Experience State Research Articles

Introduction of a New, Contemporary, and Developmentally Flexible Mindfulness Metaphor

Mindfulness is described as an experiential state and an intentional practice aimed at enhancing attention to and acceptance of the broad range of human experience. The use of figurative language occupies a central role in the psychotherapy process. This article introduces a new analogy, not currently represented in the literature, with therapeutic utility across age groups for enhancing understanding of and appreciation for the nature of thoughts, their manifestation, and role in psychological functioning. A description is offered, along with instructions for applying it as a mindfulness exercise in a therapy context. Limitations to applicability are discussed.

Key success factors for the launch of government social media platform: Identifying the formation mechanism of continuance intention

Social media has flourished recently, and government agencies across different levels are experimenting with launching government social media (GSM) to socialize government services, processes, and data. Both researchers and practitioners are focusing on understanding the key success factors related to the launch of GSM. This study aims to identify the key success factors by exploring the formation mechanism of individuals' continuous usage intention. Through the theoretical lens of the uses and gratifications theory (UGT), we identify the gratification factors (i.e., information seeking, social activity, content consumption, collective intelligence, and network externality) that stimulate users' continuance intention toward GSM. Furthermore, we draw upon the stimulus–organism–response (SOR) framework to develop a model for exploring the effects of gratification factors (as stimulus in the SOR framework) on individuals' online experiential states (i.e., flow experience and sense of belonging) and, subsequently, their continuance intention. The results of our survey of 336 government microblogging residents indicate that usage continuance intention is in part determined by gratification factors. Furthermore, the associations among gratification factors and users’ continuance intention can be mediated by the sense of belonging and flow experience.

Empathy and the Melodic Unity of the Other

Current discussions on social cognition, empathy, and interpersonal understanding are largely built on the question of how we recognize and access particular mental states of others. Mental states have been treated as temporally individuated, momentary or temporally narrow unities that can be grasped at one go. Drawing on the phenomenological tradition—on Stein and Husserl in particular—I will problematize this approach, and argue that the other’s experiential states can appear meaningful to us only they are viewed in connection with further, non-simultaneous experiential states of the other. I will focus on the temporal structure of mental states which has received less attention in the available literature. Building a comparison between empathy and music perception, I will argue that approaching the problem of other minds from the point of view of particular mental states is like considering music from the point of view of particular notes.

ACTING LIKE GOD? WAYS TO EMBODY THE DIVINE IN RELIGIOUS PLAY AND DEITY POSSESSION

This paper explores the aesthetics of divine embodiments in eastern India by taking a close look at the mimetic faculty of the human body in two types of cultural performances. I shall compare (1) the mode of acting as a deity on the Ramlila stage, i.e., during a religious play that is enacted to produce sacred reality rather than merely representing Rama or other gods; and (2) the expressiveness of women who, as part of a procession, embody a goddess and thus may become possessed by her. Whereas in both types of events performers refer to divine agency in order to rationalize their behaviour, they impersonate the deity in substantially different ways, particularly with respect to the display of emotions. Unlike several scholars who argue that in ritual drama the process of acting is likely to evoke an experiential state classified as possession, I suggest that we need to differentiate mimetic forms to understand better both deity possession and Indian theatre. Whereas the possessed body develops an expressiveness of its own, the concept of līlā does not subscribe to the ideal of aesthetic realism.

The Essential Basis of True Love and the Psychologically Healthy Interpersonal Relationship

Love is one’s most Essential Self, or pure consciousness substance, and is one’s unconditioned Being or consciousness. When one’s self-acceptance is unconditional, i.e., when I non judgmentally accept that I am the author of all of my positive and negative experiential states, and accept all of those relative opposites with the attitude of, “This too is me,” then whatever the world arouses in me will be totally acceptable to me, and I can then let it be, whatever it has to be, and I will accept it. Therefore, in essence, to love oneself unconditionally, meaning non judgmentally, is also to love the world unconditionally, or non judgmentally. This is because if I accept myself totally, whatever the world triggers in me will be acceptable to me [and, by the same token, whatever other individuals evoke in me will also be non judgmentally, unconditionally, and non-selectively acceptable to me, when I learn to welcome, embrace, include, or love all aspects of my own individual being and experience in the same manner]. Therefore, I am then free to let the world be all that it has to be, which is the essence of what love really means.

IF YOU WANT HEALTH, HAVE A HEALTH SYSTEM: CHANGING THE AGENDUM

As previously described health is an experiential state resulting from the dynamic interactions between the somatic, psychological, social and semiotic or cognitive domains that characterize a person’s integrity. Contrast that with the prevailing discrete disease and economic rationalist approaches to managing the healthcare, or should one better say disease management, system. The epidemiology of health in the community indicates that 96% of the community does require something other than those highly specific and successful discrete disease interventions offered in the secondary and tertiary care environment. A healthcare system build around the experience of health of the community will organise care in a much broader though highly sophisticated way. It will in particular include a focus on health promoting/destroying local community circumstances. Such a systemic approach is illustrated by the healthcare vortex model.

