Fair Salary Research Articles

Rational Techniques as Myth-Based Rituals: The Role of Reflective Practitioners in Remunerative Justice

Remunerative justice in public organizations remains elusive, largely because public administrators employ rational techniques in human resource management. Rational techniques include job evaluations, salary surveys, position classifications, and merit pay determinations. When they are employed to address wicked salary-assignment problems, such rational techniques are elevated to the status of myth-based rituals. Reflective practitioners can become aware of alternatives to myths by understanding the context of rational techniques, the advantages to invoking myth when making salary assignments, and the problems with using rational techniques. A thorough reevaluation of rational techniques allows reflective practitioners to apply holistic approaches, critical theory knowledge, and qualitative methods to overcoming remuneration challenges and, in so doing, promote fair salary assignments. Public administrators have a responsibility to understand myth-based rituals as they seek remunerative justice.

Państwo a problem sprawiedliwości społecznej

Marxism accepted the notion of social justice, but realized it through liquidation of private property and violence of the totalitarian state. Liberalism and neoliberalism, in the name of maximal economic liberalism, reject the idea of social justice and postulate a minimal state. Republicanism and communitarianism accept ideas of common good and social justice. The social teaching of the Church proposes a subsidiary state which is not a protective one. Contemporary popes – Pius XI (Quadragesimo anno), John XXIII (Mater et Magistra), Paul VI (Populorum progressio), John Paul II (Sollicitudo rei socialis, Centesimus annus) – postulate participation of the state in social justice. The main of its obligations are: protection and financial aid for key sectors of economic life (including agriculture), profamily policy, fighting against unemployment and providing fair salary, limited economic intervention (while respecting the rules of the free market economy at the same time), medical and social care.

Constraints and obstacles to social health protection in the Maghreb: the cases of Algeria and Morocco

Introduction Economic variables must be taken into account in any attempt to develop social health protection systems. However, such variables should not blind us to the importance of social protection as a civic right and as an effective way to improve the well-being of the population, with a resulting positive effect on the economy. Building or reforming social health protection systems involves a complex combination of political, social and technical factors and strategies. Reforms often call for major changes in resource allocation and in the distribution of power and thus evoke fear and resistance among small but powerful segments of society. This paper briefly describes attempts made by Morocco and Algeria to reform their social health protection systems. Evolution of social health protection systems The measures taken in Morocco to reform social health protection spanned the period from 2002 to 2006. Before 2002, several coexisting optional health insurance schemes covered only 17% of the population. A system of certificates of indigence was operating in parallel and still exists today. Individuals who consider themselves indigent may submit a request to local authorities to receive a certificate granting them access to subsidized hospital care in public facilities. Such a system is universally criticized for being plagued by serious malfunction. (1) In 2002, after several abortive attempts at reform, the Youssoufi government (1997-2002) pushed through a framework law (No. 65-00) on basic medical aimed at phasing in universal coverage for the Moroccan population. This law has two components: compulsory health insurance (Assurance maladie obligatoire, AMO) and medical care (Regime d'assistance medicale, RAMED) for persons in need. While the initial decrees on AMO, which were passed in 2005, only concerned the formal sector, in 2007 the Jettou government (2002-2007) extended coverage to self-employed professionals outside the AMO, through a plan known as Inaya. The RAMED, under pilot-testing in one province, had not yet come into being. With independence in 1962, Algeria inherited a fragmented social protection system with disparities in the population and services covered. Beginning in 1970, the government implemented a series of measures to harmonize and unify social protection schemes. Major health programmes were launched, and the decision to provide public sector health care for free was made in 1974. By 1983 this trend had been consolidated through the unification of social security plans. The nationalization of natural resources, the growth of oil revenues and the launch of a vast movement to industrialize the economy and pay fair salaries to the economically active population provided the foundations for the extension of social protection. This top-down way of building a broadened social protection system and health insurance plan was relatively successful for as long as the central government had substantial financial resources and continued to rapidly develop salaried employment in the public sector. The system covered almost all risks (disease, maternity, disability, death, retirement, work injuries, unemployment, etc.) for more than 85% of the population. In 1988, however, oil revenues slumped, marking the end of the social consensus based on the redistribution of income. This ushered in a protracted and exceptionally violent political, economic and social crisis. Economic constraints for Morocco Despite an annual increase of more than 4% in its per capita gross domestic product over the last decade, Morocco's economic status remains modest, with an annual per capita income still less than 2000 US dollars. Moreover, this economic growth has not significantly reduced the unemployment rate, which is 16% in urban areas, or the poverty level, with 15% of the population being poor and 23% economically vulnerable. …

