Extreme Parties Research Articles

Far right activism and electoral outcomes

This article uses an original data set of 3262 party activities to examine how the local activism of a Greek far right party, the Golden Dawn, affected its electoral performance. Whereas most studies of activism focus on its intensity, this article examines how a neglected dimension, the consistency of activism, affects electoral outcomes. It also distinguishes between those activities local parties undertake indoors to communicate with activists and those organized outdoors to communicate with voters. Instead of gauging the efficacy of activism shortly prior to elections, the study measures the effects of activism from one election to the next. The article demonstrates that consistent outdoor activism is electorally competitive. The findings have implications for the study of local activism, especially that of really extreme parties, like the Golden Dawn.

Gender Differences in Vote Choice: Social Cues and Social Harmony as Heuristics

Some parties are more popular among men, while other parties attract more female voters. This article proposes that these differences can be partially explained by two recurring gender differences in the socio-psychological literature. It argues that men’s generally lower sensitivity to social cues makes them more likely to vote for stigmatized and small parties, whereas women’s greater concern with social harmony is expected to make them less likely to vote for extreme parties. The models are tested at the individual and party levels using three waves of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data from twenty-eight countries.Ceteris paribus, men are more likely than women to vote for parties that are socially stigmatized or ideologically extreme. This has consequences for the current understanding of gender gaps in voting, and reiterates that voting has important social aspects.

The venturous bid for the independence of Catalonia

Following an ambiguous constitutional compromise for democratization, the territorial decentralization of the Spanish state developed by means of political party competition, exchanges, and bargaining. Hence, the so-calledstate of autonomieswas characterized as “non-institutional federalism” [Colomer, Josep M. 1998. “The Spanish ‘State of Autonomies': Non-institutional Federalism.”West European Politics21 (4): 40–52]. In the most recent period, competition and instability have intensified. New developments include, on one side, attempts at recentralizating the state and, on the other side, demands and mobilizations forCatexit, that is, the independence of Catalonia from Spain, which resulted in sustained inter-territorial conflict. This article addresses these recent changes with a focus on the relations between the Spanish and the Catalan governments. The political changes were analyzed as a result of opportunities and incentives offered by a loose institutional framework and the subsequent competitive strategies of extreme party leaders.

Elite Influence? Religion and the Electoral Success of the Nazis

AbstractIn Weimar Germany, the Catholic Church vehemently warned ordinary parishioners about the dangers of extremist parties. We establish that constituencies' religious composition is a key empirical predictor of Nazi vote shares—dwarfing the explanatory power of any other demographic or socioeconomic variable. Even after carefully accounting for observational differences, Catholics were far less likely to vote for the NSDAP than their Protestant counterparts. The evidence suggests that this disparity was, in large part, due to the sway of the Catholic Church and its dignitaries. At the same time, we show that attempts to immunize Catholics against the radical left failed to achieve the desired result. To explain the puzzling asymmetry in the Church's influence at the ballot box, we develop a simple theoretical framework of elite influence in electoral politics.

Extreme parties and populism: an analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries

ABSTRACTParties are adapting to the new digital environment in many ways; however, the precise relations between populist communication and social media are still hardly considered. This study compares populist communication strategies on Twitter and Facebook employed by a broad spectrum of left-wing, center, and right-wing political actors in six Western democracies. We conduct a semi-automated content analysis of politicians’ social media statements (N = 1400) and find that populism manifests itself in a fragmented form and is mostly used by political actors at the extremes of the political spectrum (both right-wing and left-wing), by opposition parties, and on Facebook.

Issue clarity in electoral competition. Insights from Austria

This paper analyses parties' policy supply in electoral campaigns. In so doing, it proposes to look at issue clarity which is defined as the share of objectively testable pledges within an election manifesto. The main argument states that parties not only decide their positions and issue saliencies, but also the level of specificity with which they present their policies. The data come from Austria (1990–2008) and, thus, provide a good example for a Western European multi-party system with proportional representation. The analyses show that extreme parties present manifestos with higher issue clarity compared to moderate parties. Furthermore, this result is strengthened by a party's role in government. Issue ownership, however, seems to have no effect on issue clarity.

