Psychological Facts Research Articles

SOCIAL SELF OF DELINQUENT JUVENILES: PERSONALITY DIMENSION

The article presents theoretical and empirical research of the personality and behavioral content of the social Self of delinquent juveniles. The theoretical argumentation of the problem relates to the necessity of studying the personal characteristics of the societal psyche of a delinquent, in which the integral picture of his social Self is reflected. It is emphasized that the sphere of personal problems affects the formation of social experience of delinquent young men and is characterized by typical symptom complexes of their personal qualities and style of interpersonal interaction. The purpose of the presented material is to study the personality and behavioral content of the social Self of a delinquent juvenile, characterized by typical symptom complexes of his personality characteristics and the style of interpersonal interaction. On the basis of the analysis and theoretical generalization of the problem, the program of empirical research has been worked out; it includes methods of observation and testing, as well as the complex of methods used for mathematical processing of the results, enables to specify the theoretical positions in the form of real psychological facts: in the assessment of “social Self” the positions of extraversion, spontaneous aggressiveness and selfishness dominate, and in the assessment of “actual Self” physical aggressiveness, irritability and negativism prevail; an aggressive form of desire for domination over others and selfishness in interpersonal contacts and inclination to rivalry are noted. It is proved that the personal dimension of “social Self” is localized in the symptom of such personality and behavioral characteristics of delinquent juveniles as physical, verbal and reactive aggressiveness, irritability, imbalance, aspiration for independence and self-centered conviction. It is noted that the obtained results can be used as psychodiagnostic guidelines for the development of specific psychocorrective measures with the obligatory use of consulting elements aimed at actualization of reflection, psychogenesis and logogenesis in the course of experiencing crisis of self-determination of delinquent juveniles.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE: CONTEXTS IN BRITISH ENGLISH AND IRAQI ARABIC

The use of language in interaction entails more than simply exchanging information about realistic ideas and objects amongst people; it is an important process, in which the relationships among people have outlined and negotiated. Any language refers to a particular culture, so learning any language does not mean learning only the grammar and the vocabulary of this language, but in fact, it is learning the behaviour and the customs of society as well as the characteristics that distinguish this community from others. There are no similar languages to the same extent as the social reality. We know that being aware of the culture is like being aware of the language so that we know that they are homogeneous psychological facts. Communication between people happens through direct linguistic messages and other messages that denoted by cultural features that are only understanding through the knowledge of the patterns specific to the society that produced them. The ideal and complex relationship between language and culture shows us that language is closely related to culture that influences each other, develops together and ultimately forming what it is to be human. Therefore, taking part in conversations, people consciously or unconsciously show their identities, their belongings to a specific culture or group and also their tendencies to become close or distant from others. By using language, people define their relationships to each other and identify themselves as part of a social group, implying that language is culture and culture is language.

Education and the Free Will Problem: A Spinozist Contribution

In this Spinozist defence of the educational promotion of students’ autonomy I argue for a deterministic position where freedom of will is deemed unrealistic in the metaphysical sense, but important in the sense that it is an undeniable psychological fact. The paper is structured in three parts. The first part investigates the concept of autonomy from different philosophical points of view, looking especially at how education and autonomy intersect. The second part focuses on explicating the philosophical position of causal determinism and it seeks to open up a way to conceive of education for autonomy without relying on the notion of free will in a metaphysical sense. The concluding part attempts to outline a Spinozistic understanding of education for autonomy where autonomy is grounded in the student's acceptance and understanding of the necessary constraints of natural causation rather than processes of self-causation.

A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation

Many think that sentences about what metaphysically explains what are true iff there exist grounding relations. This suggests that sceptics about grounding should be error theorists about metaphysical explanation. We think there is a better option: a theory of metaphysical explanation which offers truth conditions for claims about what metaphysically explains what that are not couched in terms of grounding relations, but are instead couched in terms of, inter alia, psychological facts. We do not argue that our account is superior to grounding-based accounts. Rather, we offer it to those already ill-disposed towards grounding.

Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology

A standard view in contemporary philosophy is that belief is involuntary, either as a matter of conceptual necessity or as a contingent fact of human psychology. We present seven experiments on patterns in ordinary folk-psychological judgments about belief. The results provide strong evidence that voluntary belief is conceptually possible and, granted minimal charitable assumptions about folk-psychological competence, provide some evidence that voluntary belief is psychologically possible. We also consider two hypotheses in an attempt to understand why many philosophers have been tempted to view belief as involuntary: that belief is a prototype concept and that belief is a dual character concept. Altogether, our findings contribute to longstanding philosophical debates about the relationship between the will and the intellect, while also advancing scientific understanding of important social judgments.

Forecasting financial indicators by generalized behavioral learning method

Forecasting financial indicators (indexes/prices) is a complex and a quite difficult issue because they depend on many factors such as political events, financial ratios, and economic variables. Also, the psychological facts or decision-making styles of investors or experts are other major reasons for this difficulty. In this study, a generalized behavioral learning method (GBLM) was employed to forecast financial indicators, which are the indexes/prices of 34 different financial indicators (24 stock indexes, 2 forexes, 3 financial futures, and 5 commodities). The achieved results were compared with the reported results in the literature and the obtained results by artificial neural network, which is widely used and suggested for forecasting financial indicators. These results showed that GBLM can be successfully employed in short-term forecasting financial indicators by detecting hidden market behavior (pattern) from their previous values. Also, the results showed that GBLM has the ability to track the fluctuation and the main trend.

The persuasive rhetoric of a manifesto (1870): Ribot's promise of an “independent” psychological science

I take a closer look at a manifesto in the history of psychology: the introduction to the book entitled “La psychologie anglaise contemporaine.” It was published in 1870 and written by the French psychologist and philosopher Theodule Ribot (1839–1916). First, I review the use of the label “manifesto” in the historiography of psychology. Then the aim, rhetoric, and arguments of Ribot’s text are examined, as well as the intellectual atmosphere surrounding it. Through this research, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of the aims and some immediate reactions to Ribot’s text. My analysis focuses on his understanding of psychology as “independent science.” Ribot’s manifesto contains criticism of the prevalent philosophies of his time, namely eclectic spiritualism and the positivistic schools. Within this setting, Ribot tried to present his psychology as ideologically neutral, aiming at revealing “psychological facts.” My interpretation portrays Ribot’s tone as optimistic, framed in terms of a promise and an invitation; I see his text as primarily an attempt to attract collaborators through a broadly defined scientific project. He envisaged an almost boundless field of empirical research, based on the promise of intellectual freedom and scientific progress.

Industrial Farming is Not Cruel to Animals

Critics of industrial animal agriculture (also known as “factory” farming) have argued that its practices are cruel, inhumane, or otherwise degrading to animals. These arguments sometimes form the basis of a larger case for the complete abolition of animal agriculture, while others argue for more modest welfare-based reforms that allow for certain types of industrial farming. This paper defends industrial farming against the charge of cruelty. As upsetting as certain practices may seem, I argue that they need not be construed as cruel or inhumane. Any link between industrial farming and cruelty or inhumanity is contingent on certain cultural, behavioral, and psychological facts that are person-dependent. For many people working in animal agriculture, these facts do not obtain. To be sure, industrial animal agriculture has real moral hazards that must be carefully avoided, but all that this shows is that working with animals is not for everyone.

