External CEOs Research Articles

Internal versus external CEO hires: key differences

PurposeHistorically, most CEOs were promoted from within the organization. The internal candidates offer continuity, are well known to the Board, and have deep institutional knowledge. However, if the Board is seeking changes to the firm’s strategy, operations, or culture, they turn to outside candidates with proven track records. Shareholders react positively to the announcement of an external successor but the longer-term evidence on the performance front is mixed. Most empirical studies have tended to focus on a narrow aspect of the hiring choice, whereas we undertake a more holistic examination involving various elements.Design/methodology/approachWe consider the salience of the CEO hiring choice from several perspectives: educational background, gender, compensation, and firm performance. We use a propensity score matching approach to ensure comparability between internally promoted and externally hired CEOs. The observed covariates for the matching algorithm include firm size, CEO tenure, and industry sector.FindingsWe find that external CEOs are significantly more likely to have received their undergraduate degree from an elite institution, majored in a STEM discipline, and earned an MBA credential. They earn higher total compensation (with a higher proportion of equity-linked performance pay) but do not outperform in terms of the ROA or Tobin’s Q metrics. Gender does not appear to play a distinguishing role in the internal versus external hiring choice. We also do not detect significant differences in firm performance outcomes associated with educational pedigree, a STEM education, or an MBA credential, whether the CEO is internally promoted or hired externally.Originality/valueOur paper contributes by providing novel evidence on the impact of educational background on external CEO hiring decisions. Our findings carry implications for testing hypotheses stemming from signaling theory and exploring the significant role of social networks associated with elite educational institutions. Also, the finding that externally appointed CEOs do not outperform their internally promoted counterparts may be noteworthy for corporate boards' hiring committees, especially when reviewing candidates who are edge cases.

Do External Founder CEOs Put a Strategic Emphasis on Innovation? An Imprinting Perspective

Do External Founder CEOs Put a Strategic Emphasis on Innovation? An Imprinting Perspective

A study of big bath practices in the Egyptian capital market: an emphasis on CEO turnover and origin

Purpose This study aims to investigate how major big bath accounting practices and CEO turnover in Egypt relate to one another, as well as the first to use the CEO’s origin as a moderating factor. Design/methodology/approach This study uses 10-year longitudinal data from 2012 to 2021 and 290 firm-year observations from Egypt’s listed nonfinancial firms that witnessed CEO turnover to identify the significant big bath accounting practices in Egyptian businesses after the Egyptian revolution and the COVID-19 pandemic. Using fixed and random effect models, the authors investigate the impact of CEO turnover on company earnings during the first year of a newly appointed CEO as an indicator of big bath practices after controlling CEO gender, experience, firm size, leverage, return on assets, return on equity and industry. The hypotheses were investigated using static panel data. Findings The results show the presence of big bath practices in the Egyptian market. Furthermore, big bath accounting practices are positively correlated with CEO turnover. Moreover, the results indicate that big bath accounting practices are only endured when external CEOs are employed, rather than internal ones. Research limitations/implications The sample size and availability of data are the main research limitations. In addition, this study only examined CEO turnover and CEO origin as moderators in big bath accounting. Thus, future research may consider other CEO characteristics and political factors associated with big bath practices. Practical implications The findings from this study offer valuable insights to investors and regulators for effective decision-making and governance practices within the Egyptian capital market, while also contributing to a more informed approach to emerging markets on a global scale. Originality/value The findings contribute to the big-bath and CEO turnover and origin literature by showing a lower ceiling for earnings manipulation and using Egypt as a case study due to its unique institutional environment.

CEO succession and auditor going concern decisions: An analysis of outsider CEOs and generalist skills

This study shows how external CEO succession can mitigate external auditors’ propensity to issue a going concern opinion (GCO) in financially distressed firms, particularly when the outsider CEO possesses higher generalist skills relative to the outgoing CEO. We show that our findings are unlikely to be driven by factors such as pre-succession restructuring, institutional ownership, and board quality that could trigger strategic changes and the appointment of an outsider CEO. Further, we provide evidence to rule out the possibility of our results being influenced by self-selection or omitted variables biases. We also find that the ability of outsider CEOs to mitigate going concern opinions in their appointment year significantly contributes to the subsequent improvements in the financial performance of distressed firms. Further tests on some mechanisms through which new external CEOs can reduce the likelihood of going concern opinions show that firms with such CEO appointees are more likely to reduce dividends and labor costs, issue equity, and reduce product similarity of prospector firms relative to their peers.

