Eyewitness Memory Research Research Articles

Viewing mock crimes in virtual reality increases presence without impacting memory

Traditional methods of displaying stimuli in eyewitness memory research, such as mock crime videos, are often criticised for lacking ecological validity. To overcome this, researchers have suggested using virtual reality (VR) technology to display the stimuli as it can promote a sense of presence, leading to real-world responses. However, little research has compared VR with traditional methods to demonstrate this enhanced validity. In Study 1, 54 participants viewed a mock crime video on screen or in VR while their heart rate was recorded, then completed measures of presence and emotion, and had their recall tested after 10 min. In Study 2, 74 participants’ recall was tested after a 7-day delay and included a more in-depth exploration of emotional experience. In both studies, participants in the VR group reported a statistically significant increase in their sense of general presence, spatial presence, and involvement in the scene; however, there was no statistically significant difference in recall between the groups. Participants in the VR group had a statistically significant increase in heart rate in Study 1 only, and emotional experience in Study 2 only. The findings of this research suggest that VR may provide a more ecologically valid eyewitness experience than videos, without impacting participant memory or wellbeing. The findings of the current research are discussed in relation to previous literature and implications for experimental eyewitness memory research.

On the use of receiver operating characteristic area under the curve in eyewitness memory research

AbstractPurposeEyewitness memory research has reformed police practices and policy and is sometimes relied upon in legal proceedings. Due to the practical implications derived from this research, it is imperative to evaluate how practical recommendations are postulated. To assess the practical relevance of research, effect sizes and their interpretation play a pivotal role.MethodsWe examined how the frequently used effect size Area Under the Curve (AUC) obtained via Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are used and interpreted in eyewitness memory research. We identified 157 eyewitness memory related articles that conducted ROC curve analyses resulting in 1580 AUCs.ResultsApproximately 90% of the AUCs were only interpreted via statistical significance. The majority of studies did not report 95%CIs for their AUCs. Finally, power analyses were frequently not conducted or not reproducible.ConclusionsTo improve the practical inferences of eyewitness memory research, we recommend establishing a smallest effect size of interest, focusing on 95%CIs, and conducting reproducible power analyses.

Improving the validity and reliability of eyewitness memory research using virtual reality

Improving the validity and reliability of eyewitness memory research using virtual reality

Eyewitness Memory Research and Legal Practices: A Historical Perspective

Görgü tanığı belleğinin güvenilirliği, adalet sistemleri açısından büyük önem taşımaktadır. Tanık belleğindeki bellek hataları, hem suçluların tespit edilememesi hem de tanıkların yanlış teşhisi nedeniyle yanlış kişilerin mahkum edilmesi gibi kritik sonuçlar doğurabilmektedir. Bu nedenle, yasal uygulamaların görgü tanığı belleği araştırmalarından elde edilen bulgulardan yararlanılarak düzenlenmesinin önemi büyüktür. Bu makale, kronolojik bir perspektif ile tanık belleği araştırmalarının yüz yılı aşan tarihindeki önemli bulguları derlemeye ve görgü tanıklığı konusundaki yasal düzenlemeleri bu bulgular ışığında incelemeye odaklanmıştır.

Effects of handedness consistency and saccade execution on eyewitness memory in cued- and free-recall procedures

ABSTRACTIdentifying characteristics that distinguish between people with relatively good versus poor episodic memory is an important goal of eyewitness-memory research, as is identifying activities that can improve people’s ability to retrieve episodic memories. Consistency of hand preference is a trait associated with the quality of people’s episodic memory and repetitive saccade execution is an activity known to improve people’s ability to retrieve episodic memories. These factors were examined in relation to cued and free recall of a staged criminal event. Individuals with inconsistent hand preference (versus consistent) remembered more on a cued-recall test and also freely recalled a larger amount of victim information. Repetitive saccade execution did not increase cued recall but did increase free recall of victim information. Theoretical implications are discussed, as is potential practical significance, with an emphasis on the size of the observed effects.

