Experience Of Self-agency Research Articles

A randomised controlled trial investigating the causal role of the medial prefrontal cortex in mediating self-agency during speech monitoring and reality monitoring

Self-agency is the awareness of being the agent of one's own thoughts and actions. Self-agency is essential for interacting with the outside world (reality-monitoring). The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is thought to be one neural correlate of self-agency. We investigated whether mPFC activity can causally modulate self-agency on two different tasks of speech-monitoring and reality-monitoring. The experience of self-agency is thought to result from making reliable predictions about the expected outcomes of one’s own actions. This self-prediction ability is necessary for the encoding and memory retrieval of one’s own thoughts during reality-monitoring to enable accurate judgments of self-agency. This self-prediction ability is also necessary for speech-monitoring where speakers consistently compare auditory feedback (what we hear ourselves say) with what we expect to hear while speaking. In this study, 30 healthy participants are assigned to either 10 Hz repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to enhance mPFC excitability (N = 15) or 10 Hz rTMS targeting a distal temporoparietal site (N = 15). High-frequency rTMS to mPFC enhanced self-predictions during speech-monitoring that predicted improved self-agency judgments during reality-monitoring. This is the first study to provide robust evidence for mPFC underlying a causal role in self-agency, that results from the fundamental ability of improving self-predictions across two different tasks.

The Role of the Medial Prefontal Cortex in Self-Agency in Schizophrenia.

Schizophrenia is a disorder of the self. In particular, patients show cardinal deficits in self-agency (i.e., the experience and awareness of being the agent of one’s own thoughts and actions) that directly contribute to positive psychotic symptoms of hallucinations and delusions and distort reality monitoring (defined as distinguishing self-generated information from externally-derived information). Predictive coding models suggest that the experience of self-agency results from a minimal prediction error between the predicted sensory consequence of a self-generated action and the actual outcome. In other words, the experience of self-agency is thought to be driven by making reliable predictions about the expected outcomes of one’s own actions. Most of the agency literature has focused on the motor system; here we present a novel viewpoint that examines agency from a different lens using distinct tasks of reality monitoring and speech monitoring. The self-prediction mechanism that leads to self-agency is necessary for reality monitoring in that self-predictions represent a critical precursor for the successful encoding and memory retrieval of one’s own thoughts and actions during reality monitoring to enable accurate self-agency judgments (i.e., accurate identification of self-generated information). This self-prediction mechanism is also critical for speech monitoring where we continually compare auditory feedback (i.e., what we hear ourselves say) with what we expect to hear. Prior research has shown that the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) may represent one potential neural substrate of this self-prediction mechanism. Unfortunately, patients with schizophrenia (SZ) show mPFC hypoactivity associated with self-agency impairments on reality and speech monitoring tasks, as well as aberrant mPFC functional connectivity during intrinsic measures of agency during resting states that predicted worsening psychotic symptoms. Causal neurostimulation and neurofeedback techniques can move the frontiers of schizophrenia research into a new era where we implement techniques to manipulate excitability in key neural regions, such as the mPFC, to modulate patients’ reliance on self-prediction mechanisms on distinct tasks of reality and speech monitoring. We hypothesize these findings will show that mPFC provides a unitary basis for self-agency, driven by reliance on self-prediction mechanisms, which will facilitate the development of new targeted treatments in patients with schizophrenia.

F149. NEUROBIOLOGY OF SELF-AGENCY DURING REALITY MONITORING AND SPEECH FEEDBACK MONITORING: IMPLICATIONS FOR TREATMENT DEVELOPMENT IN SCHIZOPHRENIA

