External Patrons Research Articles

Central European strategies in the new Cold War: between balancing and bandwagoning

This article argues that the security of Central Europe – defined as stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black See–is based first and foremost on the viability and engagement of the Western alliance, understood as NATO and the European Union. The security and defense policies in the region are designed in relation to NATO and bilateral relations with the United States, with limited attempts to achieve some degree of self-sufficiency. Therefore, to understand the security of Central Europe and its individual nations, it is essential to understand their attitudes and fears related to alliances as well as their perceptions of Russia’s intentions. It is posited here that the concept that can best explain the behavior of the nations of the region, allowing also for forecasting future behavior, is the balance of threat theory, as put forward by Stephen Walt. According to the theory, the nations facing threat chose to either balance the threatening power by joining forces with other actors and forming alliances or joining in with their predator, which constitutes a bandwagoning behavior. Historically, especially during the interwar period, these strategies have been employed by Central European nations. Today, the security environment is arguably very different– we have NATO, EU, and American engagement in the region. However, the international environment has deteriorated recently, especially since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Arguably, Central European states have responded by falling, to some extent, into patterns of behavior familiar from the past, with some clinging to closer relations with their external patron (the United States) and some hedging their bets and opting for relative neutrality or even closer relations with Russia. The article argues that four factors determine states’ behavior vis-à-vis the Russian threat: geography, history, predator intentions, and the perception of allied reliability.

Pathways to Cooperation: A Relational Theory of Rebel Alliance Formation

Why do some rebel organizations form a united front when others confine themselves to a loose partnership? Existing research on rebel movements reveals that insurgents should quickly leave cooperative agreements if doing so will provide particular advantages in a post-conflict setting. Still, rebel groups may build diverse alliances, from joint attacks to shared command structures. If rebels are indeed purely pragmatic, why would they tie themselves to partnerships that hinder their ability to defect easily? In this article, I argue that three relational factors shape how armed groups cooperate: rebel-civilian relations (civilian support), inter-rebel relations (partners), and rebel-sponsor relations (external patrons). Groups connected through these social networks will be more likely to join a united opposition with their shared channels of trust. Developing a new dyadic dataset, I find that sharing allies or civilian support is positively associated with forming united fronts. Yet, state sponsorship does not produce similar results.

The spectres of the Yugoslav wars: Minorities’ response to state disintegration

This article discusses minorities? responses to conflicts in post-1989 Eastern Europe that focuses on them embracing violence to cede from their original state and join their motherland or gain independence. The discussion focuses on the actions of minorities in the contested areas in the former Yugoslavia at the peak of the country?s 1990s crisis, described as a drive towards ethnic self-determination. Faced with political crisis, disintegration and/or oppression, most ethnic groups opted for confrontation, secession and armed revolt/resistance with maximalist independence claims instead of cooperation, integration or compromise. Furthermore, I discuss some possible implications of the grim Yugoslav experience. As I argue, to understand why minorities reverted to war in the former Yugoslavia and beyond, we perhaps need to recognize that post-1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe were predominantly the expressions of nationalist revolt and not democratic revolutions. In conclusion, I discuss some general conditions required for a minority to rise to arms, following Jenne?s theory that stresses the role of external patrons in spurring internal conflicts. I emphasize this synergy of ethnic nationalism, external support by the kin state and/or international actors and minority?s oppression as decisive for the eruption of ever-present antagonisms into a larger conflict and war.

Protection or predation? Understanding the behavior of community-created self-defense militias during civil wars

ABSTRACT During civil wars, some communities raise self-defense militias to protect themselves from insurgent predation, but these militias can end up mutating into predatory organizations. The extant literature has focused chiefly on the predatory propensity of state-created self-defense militias and has mostly overlooked why some community-created self-defense militias segue into predatory organizations while others eschew predation altogether. This study explains this phenomenon, drawing on in-depth interviews with active members of two community-created self-defense militias (Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a and Macawiisley) in Somalia. In doing so, two sequential mechanisms (sponsorship and mobility) that determine the propensity of predatory behavior are introduced. Self-defense militias that conduct offensive operations engage in predatory behavior, irrespective of whether they are sponsored locally or have external patrons. Externally sponsored self-defense militias that engage in offensive operations attract opportunistic recruits and become motivated by material benefits, while community-sponsored self-defense militias that conduct offensive operations instrumentalize their position to settle old scores against rival communities. By contrast, self-defense militias that restrict their operations to defensive activities typically recruit dedicated homegrown members, and are regulated by community-managed accountability mechanisms that prevent predatory and abusive behavior. This community control remains crucial for defensive self-defense militias, who must balance external patrons’ strategic aims with their local objectives.

