is paper has two aims, first, to | analyze the situation in which hu1 man values occur and, second, to suggest certain hypotheses regarding the principles of evaluation. Before proceeding with either aim, however, I would like to say a few words about experience, empirical method, and value theory In the field of value theory it is a thesis of certain logical empiricists that only statements describing what people value or have valued are scientific and empirical. Only descriptive psychological and sociological generalizations or reports are admissible by empirical method, while all other statements, particularly regarding norms, principles of evaluation, the ought or the should be, are merely expressions of private prejudice and have no scientific or empirical standing or validity. The paradox of this position, that it asserts what should be the case in value theory and does not merely describe past or present practice, is obvious enough. But the root of the difficulty, I believe, is different. lies in a faulty conception of experience. According to this view, experience is sensory apprehension. is the awareness of sensory presentations, sense data, or sensa. This conception is combined with the view that all knowledge that is not analytic consists of statements, such as psychological and sociological statements, whose content is reducible to descriptions of what is or has been or, more specifically, to sense data. One elementary defect of this conception, I think, is that it omits the telic structure of experience. conceives experience as mechanical, a mere recording of the given; whereas experience in its major modes is an apprehension of the given in terms of needs, purposes, and goals. The experience of the scientist himself illustrates this. A physicist wishes to make a measurement. Of the thousand and one possible combinations of data that a free sensibility might record when it is directed toward a clock or a measuring rod, the physicist concentrates on one combination, e.g., the positions of the hands of the clock or the incidence points of the ends of the measuring rod. Why? Obviously, because the combination is to his purpose. Similarly, in preparing and conducting an experiment, the physicist sets up and manipulates his object field in terms of an aim. If the aim requires that certain elements appear and operate in the object field and no others, these elements are introduced, arranged, and controlled, so far as possible, as the aim requires. Both in observation and in experiment, experience in science contains ordering purposes and goals, and what is, is caught within a network of oughts and should-bes springing from these telic elements. As a matter of fact, when logical positivists themselves discuss science, they often speak, as in value theory, of oughts and should-bes, of demands and requirements. Thus, Carnap writes: It is a just demand that Science should have not merely subjective interpretation but sense and validity for all subjects who participate in it., Either this statement is merely an expression of private prej-
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