BackgroundSelf-agency is the experience of being the agent of one’s own thoughts and motor actions. The intact experience of self-agency is necessary for successful interactions with the outside world (i.e., reality monitoring). Reality monitoring is the ability to distinguish internally self-generated information from outside reality (externally-derived information). We found that healthy control (HC) participants recruit medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) during encoding of self-generated information, which is also activated during accurate retrieval of self-generated information. By contrast, patients with schizophrenia (SZ) have specific self-agency impairments and do not show mPFC activation during encoding or retrieval of self-generated information. These findings indicate that SZ may rely more on environmental externally-derived information, rather than on internal self-generated information, to guide reality monitoring. Here, we relate the experience of self-agency during a lower-level speech feedback monitoring (i.e., monitoring what we hear ourselves say) to our higher-level cognitive reality monitoring task. We examine whether the sense of self-agency during speech feedback monitoring and reality monitoring are driven by the same fundamental mechanism that we hypothesize underlies the capacity to experience self-agency—the ability to make reliable predictions about the outcomes of self-generated actions.MethodsDuring speech feedback monitoring we assess self-agency by altering environmental auditory feedback so that participants listen to a perturbed version of their own speech. When subjects hear minimal perturbations in their auditory feedback while speaking, they make corrective responses, indicating that they judge the perturbations as errors in their speech output. These corrective responses are modulated by subjects’ reliance on internal predictions about the outcome of their speech output; the more subjects rely on their internal predictions, i.e. their sense of self-agency, the less they rely on external auditory feedback, resulting in smaller corrective responses. Thus, subjects who produced smaller corrective responses manifested an enhanced sense of self-agency in that they relied more on their internal predictions to generate their own actions (i.e., their speech output).ResultsWe found that self-agency judgments in the reality-monitoring task were higher in people who had smaller corrective responses (p=.05) during minimal speech perturbations of their auditory feedback. These results provide support for a unitary process for the experience of self-agency resulting from the ability to reliably predict the outcomes of self-generated actions, that governs low-level speech control and higher level reality monitoring.DiscussionThese findings have important therapeutic implications in SZ, suggesting that the more participants rely on internal predictions to guide their actions, the smaller their corrective responses in their speech output, and the more likely they are to make correct judgments of self-agency during reality monitoring. In conclusion, these findings, therefore, indicate that reality monitoring and speech monitoring paradigms provide quick and robust markers of the experience of self-agency, indicating which subjects followed their internal predictions to guide their own actions. Together, these findings have important therapeutic implications for potentiating improvements in self-agency judgments not only in HC, but in patients with schizophrenia who suffer from critical self-agency impairments.

Reality Monitoring and Feedback Control of Speech Production Are Related Through Self-Agency.

Self-agency is the experience of being the agent of one’s own thoughts and motor actions. The intact experience of self-agency is necessary for successful interactions with the outside world (i.e., reality monitoring) and for responding to sensory feedback of our motor actions (e.g., speech feedback control). Reality monitoring is the ability to distinguish internally self-generated information from outside reality (externally-derived information). In the present study, we examined the relationship of self-agency between lower-level speech feedback monitoring (i.e., monitoring what we hear ourselves say) and a higher-level cognitive reality monitoring task. In particular, we examined whether speech feedback monitoring and reality monitoring were driven by the capacity to experience self-agency—the ability to make reliable predictions about the outcomes of self-generated actions. During the reality monitoring task, subjects made judgments as to whether information was previously self-generated (self-agency judgments) or externally derived (external-agency judgments). During speech feedback monitoring, we assessed self-agency by altering environmental auditory feedback so that subjects listened to a perturbed version of their own speech. When subjects heard minimal perturbations in their auditory feedback while speaking, they made corrective responses, indicating that they judged the perturbations as errors in their speech output. We found that self-agency judgments in the reality-monitoring task were higher in people who had smaller corrective responses (p = 0.05) and smaller inter-trial variability (p = 0.03) during minimal pitch perturbations of their auditory feedback. These results provide support for a unitary process for the experience of self-agency governing low-level speech control and higher level reality monitoring.

Abnormal agency experiences in schizophrenia patients: Examining the role of psychotic symptoms and familial risk

Experiencing self-agency over one’s own action outcomes is essential for social functioning. Recent research revealed that patients with schizophrenia do not use implicitly available information about their action-outcomes (i.e., prime-based agency inference) to arrive at self-agency experiences. Here, we examined whether this is related to symptoms and/or familial risk to develop the disease. Fifty-four patients, 54 controls, and 19 unaffected (and unrelated) siblings performed an agency inference task, in which experienced agency was measured over action-outcomes that matched or mismatched outcome-primes that were presented before action performance. The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) and Comprehensive Assessment of Symptoms and History (CASH) were administered to assess psychopathology. Impairments in prime-based inferences did not differ between patients with symptoms of over- and underattribution. However, patients with agency underattribution symptoms reported significantly lower overall self-agency experiences. Siblings displayed stronger prime-based agency inferences than patients, but weaker prime-based inferences than healthy controls. However, these differences were not statistically significant. Findings suggest that impairments in prime-based agency inferences may be a trait characteristic of schizophrenia. Moreover, this study may stimulate further research on the familial basis and the clinical relevance of impairments in implicit agency inferences.

Abnormalities in the experience of self-agency in schizophrenia: A replication study

People usually experience agency over their actions and subsequent outcomes. These agency inferences over action-outcomes are essential to social interaction, and occur when an actual outcome corresponds with either a specific goal (goal-based), and matches with action-outcome information that is subtly pre-activated in the situation at hand (prime-based). Recent research showed that schizophrenia patients exhibit goal-based inferences, but not prime-based inferences. Intrigued by these findings, and underscoring their potential role in explaining poor social functioning, we replicate patients' deficit in prime-based agency inferences. Additionally, we exclude the account that patients are unable to visually process and attend to primed information.

An exploratory fMRI study into inferences of self-agency.

