Expressive Voting Research Articles

What Leads to Voting Despite Intention to Abstain?: Emotions, Turnout, and Negative Campaigns in Turkish Elections

Abstract This article sheds light on the factors that pave the way from voter abstention to voter turnout based on extensive research of tweets on national and local elections in Turkey. We find that the negative campaign strategy of the incumbent and the fact that the campaigning process has taken place on a very uneven playing field have triggered a set of emotions, primarily moral outrage and anger among the electorate, which have the power to change voting patterns in a significant way. The effect of negative campaigning on expressive voting was further enhanced by the pulling effect of the candidates and their public supporters and endorsements. We found that other, competing explanations of political outcomes are secondary to the mechanisms above.

Voters’ influence on local tax policy

In a well-functioning democracy, citizens can influence public policy through voting. By voting prospectively, voters may aim to select politicians that make policies in line with their preferences, and, by voting retrospectively, they may reward or punish politicians for their performance. To what extent voters actually influence policy is unclear, especially in local government, where many impediments to policy responsiveness may exist. Moreover, voters may realize that their influence on public policy is negligible and vote expressively instead of instrumentally. We investigate a key area in public policy, tax policy, using panel data on municipalities in the Netherlands in the period 1998–2021. We find that changes in the political color of the municipal council on average do not lead to changes in tax levels or tax distribution. However, incumbents that lower taxes fare better at the polls than incumbents that moderately increase taxes. Interestingly, strong tax increases do not lead to more severe electoral punishment, and punishment does not seem to differ between left-wing and right-wing incumbents. Our results suggest that expressive voting plays an important role. People may vote left-wing and express their identity as charitable persons, and then punish incumbents who actually raise taxes.

Costly expressive voting

We incorporate expressive utility into Börgers’ (2004) canonical symmetric model of costly voting. It is shown that, under reasonable conditions, there exist two types of Bayesian Equilibria, those in which voters vote instrumentally and those in which they vote expressively. We show that equilibria in which voting is expressive is characterized by higher turnout and higher welfare. It is also shown that, in contrast to Borgers, when voting is expressive, turnout is too low.

The Right to Expressive Voting Methods

The Right to Expressive Voting Methods

The expressive power of voting rules

Different voting rules are commonly used to settle collective decisions. A promising way to assess voting rules, for which little is known, is to compare the expressive utility that voters derive from voting with each rule. In this paper, we first propose a simple ordinal model of expressive voting that allows us to compare voting rules in terms of the expressive utility that voters can derive from voting (their expressive power). Our model provides a novel testable implication according to which expected turnout increases with expressive power. We then ran an online experiment testing this implication in a controlled environment. We find that if voters are made aware of alternative voting rules, turnout is higher in voting rules with higher expressive power. Our results also show that higher expressive power is associated with a better representation of voters’ actual preferences and, according to our model, higher expressive utility. This suggests that the expressive power of voting rules is a relevant criterion when choosing between voting rules for economic and political decisions.

Twin peaks: Expressive externality in group participation

AbstractWe introduce a model of group behavior that combines expressive participation with strategic participation. Building on the idea that expressive voting in elections is much like rooting for a sports team, we give applications to both sporting events and elections. In our model there is an expressive externality: an individual enjoys an event more when more of her peers come out to support her preferred party or team. We show that this results in the possibility of “tipping”—that participation may jump up discontinuously when the externality becomes strong enough. We examine the implications for pricing by sports teams and for voter turnout.

Expressive voting versus information avoidance: experimental evidence in the context of climate change mitigation

We theoretically and experimentally investigate the effect of self-serving information avoidance on moral bias in democratic and individual decisions in the context of climate change mitigation. Subjects choose between two allocations that differ in payoffs and contributions to climate change mitigation. We vary the observability of the environmental contribution, as well as the decision context associated with different levels of pivotality. If the contribution is directly observable, we find evidence for lower pivotality leading to higher levels of “green” decisions, as predicted by the low-cost theory of voting. This effect disappears if subjects can avoid information on the contribution. Instead, we find evidence for the exploitation of moral wiggle room via information avoidance in larger democracies as well as in the consumption context. Our results indicate that information avoidance substitutes expressive voting as an instrument to manage cognitive dissonance on the part of the voter. Hence, moral biases in elections might be less likely than previously thought.