Libertarianizm i teoria tożsamości

Libertarianism and the Theory of Personal Identity. Robert Nozick’s Closest Continuer Theory as a Background Theory of the Principle of Self‑Ownership The research problem of the present paper is the following question: May the closest continuer theory serve as a background theory for the principle of self‑ownership? This issue is a peculiar instance of the more general problem of the anthropological presuppositions of the libertarian political philosophy that can be phrased in a Kantian manner: How is self‑ownership possible?; or in a more detailed way: What sort of entity a human being has to be, if it is possible for him to be a self‑owner? The research thesis that is argued for in the paper says that: 1) the closest continuer theory may not serve as a background theory for a wide principle of self‑ownership since as an example of reductionist theory of personal identity it excludes the possibility of possessing this set of psychological facts which the personal identity is reducible to and possession of which is presupposed by the wide principle of self‑ownership; 2) the closest continuer theory may though serve as a background theory for a narrow principle of self‑ownership since this principle assumes that one can own only scarce resources and psychological facts are not instances thereof.

Letts Calculate: Moral Accounting in the Victorian Period

This essay examines the importance of an accounting culture for the rise of marginalism in Victorian England. I trace the use of accounting tools in family and private life to fend off uncertainties in the market and to enhance moral control of the self, examining the use of diaristic accounting for two Victorians, George Eliot and William Stanley Jevons, in more detail. The philosopher of mind Alexander Bain recommended the use of mercantile accounting tools, Benjamin Franklin's moral algebra in particular, to harness the mind against emotional and myopic decision making. Bain's recommendation was critically tested by Eliot in Middlemarch and used by Jevons to naturalize the mind's balancing of pleasures and pains as an algebra of feelings. Washing out all differences between reason and emotion, Jevons's theory of pleasure and pain became foundational for the economists' theory of utility. Contemporary critics of rational choice theory take this naturalized image of the economic agent as its bogeyman, ignoring the social infrastructure that brought this agent, thinking as a merchant, into existence. The idea that we calculate captures a sociohistorical reality, rather than a physiological or psychological fact.

Literature and Psychology in the Context of the Interaction of Social Sciences

There is a two-way relationship between literature and psychology coming together on the same intersection at the point of essential people and human behavior. As it is possible to approach literature and to evaluate literary works with the resources of psychology, and of literary sciences, so it is also possible to consider literary works based on psychology and to discover psychological facts in literature. Thus, both psychologists and writers have taken into consideration the relationship between literature and psychology. Studies of the science of psychology directed to literature, literary works and writers that was introduced by Freud continued with other outstanding theorists of psychology such as Adler, Jung, Lacan, From, Reich and Klein. Likewise, writers and literary theorists such as N.Holland, Lev Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoevsky and Virginia Woolf contributed to the psychology of literature. This paper is an effort to analyze the relationship between literature and psychology considering the wide field which the science of psychology opens for literature.

Sob o signo de Zarathustra

Resumo Partindo da compreensão de que são os filósofos e artistas aqueles capazes de "suscitar no espírito do homem perspectivas novas", o autor explora os temas principais da filosofia nietzschiana para mostrar a sua vigência em todas as manifestações da contemporaneidade. Pensador que teria denunciado a "infecção do mundo moderno", cuja "unidade interior é fundada na psicologia", Nietzsche explorou em profundidade o papel dos instintos, desenvolvendo uma forma de conhecimento capaz de explicar certos fatos psicológicos que constituem a filosofia e a arte. As ideias do autor do Zaratustra , assim, seriam fundamentais para entender, por exemplo, a obra de Ronald de Carvalho ‒ escritor brasileiro que, recuperando-se de um grave acidente, faleceria poucos dias depois da publicação do presente artigo.

To Believe is to Know that You Believe

Most agree that believing a proposition normally or ideally results in believing that one believes it, at least if one considers the question of whether one believes it. I defend a much stronger thesis. It is impossible to believe without knowledge of one's belief. I argue, roughly, as follows. Believing that p entails that one is able to honestly assert that p. But anyone who is able to honestly assert that p is also able to just say – i.e., authoritatively, yet not on the basis of evidence – that she believes that p. And anyone who is able to just say that she believes that p is able to act in light of the fact that she holds that belief. This ability to act, in turn, constitutes knowledge of the psychological fact. However, without a broader theory of belief to help us make sense of this result, this conclusion will be hard to accept. Why should being in a particular mental state by itself necessitate an awareness of being in that state? I sketch a theory that helps to answer this question: believing is a matter of viewing a proposition as what one ought to believe. I show how this theory explains (and entails) the thesis that to believe is to know that you believe.