Managerial Labor Market Mobility and Corporate Social Responsibility

ABSTRACT The staggered rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) by state courts increases the mobility of both managerial and rank-and-file employee labor markets. Flammer and Kacperczyk (2019) report a positive impact of the IDD rejection on firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) and interpret the finding as managers using CSR to retain employees. We propose and test managerial incentives to grow their external employment potential as another explanation. We find that the IDD rejection impact is stronger when industry firms are more likely to hire external CEOs and when external tournament prizes are greater, and weaker when CEOs are held up by unvested equity grants and when governance control is stronger. We fail to find that the IDD rejection effect varies with employee incentives. We further find that CSR investment does help CEOs obtain sought-after personal benefits by increasing their total pay and the likelihood of landing a new executive position. JEL Classifications: J44; J62; M14.

The role of national context in the relationship between founder CEO and IPO performance

PurposeAlthough founders are often replaced with external CEOs prior to firms making IPOs, firms that do retain founder CEOs generally perform better at IPO. However, this relationship may be contingent upon context. This study aims to investigate how national context influences the relationship between a founder CEO and IPO long-run performance. The authors hypothesize that founder-CEOs will perform better in IPO firms in countries where managerial discretion, future orientation, and the level of conformity to professionalize management are high, and uncertainty avoidance is low.Design/methodology/approachUsing insights from the upper echelon and institutional theory, the authors used hierarchical linear modeling to analyze over 1,000 firms across eight countries.FindingsFounder CEOs perform best in IPO firms in a national context where managerial discretion is low, uncertainty avoidance is high and the level of conformity is high.Originality/valueThis study contributes to a growing area of cross-national IPO research in management by investigating the relationship between culture, management and IPO performance.

Internal or External CEO: Which Is Financially Sounder?

CEO origin and CEO compensation and their impact on firm financial performance have gained equally significant traction amongst strategy scholars and management practitioners. Research is unequivocal about externally headhunted CEOs being compensated higher than internally promoted CEOs; however, results are mixed on whether externally headhunted CEOs generate higher financial performance than internally promoted executives do. In this paper, we find that while external CEOs total compensation is higher than their internally promoted counterparts, their basic salary is not. We also find that the CEO origin moderates the relationship between total compensation and firm’s ROA in that internally promoted CEOs strengthen this positive relationship while externally headhunted CEOs weaken this relationship. Moreover, the firm size (small, medium, large) moderates the previous moderation. Firm size (small, medium, large) moderates the previous moderation relationship. The general moderated relationship is negative and significant for smaller and medium size, while it is positive but statistically insignificant for larger organizations. The effect of this moderated moderation relationship is stronger for internally promoted CEOs, while it is statistically insignificant for externally headhunted CEOs.

CEO pay and family firm heterogeneity: A behavioral agency model perspective

We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm’s generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay, showing also less pay disparity between the CEO and other top executives. We also find that multi-generational family firms and those run by non-family CEOs offer higher total and variable CEO pay and present high pay disparity. The BAM and family’s aversion to socioemotional wealth loss can explain the effects of family control based on the pursuing of non-financial family goals. The decline of these goals derived from the aging of the firm and the hiring of external CEOs shape family control and should be considered in the design of executive compensation policies and by external parties when assessing their suitability. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G30; G32; G34; G38

The Role of National Context in the Relationship Between Founder CEO and IPO Performance

Although founders are often replaced with external CEOs prior to firms making IPOs, firms that do retain founder CEOs generally perform better at IPO. However, this relationship may be contingent upon context. This study investigates how national context influences the relationship between a founder CEO and IPO long-run performance. We hypothesize that founder-CEOs will perform better in IPO firms in countries where managerial discretion, future orientation, and level of conformity to professionalize management are high, and uncertainty avoidance is low. Using insights from the upper echelon and the institutional theory and utilizing hierarchical linear modeling to analyze over 1,000 firms, we find that founder CEOs perform best in IPO firms in a national context where managerial discretion is low, uncertainty avoidance is high, and level of conformity is high. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Executive Compensation Contracts in the Presence of Adverse Selection

We develop three complementary tests to examine how adverse selection affects the design of executive compensation contracts: First, we show that externally-hired CEOs receive higher total pay and have fewer equity incentives relative to internally-promoted CEOs, consistent with their ability to extract larger information rents due to greater private information. These differences are more pronounced when less is known about the prospective CEO, but quickly dissipate over time. Second, we show that external CEOs’ initial contracts differ more from those of their firm’s incumbent senior managers than do those of internal CEOs—particularly in terms of accounting performance metrics and equity-based pay, in line with the use of these features to elicit private information. Third, we find that following an unanticipated change in option vesting schedules prompted by SFAS 123R, newly appointed executives do not increase their option exercises and share sales—despite their newfound ability to do so—while longer-tenured executives do, consistent with contracts initially being designed to screen for certain types of managers before shifting to encourage certain behaviors. Combined, our evidence supports the distinct role of adverse selection in the design of executive compensation contracts.

