Britain's Failure Research Articles

UK fails on child rights.

Britain's failure to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child has been criticised as 'inexcusable' and 'an indication of the low priority still accorded to children's rights', the National Summit for Children was told last week.

Japanisation of Schools?

Mike Howarth is a practising headteacher with a keen interest in Japanese education. But readers of this book should not expect a detailed description of Japanese teaching methods or the curriculum in Japanese schools. It is rather an attempt to describe how education can contribute to economic output. Howarth seems to have been motivated to undertake this comparative study of Japanese education through his contact with a number of Japanese factories operating in Wales, and so his purpose is to examine recent educational reforms in England and Wales to determine whether they are aimed in the right direction or not, using Japan as comparator, with the right direction here meaning whether the change will contribute to Britain's economic progress. The author begins by describing the factors which have conspired to effect Britain's economic decline, as the background to present educational change; he then examines the statistical differences in educational standards between the two countries. He attributes the differences more to the so-called 'learning culture' prevalent in Japan, which British education has so far failed to foster. The current reforms are criticised for not dealing with this demand. The current examination system, the National Curriculum and vocational provision are examined in the next four chapters. Lastly, he argues that this 'learning culture' nurtured by a more comprehensive educational system will change the attitudes of the British people and eventually enable British companies to take advantage of the Japanese management methods which he praises so intensely. In a way this is exactly the same kind of interest which has inspired American comparative studies of Japanese education. As Cummings (1989) recently wrote, the perception of the strength of Japanese education has 'piggy backed' on that of the challenge of Japanese economic competitiveness (Comparative Education, 25(3) (sic, pp. 293-302). It is not my intention to argue that this interest is unjustified, but it is sometimes important to be aware of the fact that the comparison of two countries and putative application of one successful method in one country to another do not always work, as a result of other factors which are equally important. This is especially so when one tries to assess one's own country's education system, using another country's system as a model. While admitting that education and training are not the only contributor to Britain's economic failure, the author nevertheless takes the relation between education, training and economic progress for granted. He justifies this by saying that there has been a marked shift in employment from low-skill to high-skill and low knowledge to high knowledge, exemplified by information technology and its applications. British firms

1939 revisited: on theories of the origins of wars

Fifty years ago the outbreak of the Second World War profoundly altered our theories of how wars begin and, in consequence, of how their outbreak can be avoided or averted. In the years leading up to 1939 the main aim of British and French policy was to prevent a war from developing, as it was assumed the First World War had done, by the magnification of a small but tragic incident of terrorism into the outbreak of hostilities between the major powers-what could be called the 'Sarajevo' thesis. The instrument of such escalation was, it was assumed, the competing and, as such, inherently unstable alliance systems by which the major powers had sought to preserve their own security. The driving forces were outraged nationalism, combined with military planning schedules and timetables which excluded any time or prospect of time for defusing the issue out of which the escalation had arisen. Various other suppositions about the propensity of arms races for bringing about war, about Britain's failure to define its position in advance and about failures in communication were also involved.

Rented Housing and Market Rents: A Social Policy Critique

AbstractThe private rented sector of the British housing market has been in decline since the beginning of the present century; that decline has continued apace since the end of the Second World War. A proposed solution for the stemming of this demise is the removal of present rent controls and the substitution of free market conditions so that rents find their own market levels. This, so it is argued, would enable landlords to obtain a proper return on their housing investments and lead therefore to an increase in supply and an ending to the present disinvestment from this housing sector.This article disputes this thesis. In the first place it is argued that “market rent” is a problematic concept and raises complex issues of distributive justice and social policy — which its advocates ignore. Secondly, it is argued that a free market solution is ahistorical in that it takes no account of the past failure in Britain of privately rented housing; and similarly it ignores the complex web of historical circumstances behind its decline — attributing the decline to the single causal factor of rent control. Thirdly, it is suggested that a market solution is sociologically misconceived because it ignores the characteristics and needs of those social groups dependent upon this sector. Finally, on grounds of practicability it is proposed that a free market in rented housing may be quite inappropriate for the rump of housing stock remaining in the private rented sector; and that, given the current social and economic constraints operating in the housing market as a whole, any revival of this sector is unlikely even with enhanced rental inducements.It is thus concluded that a free market solution is misconceived and would merely serve to impose an ideological straightjacket upon the provision of a basic human need.

Churchill's ‘No’ to Europe: The ‘Rejection’ of European Union by Churchill's Post-War Government, 1951–1952

There are several points in post-war history at which, it is argued, Britain lost an early opportunity to enter the European community. The refusals to join the Schuman Plan and Messina deliberations in the 1950s, and the failure of the E.E.C. applications of Macmillan and Wilson, are most commonly mentioned. But some commentators have pointed to another ‘missed opportunity’, following Winston Churchill's return to Downing Street in October 1951. For, in opposition, Churchill had seemed a great exponent of European unity, and several of his ministers – foremost among them the home secretary, Maxwell Fyfe, and housing minister, Harold Macmillan – had shown great enthusiasm for his ideas. Hopes that Churchill's government would favour a more positive approach to European unification were quickly disappointed, however: within weeks the foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, had ruled out any direct British role in Europe's emerging ‘supranational’ institutions, and in 1952 he defeated some determined efforts by Macmillan to change his policy. The ‘pro-Europeans’ did not forget this ‘betrayal’, however. They argued that a real opportunity to take the leadership of Europe had been lost and in the ensuing years, as Britain's failure to join the European community became more generally criticized, their thesis seemed credible. An examination of the evidence, however, allows a very different picture of this ‘missed opportunity’ to be painted.

