Extent Of Policy Change Research Articles

A Reform Dilemma in polarized democracies

Abstract We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently. We identify a so-called Reform Dilemma, which manifests itself in two variants. From a static perspective, low-reform-ability politicians are elected when political parties are polarized, who then impose high costs on citizens for each reform step. This property of elections arises as low reform ability is a substitute for policy commitment. From a dynamic perspective, incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re-elected regardless of their reform ability.

A Reform Dilemma in polarized democracies

We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently. We identify a so-called Reform Dilemma, which manifests itself in two variants. From a static perspective, low-reform-ability politicians are elected when political parties are polarized, who then impose high costs on citizens for each reform step. This property of elections arises as low reform ability is a substitute for policy commitment. From a dynamic perspective, incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re-elected regardless of their reform ability.

A Reform Dilemma in Polarized Democracies

We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in polarized democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently. We identify a so-called Reform Dilemma, which manifests itself in two variants. From a static perspective, low-reform-ability politicians may be elected, who impose high costs on citizens for each reform step. From a dynamic perspective, incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social Need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re-elected regardless of their Reform ability. In general, both manifestations of the Reform Dilemma are more pronounced when political parties’ positions are polarized. Furthermore, the existence of the Reform Dilemma is independent of the exact point in time when the abilities of candidates reveal themselves and become common knowledge.

Evaluating the transition to sustainable forest management in Ontario’s Crown Forest Sustainability Act and forest management planning manuals from 1994 to 2009

The purpose of the paper is to analyse the extent of policy change and learning in the 20 years following the implementation of Ontario’s forest sustainability legislation. Extent of policy learning and change towards sustainable forest management are measured using a combination of content, co-occurrence, and textual analysis of the previous Crown Timber Act and the new Crown Forest Sustainability Act, as well as the latter’s 1996 and 2009 forest planning manuals. There were four key findings. First, policy change towards sustainable forest management has been limited. Second, although there was an increased number of values mentioned in new legislation and planning manuals, the frequency of timber values remained dominant. Third, although integration occurred among a greater range of values, integration with timber values continued to dominate. Fourth, with respect to policy learning, the achievement of sustainable forest management is now explicit and judged based on evidence regarding the inclusion of a range of values beyond timber. The paper concludes that the transition to the more integrative and responsive policies of sustainable forest management remains a work in progress.

Crisis and Welfare State Change in the Netherlands

AbstractThe current economic crisis is assumed to create new pressures for the welfare state. In this article we investigate to what extent the crisis leads to changes in Dutch welfare state policies and institutions. Usually these changes are operationalized in terms of retrenchment (cost reduction) or restructuring (institutions). We focus, however, on developments in social rights in the hope of gaining better insight into the content and extent of policy change. This perspective combines attention for costs and institutional structure with attention for the content and substance of social rights. We start by analyzing the development of social rights in the Dutch welfare state as a reaction to the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, we will analyze current perceptions of social risks and social rights as well as how we think these perceptions will be affected by the pressures brought on by the economic crisis of 2008–09. Using an institutional perspective, we examine the consequences of the current economic crisis for perceptions of social citizenship and entitlement to social risk protection within the welfare state.

The Influence of Values on Consensus and Contentious Morality Policy: U.S. Death Penalty Reform, 1956-82

We know that policy makers respond more directly to citizen values on morality policy than on nonmorality policy (Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; Mooney and Lee 1995), but how is their response different when morality policy is favored by a clear majority (consensus policy) than when public opinion is more closely divided (contentious policy) (Meier n.d.)? Which values and whose values are responded to under each of these conditions? To address these questions, we conduct an event history analysis on the adoption of two states' death penalty reforms within very different public opinion contexts: the abolition of the death penalty (1956-71), and its reestablishment in the 11 years after Furman v. Georgia (1972). We find that when public opinion is closely divided on a morality policy issue, policy makers follow its contours closely, to the exclusion of most other influences. But when public opinion is one-sided, political elite ideology has almost exclusive influence on the timing and extent of policy change.