Building on the recent findings that the experience of self-agency over actions and corresponding outcomes can also rely on cognitive inferential processes, rather than motor prediction processes, this study aims to investigate the brain areas involved in agency inference processing in a setting where action and outcome are independent. Twenty-three right-handed subjects were scanned using functional MRI while performing an agency inference task, in which action outcomes matched or mismatched goals. The experience of self-agency was associated with increased activation in the inferior parietal lobule as well as the bilateral (medial) superior frontal cortex and medial prefrontal cortex. These findings provide new and exciting insights in the processing of inferential self-agency, providing a first look at the neural correlates of self-agency processing independent of motor-prediction processes.

On The Nature of Experiencing Self‐Agency: The Role of Goals and Primes in Inferring Oneself as the Cause of Behavior

AbstractPeople often find themselves in situations where the cause of events may be ambiguous. Surprisingly though, the experience of self‐agency, i.e., perceiving oneself as the causal agent of behavioral outcomes, appears quite natural to most people. How then do these experiences arise? We discuss common models proposing that self‐agency experiences result from the comparison between actual action‐outcomes and the outcomes one explicitly set as a goal. However, recent developments in psychology and neuroscience suggest that our behaviors and the outcomes they produce can be primed and implicitly guided by environmental cues and yet are accompanied by experiences of self‐agency. Hence, we also review research revealing how self‐agency experiences may arise over behavioral outcomes that are implicitly primed before they occur and how such implicitly cued agency experiences may differ from agency experiences that are the result of explicitly set goals. Directions for future research are briefly addressed.

A matter of matching: How goals and primes affect self-agency experiences.

The sense of self-agency is a pervasive experience that people infer from their actions and the outcomes they produce. Recent research suggests that self-agency inferences arise from an explicit goal-directed process as well as an implicit outcome-priming process. Three experiments examined potential differences between these 2 processes. Participants had the goal to produce an outcome or were primed with the outcome. Next, they performed an action in an agency-ambiguous situation, followed by an outcome that matched or mismatched the goal or prime, and indicated experienced self-agency over the action-outcome. Results showed that goals reduce self-agency over mismatching outcomes. However, outcome-primes did not affect self-agency over mismatching outcomes but even enhanced self-agency over mismatching proximate outcomes. Goals and outcome-primes equally enhanced self-agency for matches. Our findings provide novel evidence that self-agency experiences result from 2 distinct inferential routes and that goals and primes differentially affect the perception of our own behavior.

Abnormalities in the establishment of feeling of self-agency in schizophrenia

BackgroundPeople usually feel they cause their own actions and the consequences of those actions, i.e., they attribute behavior to the proper agent. Research suggests that there are two routes to the experience of self-agency: 1) an explicit route, where one has the intention to obtain a goal (if it occurs, I must have done it) and 2) an implicit route, where information about the goal is unconsciously available and increases the feeling of self-agency. Schizophrenia patients typically experience no behavioral control and exhibit difficulties in distinguishing one's own actions from those of others. The present study investigates differences in both routes to self-agency experiences between schizophrenia patients and controls. MethodsTwenty-three schizophrenia patients and 23 controls performed a task where they performed an action (button press) and subsequently indicated whether or not they were the agent of the consequence of this action (the outcome) on a 9-point scale. The task can be manipulated to measure both the explicit and implicit route (by using priming) to the experience of self-agency. ResultsIn the explicit condition (participants intended to produce a specific outcome, and this outcome matched their goal), both groups experienced enhanced self-agency. In the implicit condition (the outcome matched the primed outcome), healthy controls showed increased self-agency over the outcome, while patients did not. Potential differences in task motivation and attention did not explain these findings. ConclusionsThese findings provide new evidence for the idea that implicit processes leading to feelings of self-agency may be disturbed in schizophrenia.

Reliability of sensory predictions determines the experience of self-agency

This study examines the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the sense of agency, that is, the experience of causing and controlling events in our environment. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that the sense of agency depends on an optimal integration of different anticipatory signals, generated by motor and nonmotor systems. An established marker of pre-reflective agency experience is the suppression of cortical responses to actively generated feedback as compared to passively observed feedback, which was measured here by event-related potentials (ERPs). Sensory expectations based on motor-related and unrelated signals were induced by varying the probabilistic contingency between action and feedback, and by priming the feedback prior to the action. Moreover, simultaneous conscious agency judgments were assessed. A reduction of visual N1 response was found to self- as compared to externally generated feedback. In addition, the N1 was modulated by accurate anticipations based on prime stimuli, independent of the precision of motor predictions. Conscious agency judgments, in contrast, were enhanced by prime stimuli only in situations where no precise motor predictions of the action feedback were available. These results indicate that anticipatory signals arising from motor and nonmotor systems are integrated differently depending on the level of agency processing. Our findings suggest that, at a pre-reflective level, the brain's agency system relies on both embodied signals and nonmotor sensory expectations. At higher cognitive levels, motor and nonmotor cues are weighted differently depending on their relative reliability in a given context, thereby providing a basis for robust agentive self-awareness.

