Explanatory Advantages Research Articles

In Defence of Macroidealism

ABSTRACT This paper defends macroidealism: the thesis that physical truths metaphysically depend on truths about the phenomenal experiences of macroscopic subjects. I argue that macroidealism has explanatory advantages over materialism and dualism. I also defend macroidealism from objections relating to illusions, imperceptible phenomena, and the explanation of phenomenal coherence.

Perceiving affordances and the problem of visually indiscernible kinds.

In this study, I defend the claim that we can perceptually experience what objects afford when we engage with objects belonging to natural or artificial categorical high-level kinds. Experiencing affordances perceptually positions us to act in specific ways. The main aim of this study was to argue that this view has explanatory advantages over alternative views. An increasingly popular view within the philosophy of perception, most famously defended by Susanna Siegel, claims that we sometimes visually experience natural and artificial objects as belonging to categorical high-level kinds. When visually experiencing a lemon, one does not only experience its low-level properties such as shape and color, sometimes one also experiences the object as a lemon. A challenge arises when attempting to explain what happens when one experiences an object that is experientially indistinguishable from another object, yet these objects belong to different high-level categorical kinds. For instance, if someone perceptually experiences a lemon as a lemon, her experience can be considered as accurately representing or presenting a lemon. However, if the subject perceptually experiences a lemon-shaped soap bar, which cannot be discriminated from a real lemon by sight alone, the experience is deemed inaccurate because there is no real lemon present. The problem is that such a judgment seems counterintuitive; unlike with hallucinations and illusions, there seems to be nothing wrong with how the object appears. Therefore, it is difficult to understand how the mistake could be a perceptual mistake. I will first present arguments supporting the claim that when we visually encounter objects such as lemons, we sometimes also perceive the affordances of these objects-what they provide or offer us. I will further argue that this perspective on affordances offers a more compelling explanation than other alternative accounts when it comes to our perception of visually indistinguishable objects that nonetheless belong to categorically distinct high-level kinds.

Not a set of norms or a set of practices

ABSTRACT In this paper, we consider the 'eliminativist' character of Hershovitz's non-positivist theory. Focusing on chapter 5 of Law Is A Moral Practice, we ask whether Hershovitz's theory takes full advantage of the explanatory advantages of viewing non-positivism in explicitly eliminativist terms.

Conceptual Engineering: For What Matters

Abstract Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering.

Innovation Doesn’t Work: The Explanatory Power of a Socio-Technical Approach

This comment engages with two questions introduced by Alan Irwin’s introductory essay to this thematic collection on STS and Innovation (2023), and invites the reader to reflect on them as parts of a problem-solution relationship: When it comes to engaging with and acting upon socio-technical change, is ‘innovation’ part of the solution or of the problem? What new conceptual and empirical resources can STS bring to the study of innovation? The ‘problematic side’ (the first question) of our argument is focused on the theoretical constraints of ‘innovation’ as an analytical concept. Then, to address the ‘solution side’ (the second question), we introduce an approach to socio-technical change: the interactive socio-cognitive model. This model is presented as an analytical framework that makes explicit the explanatory (and programmatic) advantages that the notion of socio-technical change has compared to innovation.

On the expressive theory of paternalism

ABSTRACT The expressive theory of paternalism holds that an action is paternalistic when and because it expresses the insulting idea that the actor knows better than the person acted upon. I argue that the expressive theory has implausible implications. First, it entails that a government’s interventions in people’s lives count as paternalistic only if their motivations are sufficiently consistent and well-publicised that the circumstances allow its policies to express the relevant insult. In other words, secret paternalism is impossible. Second, the theory implies that governments can remove any objection to a policy qua paternalistic by means of a manipulative exercise in public relations. Nor, I argue, does the expressive theory offer any explanatory advantage over autonomy-based theories.

Theorizing the Use of Performance Enhancing Substances and Methods in Sport as Four Different Types of Deviant Behavior

ABSTRACT The central objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the validity of the Hughes and Coakley (H&C) model of deviance in sport is context specific and depends on the time, place, social groups involved, and the relative power of the audience and deviant(s). H&C argued that performance enhancing substance (PES) use constituted a single type of deviant behavior among athletes (i.e. positive deviance). The Heckert and Heckert (H&H) deviance framework made it possible to theorize performance-enhancing substances and methods (PESM) use as four ideal types of deviant behavior among athletes and in sports collectives. Given the variability in the historical and social contexts where PESM use has occurred in sport, a comprehensive explanatory framework is needed to understand a full range of PESM behaviors. This paper demonstrates that the H&H framework has a clear explanatory advantage over the H&C model.