Receiver operating characteristic analysis of age-related changes in lineup performance

In the basic face memory literature, support has been found for the late maturation hypothesis, which holds that face recognition ability is not fully developed until at least adolescence. Support for the late maturation hypothesis in the criminal lineup identification literature, however, has been equivocal because of the analytic approach that has been used to examine age-related changes in identification performance. Recently, receiver operator characteristic (ROC) analysis was applied for the first time in the adult eyewitness memory literature to examine whether memory sensitivity differs across different types of lineup tests. ROC analysis allows for the separation of memory sensitivity from response bias in the analysis of recognition data. Here, we have made the first ROC-based comparison of adults’ and children’s (5- and 6-year-olds and 9- and 10-year-olds) memory performance on lineups by reanalyzing data from Humphries, Holliday, and Flowe (2012). In line with the late maturation hypothesis, memory sensitivity was significantly greater for adults compared with young children. Memory sensitivity for older children was similar to that for adults. The results indicate that the late maturation hypothesis can be generalized to account for age-related performance differences on an eyewitness memory task. The implications for developmental eyewitness memory research are discussed.

Are individuals' familiarity judgments diagnostic of prior contact?

The extensive eyewitness memory research literature has been restricted to memory for strangers. Although it is often assumed that eyewitnesses are more accurate identifying familiar than unfamiliar individuals, little is known about whether individuals' familiarity judgments are diagnostic of prior contact. Caucasian and Asian sophomores (N=139) in two small private high schools viewed yearbook pictures of (a) graduated students from their school who were seniors (fourth year) when participants were freshmen (first year) (familiar) and (b) unfamiliar individuals, and responded whether each was ‘familiar’. The design was completely crossed; familiar faces at each school served as unfamiliar faces at the other school. Based on d′ data, the cross-race effect resulted for familiarity judgments. Also, although individuals' familiarity judgments were diagnostic of prior contact, accuracy was low (mean hit rate=0.42; mean false alarm rate=0.23), rendering an eyewitness's report of having seen a perpetrator casually in the past of limited forensic value.

Children's Memory for Their Mother's Murder: Accuracy, Suggestibility, and Resistance to Suggestion

From its inception, child eyewitness memory research has been guided by dramatic legal cases that turn on the testimony of children. Decades of scientific research reveal that, under many conditions, children can provide veracious accounts of traumatic experiences. Scientific studies also document factors that lead children to make false statements. In this paper we describe a legal case in which children testified about their mother's murder. We discuss factors that may have influenced the accuracy of the children's eyewitness memory. Children's suggestibility and resistance to suggestion are illustrated. Expert testimony, based on scientific research, can aid the trier of fact when children provide crucial evidence in criminal investigations and courtroom trials about tragic events.

The Effect of Repeated Exposure on the Picture Preference Bias of Source Monitoring

People often rely on formal knowledge as well as experience about how memory works when evaluating the source of remembered information (Johnson, Raye, Foley, Foley, 1981; Johnson, 1997). Such reliance may lead to the picture preference bias, a tendency to misattribute perceived words as pictures rather than misattributing perceived pictures as words in a word-picture monitoring task (Foley, Durso, Wilder, Friedman, 1991; Riefer, Hu, Batchelder, 1994; Foley, 1998). Previous research has suggested that picture preference bias in source monitoring may have played a role in the misinformation effect in eyewitness memory research. In the present study, the effect of repeated exposure on the picture preference bias was examined in a standard source monitoring paradigm. A 2 (Item type: word vs. picture) × 2 (Exposure: once vs. twice) × 2 (Test: source monitoring vs. recognition) within-subjects design was employed. The participants studied 144 words or pictures either once or twice during the study phase. They then completed a mixed source monitoring and recognition test. The results revealed a significant interaction between source misattribution type and exposure so that the picture preference bias emerged only after repeated exposure: The error of misattributing perceived words to pictures was significantly higher than that of misattributing pictures to words in the repeated exposure condition, but not in the one exposure condition. Findings from the present study suggest that attempting to enhance eyewitness memory by repeatedly exposing the witnesses to the remnants of the original event could be counterproductive.