“De-Facto Borders” as a Mirror of Sovereignty. The Case of the Post-Soviet Non-Recognized States

The crisis of statehood in many countries has resulted in the emergence of non-recognized states that have become an intrinsic feature of the world geopolitical order. Using the concept of bordering, we study a specific type of border that was shaped in the course of state-building processes and conflicts with parent states. Some “de-facto borders” are not stable;in addition, non-recognized states often do not control all their declared territory. Looking in detail at the situation in six non-recognized republics in the post-Soviet space, we show the asymmetry of their borders with the parent state and with the external patron. Comparing the basic socio-economic indicators by regions, we conclude that non-recog-nized states still lag far behind both their parent and their patron state. Citi-zens of non-recognized republics regularly visit border areas of the patron and parent states and spend a considerable part of their income there. This can contribute to the normalization of relations between adversaries, but at the same time can perpetuate the separation between them. The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly increased the barrier functions of the borders with parent states. © 2021, GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. All rights reserved.

Інтернаціоналізація громадянської війни в Сирії (регіональний вимір)

Syrian civil war that started in 2011 is characterized by an extremely high degree of internationalization. The country has become the focus for the different actors in the world and regional politics, as separate states and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations. In this sense neighboring (regional) countries, whose own security and stability directly depends on the situation in Syria, show the greatest interest and activity. The Syria’s civil war is seen as an internationalized intrastate conflict – an armed conflict between a government and a non-government party where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive troop support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict. This article focuses on the interventions of regional actors in the conflict, especially the most powerful regional states (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia). The intervention of regional powers in the Syria’s civil war can be explained by the combination of realist and constructivist approaches. In such an insecure region, all major states seek to maximize their power, famously creating a security dilemma, in which all end up less secure. Against this insecurity, all states “power balance”, in particular by forming alliances against shared threats. The inter-state rivalry for leadership of supra-state communities is endemic, expressed in recurring “cold wars”, in which stronger states deploy ideology and identity discourses to gain allies and subvert rival governments in the search for regional hegemony. Syria became a battleground in «proxy war», in which the warring parties actually serve the interests of their external patrons, who are fighting for regional leadership. Largely as a result of the internationalization of the conflict, Syria became a typical «fragile state» that will produce problems for a long time to come, even when the fighting finally stops: regional instability, refugees problem, criminal activities and extremism. Notwithstanding the Assad regime’s survival and clear victory in the civil war, the main regional interveners’ (Iran and Turkey) interference in Syria will continue, because threats to its national security and regional influence have not been completely eliminated.

Alliance-Building in Post-War Europe: Lessons for Russia

Although great powers may forge ad hoc coalitions to attain their short-term goals, this does not diminish the role of long-term strategic alliances. The alliance theory has long become a separate strand of IR. However, most scholars have focused more on external rather than internal threats to account for alliance choices. The authors review the existing literature on the formation of alliances and, shifting the focus to the struggle for power between internal political actors, propose a theory that explains the formation of asymmetric alliances. By extending support to friendly political groups, great powers can build alliances with those countries where the elites are facing formidable opponents. On the contrary, leaders who rule unchallenged have little incentive to rely on external patrons. The article examines the cases of postwar Italy and Yugoslavia to test the proposed hypotheses. The conclusions drawn from the analysis help formulate recommendations that can be used by Russia in its current strategic environment.

Navigating de facto statehood: trade, trust, and agency in Abkhazia’s external economic relations

ABSTRACT What opportunities and trade-offs do de facto states encounter in developing economic ties with the outside world? This article explores the complex relationship between trade and trust in the context of contested statehood. Most de facto states are heavily dependent on an external patron for economic aid and investment. However, we challenge the widespread assumption that de facto states are merely hapless pawns in the power-play of their patrons. Such an approach fails to capture the conflict dynamics involved. Drawing on a case study of Abkhazia, we explore how this de facto state navigates between its “patron”Russia, its “parent state”Georgia, and the EU. The conflict transformation literature has highlighted the interrelationship between trust and trade – but how does this unfold in the context of continued nonrecognition and contested statehood? Does trade serve to facilitate trust and hence prospects for conflict transformation? With Abkhazia, we find scant correlation between trust and trade: in the absence of formal recognition, trade does not necessarily facilitate trust. However, the interrelationship between trade, trust, and recognition proves more complex than expected: we find less trust in the patron and more trade with the parent than might have been anticipated.

