Anti-pastoralism policies are outdated--hence the word 'still' in the title. Apart from the important moral and political considerations, they are now outdated on economic grounds. There is an emerging consensus among scholars and practitioners concerned with range management and livestock production that in most of the world's dry belt, mountainous areas and tundra, reliable food production depends on mobile livestock-keeping (for a global overview, see Khazanov and Schlee 2012). All healthy pastoral systems include dry-season grazing reserves. These are relatively small areas of higher fertility that could also allow some crop farming. However, to take these areas out of pastoralist production and dedicate them solely to other uses would damage the pastoral system to an extent that would exceed the benefits of those other uses. If the output of the overall economy is the aim- which, unfortunately, might not be the case, as is suggested below--then, in such eases, the alienation of lands from pastoralist production has a negative economic output and should therefore be avoided. This case is convincingly made by several scholars in the recently published collection Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins (Catley et al. 2013), such as Roy Behnke and Carol Kerven ('Counting the Costs: Replacing Pastoralism with Irrigated Agriculture in the Awash Valley'), John Galaty ('Land Grabbing in the Eastern African Rangelands') and Mustafa Babiker ('Mobile Pastoralism and Land Grabbing in the Sudan: Impacts and Responses'). This position paper has grown out of a comment on that volume. Behnke and Kerven find that large-scale, irrigated cotton or sugar cane production yields less per hectare than simply leaving the land to the pastoralists, not even counting the losses of surface suitable for any kind of crop or fodder production caused by forms of irrigation that lead to increased soil salinity. Galaty compares the revenues from extensive livestock production favourably to those from a number of alternative uses, including hunting concessions and photosafaris. To some extent, these other uses need not exclude pastoralism, because, with a bit more good will and organization, wildlife, tourism and extensive pastoralism can be made to coexist, and the income from various activities could then be combined when calculating the productivity of a region. While Babiker gives no figures to compare the income derived from the transition to mechanized crop production with the losses that this process entails to pastoral production, his discussion of the negative impact that this transition has on pastoralists and the wider society suggests that the losses caused by this kind of development exceed the gains--or at least diminish them considerably. The costs include the following: hostility between pastoralists and large farmers (a 'security' issue, which, like all such issues, also has a financial side); decline of the remaining, congested rangelands; high costs of supplementary fodder, a factor that squeezes out small herd owners; and intensive litigation about 'trespassing', caused by the expansion of agriculture into long-established but no longer properly enforced livestock corridors, which, after having been reduced from grazing areas to mere routes, are now often blocked completely by cultivated fields. With unintended irony, one of Babiker's sources speaks of 'the encroachment of herding on croplands', while historically the encroachment has, of course, happened the other way round (Babiker 2013: 179). On the side of benefits, Babiker lists only the enrichment of 'a few well-connected elites whose livelihoods are already secure' (ibid.: 177). In their introduction, the editors of the volume ask 'why [do] governments seek to replace pastoralism with alternative land uses?'--and answer, 'An important reason is the interest of governments in raising tax revenue and, more generally, to exert greater control over economic and political life at the margins. …