Re-examining online customer experience to include purchase frequency and perceived risk

This research examines the important emerging area of online customer experience (OCE) using data collected from an online survey of frequent and infrequent online shoppers. The study examines a model of antecedents for cognitive and affective experiential states and their influence on outcomes, such as online shopping satisfaction and repurchase intentions. The model also examines the relationships between perceived risk, trust, satisfaction and repurchase intentions. Theoretically, the study provides a broader understanding of OCE, through insights into two shopper segments identified as being important in e-retailing. For managers, the study highlights areas of OCE and their implications for ongoing management of the online channel.

Concepts in context: Processing mental state concepts with internal or external focus involves different neural systems

According to embodied cognition theories, concepts are contextually situated and grounded in neural systems that produce experiential states. This view predicts that processing mental state concepts recruits neural regions associated with different aspects of experience depending on the context in which people understand a concept. This neuroimaging study tested this prediction using a set of sentences that described emotional (e.g., fear, joy) and nonemotional (e.g., thinking, hunger) mental states with internal focus (i.e., focusing on bodily sensations and introspection) or external focus (i.e., focusing on expression and action). Consistent with our predictions, data suggested that the inferior frontal gyrus, a region associated with action representation, was engaged more by external than internal sentences. By contrast, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a region associated with the generation of internal states, was engaged more by internal emotion sentences than external sentence categories. Similar patterns emerged when we examined the relationship between neural activity and independent ratings of sentence focus. Furthermore, ratings of emotion were associated with activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, whereas ratings of activity were associated with activation in the inferior frontal gyrus. These results suggest that mental state concepts are represented in a dynamic way, using context-relevant interoceptive and sensorimotor resources.

Experienced Continuity of Experiences

The theories of time consciousness have primarily sought to account two types of phenomena. The first is our experiences of temporally extended events, such as change, motion, and succession. Assuming that we can have experiences of succession, for example, the main explanations for these experiences fall into two categories, namely to extensionalist and retentionalist models of specious present. Specious present refers to the idea that (subjectively speaking) our experiences are temporally extended – an idea that both theories subscribe. However, extensionalist models furthermore maintain that experiences, one specious present, is objectively speaking temporally extended too, whereas retentionalist models reject this claim. One way to express this difference is to say that according to extensionalist models an experience of succession requires a succession of experiences, while such claim is rejected by retentionalist models.The second explanandum concerns the continuous flow of our experiences. According to William James, our stream of consciousness is not chopped up into separate bits. Most philosophers agree with James at least if the claim is taken to be that we have an experiential state at each moment during some interval (say during the time we are awake). That is to say that there are no gaps in the stream of consciousness. Assuming that one specious present can follow another without any delay, and there is no obvious reason why this could not hold, then all extensionalist and retentionalist theories are compatible with this version of continuity thesis. Agreeing with James, Barry Dainton argues, however, for a more demanding version of continuity according to which our stream of consciousness is indeed gapless, continuous, but in addition we can experience the continuous stream of consciousness itself. The continuity is something that is experienced and (we agree with Dainton that) the mere continuous stream of contents is not enough to establish this. Crucially, Dainton argues that only his overlap model of specious present, a version of extensionalist models, can accommodate the strong continuity. Consequently, Dainton concludes that retentionalist model of specious present and the continuity of the stream of consciousness is erroneous.In this paper, we argue however that Dainton's overlap model has the result that either we do not have experiences of succession or that we can experience succession without having a specious present where one item succeeds the other. Given that both of these results contradict the extensionalist model of specious present, the overlap model turns out to be inconsistent. As a result, this necessitates a reevaluation of Dainton's arguments related to the continuous flow of experiences. We end by considering two alternatives: (i) the possibility that the strong version of continuity does not hold, in which case the issue of continuity cannot be used to reject different models, and (ii) providing a version of retentionalist model that can accommodate the strong continuity.

A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: Explaining the puzzle of perceptual presence and its absence in synesthesia

