Neuroscientific Explanations Research Articles

Neurophysiological correlates of embodiment and motivational factors during the perception of virtual architectural environments.

The recent efforts aimed at providing neuroscientific explanations of how people perceive and experience architectural environments have largely justified the initial belief in the value of neuroscience for architecture. However, a systematic development of a coherent theoretical and experimental framework is missing. To investigate the neurophysiological reactions related to the appreciation of ambiances, we recorded the electroencephalographic (EEG) signals in an immersive virtual reality during the appreciation of interior designs. Such data have been analyzed according to the working hypothesis that appreciated environments involve embodied simulation mechanisms and circuits mediating approaching stimuli. EEG recordings of 12 healthy subjects have been performed during the perception of three-dimensional interiors that have been simulated in a CAVE system and judged according to dimensions of familiarity, novelty, comfort, pleasantness, arousal and presence. A correlation analysis on personal judgmentsreturned that scores of novelty, pleasantness and comfort are positively correlated, while familiarity and novelty are in negative way. Statistical spectral maps reveal that pleasant, novel and comfortable interiors produce a de-synchronization of the mu rhythm over left sensorimotor areas. Interiors judged more pleasant and less familiar generate an activation of left frontal areas (theta and alpha bands), along an involvement of areas devoted to spatial navigation. An increase in comfort returns an enhancement of the theta frontal midline activity. Cerebral activations underlying appreciation of architecture could involve different mechanisms regulating corporeal, emotional and cognitive reactions. Therefore, it might be suggested that people's experience of architectural environments is intrinsically structured by the possibilities for action.

Are the neurocognitive correlates of subtle subjective symptoms the way forward in psychiatry?

In their thoughtful overview, Sass and Byrom (1) correlate three levels of description: the subjective experience of the patient as understood by a third person (phenomenology), cognitive models and neuroscience. In particular, they link two diverging models with each other, i.e., selected phenomenological accounts of delusions and their potential underlying neurocognitive explications. They identify correlations between the two models and crystallize neglected areas in neurocognitive accounts, filling them with phenomenological notions. Basically, they argue to look for fine grained, subjective symptoms – beyond structured interviews and DSM/ICD criteria – and to relate them to neurocognitive data. The authors’ ambition is to find a neuroscientific explanation of subjective experiences. However, neuroscience should not be a validator for phenomenology, as they are two different realms of description, which should inform each other. There is of course a fundamental “explanatory gap”. The subjective consciousness (first person perspective) has to be translated by the patient into a second person “output”, usually verbal and non-verbal; this has to be understood by the interviewer and then related to brain states (third person perspective). The mind-body relation is a yet unresolved philosophical question; therefore we can only correlate such levels of descriptions, but we cannot explain them with one another. Correlating symptoms with brain states has already been successfully achieved by a neuroimaging “symptom catching” approach, mainly for auditory hallucinations and formal thought disorder. In the beginning, cruder syndromes have been related to brain activation (2,3), while recently a more fine grained and subjective psychopathology has been applied (4,5). In the article, highly selected phenomenological ideas (models) are correlated with current neuroscience models. Since there is not much replicated data on the neurobiology of delusions, Sass and Byrom's account is rather a comparison of models. Ideally, one would have a phenomenologically derived symptom or experience and relate this to empirical data, rather than comparing models with each other. More empirically testable predictions from phenomenology would be welcome. However, this begs the question of which among the many phenomenological accounts (Sass and Byrom only discuss a few) should be translated into experiments and tested. For current neuroscientific data acquisition, a fluctuating phenomenon/symptom is usually considered, and the patient is investigated experimentally at two or more points in time, with symptom severity being correlated with cognitive measures and/or brain states. This methodological constraint vastly reduces the number of phenomena possibly investigated. A further current problem is that the conception of our patients’ inner lives has been oversimplified by the operationalized diagnostic approaches. This oversimplification has been accompanied by a reliance on methodologies that are unable to capture the delicate forms of human experience and expression (6). If the cognitive scientist wants to base experiments on phenomenological notions, he or she must be deeply familiar with the philosophical-phenomenological literature. This needs thorough reading and understanding of the ideas, which are currently marginalized. Many French and German texts have not been translated into English and are therefore inaccessible to a wider international audience. For example, Sass and Byrom discuss concepts by K. Conrad, but another important phenomenological contribution on chronic, negative symptoms stems from W. Blankenburg (7), both from Marburg. Their two main books have equally not been translated into English. The clinician should be familiar with the rich descriptive and hermeneutic tradition of psychiatry. We only see in our patients what we know. There are other levels for the explanation of experiences than cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and a deep understanding of the patient's world is interesting and therapeutic in itself. A phenomenologically informed systems neuroscience, integrating environmental, genetic, molecular and brain imaging data in the same patient across his life, will eventually explain the etiology and pathophysiology of mental disorders. It can, however, not replace an interpersonally shared understanding of the patient's inner life as a humane value and source of content in itself.