From theory into practice? Restructuring and dynamism in transition economies

This paper draws on microeconomic, industry-level, and macroeconomic evidence to investigate the mechanisms of enterprise restructuring in transition economies, its outcomes in terms of industry-level export performance, and its interaction with macroeconomic policy and constraints. The aim is to throw light on the process by which catch-up is taking place in the leading transition economies. We begin at the micro level and find that institutional changes have produced improvements in performance more or less in line with theoretical predictions. Variation in the extent of policy changes helps to account for cross-country differences in restructuring behaviour. In the leading transition countries where growth has been under way for a number of years, many features of the enterprise sector differentiate it from that of an advanced market economy. To measure the extent of catch-up associated with the reforms, use is made of detailed information about the quality of goods traded on the EU market. In the final section, the inclusion of macroeconomic constraints allows distinctive transition paths to catching up in the Visegrad countries to be identified.

The Structure of Privatization Plans

In recent years a vast transfer of state-owned assets to the private sector has taken place in many countries, irrespective of their level of development or the political affiliation of their government. Privatization is believed to improve economic incentives; attract managerial and technological resources from the private sector; broaden share ownership; and reduce public sector borrowing. In fact, privatization can be interpreted as an alternative form of public financing, a sort of equity financing to reduce the overhang of public debt, as the budget gains from the higher value of the firm under private ownership. In fact, the historical evidence indicates that state-owned enterprises have systematically drained public resources rather than contributed earnings, particularly in the Third World. We document strong regularities in privatization programs across several countries. The data indicate a predominance of partial, staggered sales. Even though transfer of control typically takes place rapidly, governments tend to retain a significant stake for long intervals of time. The paper also examines the traditional argument for gradual sales, namely limited market capacity, with a confidence-building rationale. Even after privatization restrains government interference, a firm is still exposed to the risk of adverse policy changes, particularly when it operates in a monopolistic market. A selling government will face investors' diffidence about its policy intentions after the sale; it may therefore structure the sale as to build policy credibility and maximize proceeds. To enhance investors' confidence, a selling government may signal commitment to current policy by retaining a stake in the firm for some time (while transferring managerial control), thus showing willingness to bear some financial cost of policy changes; as time passes,without a policy reversal, confidence and thus sale prices improve. In addition, early sales,may be deliberately underpriced in order to convince the market to absorb larger sales, which reduce the risk born by the government and therefore enhance policy risk. While the two explanations have similar empirical implications, our informal evaluation of the evidence appears more favorable to the reputation-building hypothesis than to the notion of temporary market capacity constraints. Presumably, the risk and the extent of policy change is largest for monopolistic industries or firms in protected markets, while firms operating in competitive markets are less subject to the threat of quasi rent appropriation. We find evidence that firms in such policy-sensitive sectors tend to be privatized with smaller initial sales and larger underpricing, and possibly requiring a longer time horizon before the share retained by the government can be sold. Complete sales are on average associated with manufacturing firms in competitive markets, while sales of utilities with potential monopolistic rents are more distributed over time. We document that retained stakes are explicitly meant to be sold gradually over a few years. Often, stakes in several firms are sold simultaneously, creating considerable government risk sharing across industries. The profile of privatization proceeds increases over time, suggesting gradual selling calibrated to build investors confidence. As policy credibility increases, larger initial sales become more frequent. We also document extensive underpricing, which is on average greater in privatization sales than in initial public offerings (IPO) of private firms. Underpricing appear to be largest for firms with large taxable rents, such as utilities. This is consistent with a signalling argument, since these firms are exposed to greater policy risk, and inconsistent with an asymmetric information explanation over asset values, since these firms tend to be large and well known relative to private IPOs.

The Political Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia

Research Article| September 01 1989 The Political Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia M. Hadi Soesastro M. Hadi Soesastro Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1960) 29 (9): 853–869. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644831 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation M. Hadi Soesastro; The Political Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia. Far Eastern Survey 1 September 1960; 29 (9): 853–869. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2644831 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1989 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.