargaining directly take into account the significance of wage comparisons between employees at different plants or among different groups of employees, and here we are at the core of the argument in this article The development during the last years indicates that a theory about what is actually going on in wage negotiations has to take into account the question of wage inequalities and their legitimacy, i e the question of a fair wage distribution The wage level and wage growth for other groups or in other firms today has quite a different impact on the outcome of the negotiations than is assumed in traditional bargaining theory. The significance of norms of fairness is not limited to the study of local bargaining processes With increasing strength the normative perspective also becomes necessary to our understanding of negotiations at the macro level, i.e the central negotiations This seems to be the case especially where, as in Norway, the state authorities play an active role in the negotiations, along with the unions and the employer's associations Although the main problems discussed in this article are related to the Norwegian wage formation, the arguments put forward are of a more general type They are assumed to be of importance in relation to the Situation in countries with an institutional structure similar to that in Norway concerning wage bargaining and wage policy

Conflict Analysis of Water Resources Allocation

This paper focusses the significance of the total load control scheme which was recently introduced by the Japanese Government, to apply to designated closed water bodies in Japan. By showing that part of the problem is the resolution of conflicts in the allocation of environmental loads to be discharged by interested parties, a game-theoretic model by use of cooperative game theory has been presented. Mathematical analyses have been performed to derive theoretical properties of the two-person game that has been formulated as a prototype model of the conflict.It has been shown that what originally appears to be a game of COD load allocation can be reduced to what is called a cost allocation game. This latter type of allocation game has been proved to be largely determined by an a priori assignment of total COD loads dischargeable to each player.Illustration has been made of the necessity of setting up on a higher level than this game, some fairness norms that may bind what follows as a cost allocation game. The paper concludes by suggesting possible further generalization of the proposed two-person game into an n-person game.

The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems

The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems

Fairness or discrimination in intergroup behaviour? a reply to Branthwaite, Doyle and Lightbown

AbstractBranthwaite, Doyle and Lightbown (1979) argue that minimal intergroup behaviour represents a compromise or balance between fairness and discrimination, that fairness and discrimination are opposed, generic norms of intergroup relations and that one factor affecting their relative weight is status position since, apparently, different status groups attempt to equalize their positions by varying the degree to which they are fair or discriminatory. This reply reviews evidence to show that minimal groups are never fair but always discriminatory to varying degrees and that a generic norm of intergroup fairness is unnecessary to explain why that discrimination rarely approaches maximum. It also argues that the concept of opposed, generic norms has neither empirical nor theoretical value. Finally, it cites findings that the basic tendency in intergroup behaviour is not to equalize but to accentuate evaluative differences between groups (whether of similar or different status) in favour of the ingroup.

The balance between fairness and discrimination

AbstractResearch on intergroup relations by Tafel and others (e.g. Tafel et al., 1971; Billig and Taifel, 1973) has indicated that there are two opposing norms governing intergroup behaviour‐ norm for discrimination and a norm for fairness. The behaviour that results from social categorization represents a compromise between these opposing norms. The norm for discrimination is explained in terms of social comparison processes and the need to achieve a positive ingroup identity (Turner, 1975). Along similar lines, another study suggests that discrimination is strongest on the part of the self‐perceived underdog in order to assert its independent and individual identity (Branthwaite and Jones, 1975). The origin of the norm for fairness has received less attention but may be attributed to general moral judgements.Since there are opposing norms for discrimination and fairness and the observed behaviour is a resultant of the two, an explanation of intergroup behaviour cannot focus on fairness or discrimination alone, but it must take into account the balance between these forces. The relative strength of the two norms is a question of some importance, together with the factors which influence the relative strengths. This paper examines this issue and presents evidence from two studies that the status of the groups is an influence on the strength of the norm for discrimination. Both studies employed the Taifel matrix method: one in an experimental situation where the status of the groups was manipulated by the research procedures; the other in a more natural setting.

Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws

The conventional model of the practice of law views lawyers as those who apply legal rules in the service of client interests, checked only by the constraints of the adversary system. A study of the impact of consumer protection laws on the practice of Wisconsin lawyers shows this to be an oversimplification. Lawyers for individuals tend to know little of the precise contours of consumer protection law. They most often serve as mediators between buyer and seller, relying on general norms of fairness and good faith. Lawyers for businesses are more likely to make use of the law, but they are seldom called on to deal with particular disputes. Lawyers' own values and interests are reflected in the way in which they represent clients. As a result, reform laws which create individual rights are likely to have only symbolic effect unless incentives are devised to make their vindication in the long-range interest of members of the bar. Moreover, an understanding of the many roles played by lawyers also requires a more expanded picture of practice. The picture of the lawyer as litigator in the adversary system may itself serve largely symbolic functions.

Preference for modes of dispute resolution as a function of process and decision control

Research on procedural justice has suggested that the distribution of control among participants can be used to classify dispute-resolution procedures and may be an important determinant of preference for such procedures. This experiment demonstrates that control can be meaningfully divided into two components: control over the presentation of evidence and control over the final decision. The experiment placed subjects (law students and undergraduates) in a situation of conflict and varied two between-subjects factors: (1) Role, whether subjects expected to role-play third parties (law students) or litigants (undergraduates), and (2) Orientation, whether individuals focused on equity claims (appeals to a norm of fairness) or legal claims (appeals to a strict, legal interpretation of events). As a control, a third-party neutral-orientation condition was included. In addition, subjects were presented with four dispute-resolution procedures which varied in third-party control over the presentation of evidence (Process Control) and third-party control over the final decision (Decision Control) as within-subjects factors. Results revealed that both litigants and third parties preferred high rather than low third-party decision control. Litigants with an equity orientation preferred low third-party control over the presentation of evidence, particularly when third parties had high rather than low decision control. Third parties and litigants with a legal orientation preferred low rather than high third-party process control only when there was high third-party decision control. Litigant preferences were more affected by variation in process control than variation in decision control while third-party preferences were more affected by variation in decision control than in process control. As a check on external validity, military judges given a neutral orientation were asked to evaluate and express preferences for the four dispute-resolution procedures. Their results were not detectably different from those of the law students who role-played third parties in the main portion of the study.

Fairness and discrimination: English versus Welsh

AbstractIt has previously been suggested that there is a generic norm of conflict between groups so that when a differentiation is perceived between one group and another there is a predisposition to discriminate against the outgroup. The present study investigates whether this norm of conflict operates in social situations involving differentiation over real issues, or to what extent behavior is modified by norms of fairness. The research examined English and Welsh groups and found that when there was an opportunity of giving equal rewards to both parties about one‐third of subjects acted in this fair way. Never as many as one‐third of subjects acted in the most discriminatory way possible, and the remainder modified or tempered their discrimination. Behavior in this situation was felt to be the result of opposing internal norms for fairness and discrimination. Differences were found between the English and Welsh subjects. The Welsh showed more discrimination against the outgroup, while discrimination in favor of the outgroup was more common among the English. It is hypothesized that that effect may be characteristic of the behavior of ‘top‐dogs’ and ‘underdogs’.

Consistency and modification of judgment

In an investigation of minority influence, it was predicted that a consistent preference for paintings based on nationality by a confederate would cause previously neutral subjects to increase their preference in the direction of this minority viewpoint. Further, it was predicted that ethnic origin of the confederate could be seen as a biasing factor which could diminish influence. Four naive subjects were paired with one experimental confederate who was presented as being of either Italian, German, or unknown ethnic origin. On every trial, subjects were asked to indicate their preference between two paintings, one labeled “Italian” and the other labeled “German.” Labels were actually assigned at random. The confederate consistently chose the Italian or the German paintings on every one of the 19 trials. Results indicate that Control subjects rather than being neutral, exhibited a preference for the Italian paintings. Further, the presence of a confederate who took a consistent standard, whether it was Italian or German, had the effect of making subjects significantly more pro-German (or less pro-Italian) than the control group. The findings are explained on the basis that the German position was actalternative minority position, whereas the Italian position was actually an extreme of the majority position. While the former situation leads to minority influence as predicted, the latter situation appears to have polarized subjects. An alternative in terms of a norm of fairness is suggested, also.