Does Practicality Support Noncognitivism?

Abstract Normative judgments are practical: they bear a close connection to motivation. Noncognitivists often claim that they have a distinctive explanatory advantage accounting for this connection. After all, if normative judgments just are noncognitive, desire-like states, then it is no mystery why they bear an intimate connection to motivation: desire-like states motivate. In this paper, however, I argue that noncognitivism does not have this explanatory advantage after all. The problem is that noncognitivists cannot provide a characterization of the practicality of normative judgment that allows them to retain this advantage. Noncognitivists either posit a strong and controversial connection between normative judgment and motivation that cognitivists have no trouble rejecting, or they posit a weaker connection that cognitivists can explain just as well. Either way, noncognitivists cannot argue from the practicality of normative judgments to their claim that normative judgments are noncognitive, desire-like states. The practicality of normative judgments does not support noncognitivism.

From single attitudes to belief systems: Examining the centrality of STEM attitudes using belief network analysis

Many achievement and motivation theories claim that a specific set of beliefs, interests or values plays a central role in determining career choice and behavior. In order to investigate how attitudes determine behaviors, researchers generally investigate each attitude in isolation. This article argues that studying belief systems rather than single attitudes has several explanatory advantages. In particular, a system-level approach can provide clear definitions and measures of attitude importance. Using a nationally representative sample of 13,283 9th graders and measures of 136 STEM-related attitudes, I implement a belief network analysis to investigate which attitudes are most influential in determining STEM career choice. The results suggest that identity beliefs, educational expectations and ability-related beliefs play central roles in individuals’ belief systems.

Structural Power without the Structure: A Class-Centered Challenge to New Structural Power Formulations

This article argues for the utility in conceiving of two distinctive approaches to the structural power of finance—New Structural Power (NSP) and Traditional Structural Power (TSP). While both are crucial to political economy scholarship, this article highlights the intellectual trade-off that is inherent to the adoption of one perspective over the other, and it stresses the explanatory advantages of the TSP perspective specifically. First, it shows how the TSP framework can facilitate an understanding of when policymaker ideas do and do not matter in the exercise of structural power, retaining the concept of “automaticity” in structural power operations. Second, it demonstrates how each framework is custom-built to explain substantively different aspects of the policy process, with TSP research aimed at system-oriented limitation mechanisms and NSP research aimed at agent-oriented selection mechanisms. Third, it contends that TSP formulations must be embedded within a model of (contradictory) functional explanation, which is the best way to gain empirical traction on the most important macrostructural developments in contemporary finance-led capitalism. Methodologically, this implies an agenda of “explanation through commonalities” rather than the NSP-favored “explanation through variation.”

Skills as Knowledge

ABSTRACT This paper advances a unified theory of skilful and intentional action. According to our theory, the distinguishing feature of both skilful and intentional actions is that they are guided by the agent’s knowledge of the means of performing the task at hand. This theory leads naturally to an intellectualist view of skills, according to which skills are propositional knowledge states. We show that this view enjoys a number of explanatory advantages over more familiar dispositional accounts of skills.

Francisco de Vitoria as an Early Precedent of the Modern Idea of a Legal System

In general, the development of the theory of the legal system has focused on the contributions of legal positivism authors, leaving to one side the contributions of natural law theory. This study seeks to rebuild the theory of the legal system developed by the School of Salamanca’s founder, Francisco de Vitoria, showing its explanatory advantages in comparison with the first analytical legal theory of legal system formulated by John Austin. This study shows that, just as in Austin, it is possible in Francisco de Vitoria to reconstruct the existence and identity criteria of legal systems from the notions of command and sovereignty. These findings allow us to maintain that 300 years before Austin, and in a non-analytical environment, Francisco de Vitoria developed a theory of legal system.

Reincarnation as a Complement to the Flawed DNA-Based Model of Life: Potential Contributions to Our Disposition towards Family and Religion/Spirituality

Briefly summarized here are some reasons why the DNA/genetic model of life appears to be inadequate (for more details see previous OJPP paper). Given its foundational role with regards to our understanding of life and its challenges, this is significant. The traditional dualistic reincarnation model is introduced. That model is then considered, along with the DNA model, as potential explanations for our natural religious instincts. Next, the two models are considered as possible bases for the phenomenon of kin orientation or bias. Together the case is made that a soul-based reincarnation model offers some explanatory advantages therein over the genetic-based (material-only) model. Finally, and of potential practical and philosophical significance, the corresponding imports for life and meaning are considered.

Objective ages of acquisition for 3300+ simplified Chinese characters.