Limited Resources and the Treatment of End-stage Renal Failure in Britain and the United States

Limited Resources and the Treatment of End-stage Renal Failure in Britain and the United States

Education

The continuing failure of Britain's education system to turn out the kind of recruits that British industry says it needs but is not getting, is not helped, of course, by recession and mounting unemployment. Before recession, the education system was allegedly not producing the goods, during recession it can hardly be blamed for not producing them — in view of educational cutbacks and zero job prospects — while after the recession (if, indeed there is to be an after) it will probably be in no better shape than it was before.

On the nature of industrial decline in the UK

poor competitive performance of the UK economy since the second world war (Blackaby, 1979; Singh, 1977), and in particular has highlighted its relatively low productivity growth (Maddison, 1977). These studies however have tended to ignore workplace conflict over the organisation of production, although the resolution of this conflict significantly influences overall factor productivity. (This point has also been made by Mason (1979).) The labour process has also been largely neglected in those studies which have recognised that the relative industrial decline of the UK economy has been underway for over a century. The supply side of the economy has of course by no means been completely ignored: many studies have detailed how since at least 1870 Britain has been systematically slow at widely adopting new products and processes even when these were invented (and sometimes even manufactured) in Britain, while others have drawn attention to relatively high manning levels in the UK.f Even so, the focus of attention has usually been on 'entrepreneurial failure'J or on so-called 'institutional' factors such as Britain's failure to develop a comprehensive technical education system in the nineteenth century. § While the importance of factors such as the educational infrastructure is not disputed we shall argue that Britain's industrial performance cannot be understood without some analysis of the labour process. The role of collective bargaining and the strength of job-based worker organisation are factors which must be carefully considered. In the UK, collective bargaining over all aspects of work takes place at local as well as at national level. However, the ability

Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937

1. Britain's Far East problem 2. British trade and Japanese competition 3. Britain's search for a policy 4. Naval questions 5. Britain, China and the Amau statement 6. The navy, the Dominions and Japan 7. The Federation of British Industries mission to Japan and Manchukuo 8. Britain, China and the silver problem 9. The Leith Ross mission 10. Set-backs for Britain's policy-makers 11. Japanese approaches, Australian proposals 12. The failure of Britain's dual diplomacy.

Real Profit Consciousness and the Investment Decision

Most serious analysis of the problems currently experienced by manufacturing industry in the UK agrees on two main points: both the level of investment and the incremental output capital ratio in productive industry are much too low. In other words, not only do we invest less, in aggregate, than any of our major competitors but the increase in production obtained from each marginal increase in investment is also far less than might be reasonably expected abroad. The reasons advanced for these two related problems are legion but it is upon the former failure that attention is focussed here. Certainly there can be no doubt as to the truth of the diagnosis. The evidence confirms Britain's relative failure on this score throughout the post World War II period. Between 1955 and 1964, for example, whereas gross investment in Japan and West Germany (always the yardsticks used in such comparisons) averaged 28·8 per cent and 23·7 per cent of gross national product respectively, the comparable British figure was a niggardly 15·8 per cent. Since then the problem has become further compounded. In 1972, for example, per capita investment in new plant and machinery in America was 1·49 times the British figure, in Sweden 1·66 times, in France 1·72 times and in West Germany 1·90 times greater than in Britain.

The Failure of Britain's Irish Policy

The Failure of Britain's Irish Policy

Labour Costs and International Competitiveness

Figures published recently in Sweden illustrate the implications of Britain's failure to improve productivity in the 1960s as quickly as continental Western Europe. Though wage costs per unit of output in manufacturing industry have risen faster in Britain than in other major industrial countries, the statistics show that employers' total payments per hour of work are now lower here than in almost any industrial country except Japan.

The balance of trade in agricultural machinery

Advances reasons regarding causes behind the increasing volume of imports of agricultural machinery and Britain's failure to increase exports over a period of 18 years. Reports a research study that shows how the domestic industry can improve its position in its own market. Demonstrates, through results of a research made in 1966/67, why the UK bill for imported machinery was rising at such a rapid rate; 175 individuals (directors to individual farmers) were solicited for their opinions and these are summarised and itemised. Gives reasons for failure to increase exports and shows how the domestic industry can improve. Concludes that in future farms will continue to become larger, and decisions whether or not to purchase a certain machine will become increasingly important.