Eyewitness identification tests

When investigating crimes police frequently use eyewitness identification tests such as lineups in an attempt to establish the culprit's identity. It is now well documented that witnesses commonly make mistakes, sometimes identifying innocent suspects or failing to identify the culprit. Lineup administrators also make mistakes in the sense that they use procedures that increase the likelihood of eyewitness error. Eyewitness memory research has provided a basis for many useful guidelines regarding the conduct of identification tests. Here, we review the relevant research underpinning effective procedures for lineup construction, lineup presentation, recording the witness's decision, and providing feedback to the witness. The systematic implementation of these guidelines is likely to reduce significantly the extent of eyewitness errors at the identification test and improve the probative value of courtroom testimony about identity. However, further significant advances may well require the development of novel procedures for accessing witnesses' memories.

Hugo who? G. F. Arnold's alternative early approach to psychology and law

AbstractHugo Münsterberg is widely regarded as the founder of the discipline of psychology and law, and the publication of his book On the Witness Stand (1908) is considered the signal event in its founding. However, numerous other researchers were conducting and publishing research on psycholegal topics in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and at least one other book on psychology and law—G. F. Arnold's Psychology Applied to Legal Evidence and Other Constructions of Law (1906)—appeared prior to the publication of Münsterberg's work. The present paper contrasts these two seminal publications, focussing on their relevance to the ‘basic‐versus‐applied’ debate in contemporary eyewitness memory research and exploring reasons why Münsterberg has been so influential while Arnold has been largely ignored. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Expert testimony: Does eyewitness memory research have probative value for the courts?

Abstract Case studies, and more recently DNA testing in the United States, have shown that mistaken eyewitness identification is responsible for more wrongful convictions than all other causes combined. It is argued that scientific laboratory and field research can contribute to the court's better understanding of those factors which contribute to both accurate and mistaken eyewitness recall and identification. Attention is given to the value of common knowledge in prediction of eyewitness memory performance, to the major critiques of expert eyewitness testimony, and to the worth of legal safeguards designed to prevent false identification leading to wrongful convictions. Expert eyewitness testimony provides an opportunity for the trier of fact to be assisted in decision-making such that convictions of innocent suspects may be minimized, and the just conviction of guilty suspects maximized. Eyewitnesses have been giving testimony in Englishspeaking courts since the late 16` century. Expert testimony on eyewitness memory, however, is relatively recent and still an infrequent event. In fact, following the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Regina v. McIntosh and McCarthy (1997), expert eyewitness testimony in the province of Ontario appears to have been put on hold until further notice. The trial judge and the Court of Appeal in McIntosh and McCarthy concluded that expert testimony would not be more than common knowledge, and would not assist the jurors in their deliberations. The major purposes of this paper are to present an overview of some of the challenges an expert witness in eyewitness memory typically faces, some of the responses that can be made to these challenges, and some data from a recently completed study which addresses the notion that we have more to offer the courts than mere common sense. Nearly 100 years ago, Hugo Munsterberg (1908) argued that because experimental psychology concerns itself with the scientific study of human behaviour and experience, the results of laboratory studies on human perception and memory should be especially relevant to American courts' evaluations of witness testimony. Unfortunately, Munsterberg's proposals lacked sufficient empirical support and attacked the legal establishment for their lack of appreciation and endorsement of psychology's offerings. Justice Wigmore (1909) answered Munsterberg by writing a satirical and crushing review of his thesis. In spite of this relatively poor introduction to an integration of the psychology of testimony and law, Wigmore and other legal scholars of that period encouraged the application of scientifically valid research findings to the courts' better understanding of witness testimony (Sporer, 1982). Unlike Europe, there was little interest in America in developing a rapprochement between the psychology of testimony and the courts until the 1970s (e.g., Buckhout, 1974; Clifford & Bull, 1978; Loftus, 1979; Yarmey, 1979). Furthermore, unlike Munsterberg, contemporary psychology has not suggested that the courts submit to an alternative authority. Over the last two decades, valuable advances in the scientific understanding of eyewitness perception and memory have been made which can assist the court in their evaluations of eyewitnesses' reports. Furthermore, Canadian psychology students and law students now have a textbook (Schuller & Ogloff, in press) which emphasizes Canadian perspectives on an integration of the law and psychology, including eyewitness testimony (Read, Connolly, & Turtle, in press). MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATIONS The reality that eyewitnesses make errors and innocent people are convicted based upon faulty identifications is accepted by Canadian legal professionals (Brooks, 1983). Perhaps what is not fully appreciated is the fact that eyewitness misidentifications are the single most common cause of wrongful convictions (Huff, Rattne, & Sagarin, 1986). Next to an actual confession, eyewitness testimony has been described as the most incriminating evidence that can be introduced against an accused (Brandon & Davies, 1973). …

Experts in court: A view from the bench.