The battle of Aleppo: external patrons and the victimization of civilians in civil war

ABSTRACTCivilian victimization, whether deliberate or collateral, is a common occurrence in civil war. This study investigates patterns of civilian victimization during the 5-year Battle of Aleppo, a major campaign of the Syrian Civil War in which there were 24,462 documented civilian fatalities. We argue that the primary belligerents and their external patrons respond to shifts in the conflict’s strategic balance of power, employing more indiscriminate force when their opponent is gaining advantage, resulting in higher civilian fatalities. A quantitative analysis of the Battle of Aleppo models weekly civilian fatalities as a function of belligerents’ conflict initiation interacted with regime and rebel offensives aimed at shifting the status quo. While regime-initiated conflict events appear to be the primary determinant of civilian fatalities, our analysis finds that conflict events initiated by the opposition forces during periods of rebel offensive gains are associated with fewer civilian casualties, while pro-government external intervention during rebel offensives is associated with elevated civilian fatalities. We expand on these findings through a focused case study of third party intervention during the final year of the battle, with emphasis on the Russian intervention on behalf of the Syrian Regime that broke the opposition’s final counteroffensive.

Dnipropetrovsk Oligarchs: Lynchpins of Sovereignty or Sources of Instability?

The choices made by oligarchs and citizens in Dnipropetrovsk during and after the Euromaidan rebellion of 2013–14 were not just event-driven manifestations in response to domestic and internal pressures. They were responses shaped by historically-composed social structures and interrelationships forged over decades within the region, across southeastern Ukraine, and in relation to competing centers of power—in Kyiv, Moscow, Washington, Brussels and beyond. This paper argues that Dnipropetrovsk—and its leaders—played a crucial intermediary role in not only deescalating tensions in southeastern Ukraine more broadly, but also by buttressing the Ukrainian state in a time of existential crisis. In this analysis, oligarchic self-interest is taken as a given and one factor among many, including the signaling of interventionist intent from an external patron and also deeper, regionally specific, economic and structural forces. This piece brings into the analysis a historian’s understanding of contingency, arguing that analyses of developments in southeastern Ukraine (in the past and present) should strive to better situate regional actors not only in space but also time, so as to better understand the complex set of forces and heterogenous social temporalities shaping their choices.

Problemy rozwoju gospodarczego państw nieuznawanych na przykładzie Abchazji

Problems of Economic Development of the Unrecognised State – the Case of AbkhaziaSince its inception as a result of the victorious war with Georgia, the de facto independent Abkhazia has been struggling with a deep economic crisis characterised by war damage, economic blockade and the lack of international recognition. The aim of this paper is to analyse the main problems and challenges of unrecognised states in the field of economic development on the example of the Republic of Abkhazia. The article summarises the economic consequences of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, characterises the economic development of Abkhazia in the post-war period and analyses the effects of the economic blockade as well as the economic effects of the support of the external patron (the Russian Federation).

The Concept of Civilization in Scientific, Ideological and Everyday Discursive Practices of Wartime in Ukraine

The article analyzes the concept of «civilization» in the context of the modern sociological language. It is shown that at the moment this concept has the lack of clarity of its content. Its history has led to the preservation in it the idea of linear progress with its characteristic steps and idea of different cultural areas. The dialectical tension between universalism and particularism in the concept of civilization has not yet become a stimulus for the development of the theory of civilization. The scientific program of the civilization approach is interdisciplinary and philosophical discourse prevails in it. The hard core of the program demonstrates the inability to development. The history of the study of civilizations is a series of author's visions of reality. There is no repeatability of the results and no falsification of the fundamental thesis of the civilizational approach. The peripheral moments of scientific program of the civilization approach vary depending on the political predilections of scientists and specific circumstances. Most of the forecasts made by supporters of the civilizational approach have not been confirmed in the course of historical development. Insufficient sociological elaboration of the concept of civilization makes it unproductive in scientific research and in public practice. At moments of international crises and wars the civilizational approach turns into a translator of ideological influences on sociology. This is demonstrated by the basic texts of Nikolai Danilevsky and Samuel Huntington. In the geopolitics of large countries, the civilizational approach justifies their right to dominate in some part of the globe. Elites of small countries use it to substantiate the choice of an external patron and to join certain unions. In Ukraine, at present, the civilizational approach is mainly used in the options of civilizational war and civilizational choice. As empirical studies show, it does not find support in the mass consciousness and can not serve the purposes of mobilizing the population to confront the enemy.