Populist online communication: introduction to the special issue

ABSTRACTPopulism continues to gain traction in politics but there has been relatively little research on how it plays out on the Internet. The special issue at hand aims at narrowing this gap of research by focusing on the close relation between populism and online communication. This introduction presents an integrative definition of populism, as well as a theoretical analysis of the interplay between populist communication logic and online opportunity structures. The individual contributions discuss how populist actors may benefit from the Internet. They analyze how political leaders and extreme parties use populist online communication. The authors also shed light on how populist movements may relate to various political parties. They finally demonstrate which groups of social media users are more susceptible to populism than others and what effects populist online communication may have on citizens. We hope that this special issue will contribute to the discussion on what is arguably one of the largest political challenges currently faced by a series of nations around the globe.

The Consequences of Collective Discontent: A New Measure of Zeitgeist Predicts Voting for Extreme Parties

In recent years, extreme right‐wing and left‐wing political parties and actors have gained popularity in many Western countries. What motivates people to vote for extreme right‐ or left‐wing parties? In previous research, we showed that a collectively shared sense of doom and gloom about society can exist among citizens who, individually, experience high well‐being. Previous research developed an operationalization of this collective societal discontent as an aspect of Zeitgeist, which can be compared to personal experiences (van der Bles, Postmes, & Meijer, ). In the present research, we investigated whether this Zeitgeist of societal discontent predicts voting for extreme parties. We conducted a field study during the 2015 Dutch provincial elections (N = 407). Results showed that collective societal discontent (Zeitgeist) predicted voting for extreme parties but that personal discontent did not. Results also showed that pessimistic Zeitgeist was associated with lower education levels and tabloid‐style media consumption. These findings advance our understanding of the discontents that fuel extreme voting outcomes: Global and abstract (negative) beliefs about society are more consequential than concrete personal experiences.

Intergenerational Correlations of Extreme Right‐Wing Party Preferences and Attitudes toward Immigration

AbstractIn this paper, we analyze the importance of parental socialization on the development of children's far right‐wing preferences and attitudes toward immigration. Using longitudinal data from Germany, our intergenerational estimates suggest that the strongest and most important predictor for young people's right‐wing extremism are their parents' right‐wing extremist attitudes. While intergenerational associations in attitudes toward immigration are equally high for sons and daughters, we find a positive intergenerational transmission of right‐wing extremist party affinity for sons, but not for daughters. Compared to the intergenerational correlation of other party affinities, the high association between fathers' and sons' right‐wing extremist attitudes is particularly striking.

From fringe to fringe: the shift from the clericalist League of Polish Families to the anticlericalist Palikot Movement 2001–2015

ABSTRACTThe period between 2001 and 2015 brought two events in Poland that deserve to be called phenomena. In 2001 the rightist, clericalist League of Polish Families entered the Sejm. Ten years later, the leftist, anticlericalist Palikot Movement achieved spectacular success in the 2011 elections. These events give a picture of a radical shift in the Polish political scene: a rightist clericalist party disappeared from the right flank of the political scene, while a new, leftist-anticlericalist formation appeared. The article makes reference to a set of five explanations on both the causes and consequences (and permanence) of the observed changes. I argue that only a concurrence of a number of complementary factors – global (secularisation, right-wing populism, postmodernism); structural (changing patterns of rivalry between Polish political parties); and periodic (critical events) – allows us to explain both the radical shift in ‘religious’ voting and the success of politically extreme parties. In total, these conditions make up an ‘opportunity structure’ within which only a set of mutually conditioning factors can bring about such a critical shift.

Explaining the Emergence of Echo Chambers on Social Media: The Role of Ideology and Extremism

The emergence of politically driven divisions in online discussion networks has attracted a wealth of literature, but also one which has thus far been largely limited to single country studies. Hence whilst there is good evidence that these networks do divide and fragment into what are often described as “echo chambers”, we know little about the factors which might explain this division or make networks more or less fragmented, as studies have been limited to a small number of political groupings with limited possibilities for systematic comparison. This study seeks to remedy this deficit, by providing a systematic large scale study of fragmentation on Twitter which considers discussion networks surrounding 59 different political parties in 11 different countries. It shows that political party groupings which are further apart in ideological terms interact less, and that individuals and parties which sit at the extreme ends of the ideological scale are particularly likely to form echo chambers. Indeed, exchanges between centrist parties who sit on different sides of the left-right divide are more likely than communication between centrist and extremist parties who are, notionally, from the same ideological wing. In light of the results, theory about exposure to different ideological viewpoints online is discussed and enhanced.