Charitable inclination and the chief executive officer's pay package

AbstractUsing chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) lifetime nonemployment experience in prominent charitable organizations to create a proxy for CEO charitable inclination, I find that charitably inclined CEOs receive a significant pay premium. The pay premium sensitivity to CEO charitable inclination is particularly pronounced for male, external, and specialist CEOs who are employed at firms that are undiversified, larger, less debt reliant, poor performing, facing high product‐market competition, and that keep nonmanipulative financial statements and demonstrate high inclination to social responsibility in the area of diversity, employee relations, and internal governance. This research contributes to the broader debate on labor market pricing of CEO characteristics.

The Impact of Strategic Change on Corporate Misconduct: A Situation-Specific Governance Approach

Firms undergo major strategic changes to realign their operations according to changing internal and external conditions. In this context, we examine the impact of the magnitude of strategic change on the likelihood of corporate misconduct as a severe negative consequence of firms’ strategic change activities. Building on the fraud triangle, we analyze how the three elements of motivation, opportunity, and rationalization simultaneously increase during times of strategic change. We use a matched-pairs design methodology (with 217 fraud cases identified through security class action lawsuits of listed U.S. organizations) and find a positive relationship between the magnitude of strategic change and the likelihood of corporate misconduct. However, this likelihood decreases with larger board sizes and a higher proportion of external CEOs as outside directors. The moderating effects identified in this study path the way towards situation-specific governance mechanisms that increase the board’s monitoring effectivity during unstable times, such as strategic change. The findings contribute to an enhanced understanding of specific situations in which firms require additional monitoring efforts to prevent increased risks of corporate misconduct.

Does religion enhance firm performance? Evidence from private firms in China

We study the impact of religiosity on firm performance in China. We find that entrepreneurs with religious beliefs have higher accounting performance. Firms are more likely to obtain bank credit if entrepreneurs have religious beliefs as religiosity stimulate them to invest more in networking, which further enhance the access to bank credit. Religious entrepreneurs have more trust towards external people, which incentivizes them to adopt a shareholding reform and employ external professional CEOs instead of family members, and thus enhances the corporate governance of these firms. In contrast, religious entrepreneurs also prefer family members as shareholders and inheritance of the firm by family members. The preference of inheritance of the firm by family members undermines the enhancing effect of external CEOs on firm performance. Religious entrepreneurs are more likely to spend more on safety insurance for employees, which is driven by the altruism originated from religious doctrines and also the risk aversion channel. The impact of religiosity complements market institutions, and political and social status of the entrepreneurs, which shows the interaction between religion and formal market institutions. We find that it's mainly Buddhism that drives our results, while other religions have limited impact on business activities in the country.

CEO Power and Board Dynamics

We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find board independence increases at CEO turnover and falls with CEO tenure, with the decline stronger following superior performance. CEOs are also more likely to be appointed board chair as tenure increases, and we find evidence consistent with a substitution between board independence and chair duality. Other results suggest that these classes of models fail to capture important elements of board dynamics. First, the magnitude of the CEO tenure effect is economically small, much smaller for example than the strong persistence in board structure that we document. Second, when external CEOs are hired, board independence falls and subsequently increases. Third, event studies document a positive market reaction when powerful CEOs die in office, consistent with powerful CEOs becoming entrenched.

CEO-board dynamics

We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find board independence increases at CEO turnover and falls with CEO tenure, with the decline stronger following superior performance. CEOs are also more likely to be appointed board chair as tenure increases, and we find evidence consistent with a substitution between board independence and chair duality. Other results suggest that these classes of models fail to capture important elements of board dynamics. First, the magnitude of the CEO tenure effect is economically small, much smaller, for example, than the strong persistence in board structure that we show. Second, when external CEOs are hired, board independence falls and subsequently increases. Third, event studies show a positive market reaction when powerful CEOs die in office, consistent with powerful CEOs becoming entrenched.