European tradition of national identity, understanding of patriotism and of the complex integration in the in the context of public strategies Ukraine

One World democracy and the European tradition consider civil and socio-political identity as the main national and state-forming factor. The unity of the nation is only possible in a civil society that is guided by democratic principles. The nation is primarily a political community, United by common political values, norms and culture, preservation of national unity in accordance with these principles is a combination of public policy underlying the civil-democratic values of freedom, justice, solidarity. Different social layers of the Ukrainian society for many centuries in their aspirations and activities focused on those or other foreign countries, effectively identifying their own narrow corporate, social class or regional interests with a policy of external patrons. Attempts to establish national unity solely on the basis of anthropological, linguistic and emotional identity in the case of the Ukrainian people stumble upon a number of objections. Only joint internal economic-political and social and civic development trends, combined with active relationships between people provide for this phenomenon the term spread. Public and political activity needs to focus not on the emancipation of the rights and interests of some certain groups of Ukrainian society, and the nation as a whole, a unity which must be bonded to the state-a political entity that could represent the interests of all groups and would encourage them to cooperate for the common good. This national and state elite is primarily a spiritual factor that voluntarily takes on himself the burden of responsibility for social welfare, so that every member of society, regardless of regional and social origin primarily saw themselves as belonging primarily to the national political community, and not to a particular class. These values have the same fundamental importance and is inextricably linked. According to the concept of civilian democracy, the nation as a political whole is finally formed only under condition of effective functioning of democracy, as it is in all its varieties (both political and industrial) is a necessary basis for the establishment and development of civil society, forming a wide system of socio-political relationships, cement national unity

Book Review: Unrelenting change, innovation, and risk: Forging the next generation of community colleges by Phelan, D. J.

Anyone in academe can attest to the saying that change is constant. For all sectors within higher education, this reality often poses significant leadership challenges, even for community colleges that have been perceived to be the greatest agents of change in postsecondary education. The level and direction of change confronting community colleges might rival any experienced in their past, leaving many scrambling to stay ahead of the curve, to energize staff and faculty for what lies ahead, and to find ways to effectively communicate what is happening to constituents within and outside the institution. At a time when external patrons frequently question the economic value of postsecondary education, there is much to consider in Daniel Phelan's commentary on the issues, challenges, and opportunities leaders face as they position the next generation of community colleges.Written to appeal to current and future leaders and board of trustee members more than to researchers, Phelan weaves together his extensive leadership experience in different college settings with contemporary leadership and management literature to explore a set of key questions for today's community colleges. What makes the text so compelling is the way that Phelan digs deeply into the issues and their consequences, and how he constantly examines these through the lenses of change, innovation, and risk. Rather than pose oppositional choices for leaders and their colleges, Phelan frames his discussion as a continuum of alternatives which may affect larger institutional goals. Again, this seems very straightforward for writing a leadership guide, but as Phelan indicates throughout the text, the complexity and murkiness of what leaders confront is often not straightforward or at least not something they can act upon in isolation.Phelan uses the extant literature and several personal experiences to illustrate the complexities and what is required of leaders (and others in the college) to work through them. For example, he shares a multi-year experience of the decision to build campus residence halls to show the preparation, seed planting, data gathering, negotiation, and space for reflection required to get buy-in to a proposal he at first thought was straightforward. This and many other examples shared in the book help show that if the goal is real change and innovation, then a good idea is only the start. Leaders must draw upon skills that reflect multi-framing, effective listening, the right balance of challenging ideas and providing support for anxiety produced by new ways of thinking, building and retaining trust when taking risks, and helping others find their roles and authority as disruptive innovations emerge. Phelan does not often refer to second order and deep change found in the organizational change literature nor does he focus only on first-order changes that do not challenge the mission, role, and vision of the college. He clearly intends, rather, to raise the reader's consciousness to the realities that lie ahead for community colleges as the world changes around them.After laying out his basic arguments and context, Phelan uses the metaphor of sailing--Innovation and Change Strategy Archetype for Innovation and Leading (SAIL) (p. 53)--to set-up the latter chapters of the book which address four issues of innovation and change (or battens, in nautical terms) that include leadership and institutional preparation, assessment, planning, execution, and evaluation. When applied effectively, Phelan argues these approaches increase the likelihood of improved change outcomes. …

Dynamics of One-sided Violence in the Civil War in Northern Uganda

The analysis aims at detecting patterns in the use of violence against the civilian population in the Civil War that was fought in the North of Uganda by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an armed group that is known for its atrocities. One-sided violence increased with a decline in popular support and was related to the support of an external patron who influenced the relative military strength. The results of the quantitative analysis indicate that the LRA’s use of violence varied systematically with battle-related activities and was higher after the LRA had to suffer losses in combat.