Abstract There has been a significant increase in the frequency of expert testimony over the past 25 years in Canada. As such, there has also been an increase in psychological expert testimony. In drawing from his experience as a litigator and judge, and reflecting on the articles by Yarmey and Peters, the author explains what it is that judges expect of an expert and how experts should be prepared. He also summarizes some of the legal rules concerning expert testimony. Finally, the author considers the future of expert psychological testimony. This paper is largely a reconstruction of remarks made by the writer during a panel discussion at the 60th Annual Convention of the Canadian Psychological Association in Halifax, Nova Scotia, May 20, 1999. My comments and observations here derive from 18 years in practice as a litigator and almost 10 years as a trial judge, either sitting alone or presiding with a jury covering the spectrum of litigation: criminal, civil, commercial, family, tax, and probate. I know you will understand that I should not be presumed to speak for my other colleagues on the Court. I have not restricted my remarks to the context of a criminal trial. Rather I will try to address a variety of cases where psychologists may have provided advice. These cases include: wrongful dismissal - emotional shock and depression following termination; worker's compensation - long-term employability and other human resources issues; personal injury - legitimacy of a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder; medical malpractice - cognitive deficit and long-term memory impairment after botched surgery; probate testamentary capacity; and custody and access - children with learning, behavioural, and attention deficit disorders. In every one of these examples, it seems to me that psychologists may have relevant, necessary, and reliable evidence to give, which will assist me, as the trier of fact, in areas where I have no special training. Do. Daniel Yarmey and Mr. Martin Peters have prepared two excellent papers. Dr. Yarmey's is entitled Testimony: Does Eyewitness Memory Research Have Probative Value for the Courts? Mr. Peters' is entitled Forensic Psychological Testimony: Is the Courtroom Door Now Locked and Barred? In this article, I will comment on some of the significant issues raised by these authors in their papers from my perspective as a trial judge. I intend to do that by asking and answering the following questions: - What do judges expect of an expert and how should experts be prepared? How did we get to all of these rules? - Is R v. McIntosh and McCarthy (1997) a trendsetter? - How does it all look from where I sit? - WHAT DO JUDGES EXPECT OF AN EXPERT AND HOW SHOULD EXPERTS BE PREPARED Definition of an Expert An expert is someone who by virtue of special training, education, experience or skill is qualified to offer a relevant opinion to assist the trier of fact in arriving at a conclusion which the court is unable to reach without the expert's help. Thus the first step is to decide whether an expert is even necessary. An expert will not be required if the expert's opinion would not be anymore helpful than that of the judge or the jurors themselves. What we expect from an expert witness is an opinion as to the significance of, or the inference which may be drawn from, proved facts in a field in which the expert witness possesses special knowledge and experience beyond that of the triers of fact. The expert is then permitted to give such opinions to assist the jury or trial judge. But where the opinion is one which falls within the knowledge and experience of the trier of fact, there is no need for expert evidence and an opinion will not be permitted. Thus the test for the admissibility of an expert opinion is whether it is relevant and will assist the Court in making findings of fact or reaching conclusions which the Court is unable to do without the help of that expert. …

The ethics of conducting ‘false memory’ research with children: a reply to Herrmann and Yoder