Normal perception involves experiencing objects within perceptual scenes as real, as existing in the world. This property of “perceptual presence” has motivated “sensorimotor theories” which understand perception to involve the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. However, the mechanistic basis of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery has remained unclear. Sensorimotor theory also struggles to explain instances of perception, such as synesthesia, that appear to lack perceptual presence and for which relevant sensorimotor contingencies are difficult to identify. On alternative “predictive processing” theories, perceptual content emerges from probabilistic inference on the external causes of sensory signals, however, this view has addressed neither the problem of perceptual presence nor synesthesia. Here, I describe a theory of predictive perception of sensorimotor contingencies which (1) accounts for perceptual presence in normal perception, as well as its absence in synesthesia, and (2) operationalizes the notion of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery. The core idea is that generative models underlying perception incorporate explicitly counterfactual elements related to how sensory inputs would change on the basis of a broad repertoire of possible actions, even if those actions are not performed. These “counterfactually-rich” generative models encode sensorimotor contingencies related to repertoires of sensorimotor dependencies, with counterfactual richness determining the degree of perceptual presence associated with a stimulus. While the generative models underlying normal perception are typically counterfactually rich (reflecting a large repertoire of possible sensorimotor dependencies), those underlying synesthetic concurrents are hypothesized to be counterfactually poor. In addition to accounting for the phenomenology of synesthesia, the theory naturally accommodates phenomenological differences between a range of experiential states including dreaming, hallucination, and the like. It may also lead to a new view of the (in)determinacy of normal perception.

Experiencing and governing safety in the night-time economy: Nurturing the state of being carefree

Against a background of widespread academic and policy interest in fear and security in urban consumption spaces across the Global North this paper explores subjective experiences of safety and the way these may be (un)affected by CCTV and on-street policing. Adopting a phenomenological perspective and drawing on the narratives of nightlife consumers in three Dutch cities (Utrecht, Rotterdam, Groningen), we propose to conceptualise safety as a range of 'meta-stable' experiential states. In the first and basic state we termed ‘absorptive coping’, nightlife consumers interact with the world as if on auto-pilot and are carefree; they are unconcerned about their safety and experience no trouble or worries. This state is suspended when consumers become ‘on the alert’. ‘Actual danger’ occurs when consumers perceive one or more individuals with the intention to do harm. We find that surveillance and policing practices can induce and affect transitions between the identified states. CCTV has marginal effects in this regard; on-street policing is more effective in preventing the states of being on the alert or actual danger and in shifting consumers back to absorptive coping. Yet, police presence and practices can also be counter-productive, triggering unease in consumers and suspending absorptive coping. Implications for the surveillance and policing of urban consumption spaces are outlined.

How I found out I had a bipolar disorder: A reflexive-collaborative exploration of the process of identifying that one is struggling with a severe mental health problem

Research indicates that it may take up to 10 years between onset of symptoms of bipolar disorder and receiving correct diagnosis and treatment. What is this period like? How do individuals experience the process of discovering that they have a bipolar disorder? In this study we utilized a hermeneutical-phenomenological approach developed within a reflexive-collaborative framework to explore these questions. In-depth interviews with 13 participants who reported both bipolar I and bipolar II diagnoses were conducted. We analyzed our data in collaboration with a group of 12 coresearchers who have experiences of mood disorders, and through reflexive dialogue with this group we validated and expanded our results. We describe three phases through which participants manoeuvred from (a) “uncertainty and confusion” through (b) “grasping the novel and unusual experiential states” to (c) “giving meaning to the lived experiences of intense ups and downs.” These results are discussed in relation to theory, research and practice.

Remembering and Knowing: Using another’s subjective report to make inferences about memory strength and subjective experience

The Remember-Know paradigm is commonly used to examine experiential states during recognition. In this paradigm, whether a Know response is defined as a high-confidence state of certainty or a low-confidence state based on familiarity varies across researchers, and differences in definitions and instructions have been shown to influence participants' responding. Using a novel approach, in three internet-based questionnaires participants were placed in the role of 'memory expert' and classified others' justifications of recognition decisions. Results demonstrated that participants reliably differentiated between others' memory experiences--both in terms of confidence and other inherent differences in the justifications. Furthermore, under certain conditions, manipulations of confidence were found to shift how items were assigned to subjective experience categories (Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess). Findings are discussed in relation to the relationship between subjective experience and confidence, and the separation of Know and Familiar response categories within the Remember-Know paradigm.

Phenomenological metaphors in readers’ engagement with characters: The case of Ian McEwan’s Saturday

Internally focalized passages in narrative often employ metaphors to capture the experiential states of the focalizing character. My investigation of these metaphors – ‘phenomenological metaphors’, as I call them – has two important precedents in the fields of narratology and literary stylistics: Dorrit Cohn’s (1978) treatment of ‘psycho-analogies’ and Semino and Swindlehurst’s (1996) approach to metaphor and ‘mind style’. After positioning phenomenological metaphors vis-à-vis these related concepts, I put forward the central claim of this article: metaphorical language plays a role in readers’ engagement with focalizing characters because it can sustain readers’ illusion of experiencing a storyworld through the consciousness of a fictional being. But what is it about metaphorical language that makes it especially suited to bring about this effect on readers? In order to answer this question, I use Ian McEwan’s novel Saturday (2005) as a case study, presenting two different lines of argument. First, I contend that metaphors reflect, at a linguistic level, the seamless integration of perception, emotion and language that characterizes our everyday transactions with the world. Second, I look at the relationship between understanding metaphorical language and readers’ empathy for characters, arguing that the continuity between these psychological processes is grounded in their perspectival nature: just as metaphors invite recipients to adopt a new perspective on a conceptual domain, engaging with a focalizing character encourages readers to ‘try on’ his or her experiential perspective and worldview. Taken together, these hypotheses provide an explanation for the effectiveness of phenomenological metaphors at conveying to readers the qualitative ‘feel’ of characters’ experiences.