Explicação em Neurociência: uma análise crítica do modelo mecanístico-causal multinivelar de Carl Craver

The most expressive account of explanations in neuroscience is currently the causal-mechanistic model (MMM model) formulated by Carl Craver. According to him, explanations in neuroscience describe mechanisms, in other words, it points out how parts organize themselves and interact to engender the phenomenon. Furthermore, neuroscience is unified as scientists from different areas that compose it work together to develop mechanisms. This model was extensively discussed in the last years and several criticisms were raised towards it. Still, it remains as the soundest model for explanations in neuroscience nowadays. This paper is presented as a review of this model, as well as the critiques worked out against it and finishes with a brief consideration of the problem of explanation in neuroscience.

Bridging Levels of Understanding in Schizophrenia Through Computational Modeling.

Schizophrenia is an illness with a remarkably complex symptom presentation that has thus far been out of reach of neuroscientific explanation. This presents a fundamental problem for developing better treatments that target specific symptoms or root causes. One promising path forward is the incorporation of computational neuroscience, which provides a way to formalize experimental observations and, in turn, make theoretical predictions for subsequent studies. We review three complementary approaches: (a) biophysically based models developed to test cellular-level and synaptic hypotheses, (b) connectionist models that give insight into large-scale neural-system-level disturbances in schizophrenia, and (c) models that provide a formalism for observations of complex behavioral deficits, such as negative symptoms. We argue that harnessing all of these modeling approaches represents a productive approach for better understanding schizophrenia. We discuss how blending these approaches can allow the field to progress toward a more comprehensive understanding of schizophrenia and its treatment.

Dynamical Models and Explanation in Neuroscience

Kaplan and Craver claim that all explanations in neuroscience appeal to mechanisms. They extend this view to the use of mathematical models in neuroscience and propose a constraint such models must meet in order to be explanatory. I analyze a mathematical model used to provide explanations in dynamical systems neuroscience and indicate how this explanation cannot be accommodated by the mechanist framework. I argue that this explanation is well characterized by Batterman’s account of minimal model explanations and that it demonstrates how relationships between explanatory models in neuroscience and the systems they represent is more complex than has been appreciated.

Noise and its impact on the perception of food and drink

Noise is currently the second most common complaint amongst restaurant-goers, behind poor service. In fact, over the last decade or two, many restaurants have become so loud that some critics now regularly report on the noise levels alongside the quality of the food. In this review, I first highlight the growing problem of noise in restaurants and bars and look at the possible causes. I then critically evaluate the laboratory-based research that has examined the effect of loud background noise on taste perception. I distinguish between the effect of noise on the taste, aroma/flavour, and textural properties of food and drink. Taken together, the evidence now clearly demonstrates that both background noise and loud music can impair our ability to taste food and drink. It would appear that noise selectively impairs the ability to detect tastes such as sweet and sour while leaving certain other taste and flavour experiences relatively unaffected. Possible neuroscientific explanations for such effects are outlined, and directions for future research highlighted. Finally, having identified the growing problem with noise in restaurants, I end by looking at some of the possible solutions and touch on the concept of silent dining.

The Selective Allure of Neuroscientific Explanations

Some claim that recent advances in neuroscience will revolutionize the way we think about human nature and legal culpability. Empirical support for this proposition is mixed. Two highly-cited empirical studies found that irrelevant neuroscientific explanations and neuroimages were highly persuasive to laypersons. However, attempts to replicate these effects have largely been unsuccessful. Two separate experiments tested the hypothesis that neuroscience is susceptible to motivated reasoning, which refers to the tendency to selectively credit or discredit information in a manner that reinforces preexisting beliefs. Participants read a newspaper article about a cutting-edge neuroscience study. Consistent with the hypothesis, participants deemed the hypothetical study sound and the neuroscience persuasive when the outcome of the study was congruent with their prior beliefs, but gave the identical study and neuroscience negative evaluations when it frustrated their beliefs. Neuroscience, it appears, is subject to the same sort of cognitive dynamics as other types of scientific evidence. These findings qualify claims that neuroscience will play a qualitatively different role in the way in which it shapes people’s beliefs and informs issues of social policy.