Feeling Shakespearian

In The Anatomy of Melancholy the seventeenth-century scholar Robert Burton explained how fear functioned as a vehicle for bodily contagion, through which anxious bystanders could fall victim to infection: ‘if they see but another man tremble, giddy, or sick of some fearful disease, their apprehension and feare is so strong in this kind, that they will have the same disease’. For Burton – a thoroughly Galenic head-shrinker – emotions were intricately connected to health. The body’s balance of the four humours (distinct elemental fluids) determined one’s physical well-being and mental equilibrium. And our passions were not simply our own: the outside world and – crucially – other people influenced our humoral make-up and hence our inward feelings. ‘Passion, I see, is catching’, observes Mark Antony in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar . Allison P. Hobgood takes this fact of early modern psychology seriously, and it is the basis for her excellent study of playgoing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Hobgood’s book is one of several in the past few years that has sought to explore the experience of seeing a play in Shakespeare’s London (Charles Whitney’s Early Responses to Renaissance Drama and Imagining the Audience in Early Modern Drama by Jennifer Low and Nova Myhill are both important precursors), a growth area despite the dearth of evidence testifying to the subjective experience of Renaissance audience members (theatre historians can count on the fingers of very few hands the number of extant printed or manuscript accounts of a visit to an English playhouse).

Rights, Goods, and Proportionate War

1. INTRODUCTIONAt the moral core of the Just War Tradition (JWT) is the claim that a just war must have a just cause, where a just cause involves the commission of some grave moral wrong. As a matter of sociological and psychological fact, victims of wrongdoing are inclined to take umbrage at the injustices inflicted on them and to take the violations inflicted on them to permit some appropriately vigorous response. Other things equal, the more egregious the violation, the stronger the victim's inclination to respond. As a matter of brute sociological and psychological fact, then, the members of a community that has been victimized by wrongdoing that is grave enough to satisfy the just cause requirement will likely be inclined to respond in a most ?vigorous' manner. Correlatively, many will find alien-and perhaps even offensive-the demand that they restrain themselves from taking the means necessary to respond to the egregious violations to which they have been subjected. But the possibility that those who belong to a violated community must exercise just this kind of restraint is a clear implication of any adequate understanding of the JWT. For fundamental to the JWT is the claim that a community can have a fully sufficient just cause to respond to an enemy attack and yet be morally forbidden to do so.1 This is, I think, one of the most difficult holdings of the JWT.The JWT's ad bellum proportionality requirement (ABP) captures that fundamental, difficult truth. According to the ABP, a community may wage war in response to a violation that satisfies the just cause requirement only if the relevant goods achieved by so responding are proportionate to the relevant evils caused thereby. My main aim in this paper is to engage recent work by Thomas Hurka regarding what makes certain goods and evils relevant to a proportionality assessment. A secondary aim is to specify the place of the ABP in the JWT's overall justificatory architecture. Given these two rather limited aims, it should be clear that I do not pretend to provide a complete account.2. AN INITIAL EXPLICATION OF THE PROPORTIONALITY REQUIREMENTLet me begin by providing a brief explication of the ABP. Basic to the moral vision of the JWT is the claim that human beings naturally and properly belong to various communities each of which is presumptively prohibited from attacking any another. This presumption against war can be overcome only when one community violates another in some egregious respect(s). But the moral standing of a given war cannot be entirely a function of the normative relations between violators and violated. This is because the morally relevant consequences of war are seldom, if ever, limited only to those who commit the violation that provides for a just cause. Far from it: in the actual world, the deployment of military violence in response to an egregious wrong will typically have dire consequences for human beings who play no role at all in committing that violation. Such 'innocent' human beings must be given their normative due. The primary function of the ABP in the JWT's overall justificatory framework is to formalize that requirement: the JWT permits war only when some particular community commits a relevantly egregious violation, but assesses that prima facie permission in light of the consequences of war for all innocents, irrespective of communal membership. If the consequences of waging a given war are ?excessively bad,' then that war is ?disproportionate' and so morally impermissible.Of course, we need to provide this rather unspecific understanding of the ABP with a bit more granularity. To that end, note, first, that although the ABP implies that every war ought to be assessed in light of relevant consequences, it does not mandate anything like a global consequentialist assessment. That is, it does not require us to agglomerate all of the goods and evils that result from Cl's war with C2, compare that result with the agglomerated goods and evils of the various alternatives to Cl's waging war with C2, and conclude that Cl's war is permissible only if its net result is higher than all of the alternatives. …