Steve Sussman on Matilda Hellman's “Mind the Gap! Failure in Understanding Key Dimensions of an Addicted Drug User's Life” Addictive Effects

“Addictive effects” are experiential states sought by individuals that underlie addictive behaviors. Consistent with ideas that addictive effects mimic satiation of appetitive motives, a literature search-derived heuristic catalogue of addictive behaviors is offered and contrasted across four general appetitive-like motives that have been posited as underlying addictive behaviors (dominance, submissiveness, self-pleasure, and nurturance). I suggest, in part, that addictive behaviors are misdirected attempts to satisfy appetitive motives.

Function and feeling machines: a defense of the philosophical conception of subjective experience

Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs about the entity to which those experiential states are attributed. In two experiments, we demonstrate that ordinary attributions of subjective experiences (of smell and felt emotions) to a simple robot are not sensitive to valence, but instead respond to functional assumptions about the entity to which the states are (or are not) attributed.

Sporting Recommendations for Spiritual Encounters: Delivering Sport Psychology inside the English Premier League

Sporting Recommendations for Spiritual Encounters: Delivering Sport Psychology inside the English Premier LeagueSport psychologists rarely discuss religious belief or spirituality in their work. Where they do, this is most usually in relation to flow and positive experiential states linked to optimal performance. This article argues that other spiritual dimensions, such as courage, sacrifice and suffering can also be encountered in sport, especially at elite and professional levels. By drawing on broader and more holistic approaches to identity in sport it becomes possible to recognise that for some athletes, religious faith and other sources of spirituality are a major source of meaning in their lives. Applied experiences of the author delivering sport psychology counselling inside several English Premier League teams over 9 seasons is used to highlight how spirituality can be encountered in work with elite professional footballers. Existential phenomenological psychology and philosophical personalism are offered as ways in which sport psychology might be able to find a suitable theoretical framework that can accommodate spiritual ideas and renew focus on the person of the athlete.

In the zone: Flow state and cognition in older adults.

The current study investigated the nature of the flow state among older adults. Flow is a pleasurable experiential state that occurs during full-capacity engagement in which an individual is performing at a level that is matched with the demands of the task. Each participant completed a scale assessing dimensions of flow in a particular activity selected by the participant. More cognitively demanding activities elicited higher levels of flow for those with higher fluid ability, but lower levels of flow for those with lower fluid ability. This pattern was reversed for activities that were low in demand. Our data highlight the potential importance of considering motivational states such as flow in understanding cognitive optimization in adulthood.

Religious experiences, transformative paths and religious goals

Though McNamara indicates that his focus is mainly on theistic forms of religious experience common in the West, it is important to consider how his broadly stated thesis might be affected by data from traditions other than those that are the focus of his book. Although he is right to call our attention to the processes through which religious traditions promote and religious practitioners cultivate experiential states, his approach is limited by his non-attributional conceptualization of religious experience as the culmination of one path toward one goal. A more nuanced approach would require attending more closely to: (1) the diversity of ‘experiences’ that religious traditions set apart as being of particular importance; (2) the diversity of practices that are prescribed as being efficacious towards the attainment of those experiences; and (3) the dynamic relationship between individual practitioners and authorities of a religious tradition, wherein questions of authenticity arise and experiences are deemed ‘religious’ or not.

Psychological Need Thwarting in the Sport Context: Assessing the Darker Side of Athletic Experience

Research in self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2002) has shown that satisfaction of autonomy, competence, and relatedness needs in sport contexts is associated with enhanced engagement, performance, and well-being. This article outlines the initial development of a multidimensional measure designed to assess psychological need thwarting, an under-studied area of conceptual and practical importance. Study 1 generated a pool of items designed to tap the negative experiential state that occurs when athletes perceive their needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness to be actively undermined. Study 2 tested the factorial structure of the questionnaire using confirmatory factor analysis. The supported model comprised 3 factors, which represented the hypothesized interrelated dimensions of need thwarting. The model was refined and cross-validated using an independent sample in Study 3. Overall, the psychological need thwarting scale (PNTS) demonstrated good content, factorial, and predictive validity, as well as internal consistency and invariance across gender, sport type, competitive level, and competitive experience. The conceptualization of psychological need thwarting is discussed, and suggestions are made regarding the use of the PNTS in research pertaining to the darker side of sport participation.