Market economy for scientists

Changes in environment and location are a part of all professional careers and particularly suit the international nature of scientific research. Young scientists often undertake their post-doctoral positions at different universities in an attempt to carve out a niche in a competitive arena, and established senior scientists regularly advance their careers and improve their research by moving between institutes. However, in many cases the decision to move is based not on ‘noble' motives, but simply on a bigger pay cheque. This should not come as a surprise. Why should the financial interests of scientists differ from those of any other profession? We live in a society in which bills must be paid, material wealth gives status, frequent holidays are almost a civil right, and the quality of healthcare and education increasingly depend on one's ability to pay for ‘extras'. There are, quite obviously, real advantages to earning more money—a fact that has not escaped the attention of scientists. Yet there still lingers an image of scientists as dedicated individuals interested only in ‘higher' goals and the pursuit of great truths, rather than the more ‘profane' matters of salary and financial gain. Indeed, and perhaps because of this, scientists often deny any interest in material matters. This attitude, despite the sincerity with which it is held, might ultimately be misguided. Science cannot afford to send out the message that the most qualified minds should expect to be the most poorly paid in comparison with their peers. Clearly the status quo does not provide fair remuneration for committed scientists—on whom the future of the world's biggest economies depends. Even scientists who genuinely see research as a vocation might not disagree with their non-scientist spouses on what constitutes a fair salary and how to make adequate provision for their retirement. Along with today's materialistic attitude to status comes the development of a real market for high-flying scientists, driven by universities and research institutes on the prowl for talent. Their reasoning can be quite diverse: some institutes want to spot a potential Nobel prize-winner, such that the honour shines on the institute as well as the individual; some regions or countries want to jump-start research activities by attracting the best minds; and others simply know that a quality performer can boost the ranking of an institute and result in more research funding. However diverse the reasons, the basic motivation is the same: institutes or departments work in a competitive arena and their strategy is to buy the best ‘players'. Indeed, the analogy of the transfer markets in professional sports is particularly appropriate. Wealthy clubs can afford good players and the results are success and greater riches. The same is increasingly true of research institutes. On the surface, this might seem to be a win–win situation. For the scientist, the move to a new job usually means a higher salary, an improved lifestyle and better financial support to tackle more challenging research projects. For the receiving institute, there is a measurable increase in its competitiveness and a new source of income through grants and overheads. In addition, the presence of a ‘star' is sure to attract other skilled researchers, thus raising the overall quality of research throughout the institute. However, what is left out of this win–win calculation is the fact that the gains of one institute are inevitably the losses of another. The researcher who leaves might take with them personnel, grants and prestige, all of which have a knock-on effect on the institute and its remaining staff. For a small institute—or, indeed, country—struggling to strengthen its research, the departure of even one crucial scientist can be devastating. The feeling of unfair competition with rich universities is certainly justified—indeed, in contrast to player transfers in professional sports, no compensation is paid to the ‘team' that loses the crucial researcher. The increasing enthusiasm for portable grants in Europe should therefore be regarded with some caution, if only because they might lead to these types of problem if left unregulated or unchecked. It is conceivable that portable grants will increase the already significant ‘brain drain' by encouraging senior researchers to leave poorer regions. This is certainly not in the long-term interests of Europe. University rectors and managers of research institutes should therefore be forewarned of the increasing trend of a market economy for scientists and take better care of their crucial staff. Those in a position to provide moral, financial and emotional support for their researchers should do so, or they might lose their most valuable assets: their scientists. If the market economy for researchers stimulates such pro-active reactions, its overall effect will certainly improve the image of science as both a noble and financially rewarding profession—which might not be such a bad thing after all.

Factors associated with turnover interntion among nurses in small and medium-sized medical institutions.