Inducement grants, hiring announcements, and adverse selection for new CEOs

We examine how adverse selection problems when hiring new external CEOs affect contractual features of inducement grants. Focusing on the sensitivity of inducement grants to the new CEO announcement return ($Sensitivity), we find that firms provide inducement grants that are more sensitive to the new CEO announcement return when information asymmetry about the new CEO is more severe and the costs of adverse selection problems are higher. We also find a positive relation between the market reaction to the appointment and $Sensitivity. We consider factors that reduce information asymmetry (e.g., engaging a search firm or appointing internal CEOs) and find they are associated with lower sensitivity of the inducement grant to the announcement.

Firm age and the probability of product innovation. Do CEO tenure and product tenure matter?

This paper examines the influence that the age of a firm has on the probability of product innovation by taking into account two factors: the role of the CEO’s tenure and the lifecycle of the last product introduced. In a sample of Italian manufacturing firms (n = 2163), analysis reveals that the new entrants’ high innovative activity is mainly driven by the new CEO’s innovation propensity, which is strictly dependent on his tenure. Likewise, the lower innovation activity observed in mature firms is mostly explained by the dynamics of the product’s lifecycle and the CEO’s tenure. More generally, the existence of a negative relationship between innovation and firm age is questioned, as controlling for time-related variables that overlap during the company’s lifecycle —product age and CEO’s tenure — turns the relationship positive. Finally, the innovative behavior of incumbent companies turns out to be dependent on the renewal abilities of newly appointed external CEOs, whereas CEOs from within the family play a minor role.

A Contingent Perspective on Management Accounting Systems in Family Firms

This study analyzes both theoretically and empirically management accounting system choices in family firms with family CEOs in comparison to non-family firms and family firms with external CEOs. After theorizing differences with regard to both decision-facilitating (timeliness of management accounting information) and decision-influencing (objective performance evaluation, target specificity, target deviation tolerance) management controls, I argue that family CEOs with a propensity for technocratic decision making are better capable of balancing family and business perspectives. This implies that technocratic decision making weakens the family effect on management accounting system choices. Drawing on a dataset of 190 Austrian small and medium-sized firms from the manufacturing industry the results indicate idiosyncratic behavior of family firms in terms of management accounting system choices. Furthermore, the results corroborate the hypothesis that technocratic decision making moderates the family effect on management accounting systems. Finally, I also conduct an exploratory performance analysis to shed more light on the performance effects of management accounting systems in family firms. The findings indicate that only timeliness of management accounting information displays a significant positive effect while the decision-influencing management controls are not related to firm performance.

Does the origin of a succession CEO matter in the market value of innovation? Disentangling the origin of internal CEOs

AbstractThis study complements previous research regarding CEO origin and family businesses by incorporating upper echelons theory with the perspective of family effect as well as disentangling CEO origin to provide a better understanding of how external, unrelated internal, and family succession CEOs affect innovation performance. We further reveal how a family founder helps improve the value of innovations undertaken by family heirs. The results show that firms with unrelated internal succession CEOs experience higher (lower) stock market reactions to innovation announcements than those with family (external) succession CEOs. Founders serving on the board reduce the negative effect between family heirs and innovation performance. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Can non-CEO inside directors add value? Evidence from unplanned CEO turnovers

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the roles of non-CEO inside directors (NCIDs) in the new CEO-firm matching process using the context of unplanned CEO departures when immediate CEO succession planning becomes a sole board responsibility. Although critics argue that inside directors decrease the monitoring effectiveness of a board, inside directors arguably possess superior firm-specific experience and knowledge that can be beneficial during the leadership transition. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a comprehensive, manually collected data set of unplanned CEO departures from 1993 to 2012. Findings The authors find that NCIDs play an important role in the CEO transitioning process. They help firms identify qualified inside replacements and provide stability as the new permanent or interim CEO. In addition, NCIDs facilitate the transfer of information and help the new external CEOs succeed. They show that the longer the NCID stays with the company, the longer the tenure of the new CEO. They also document that the presence of NCIDs improves operating and stock performance; especially when the new CEO is hired from outside of the firm. Practical implications The impact of NCIDs is particularly important when the firm hires an outsider as the new CEO. These results suggest that board composition affects frictions in the CEO labor market. Originality/value The literature has predominantly focused on the downside of having inside directors. Too many inside directors on a firm’s board is often associated with ineffective boards and entrenchment. To the contrary, the authors focus on a potential benefit of having inside directors.