We report the construction of two age-of-acquisition (AoA) norms for 3300+ characters in simplified Chinese, which make up about 99% of the texts used in daily life. We determined a character's AoA according to the time in which the character is formally learned in two sets of leading textbooks of Chinese in compulsory education, published respectively on the basis of the 2001 and 2011 national curriculum. Apart from having a significantly larger coverage of characters than previous norms, the current norms also outperformed them in explaining accuracy and reaction times in four large-scale databases for character decision, character naming, or character handwriting, even after controlling for the effects of frequency, number of meanings, and number of strokes. The explanatory advantage of the current norms suggests that, compared to earlier norms, the current norms capture more up-to-date character AoAs; these findings also highlight the diachronic nature of some lexical variables such as AoA and frequency. The developed objective AoA norms can be used for subsequent research on Chinese character recognition or production.

AXIO-SYSTEMIC VALIDITY: POSITIVISM WITH REASON

Systemic validity is generally in conformity with the understanding of validity adopted by legal officials. On the other hand, it suffers from an inability to account for why an enactment in conformity with the systemic criteria constitutes a norm. Axio-systemic validity aims to compensate this deficiency by introducing a hybrid understanding of validity. While the systemic component continues the descriptive and explanatory advantages, the minimum axiological element guarantees that the enactments possess the character of norms. While axio-systemic validity violates the social fact and sources theses, it is compatible with the separability thesis. Therefore, it can be conceived of as a positivist understanding of validity

Alfano, Mark. Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. 314. $99.99 (cloth).

Alfano, Mark. <i>Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology</i>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. 314. $99.99 (cloth).

Externalist perspectives on meaning change and conceptual stability

ABSTRACT In recent debates about conceptual engineering (broadly understood), it appears that the internalist has an explanatory advantage when it comes to accounting for meaning change and conceptual change. In this paper, I argue against this impression. I show how two different varieties of externalism, originalism and anti-individualism, can coherently explain various cases of meaning change, irrespective of whether they involve proper names or kind terms; and also irrespective of whether they occur in everyday, legal, or scientific contexts. I point out which mechanisms and interpretational strategies the originalist and anti-individualist can invoke, relative to their respective background assumptions about the nature of concepts. Furthermore, I offer an argument in favour of the claim that externalism as such has no implications concerning whether concepts can undergo change. I establish this by showing that originalism allows for conceptual change while anti-individualism insists on conceptual stability.

Epistemic Slurs: A Novel Explicandum and Adequacy Constraint for Slur Theories

I argue that there are slurs that are distinctly derogatory insofar as they only derogate their target’s epistemic faculties or capacities qua group member. I call these slurs epistemic slurs. Given that slur theories should explain the derogatory nature of all slurs, any comprehensive slur theory should be able to explain the derogatory nature of the epistemic slurs. I argue, however, that two particular expressivist theories of slurs cannot explain their distinctive derogatory nature. The epistemic slurs thus constitute a novel explanatory problem for these expressivist slur theories. Yet I argue that a semantic theory of slurs, combinatorial externalism, can explain the distinctive derogatory nature of the epistemic slurs in which case these slurs constitute a novel explanatory advantage for combinatorial externalism. Whether the epistemic slurs constitute a novel explanatory problem or advantage for any other slur theories remains to be seen.

The Small Number System

I argue that the human mind includes an innate domain-specific system for representing precise small numerical quantities. This theory contrasts with object-tracking theories and with domain-general theories that only make use of mental models. I argue that there is a good amount of evidence for innate representations of small numerical quantities and that such a domain-specific system has explanatory advantages when infants’ poor working memory is taken into account. I also show that the mental models approach requires previously unnoticed domain-specific structure and consequently that there is no domain-general alternative to an innate domain-specific small number system.

Ownership of Personal Data in the Internet of Things

This article analyses, defines, and refines the concepts of ownership and personal data. It critically examines the traditional dividing line between personal and non-personal data and argues for a strict conceptual separation of personal data from personal information. The article also considers whether, and to what extent, the concept of ownership can be applied to personal data in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT). This consideration is framed around two main approaches shaping all ownership theories: a bottom-up and top-down approach. Via these dual lenses, the article reviews existing debates relating to four elements supporting introduction of ownership of personal data, namely the elements of control, protection, valuation, and allocation of personal data. It then explores the explanatory advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches in relation to each of these elements as well as to ownership of personal data in IoT at large. Lastly, the article outlines a revised approach to ownership of personal data in IoT that may serve as a blueprint for future regulatory and policy debates in the context of EU law and beyond.