In this scholarly exploration, we delve into the intricate interplay between political dynamics and legal decision-making within the context of Pakistan. Our analysis draws inspiration from Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic theory of democracy, which posits that inherent conflicts (antagonisms) are an essential dimension of the political landscape. These conflicts, while requiring tempering for the functioning of a pluralist democracy, remain unalienable and ever-present. Within the juridical domain, judges occupy a unique position. Cloaked in legal form, their pronouncements extend beyond mere legal interpretations. Instead, they adjudicate individual instances of ongoing collective conflicts—pitting workers against employers, consumers against traders, tenants against landlords, and moral progressives against traditionalists. These decisions, seemingly juridical, are inherently political. Judges wield a “relative sovereignty,” navigating institutional imperatives while being influenced by ideological currents. However, legal determinacy remains relative. Judges, through rigorous interpretive work, can diverge from prima facie interpretations. The collective conflicts, once juridified, crystallize into temporary hegemonic fixations. Our critical legal scholarship endeavors to destabilize these hegemonies in pursuit of justice. This task necessitates not only external critique but also internal scrutiny. We propose evaluating judicial decisions by considering all plausible alternatives, weighing conflicting interests and ideologies. In summary, our examination underscores the dual nature of judicial decisions—simultaneously juridical and political. By embracing this complexity, we contribute to a nuanced understanding of legal reform processes in Pakistan, advocating for justice beyond mere legal formalism.
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