Electoral Non-Participation and Communicative Voting in the EU: Attitudinal Explanations

Recently held elections in a number of established democracies have been characterized by voters' increasing electoral non-participation and a substantial rise in the vote shares of extreme political parties. This paper investigates the role of European citizens’ political attitudes in changing voting dynamics. Empirical analysis first establishes the relationship between citizens’ voting decisions (i.e., both their decision to abstain from voting as well as their decision to communicatively vote for anti-establishment right-wing parties) and their disapproving political attitudes — political dissatisfactions and distrusts — towards existing institutions and actors. Secondly, it lists political attitudes (i.e., dissatisfaction with government, distrust in political parties) that distinguish non-voters from right-wing voters. Finally, I exploit the main results to provide policy implications for the contemporary European political system.

How the Greek Radical Left and Extreme Right are Perceiving Democracy: A Research Attempt at a Social Epistemological Explanation

The outbreak of the unprecedented financial crisis in Greece and the ensuing fundamental change of the political landscape have brought to the fore serious problems in the functioning of the democratic order and institutions. Two political actors have played a major role in the challenging of democratic principles, namely the Radical Left Party SYRIZA and the extreme neo-fascist party Golden Dawn. The former has advanced from a small radical left party to the main opposition and - recently - the governing party, while the latter has become established, from a formerly old neo-nazi pariah party, as the third political power in parliament. This study tackles the long addressed problems of democratic order building in Greece. It is based on the working hypothesis that the malfunctioning of the democratic institutions in Greece is connected with the “pre-political” cognitive infrastructure of the Greek society, which originates in the past and is an integral element of the self-instituting political community “texture”. Our research method includes qualitative comprehensive interviews with party members and voters of SYRIZA and Golden Dawn. The main research objective is to reach an in-depth understanding of the interviewees, in the sense of uncovering their indigenous concepts concerning the democratic idea and practices, and to interpret the material in a permanent interaction between the interpretation frame and the facts concerning the research object. It will be asked, how the interviewees comprehend the key prerequisites for the construction of a democratic order, what is their socially-historically founded ideological horizon, how the links are formed between the ideas, images, models in mind and the incorporated collective memory with respect to the democratic principle. It will also be asked whether these problems with democratic understanding could be valid across party lines.

Do citizens vote for parties, policies or the expected winner in proportional representation systems? Evidence from four different countries using a multiple-type model

This article presents a unified framework that allows us to disentangle to what extent agents in proportional representation (PR) systems engage in the different strategies that the available voting models have separately suggested: ‘party’, ‘coalitional’, ‘bandwagon’ and ‘other’ voting (i.e. neither of the previous three). Results using data from multiple countries reveal that at least 75% of agents cast a sincere party vote. Around 10% of voters try to affect policymaking by casting a coalitional vote. Since most coalitional agents use their vote to ‘push’ coalitions away from the centre, extreme parties are the most benefited. Hence, strategic coalitional voting may increase rather than preclude fragmentation of a party system in PR contexts. Another 5% of voters support the expected winner regardless of their own party and coalition preferences. Finally, 5–10% of voters fall into the category of other types. The characteristics and motivations of each type are uncovered. Political sophistication increases the likelihood of sincere and coalitional voting. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with parties voted for in the past increases other voting. In particular, recent growth of European right-wing nationalist parties is shown to rely more on other voting and less on sincere and coalitional support.

Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse

In this spatial model of common-value elections, votes convey citizens' private opinions regarding which policies are socially optimal, and the winning candidate utilizes this information in choosing policy. In equilibrium, large margins of victory convey mandates for candidates to make bold policy changes. To communicate extreme policy views, citizens support extreme parties that may be unlikely to win office. To convey moderate views, citizens deliberately abstain from voting, thereby avoiding the signaling voter's curse of encouraging overextremism. In large elections, mandates can identify the optimal policy from an entire continuum, thereby greatly strengthening Condorcet's (1785) classic “jury” theorem. Behavioral patterns are consistent with otherwise puzzling empirical features of elections, and can also apply to other political activities, such as public protests or writing letters to elected officials.