Symbolic Shareholder Democracy: Toward a Behavioral Understanding of the Role of Shareholder Voting in CEO Dismissals

We investigate the effect of expressive shareholder dissent voting, in which shareholders use their votes symbolically to express their discontent with management, on subsequent chief executive officer (CEO) dismissals. Using the routine but highly symbolic executive board discharge proposal voted on at the annual shareholder meetings of German firms, we argue that the board of directors understands these votes as a “vote of confidence in management” that challenges the CEO’s mandate to lead the firm. Arguing that board chairs are uniquely positioned to take up the stance of a steward of the firm and its leadership, we examine how independent and family board chairs moderate the board’s response to expressive voting dissent. Using a sample of German public firms over the period 2008–2015, we find that expressive voting dissent increases the chance of CEO dismissal increasingly with the level of dissent expressed. Contrary to prevailing agency theoretical expectations, we do not find that independent chairs are more responsive to expressive voting dissent, nor that this relationship is strengthened by the degree of minority institutional investor ownership of the firm. Consistent with the symbolic perspective on shareholder voting that we seek to develop, however, we find that family chairs are more likely to lead the board to dismiss the CEO due to the intrinsic disvalue they incur from symbolic leadership legitimacy challenges in their firms, and that the positive effect of having a family chair on the dissent induced chance of CEO dismissal is strengthened by the level of family ownership in the firm.Funding: A University of Illinois at Chicago Summer Research Grant is gratefully acknowledged for S. Sauerwald.

Expressive Voting and Irrational Outcomes in Corporate Elections

Over the past three decades, shareholders have steadily been provided with greater voting power over corporate decisions. A great academic debate has arisen about the character and outcomes of the shareholder franchise. All parties to this debate start with the assumption that shareholders will vote rationally, and generally in their economic interests. There is a large empirical literature in political science, however, that finds that where the marginal value of a vote is low, information is processed and votes cast on the basis of strongly held prejudices, tribal loyalty, mood-affiliation, and a desire to flatter the voter’s self-image. In other words, the voter behaves irrationally from the standpoint of the real-world impact of their vote. This article reviews the empirical literature around shareholder voting to show that irrational voting characterizes the corporate franchise as well. Shareholders give their voting rights almost no value and their voting patterns do not reflect the economic performance of the company. Moreover, shareholders vote in ways that contradict their economic views (measured by looking at their trading decisions), and their voting is primarily driven by empirically questionable and deliberately ineffective corporate governance practices. Fortunately, the empirical political science literature provides some direction for reforming the corporate franchise.

Responsible Majorities? How Group Composition Drives Partisan Expressive Voting

Responsible Majorities? How Group Composition Drives Partisan Expressive Voting

Not-so-strategic voters: Evidence from an in situ experiment during the 2017 French presidential election

An experiment carried out in situ during the 2017 French presidential election provides the natural conditions in which to disentangle the motivations of expressive voting and strategic voting as determinants of voters’ choice. Under the two-round plurality rule, when voters vote for a single candidate in the first round, they may wish primarily to express which is their favorite candidate, or, rather, to influence the outcome of the second-round outcome by strategic voting. These two motives may coincide or conflict. We show that insincere strategic voting is relatively low in this context since it represents less than 7% of the votes cast. When the expressive and the strategic motives conflict with each other, i.e., where expression requires giving up any influence on the outcome of the election, we show that voters are twice as likely to eschew strategic voting as to vote strategically.

Why Do We Vote? Evidence on Expressive Voting

Why Do We Vote? Evidence on Expressive Voting

Expressive Voting and Irrational Outcomes in Corporate Elections

Expressive Voting and Irrational Outcomes in Corporate Elections

Counting on my vote not counting: Expressive voting in committees

How do voting institutions affect incentives of committees to vote expressively? We model a committee that chooses whether to approve a proposal that some members may consider ethical. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, and all members pay a cost if the proposal is accepted. Committee members may have different depths of reasoning. Under certain sufficient conditions, the model predicts that features that reduce the probability of a member being pivotal – namely, larger committee size, or a more restrictive voting rule – raise the share of votes in favour of the proposal. A laboratory experiment with a charitable donation framing presents evidence in line with these results. Our structural estimation recovers the distributions of altruistic and expressive preferences, as well as of depth of reasoning, across individuals.

Partisanship as Cause, Not Consequence, of Participation

In most democracies, citizens who identify with a political party are more likely than non-partisans to turn out to vote. But why is this the case? Does voting foster partisanship, as prominent models of political learning and cognitive dissonance postulate? Or does partisanship encourage voting, as expressive voting models and social identity theory suggest? I introduce the concept of partisan duty to capture the role of partisan social identities in the turnout decision and present new empirical tests of the relationship between partisanship and voting. I leverage a unique institutional arrangement in Chile to establish the direction of causality with a regression discontinuity, and I implement a novel survey design with behavioral outcomes to identify causal mechanisms. Data from the US confirm that the main findings generalize beyond Chile. Electoral participation does not generate partisanship. Instead, partisanship mobilizes voters: it increases the expressive benefits to voting and generates a sense of duty to support one’s partisan group.