The objective of this study was to evaluate factors associated with turnover intention among nurses in small and medium-sized medical institutions. A self-administered questionaire survey was performed in 293 registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, and assistant nurses working full-time in various medical institutions. Multiple linear regression analysis was conducted, with turnover intention as the dependent variable, and nurses' basic attributes and job satisfaction as independent variables. As for nurses' basic attributes, turnover intention was significantly associated with registered nurses, younger nurses and those with low satisfaction with sleep. As for nurses' job satisfaction, the number of nurses with turnover intention was significantly higher for those with low satisfaction with salary, low satisfaction with welfare, poor implementation of fair salary raise and poor cooperation among nurses. Turnover intention may be reduced by the enhancement of trust in the organization, giving appropriate advice to young nurses and registered nurses, and developing measures for addressing sleep disorders.

Making Fair and Predictable Salary Adjustments for Faculty of Public Research Universities

Building upon earlier work by Camp, Gibbs, and Masters II, (1988). The Journal of Higher Education 59(6): 652–667 and Wenger and Girard, (2000). Research in Higher Education 41(2):195–207, we present a model for allocating funds for salary increases to faculty lines within an academic unit at a public research university. The model first divides available funds into three separate amounts, based on the unit norms adopted by the faculty of the academic unit. These norms define the relative effort levels to be placed on teaching, scholarship, and service. The model enables individual faculty members to negotiate different effort levels for the respective activities. Within each of these activities, specific weights can be assigned to different types of accomplishments. The result is a flexible approach that allows fair and predictable salary increases to be assigned on the basis of criteria that have been agreed to by the faculty of the academic unit.

Insights from interviews

From time to time, students who are ready for third‐level education ask me whether they should study science and if it offers more job possibilities than becoming an academic researcher. They are unsure about their life‐long interests and want to keep their options open. It is indeed very tempting to present the BSc degree as the first step to a glittering range of exciting career possibilities, both inside and outside academia. But the reality is that at that early stage a young ‘scientist’ is not trained sufficiently to compete effectively with more experienced scientists for most job openings. A career in science writing, for example, requires retraining and additional experience before being able to perform at the same level as seasoned journalists. Another option is to become a teacher at secondary‐school level, but this, again, is not possible without additional training. If an entry‐level job in industry is found, significant promotion will probably be difficult. The …

What is a “fair salary” for a surgical subspecialist?

The author presents a net present model by which a "fair salary" for surgical subspecialists is justified. Neurosurgical practitioners are used as an example, based on assumed fair salary for family physicians.

Fangelønn og menneskeverdighet

The German Constitutional Court has recently ruled on the issue of prisoner wages, which will lead to a more equitable pay scale. German prisoners are currently paid approximately 10 DM per day, or 5% of the average non-prison wage. The Court found this unconstitutional since work in prison, as the central part of the rehabilitative aim, should reflect the principle of fair salary. The ruling was based on constitutional principles regarding the social state and the dignity of all human beings.

Training in the accountancy profession

A quarter of a century ago there was a financial barrier to becoming a chartered accountant. In those days the articled clerk received little, if any, salary for his opportunity to do client work, and had to pay for his own correspondence course to get him through his examinations. Now the latter themselves are the barrier, and the student accountant expects a fair salary with training provided to enable him to meet the demands made on the public practice accountant.

Toward a fair and realistic research salary scale in government.

Toward a fair and realistic research salary scale in government.

Fair Salary Plan: Indian Lake Schools’ courteous interviews, long-term contracts, reasonable salary schedule, hold teachers

Fair Salary Plan: Indian Lake Schools’ courteous interviews, long-term contracts, reasonable salary schedule, hold teachers

A Poultry Extension Program for New Jersey

In assuming the duties of poultry extension specialist in a state, the average applicant takes the position with a thorough knowledge of poultry as it relates to production. He is probably given a desk, some stenographic help, a fair salary, an expense account, and told to go ahead and correct the poultry problems of the state.If he is industrious he will immediately outline a series of demonstrations and lectures on such phases of poultry production as breeding, feeding, sanitation, etc. Often times this preliminary thought is the last that is given to the job, especially if the talks and demonstrations prove interesting to his audiences. After the specialist has completed this step, he usually fills his brief case with the projects and goes forth to battle with the county agents and farmers of the state.No specialist can successfully do poultry extension work with so little knowledge of the .