The first half of the paper is devoted to an attempt to present a natural-science theory as to the nature of man, or, rather, the nature of ideas as the essence of man. The natural sciences themselves have only recently developed to the point where the construction of such a theory is possible, and this development has resulted especially from advances and cross-fertilization in the fields of neurology and computerand communications-engineering. For the first time in history it is possible in their terms to give a natural-science explanation of such concepts as memory, ideation, purpose, and learning. Following along the implications of such explanations, one derives a concept of man as a net sum of messages derived out of a limitless past, genetically and culturally transmitted, entrapped in the central nervous system, determining man's purpose, yet subject to modification in the process of adaptation to new environmental conditions and data. Implicit in these concepts are criteria as to the validity of these trapped ideas. In that these criteria recognize a very definite limit of certainty, they are not absolutistic; on the other hand, as they are constant so long as the basic concepts hold, they are not relativistic. They bespeak a concept of life as an almost rhythmical process of evolution from the tautological certainties preserved in form derived from the past, through doubt, search, and growth, to the creative formulation of new, if limited, certainties that modify and improve the old ones, in the sense of increasing man's range of self-determination. Also derivative from these concepts is an objective pathology of ideas. This way of thinking about man relegates the old paradoxes implicit in the traditional philosophies to the limbo of badly posed questions. It also accounts for uncertainty, difference, change, and growth, yet affords clear criteria that enable escape from the morass of relativism. Another advantage of this way of thinking is that the relation between factual and normative concepts is essentially implicit in the natural-science theory itself. According to the factual theory adduced, ideas are hierarchically ordered so that, in purposive behavior, high-order concepts will override lower ones. It is this hierarchical structuring of ideas that leads to normative concepts, concepts of the should as contrasted with those asserting the is. Normative concepts are thus, according to this way of thinking, directly derivative from the high-order factual concepts.
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