Populism and the rational choice model: The case of the French National Front

This article proposes a general model of partisan political dealignment based on the theory of expressive voting. It is based on the Riker and Odershook equation. Voters cast a ballot for a political party if the utility associated with expressing their support for it is more than their expressive costs. Expressive utility is modeled here as a certain utility model. Then, the model is applied to the rise of voting support in favor of French right-wing populists, the National Front (FN). We show that the fall of justification costs of FN ideology along with the decline in stigmatization costs of voting in favor of the extreme right has fostered the popularity of this party. Political dealignment here is only a particular case of a general process of political norms transgression inherited by each voter.

Responsible Majorities? How Group Composition Drives Partisan Expressive Voting

Individuals sometimes do not ``vote their beliefs but rather to affirm their partisan affiliation. We design an experiment to determine the conditions under which voters engage in partisan expressive voting. Democrats and Republicans are asked to vote on the answers to factual questions about politics and are rewarded if the majority of their group answers correctly. To evaluate both compositional and audience effects, we vary the number of affected co-partisans and public dissemination of vote totals. We find that voters are more expressive as the numbers of co-partisans in either the population or the voting pool increase, despite the potential costs of such behavior for co-partisans. Our results thus indicate that large majorities will sometimes produce outcomes that all could regret.

The political economy of Vermont’s abortion bill

ABSTRACT Public choice literature divides the rationality of voting between instrumental and expressive. In this paper, we take the Vermont legislature in passing the H. 57 bill as a case to explain some of the determinants of expressive voting empirically. The H.57 bill declares that no government entity can interfere with, or restrict, a consenting individual’s right to abortion care across the entire gestation period. However, the bill has not changed the previously status quo of the state towards abortion rights. Thus, it creates a situation in which we can analyze the legislator’s voting behavior through the lens of an expressive voting framework. We utilize a high dimensional dataset and post-double-selection LASSO method to explain the channels that influence the expressive voting on the H. 57 bill. We web scrape the lower and upper chamber voting data on H.57 bill and use the 2017 American Community Survey 5-year estimates to retrieve 89 different socioeconomic, housing, and demographic characteristics of State Legislative Districts. Our results suggest channels of poverty, gender, and population diversity are some crucial mechanisms.

Expressive voting with booing and cheering: Evidence from Britain

Previous work on Expressive Voting has focused on the desire of voters to express what they are for and thus who they are. But, often also as important, is the desire of voters to express what they are against, and who they are not. In this paper we extend the standard formulation of Expressive Voting to account for this possibility. Using data for the UK we find empirical evidence that the desire to boo has been increasingly important at recent elections. The implications of this for recent trends in political polarization are discussed.

Federal and Subnational Elections in Russia: Coherence and Divergence in Electoral Outcomes

Abstract This article examines the differences between Russian voting at federal elections and regional legislature elections, both combined and conducted independently. The authors analyse these differences, their character and their dynamics as an important characteristic of the nationalisation of the party system. They also test hypotheses about a higher level of oppositional voting and competitiveness in subnational elections, in accordance with the theory of second-order elections, as well as the strategic nature of voting at federal elections, by contrast with expressive voting during subnational campaigns. The empirical study is based on calculating the differences in votes for leading Russian parties at subnational elections and at federal elections (simultaneous, preceding and following) from 2003, when mandatory voting on party lists was widespread among the regions, to 2019. The level of competitiveness is measured in a similar way, by calculating the effective number of parties. The study indicates a low level of autonomy of regional party systems, in many ways caused by the fact that the law made it impossible to create regional parties, and then also by the 2005 ban on creation of regional blocs. The strong connection between federal and regional elections in Russia clearly underlines the fluid and asynchronic nature of its electoral dynamics, where subnational elections typically predetermine the results of the following federal campaigns. At the same time, the formal success of the nationalisation of the party system, achieved by increasing the homogeneity of voting at the 2016 and 2018 federal elections, is not reflected by the opposing process of desynchronisation between federal and regional elections after Putin’s third-term election. There is also a clear rise in the scale of the differences between the two. At the same time, the study demonstrates the potential presence in Russia of features common to subnational elections in many countries: their greater support for the opposition and presence of affective voting. However, there is a clear exception to this trend during the period of maximum mobilisation of the loyal electorate at the subnational elections immediately following the accession of Crimea in 2014–2015, and such tendencies are generally restrained by the conditions of electoral authoritarianism.