No brain left behind: consequences of neuroscience discourse for education

Educational neuroscience represents a concerted interdisciplinary effort to bring the fields of cognitive science, neuroscience and education to bear on classroom practice. This article draws attention to the current and potential implications of importing biological ideas, language and imagery into education. By analysing examples of brain-based consumer products and services, we express a concern that neuroscience discourse can promote reductive and deterministic ways of understanding the developing child, masking phenomenological, psychosocial, or cultural influences. Moreover, a lack of neuroscience literacy and the appeal of neuroscience explanations may leave this field especially vulnerable to misunderstanding and misappropriation. We conclude by suggesting some opportunities to mitigate these problems, thereby facilitating constructive interdisciplinary dialogue.

Stimulus Set for 'The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations'

Explanations of psychological phenomena seem to generate more public interest when they contain neuroscientific information. Even irrelevant neuroscience information in an explanation of a psychological phenomenon may interfere with people's abilities to critically consider the underlying logic of this explanation. We tested this hypothesis by giving naive adults, students in a neuroscience course, and neuroscience experts brief descriptions of psychological phenomena followed by one of four types of explanation, according to a 2 (good explanation vs. bad explanation) × 2 (without neuroscience vs. with neuroscience) design. Crucially, the neuroscience information was irrelevant to the logic of the explanation, as confirmed by the expert subjects. Subjects in all three groups judged good explanations as more satisfying than bad ones. But subjects in the two nonexpert groups additionally judged that explanations with logically irrelevant neuroscience information were more satisfying than explanations without. The neuroscience information had a particularly striking effect on nonexperts' judgments of bad explanations, masking otherwise salient problems in these explanations.

Targeting Emotion Circuits with Deep Brain Stimulation in Refractory Anorexia Nervosa

There is an urgent need to develop novel therapies for patients with anorexia nervosa (AN). A condition that is heterogeneous, highly resistant to treatment, and associated with striking rates of morbidity and mortality, few therapeutic advances specifically for AN have been made in the past 150 years. A re-orientation in the last two decades toward neuroscientific explanations for AN offers hope that an increased understanding of the illness' neural roots will lead to better treatments (Kaye et al, 2009). Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a neurosurgical procedure that targets critical nodes in dysfunctional neural circuits driving pathological behaviors (Lozano and Lipsman, 2013; Mayberg et al, 2005). DBS' efficacy in disorders like Parkinson's Disease has driven its investigation in other circuit-based conditions, including major depression (Lozano and Lipsman, 2013). Several factors led us to consider DBS in refractory AN. First, the primarily limbic structures implicated in the disorder, largely by functional neuroimaging, are consistent with the clinical observations that AN is predominantly a disorder of emotional processing. Further, the ability of DBS to safely and effectively access limbic nodes in mood- and anxiety-related circuits suggested that it could be applied to AN, a disorder marked by high rates of depressed mood and affective dysregulation. The subcallosal cingulate (SCC) has a key role in modulating emotional states and projects cortically, to medial- and orbitofrontal cortex, as well as subcortically to nucleus accumbens. Our group has also shown that SCC neurons participate directly in emotion processing, responding preferentially to affective-laden stimuli and decisions (Lipsman et al, 2013a). The SCC is thus both structurally and functionally integrated into emotion pathways, and its activity linked to disorders of emotion. Our initial experience in a small group of treatment-refractory patients (N=6; average age: 38 years; average illness duration: 18 years) showed DBS to be reasonably safe in AN, and associated with improvements in comorbid mood and anxiety symptoms (Lipsman et al, 2013b). These results were maintained during 6 months of clinical follow-up, with significant reductions in depressed mood and anxiety translating, over time, into increases in BMI (Figure 1). Although time spent on eating- and weight-related preoccupations and rituals did decrease (Lipsman et al, 2013b), we believe the primary effect of DBS was an improved utilization of conventional AN treatment as a result of improved mood and affective regulation. Figure 1 Mean (N=6) percentage changes from baseline, of weight and depression ratings, at each study time point (1 month, 3 months, and 6 months). At 6 months post-DBS, the cohort experienced a mean 12% increase in BMI and a 40% reduction in depression ... The influence of focal stimulation on global cerebral metabolism can be investigated with functional imaging, such as positron emission tomography (PET; Figure 2). PET studies in both AN and depression patients have shown significant network-wide changes in glucose utilization with DBS of the SCC. For example, after 6 months of DBS, both patient groups see significant activity reductions in the SCC and insula, as well as significant activity increases in the parietal lobe (Lipsman et al, 2013b; Mayberg et al, 2005). In AN, this change in parietal activity constitutes an effective reversal of known baseline parietal hypometabolism seen in acutely ill AN patients (Delvenne et al, 1996). These results confirm that although DBS is a focal, targeted therapy, it can influence metabolism in remote regions, and that AN-relevant structures, such as those governing mood, emotion regulation, and body perception, can be modulated by SCC stimulation. Figure 2 Three-dimensional rendering of composite cerebral metabolic changes in six patients who underwent deep brain stimulation of subcallosal cingulum for anorexia nervosa. Red indicates areas of increased activity following 6 months of stimulation compared ... Determining the potential role of DBS in the AN treatment algorithm will await the results of larger, sham-stimulation trials. It is clear, however, that the condition's physical and emotional symptoms are inextricably linked, and novel treatment strategies will need to address both in equal measure, to offer patients hope for a meaningful and enduring recovery.