High turnout in the Low Countries: Partisan effects of the abolition of compulsory voting in the Netherlands

We use a quasi-experimental framework to test the conventional wisdom that left-of-center parties benefit from higher turnout by analyzing the partisan effects of the abolition of compulsory voting in the Netherlands. Fixed effects, multilevel, and matching models of party family vote shares in the Netherlands before and after the reform–and in reference to a control group of Belgian party families–show consistent evidence the voting reform led to an increase in the vote share of Dutch social democratic parties and a decrease in the vote share won by minor and extreme parties. We find some evidence that Christian democratic and liberal parties also benefited from the voting reform, but argue this finding is not causally related to the reform itself.

Ideologies, status quo, and parties’ outside options in parliamentary politics

AbstractThis paper discusses the effect of the status quo policy versus parties’ “outside options,” which are defined as the benefits when parties are not in government, on the determination of the political equilibrium in parliamentary politics. As the value of outside options increases, the status quo becomes less important relative to outside options in terms of the parties’ bargaining strength. It is shown, among other things, that if the value of outside options is intermediate, two extreme parties may form a “disconnected coalition” in equilibrium; and if the value of outside options becomes sufficiently high, the status quo no longer maintains its grip on outcomes and the median‐voter theorem holds in essence.

The “Alternative for Germany:” Factors Behind its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-wing Populist Party

Until 2013, right-wing populist or extremist parties were unable to establish themselves as a relevant political force in Germany. With the advent of the Alternative für Deutschland the party landscape has changed significantly. The window of opportunity for the newcomer was opened in 2013 by the Euro crisis. Combining euroskepticism with liberal economic policies and a conservative social issue agenda the AfD mainly capitalized on the neglecting of these matters by the liberal party and the Christian democrats. Controversy between the market-oriented moderate wing represented by party founder Bernd Lucke and the radical advocates of national populism led to the split off of the former in July 2015. Only with the refugee crisis did the AfD regain its electoral fortunes and obtained its best results thus far in the March 2016 state elections. Most probably, the party’s prospects will remain promising if one considers the voter’s side. The main risks lie in its own ranks, where ideological battles, personal struggles and the unresolved question of how to distance the party from right-wing extremism could further self-destruction.

Encapsulation without Integration? Electoral Democracy and the Ambivalent Moderation of Hindu Nationalism in India

Has the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in power in India’s central government following its massive mandate in the 2014 Lok Sabha polls, become a normal member of India’s party family, or does it remain the quintessential outsider, whose electoral success is seen as a threat to India’s liberal, democratic and secular ethos? This article applies the Downsian median voter argument to analyze this puzzle. A comparison with the gradual moderation of Europe’s Christian Democratic parties helps generate four enabling conditions that account for the moderation of extremist parties in electoral democracies. Taking these conditions into account, the article explains why the BJP, while fully integrated within the electoral system of India, is nevertheless seen by India’s mainstream parties and bulk of the media and civil society groups as an outsider to the democratic political system, and why the BJP’s ambivalent moderation is likely to endure, at least in the short run.

Reciprocity and Discrimination: An Experiment of Hindu‐Muslim Cooperation in Indian Slums

This article shows that indirect positive reciprocity triggered by experiencing short and superficial cooperation with outgroups' individual members reduces discrimination of other members of the same group. The field research combined a lab‐in‐the‐field experiment and a survey conducted in the slums of Mumbai, an Indian city notorious for Hindu‐Muslim violence. After the treatment manipulated expectations of cooperative behavior, ethnically heterogeneous groups produced as much public goods in a public goods game as homogeneous groups. This positive experience radically reduced Hindu subjects' discriminatory attitudes towards the Muslim minority after the experiment. The effect was equally strong among voters of two extremist parties implicated in ethnic riots. The survey compared reciprocity with alternative explanations of why people discriminate against some, but not other ethnic groups. Indirect positive reciprocity and intergroup contact are associated with less, and relative size of the outgroup with more discriminatory attitudes.