Alliance-Building in Post-War Europe: Lessons for Russia

Abstract

Although great powers may forge ad hoc coalitions to attain their short-term goals, this does not diminish the role of long-term strategic alliances. The alliance theory has long become a separate strand of IR. However, most scholars have focused more on external rather than internal threats to account for alliance choices. The authors review the existing literature on the formation of alliances and, shifting the focus to the struggle for power between internal political actors, propose a theory that explains the formation of asymmetric alliances. By extending support to friendly political groups, great powers can build alliances with those countries where the elites are facing formidable opponents. On the contrary, leaders who rule unchallenged have little incentive to rely on external patrons. The article examines the cases of postwar Italy and Yugoslavia to test the proposed hypotheses. The conclusions drawn from the analysis help formulate recommendations that can be used by Russia in its current strategic environment.