Minimal models and canonical neural computations: the distinctness of computational explanation in neuroscience

In a recent paper, Kaplan (Synthese 183:339–373, 2011) takes up the task of extending Craver’s (Explaining the brain, 2007) mechanistic account of explanation in neuroscience to the new territory of computational neuroscience. He presents the model to mechanism mapping (3M) criterion as a condition for a model’s explanatory adequacy. This mechanistic approach is intended to replace earlier accounts which posited a level of computational analysis conceived as distinct and autonomous from underlying mechanistic details. In this paper I discuss work in computational neuroscience that creates difficulties for the mechanist project. Carandini and Heeger (Nat Rev Neurosci 13:51–62, 2012) propose that many neural response properties can be understood in terms of canonical neural computations. These are “standard computational modules that apply the same fundamental operations in a variety of contexts.” Importantly, these computations can have numerous biophysical realisations, and so straightforward examination of the mechanisms underlying these computations carries little explanatory weight. Through a comparison between this modelling approach and minimal models in other branches of science, I argue that computational neuroscience frequently employs a distinct explanatory style, namely, efficient coding explanation. Such explanations cannot be assimilated into the mechanistic framework but do bear interesting similarities with evolutionary and optimality explanations elsewhere in biology.

What does ‘acceptance’ mean? Public reflections on the idea that addiction is a brain disease

Public responses to the dissemination of neuroscientific explanations of addiction and other mental disorders are an interesting sociocultural phenomenon. We investigated how 55 members of the Australian public deliberated on the idea that ‘addiction is a brain disease’. Our findings point to the diverse ways in which the public understands and utilises this proposition. Interviewees readily accepted that drugs affect brain functioning but were ambivalent about whether to label addiction as a ‘disease’. Contrary to the prediction of neuroscientific advocates and social science critics, acceptance of a neurobiological conception of addiction did not necessarily affect beliefs about addicted persons’ responsibility for their addiction. We discuss the theoretical and applied implications of these findings. Theoretically, we examine the complexity surrounding how people adopt new knowledge and its role in reshaping ethical beliefs. We also discuss the implications of these findings for the ethics of communication of neuroscientific information to reduce stigma and enhance social support for the treatment of addicted individuals.

