O n February 26, 1968 Louis Hartz made a presemation on "The Nature of Revolution'" to the Senate Foreign Relations Commit tee chaired by William Fulbright. When N. Gordon Levin brought the existence of this document to my attention, it immediately stirred vague memories; I can recall Hartz talking a bit about his Washington, D.C. appearance, and it even seems to me that I can remember an expression of distaste on Hartz's face as he described something of what he felt about his encounter with Senator Karl Murldt, a right-wing member of the committee. I regret to say that nobody I knew at Harvard, at least in the Government Department, would have been much impressed one way or the other by Hartz's testifying before Fulbright's committee. In those days it seemed an unspoken matter that Hartz was one of our outstandingly brilliant faculty members; although it had at the time been somewhat surprising when Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. left the History Department to join President Kennedy's administration, by 1968 so many Harvard faculty melnbers had regularly taken part in high public matters that a Senate committee hearing was bound to seem like small potatoes. For McGeorge Bundy to have gone to be a White Ilouse assistant was a noteworthy political event; later Henry Kissinger would also depart from the Harvard Government Department for high public position; neither of these actions could possibly be compared to the significance of Hartz's going before Fulbright's committee. And yet, as one thinks back over it now, the fact of Harlz's testimony was in its own way extraordinary. I can think of no other example of a prominent political theorist being asked by Senators for his or her viewpoint: Hannah Arendt's own On Revolution had appeared in 1963, but it was a sign of Hartz's standing by 1968 that it was he who was to appear. The originality of his presentation, a characteristic part of Hartz's general thinking, held the attention of the Senators who participated in the session. The series of statements Fulbright solicited on The Nature of Revolution, from someone like Crane Brinton as well as Hartz, must also have been an aspect of the apparent political futility of Fulbright's position. By then the Vietnam War seemed to some of us a hopeless morass, although nobody I knew ever anticipated the extent of the widening of the conflict in Southeast Asia that eventually took place, or how many years it would be before the American military presence was formally withdrawn. Less than a month before Hartz's appearance the Tct Offensive had broken out on January 30, 1968. Almost simultaneously with his testimony Generals Westmoreland and Wheeler were pressing for President Johnson to agree to send another 206,000 men to Vietnam. Immediately afterwards the Senate Foreign Relations Committee moved into high gear, and many answers were demanded from Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The New Hampshire Democratic primary took place on March 12, 1968; and on March 31 Lyndon Johnson withdrew his name from the presidential race. These were times of high political drama, and Hartz's talk has to be put in its context. I do not know much about Hartz's practical politics; I talked with him in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis, but normally I would not have thought of exchanging comments with him about the Vietnam War. That was an exceptionally painful period, and another member of the Department had stopped speaking with me essentially because of our differences over the war. I do not think I ever thought Hartz could be "in favor" of it, and he never spoke at any of the later critical faculty meetings; I do remember him being eloquent in behalf of conciliation, or at least non-exacerbation of tensions, in the midst of a departmental discussion of a confrontation with students, Hartz was, however, as much a part of the establishment as Fulbright himself, and I would not have expected any irreverence fiom him about public officialdom. For several years I, like others, had simply assumed that an entirely different course of action than Johnson had been pursuing was completely within the practical powers of the Presidency, and that our job was a problem of rational persuasion; the level of frustration among those of us who were relatively conservative opponents of the war could be terrible.
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