Quantae psychologiae? - una vel multae

Concerned with the study of empirical correlations between elements of behavior and external circumstances, and especially with the research of these empirical relationships in a much simpler manner than it would be suitable for their complex nature, many psychologies rarely look at the fundamental issues of capability, or assumptions, of their own noetic efforts. Instead, there are multiple "views" that pretend to be psychological theories. The concept of psychology as a study of soul necessarily relies on the concept of science, and on the concept of soul as its subject. It is still the case - especially in academic circles - that the ruling concept of science is the modern, Cartesian, scientific concept where natural science is the only paradigm of science. When applied to the science of soul, that scientific paradigm inevitably gives different variations of reductionist psychology: from experimental psychology to neurophysiology. The truth (or factual knowledge as content) of such studies of soul must inevitably be reduced and scarce, namely, a reduced and scarce knowledge of soul itself. General psychological theory, of course, cannot be a compromise formation of disparate attitudes, rules and principles, nor can it, epistemologically, be an eclectic knowledge of mental phenomena. If different psychological theories, approaches, and points of view, which are sometimes, pretentiously, being called schools, see each mental theme or content in a totally different way, then it is necessary to examine the type, quality and place of the truth those psychologies strive for. It is not logical to expect such different approaches to reach the same truth, the same understanding of the correlations of psychological facts. In that case, the most logical question that can be asked is whether it is the same area of research and whether it is the same science about psyche.

Going against the Herd: Psychological and Cultural Factors Underlying the 'Vaccination Confidence Gap'.

By far the most common strategy used in the attempt to modify negative attitudes toward vaccination is to appeal to evidence-based reasoning. We argue, however, that focusing on science comprehension is inconsistent with one of the key facts of cognitive psychology: Humans are biased information processors and often engage in motivated reasoning. On this basis, we hypothesised that negative attitudes can be explained primarily by factors unrelated to the empirical evidence for vaccination; including some shared attitudes that also attract people to complementary and alternative medicine (CAM). In particular, we tested psychosocial factors associated with CAM endorsement in past research; including aspects of spirituality, intuitive (vs analytic) thinking styles, and the personality trait of openness to experience. These relationships were tested in a cross-sectional, stratified CATI survey (N = 1256, 624 Females). Whilst educational level and thinking style did not predict vaccination rejection, psychosocial factors including: preferring CAM to conventional medicine (OR .49, 95% CI .36–.66), endorsement of spirituality as a source of knowledge (OR .83, 95% CI .71–.96), and openness (OR .86, 95% CI .74–.99), all predicted negative attitudes to vaccination. Furthermore, for 9 of the 12 CAMs surveyed, utilisation in the last 12 months was associated with lower levels of vaccination endorsement. From this we suggest that vaccination scepticism appears to be the outcome of a particular cultural and psychological orientation leading to unwillingness to engage with the scientific evidence. Vaccination compliance might be increased either by building general confidence and understanding of evidence-based medicine, or by appealing to features usually associated with CAM, e.g. ‘strengthening your natural resistance to disease’.