In Quest for Scientific Psychiatry: Toward Bridging the Explanatory Gap

Abstract: The contemporary epistemic status of mental health disciplines does not allow the cross-validation of mental disorders among various genetic markers, biochemical pathway or mechanisms, and clinical assessments in neuroscience explanations. We attempt to provide a meta-empirical analysis of the contemporary status of the cross-disciplinary issues existing between neurobiology and psychopathology. Our case studies take as an established medical mode an example cross-validation between biological sciences and clinical cardiology in the case of myocardial infarction. This is then contrasted with (…) the incoherence between neuroscience and psychiatry in the case of bipolar disorders. We examine some methodological problems arising from the neuroimaging studies, specifically the experimental paradigm introduced by the team of Wayne Drevets. Several theoretical objections are raised: temporal discordance, state independence, and queries about the reliability and specificity, and failure of convergent validity of the interdisciplinary attempt. Both modern neuroscience and clinical psychology taken as separate fields have failed to reveal the explanatory mechanisms underlying mental disorders. The data acquired inside the monodisciplinary matrices of neurobiology and psychopathology are deeply insufficient concerning their validity, reliability, and utility. Further, there have not been developed any effective transdisciplinary connections between them. It raises the requirement for development of explanatory significant multidisciplinary ‘meta-language’ in psychiatry. We attempt to provide a novel conceptual model for an integrative dialogue between psychiatry and neuroscience that actually includes criteria for cross-validation of the commonly used psychiatric categories and the different assessment methods. The major goal of our proactive program is the foundation of complementary ‘bridging’ connections of neuroscience and psychopathology, which may stabilize the cognitive meta-structure of mental health knowledge. This entails bringing into synergy the disparate discourses of clinical psychology and neuroscience. One possible model accomplishment of this goal would be the synergistic (or at least compatible) integration of the knowledge under transdisciplinary convergent cross-validation of the commonly used methods and notions.

Reports of intimate touch: Erogenous zones and somatosensory cortical organization

IntroductionErogenous zones have paradoxical response properties, producing erotic feelings from body surfaces distant from the genitalia. Ramachandran has suggested an intriguing neuroscientific explanation for the distribution of erogenous zones, based on the arrangement of body parts (such as the adjacent positioning of the genitals and the feet) in primary somatosensory cortex (S1). The present study represents the first systematic survey of the magnitude of erotic sensations from various body parts, as well as the first empirical investigation of the S1 theory of erogenous zones, by analysis of whether evaluations of erogenous magnitude from adjacent S1 sites tend to correlate. MethodsA sample of some 800 participants, primarily from the British Isles and Sub-Saharan Africa, completed a survey of 41 body parts, each rated for erogenous intensity. ResultsRatings for the feet were surprisingly low. However, there were remarkable levels of correlation between ratings of intensity, regardless of the age, sexual orientation, nationality, race and, more surprisingly, the sex of our participant sample (R2 values ranging between .90 and .98). Multiple regression and factor analysis investigated whether body parts nearby in S1 were significantly correlated. ConclusionThe S1 hypothesis appears to lack support, because of the low level of foot ratings, the lack of inter-correlation between ratings for nearby S1 sites, and the previous literature suggesting that cortical stimulation of S1 does not appear to be erotogenic. The consistency across demographic variables is open to multiple interpretations. However, it may be that individual experience or cultural differences (a starting point for some accounts of erogenous zone distribution) are not substantial determining variables. Thus, while S1 does not appear to be the likely site that would support Ramachandran's neural body map proposal, we suggest that the origins of erogenous distribution may derive from a map located elsewhere in the brain.

Brain Development During Adolescence

Adolescence is the phase of life between late childhood and adulthood. Typically, adolescents seek diversion, new experiences, and strong emotions, sometimes putting their health at serious risk. In Germany, for example, 62% of all deaths among persons aged 15 to 20 are due to traumatic injuries. Neuroscientific explanations have been proposed for typical adolescent behavior; with these explanations in mind, one can derive appropriate ways of dealing with adolescents. We selectively review pertinent articles retrieved from the PubMed database about the structural and functional development of the brain in adolescence. New findings in developmental psychology and neuroscience reveal that a fundamental reorganization of the brain takes place in adolescence. In postnatal brain development, the maximum density of gray matter is reached first in the primary sensorimotor cortex, and the prefrontal cortex matures last. Subcortical brain areas, especially the limbic system and the reward system, develop earlier, so that there is an imbalance during adolescence between the more mature subcortical areas and less mature prefrontal areas. This may account for typical adolescent behavior patterns, including risk-taking. The high plasticity of the adolescent brain permits environmental influences to exert particularly strong effects on cortical circuitry. While this makes intellectual and emotional development possible, it also opens the door to potentially harmful influences.