Stable instability: the Syrian conflict and the postponement of the 2013 Lebanese parliamentary elections

Given the morass of the Syrian civil war and Lebanon’s exposure to the consequences, this article seeks to explore how the intersecting dynamics of Lebanese domestic conflicts and the multiple implications of the bloodbath in Syria have influenced the behaviour of Lebanese political parties in their ongoing struggle over the formulation of a new electoral law, leading to a broad consensus among the country’s parties to postpone the 2013 parliamentary elections. The article argues that, while the usual attempts to profit at the expense of other groups in society are still present and external patrons still wield great influence, the decision to postpone the elections also demonstrates a degree of pragmatism and political development since, despite dire predictions to the contrary, Lebanon has not succumbed to the return of its own civil war. Instead a complex mixture of pragmatism, elision of interests and external influence, combined with local agency, has led Lebanon into a situation of stable instability.

Inside the post-Soviet de facto states: a comparison of attitudes in Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria

In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013–2014, renewed attention has been given to the earlier so-called “frozen conflicts” of the successor states of the Soviet Union. In Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, national conflicts of the early 1990s resulted in establishment of four breakaway regions, the de facto states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorny Karabakh. While the first three are supported by Russia, the latter is supported by Armenia. Such support as well as growing internal legitimacy has enabled these republics to retain separate status for almost 25 years. Though appearing quite similar from an external perspective, the populations of the de facto states are quite diverse in composition, geopolitical preferences, and support for political institutions and persons. Large representative public opinion surveys conducted by the authors in 2010–2011 in the four de facto states allow a deeper comprehension of internal political and social dynamics. Three main dimensions of their current status and orientation (relations with Russia, support for local institutions, and possibilities of post-war reconciliation) are examined using nine key comparative questions. Nationality is the main predictor of divergent opinions within the republics, and results are reported along this dimension. Close relations with the external patron, support for the legitimacy and identity of the respective de facto republics, and little interest in returning to the parent state testify to the longevity and successful promotion of state and nation in the de facto republics in the Caucasus-Black Sea Region.

Why the Saudi Arabian Defence Binge?

:Saudi Arabia is one of the most proliferate military spenders in the world, and this article assesses the multiple reasons for Saudi Arabian defence spending. Possible motives include arming against external threats, buying internal loyalty, gaining national prestige, and soliciting support from important external patrons, especially the United States. The article argues that while Saudi Arabia does seek to improve its military capability through increased defence spending, and gain prestige and internal support, the most significant reason for the increased investment for arms sales is to gain political support in the United States, as Saudi military money preserves some defence sector jobs in the American defence industry, potentially replacing American employment that would otherwise drop because of expected US defence budget reductions. By contributing in a small but targeted way to the American economy, Saudi Arabia can try to leverage American support for its security and foreign policy requirements.

Interstate Relations, Perceptions, and Power Balance: Explaining China’s Policies Toward Ethnic Groups, 1949–1965

Why do multi-ethnic states treat various ethnic groups differently? How do ethnic groups respond to these state policies? We argue that interstate relations and ethnic group perceptions about the relative strength of competing states are important—but neglected—factors in accounting for the variation in state-ethnic group relations. In particular, whether an ethnic group is perceived as having an external patron matters a great deal for the host state's treatment of the group. If the external patron of the ethnic group is an enemy of the host state, then repression is likely. If it is an ally, then accommodation ensues. Given the existence of an external patron, an ethnic group's response to a host state's policies depends on the perceptions about the relative strength of the external patron vis-à-vis the host state and whether the support is originating from an enemy or an ally of the host state. We present five configurations and illustrate our theoretical framework on the eighteen largest ethnic groups in China from 1949 to 1965, tracing the Chinese government's policies toward these groups, and examine how each group responded to these various nation-building policies.

The Arab Spring: last episode of the Cold War

Using the Regional Security Complex Theory and developing its regime-related dimension, this article analyses the involvement of external powers in Arab Spring conflicts. Libya, Syria and Bahrain are used as case studies showing that Western support for the incumbent regime or for its adversaries was not based on a choice between democracy and authoritarianism. Rather, it was motivated by a pattern of amity and enmity inherited from the Cold War period. The surprising survival of this pattern was due to the three authoritarian regimes’ inability to reform; to the ensuing preservation of their Cold War era perception in the West; and to Russia's new availability as an external patron. Consequently, the article argues that the Arab Spring can be perceived as the last, belated episode of the Cold War. However, its political consequences put an end to the last features inherited from the pre-1989 period and open a new Middle Eastern era.