Britain, Europe, and the Atlantic Community

It would be difficult to imagine a more inappropriate moment for trying to assess the British role in the evolution of the Atlantic Community. Writing in May 1963, one is all too aware of the importance of the decisions that will still have to be taken to meet the situation that has arisen from the failure of Britain's application to join the Common Market. Both the protagonists of Britain's entry and the opponents of this move, however, drew closer together on at least one point as the long debate over the negotiations went on. Both sides agreed that the decision—one way or the other—would be a major turning point in Britain's history. Indeed, if we omit the crises of two world wars, it would be difficult to think of an adequate parallel. Even the bitterly contested repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840's— the event which is usually taken as signifying the triumph of industrial over agrarian Britain—was less far-reaching in its implications.

Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years (review)

Book Reviews101 Finally, there is hardly an aspect of the war which does not receive at least a passing nod. Lord Russell did not see how the United States "could be cobbled together again." A French poet is noted who excoriated the North because a former mistress had to flee her Southern home. Monsignor Doupanloup, Bishop of Orléans, spoke out to his clergy against slavery. Richard Cobden would "walk barefoot to the end of the earth" to end the war. Karl Marx, a correspondent for the Vienna Press during the war, assigns Lincoln a place beside Washington. After Lincoln's assassination, condolences poured into Washington. Especially touching is Queen Victoria's personally written note from one widow to another, and the poem by Henrik Ibsen. It is regrettable that an index was omitted. The greatest value of the compilation, in this reviewer's judgment, is the clear picture it leaves of the reason England in the main favored the Confederacy. In a word, it was jealousy of America's growing stature. EllaLonn St. Petersburg, Florida Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years. By Robin W. Winks. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960. Pp. xv, 430. $6.50.) Since World War II, historians have expressed an increasing interest in Canadian-American relations. The concept of a century of peace between the United States and Canada has had particular appeal to a society which has been forced to live in a perpetual cold war. Recently however, several works have demonstrated that the tradition of a century of peace is a myth, that during most of the nineteenth century, a cold war existed between Canada and the United States. Mr. Winks of Yale University does much to explode this myth by focusing on the relations between the United States and Canada during the Civil War years. One of his basic themes is that if real harmony had existed between British North America and the United States after 1815, there would not have been such widespread "hostility" between the two countries during the Civil War. The period of the war was one of unusual tension along the border and elsewhere, with many people on each side convinced that war was inevitable. Mr. Winks makes a major contribution to Civil War literature by stressing the importance of Canada in determining Britain's foreign policy during the war. In explaining Britain's failure to aid the Confederate states, historians have long harped on the British need for Northern wheat, Britain's concern over the Schleswig-Holstein dispute on the Continent, and the repugnance for slavery felt by the British working classes and the royal family. But Mr. Winks makes it unmistakably clear that Britain's fear of losing her Canadian provinces by force, with a resulting loss of prestige, was equally important in shaping Britain's neutral policy during the war. The author also presents much new information on the subject of Can- 102 CIVIL WAR HISTORY adían enlistments in the Northern armies, Canadian public opinion as related to the war, and the Confederacy's efforts to embroil the North in war with Britain through her Canadian provinces. Just as America's political and economic institutions owe much to the Civil War, the author demonstrates that the same is true for Canada. By pointing out the necessity for a more adequate system of defense, the Civil War promoted national unity and a period of constitution-making in Canada. With the temporary disruption of American trade, it also stimulated the economic development of Canada. This book is an example of history as it should be written. Mr. Winks writes in a lively style which illuminates all aspects of Canadian-American relations during the Civil War years. The volume reflects more research into newspapers, diaries, private letters, official correspondence, and public speeches than any other this reviewer has had the pleasure to read in quite a while. A unique aspect of the book is its versatility. Students of the Civil War, Canadian history, the British Empire, or Anglo-American relations should read it. The author should be encouraged to continue his work in both Canadian and American history, as historians can learn much about...

The Federalization of the Australian Cabinet, 1901-39

During the debates in the Australian federation conventions of 1891 and 1897–8, Canadian experience was usually cited to indicate practices to be avoided rather than emulated. J. W. Hackett, addressing the 1891 convention as a representative of Western Australia, which was then the least populous of the Australian colonies, stressed the need of a strong senate whose function it would be to convert the popular will into the federal will. From the viewpoint of a defender of the interest of the smaller colonies, the weakening of the prestige of the senate, through the cabinet's being responsible in practice to the lower house, made responsible government a threat which Hackett was ready to attack. He questioned whether responsible government could be successful under any conditions. The experiment of the Canadian Dominion was hardly a success. “It was begun … in bribery and is continued by subsidies.” Pointing to the agitation for home rule in Ireland, he suggested that responsible government was a failure in Britain itself. “If that is the responsible government which they wish to graft into our federation,” he asserted, “there will be one of two alternatives—either responsible government will kill federation, or federation, in the form in which we shall, I hope, be prepared to accept it, will kill responsible government.” Responsible government has, in fact, proved rather deadly to Hackett's idea of federalism. Nevertheless, in Australia, as in Canada, the cabinet itself has been federalized, although the process in Australia has not been recognized by the quantity of academic and popular commentary which has marked its Canadian counterpart.