Intentional concepts in cognitive neuroscience

In this article, I develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in cognitive neuroscience explanations. As pointed out by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, intentional language abounds in neuroscience theories. According to Bennett and Hacker, the subpersonal use of intentional predicates results in conceptual confusion. I argue against this overly strong conclusion by evaluating the contested language use in light of its explanatory function. By employing conceptual resources from the contemporary philosophy of science, I show that although the use of intentional predicates in mechanistic explanations sometimes leads to explanatorily inert claims, intentional predicates can also successfully feature in mechanistic explanations as tools for the functional analysis of the explanandum phenomenon. Despite the similarities between my account and Daniel Dennett's intentional-stance approach, I argue that intentional stance should not be understood as a theory of subpersonal causal explanation, and therefore cannot be used to assess the explanatory role of intentional predicates in neuroscience. Finally, I outline a general strategy for answering the question of what kind of language can be employed in mechanistic explanations.

Neurotheology-Matters of the Mind or Matters that Mind?

Understanding the true nature of an individual, be it a child or an adult, a male or a female, is almost an impossible task. The vast abyss like behaviour of a human mind is virtually unfathomable. Yet, with the advent of neurosciences, it can be said that we, as the medical fraternity, have been in a position to decipher a considerable part of the human mind. This review accepts the fact that religion and theology have extreme reverence and respect. Yet, when it comes to extraordinary beliefs, phenomena, unimaginable feats and emotional deviations of the human mind, especially those which involve deep faiths and beliefs, comprehensive neuroscientific explanations from the emerging data, with the aid of elaborate neuroimaging, have proved to be extremely rational and logical. This review did make an attempt to untangle some facets of spirituality and to make rational explanations of the same. It was an attempt to understand the function of the mind (as an abstract) and the brain, on the spiritual experiences and sudden enlightments, the experience of togetherness with the universe, and to understand the phenomena of trance and an altered state of consciousness, which is better referred as the emerging science of neurotheology.

On Why Music Changes What (We Think) We Taste

A pair of recently published studies demonstrate that what we happen to be listening to can sometimes change our perception (or, at the very least, our rating) of what we are eating or drinking. In one recent study, North (2012) showed that the emotional attributes (or connotation) of a piece of music could influence people's perception of red or white wine. Meanwhile, Crisinel et al. (2012) reported that listening to a lower-pitched soundscape can help to emphasize the bitter notes in a bittersweet toffee while listening to a soundscape with a higher pitch tends to bring out its sweetness. Although the most appropriate psychological and neuroscientific explanations for such crossmodal effects are still uncertain, we outline a number of possible alternatives for such intriguing, not to mention surprising, phenomena.

Challenging neuroscience and evolutionary explanations of social and psychological processes

In order to provide the context for this special issue of Contemporary Social Science, a brief review of the biological and evolutionary explanations of psychological and socio-cultural phenomena is presented. This distinguishes five separate aspects of what may be characterised as ‘biologising’ the social sciences: Darwinian theories, neuroscience explanations, genetic causation, pharmacological and hormonal causes, and the less fundamentalist use of evolutionary ideas as analogies or metaphors. The remarkable range of phenomena that these biologically oriented perspectives try to address is cause for some scepticism and concern, forming the basis for an overview of the growing groundswell of arguments that challenge attempts at biologising the social sciences. At the heart of these challenges is the recognition that human beings can talk and interact with each other, generating cultures and societies that have an existence that cannot be reduced to their mere mechanical parts.

Conscious Access Is Linked to Ongoing Brain State: Electrophysiological Evidence from the Attentional Blink

Neuroscience explanations of conscious access focus on neural events elicited by stimuli. In contrast, here, we used the attentional blink paradigm in combination with event-related brain potentials to examine whether the ongoing state of the brain before a stimulus can determine both conscious access and the poststimulus neural events associated with consciousness. Participants were required to detect 2 target letters from digit distractors while their brain activity was being recorded. Trials were classified based on whether the secondcritical target (T2) was detected. We found that T2-detection was predetermined by brain activity prior to the onset of the stimulation stream. Specifically, T2-detected trials were predicated by a frontocentral positive going deflection that started more than 200 ms before the stream began. Accurate T2 detection was also accompanied by enhanced poststimulus neural activity, as reflected by a larger P3b component. Furthermore, prestimulus and poststimulus markers of T2-detection were highly correlated with one another. We therefore argue that conscious experiences are shaped by potentially random fluctuations in neural activity. Overall, the results reveal that conscious access is underpinned by an important relationship involving predictive prestimulus neural activity and responsive poststimulus brain activity.