Intersections of Politics, Culture, Class, and Gender in Shakespeare’s "Titus Andronicus", "The Taming of the Shrew", and "The Merchant of Venice"

Multicultural Shakespeare: Translation, Appropriation and Performance vol. 12 (27), 2015; DOI: 10.1515/mstap-2015-0004 Let me open with a question: what does this drawing represent? Whichever way you first saw it, direct your vision to the opposite angle and try to see it as the other representation now. After you have recognized both images and have switched back and forth between them a few times, you may then understand the drawing as the ambiguous rabbit-duck illusion. This drawing, by an unattributed artist, first appeared in the 23 October 1892 issue of Fliegende Bltter (147), a German humor magazine. Its caption was Welche Thiere gleichen einander am meisten? (Which animals are most like each other?), with Kaninchen und Ente (Rabbit and Duck) written underneath. A simplified version of the image 1 was made famous by Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations, first published in 1953, in which he (165-71) utilized it as a means of describing two different ways of seeing: seeing that and seeing as. In his analysis, a person can view something in a straightforward manner and see that this image is of a rabbit. However, in another instance, one may notice Department of English, Comparative Literature, and Linguistics, California State University at Fullerton, USA. 1 Wittgenstein (165) credits American psychologist Joseph Jastrow for the image, as used in his Fact and Fable in Psychology (1900), but Jastrow based his simplified version on a cartoon in the 19 November 1892 edition of Harpers Weekly (1114), which was itself based on the drawing published about four weeks earlier in Fliegende Bltter. Kay Stanton Intersections of Politics, Culture, Class, and Gender in Shakespeares Titus Andronicus, The Taming of the Shrew, and The Merchant of Venice 42 Kay Stanton a particular aspectseeing it as something, a duck. To Wittgenstein, when one looks at the rabbit-duck and sees a rabbit, one is not interpreting the picture as a rabbit, but rather reporting what one sees: the picture as a rabbit. But what about the case when one sees it first as a duck, then as a rabbit (as, by the way, I did)? Apparently, Wittgenstein was not sure, except that he did believe that it could not be the case that the external world stays the same while an internal cognitive change happens. Since then, the image (as well as other similarly ambiguous figures) has received much additional analysis, notably by gestalt psychologists, who find a correspondence between the interpretations of ambiguous representations and the subjects mode of perceiving reality. Although the rabbit-duck drawing and its interpretations were unavailable to Shakespeare, it can, I believe, be helpful as we ponder the topic of this volume, particularly in regard to Shakespeares treatments of diversity and homogeneity relating to the issues it raises. In his 1977 article Rabbits, Ducks, and Henry V, Norman Rabkin made a landmark contribution to scholarship on Henry V by his use of this gestalt figure of the rabbit-duck to explain why to some readers and audiences and in some points in time, the play and its eponymous king are heroic, and to others and in other points in time, the king is monstrous and the play a scathing indictment of him. Better support for his argument can hardly be found than through comparison of Laurence Olivers post-World War II film of the play and Kenneth Branaghs post-Falklands War treatments on stage and filmthough in the film Branagh allows himself in the second half to be swept up into militaristic celebration. New historicist and cultural materialist criticism, notably by Stephen Greenblatt in Invisible Bullets and Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield in History and Ideology: The Instance of Henry V, suggests duality of vision in the play as well, but in terms of a subversion-containment model, through which the play presents instances of subversive acts that are ultimately contained and controlled by the dominant ideology through its fount, the kingand with Shakespeare, according to Greenblatt (64), in underlying complicity with King Harry, a view with which I strongly disagree, by the way, but recognize as possible by means of Greenblatts perspective. …

Факт в современной психологии: методологические проблемы

Факт в современной психологии: методологические проблемы

Ideal rationality and logical omniscience

Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is designed to explain the rational requirement of logical omniscience. On this account, apriori justification for beliefs about logic has its source in logical facts, rather than psychological facts about experience, reasoning, or understanding. This account has important consequences for the epistemic role of experience in the logical domain. In a slogan, the epistemic role of experience in the apriori domain is not a justifying role, but rather an enabling and disabling role.