Child witness research has two central yet complementary goals: (1) to advance scienti®c knowledge, and (2) to address real-world problems. Research on children's eyewitness memory, including research on `implanted' or `false' memory, integrates the two goals well. In regard to scienti®c advances, valuable knowledge about how children encode, store, and retrieve information is gained. In regard to addressing real-world problems, important information is provided about children's capabilities in forensic interviews and courtroom encounters, information that is potentially relevant to the guilt or innocence of individuals accused of crimes against children. It is essential to weigh the utility of `false memory' research in relation to these two goals when discussing its future and ethics. In the present commentary, we respond to concerns raised by Herrmann and Yoder about the ethics of conducting implanted memory studies. We welcome discussion of ethical issues in eyewitness memory research with children, especially false memory research, and we agree with a number of general points made by Herrmann and Yoder. For example, the authors rightfully state that `future development of memory paradigms to be used with children should from the outset include consultation of the relevant child development literature'. As Thompson (1990, 1992) notes, the ability to conduct ethically sound research with children depends largely on consideration of children's cognitive and socio-emotional development. Another point raised by Herrmann andYoder is alsowell justi®ed: `Although the implantedmemory paradigm has increased knowledge about memory, we believe this research as it has been used with children raises ethical issues that should be examined'. We concur that empirical research should address the issues raised byHerrmann andYoder, and that researchers who have already conducted implanted memory studies should take the lead. However, we contend that such an examination should co-occur with: (1) appreciation of the signi®cance of implanted memory research for societal intervention into child maltreatment, particularly child sexual abuse, and for psychological theory; (2) more critical and complete analysis of the actual methodologies and results of false memory studies; (3) discussion of possible bene®ts to children of participating in child eyewitness studies; and (4) evaluation of other types of child witness research that may be more deserving of ethical scrutiny. We discuss these issues in turn. Finally, at the end

Probative v. prejudicial value of eyewitness memory research

A commentary is given on Ebbesen and Konecni‘s (1996) critical review ofeyewitness memory research and their conclusions that expert testimony hasgreater prejudicial than probative value and should not be admissible incourt. Selective attention is given to issues of admissibility, researchprocedures, face validity, voice identification, lineup fairness, showupsand lineups, and common knowledge. It is concluded that Ebbesen andKonecni‘s review is a necessary contribution to the field of eyewitnessmemory research. However, the psycho-legal conclusions drawn from thisreview appear to reflect a negative predisposition rather than a balancedscientific appraisal of the literature.

Eyewitness memory of police trainees for realistic role plays.

One hundred and twenty police recruits (probationer constables) being trained at the Metropolitan Police Training Centre in Hendon, England, participated in 1 of 2 occupational simulations, either nonstressful or stressful. Twenty of the recruits in each condition were active participants in the event, whereas the other 40 were observers. Half of the recruits were interviewed after a delay of 1 week and again after 12 weeks. The others were interviewed only once after a period of 12 weeks. Stress decreased the amount recalled but improved both accuracy and resistance to decay over time. Participants recalled more details than observers. Delay of recall and the number of recall trials also affected performance. The results are discussed in terms of the advantages of a research context that permits much of the control of the laboratory while retaining many of the characteristics of actual forensic contexts. As with any new area of scientific inquiry, the first century of eyewitness memory research (e.g., Binet, 1900) has been characterized by debate and an evolution of method. During the past decade, the debate over the ecological validity of the research has taken center stage, as it did in the early part of this century (cf. Wigmore, 1909). The current version of this debate (e.g., Loftus, 1991; Yuille & Wells, 1991) focuses on the relationship between memory as it operates in the laboratory and memory in other contexts. Some have argued that memory is best studied in the laboratory where maximum control and precision are possible (e.g., Banaji & Crowder, 1989). Although there are several problems associated with this argument (see commentaries edited by Loftus, 1991), one salient problem is the inability to produce certain circumstances in the laboratory. For example, for obvious ethical reasons, strong emotional reactions or high levels of stress can no longer be induced in laboratories. Anyone interested in the relationship between emotions or stress and memory must, at some point, leave the laboratory to seek research venues in which such reactions occur naturally. This article reports the results of our first study of eyewitness memory at a police-training college in Hendon, England. Probationer constables of the London Metropolitan Police Force spend the first 20 weeks of their career at this college in initial training. A major component of the training is a series of role

Children's Eyewitness-Memory Research: Implications for Practice

The authors review the empirical literature relating to child-witness testimony and draw implications for professionals who conduct investigatory interviews with preadolescent children about alleged offenses. Issues related to the quality of communication between the child and interviewer, the interview setting, and specific interviewing techniques are addressed. Practical recommendations are offered regarding the techniques likely to maximize the accuracy and completeness of children's recall of events.