CEO succession and auditor going concern decisions: An analysis of outsider CEOs and generalist skills

Abstract

This study shows how external CEO succession can mitigate external auditors’ propensity to issue a going concern opinion (GCO) in financially distressed firms, particularly when the outsider CEO possesses higher generalist skills relative to the outgoing CEO. We show that our findings are unlikely to be driven by factors such as pre-succession restructuring, institutional ownership, and board quality that could trigger strategic changes and the appointment of an outsider CEO. Further, we provide evidence to rule out the possibility of our results being influenced by self-selection or omitted variables biases. We also find that the ability of outsider CEOs to mitigate going concern opinions in their appointment year significantly contributes to the subsequent improvements in the financial performance of distressed firms. Further tests on some mechanisms through which new external CEOs can reduce the likelihood of going concern opinions show that firms with such CEO appointees are more likely to reduce dividends and labor costs, issue equity, and reduce product similarity of prospector firms relative to their peers.