I Did It: Unconscious Expectation of Sensory Consequences Modulates the Experience of Self-agency and Its Functional Signature

The ability to recognize oneself in voluntary action is called the sense of agency and refers to the experience of causing one's own actions and their sensory consequences. This form of self-awareness is important not only for motor control but also for social interactions and the ascription of causal responsibility. Here, we examined the sense of agency at early and prereflective stages of action perception using ERPs. Subjects performed a visual forced-choice response task in which action effects were either caused by the subject or by the computer. In addition, to modulate the conscious experience of agency, action effects were subliminally primed by the presentation of congruent, incongruent, or neutral effect stimuli before the action. First, we observed sensorimotor attenuation in the visual ERP selectively for self-generated action effects. That is, the N1 component, a negative deflection around 100 msec after a visual stimulus, was smaller in amplitude for visual effects caused by the subject as compared with effects caused by the computer. Second, congruent effect priming enhanced the explicit judgment of agency and further reduced the N1 amplitude for self-generated effects, although effect primes were not consciously processed. Taken together, these results provide evidence of a top-down modulation of sensory processing of action effects by prior effect information and support the neurophysiological mechanism of sensorimotor attenuation as underlying self-registration in action. Our findings suggest that both efferent information and prior thoughts about the action consequence provide important cues for a prereflective form of the experience of being an agent.

Prime and probability: Causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences

Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action-outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their (combined) contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal knowledge that was either relevant or irrelevant by varying the probability of co-occurrence (50% or 80%) of specific actions and outcomes. Afterwards, we measured self-agency experiences in an action-outcome task where outcomes were primed or not. Results showed that motor prediction only affected self-agency when relevant actions and outcomes were learned to be causally related. Interestingly, however, inference effects also occurred when no relevant causal knowledge was acquired.

The self in action effects: Selective attenuation of self-generated sounds

The immediate experience of self-agency, that is, the experience of generating and controlling our actions, is thought to be a key aspect of selfhood. It has been suggested that this experience is intimately linked to internal motor signals associated with the ongoing actions. These signals should lead to an attenuation of the sensory consequences of one’s own actions and thereby allow classifying them as self-generated. The discovery of shared representations of actions between self and other, however, challenges this idea and suggests similar attenuation of one’s own and other’s sensory action effects. Here, we tested these assumptions by comparing sensory attenuation of self-generated and observed sensory effects. More specifically, we compared the loudness perception of sounds that were either self-generated, generated by another person or a computer. In two experiments, we found a reduced perception of loudness intensity specifically related to self-generation. Furthermore, the perception of sounds generated by another person and a computer did not differ from each other. These findings indicate that one’s own agentive influence upon the outside world has a special perceptual quality which distinguishes it from any sort of external influence, including human and non-human sources. This suggests that a real sense of self-agency is not a socially shared but rather a unique and private experience.

Reflecting on the action or its outcome: Behavior representation level modulates high level outcome priming effects on self-agency experiences

Recent research suggests that one can have the feeling of being the cause of an action’s outcome, even in the absence of a prior intention to act. That is, experienced self-agency over behavior increases when outcome representations are primed outside of awareness, prior to executing the action and observing the resulting outcome. Based on the notion that behavior can be represented at different levels, we propose that priming outcome representations is more likely to augment self-agency experiences when the primed representation corresponds with a person’s behavior representation level. Three experiments, using different priming and self-agency tasks, both measuring and manipulating the level of behavior representation, confirmed this idea. Priming high level outcome representations enhanced experienced self-agency over behavior more strongly when behavior was represented at a higher level, rather than a lower level. Thus, priming effects on self-agency experiences critically depend on behavior representation level.

Cultural and Universal Routes to Authorship Ascription: Effects of Outcome Priming on Experienced Self-Agency in the Netherlands and Japan

The experience of self-agency is a fundamental feature of human experience. Recent research has suggested that self-agency experiences are driven by an unconscious authorship ascription process that relies on an online match between accessible outcome representations and the production of the outcome. Extending this work, this study explores the role of culture in the manifestation of this unconscious authorship ascription process by testing whether subliminal priming of the outcome of an action prior to occurrence increased experiences of self-agency in Dutch and Japanese participants. Results show that outcome priming enhances the experience of self-agency independently of cultural background. However, Dutch participants experienced higher levels of self-agency than did Japanese participants, and this cultural effect was mediated by differences in beliefs of self-determination.These findings suggest that the experience of self-agency has a universal, nonconscious component that operates independently from a more cultural one, reflecting differences in conscious beliefs about the role of the self in choice and control.

Priming and authorship ascription: When nonconscious goals turn into conscious experiences of self-agency.

The conscious experience of self-agency (i.e., the feeling that one causes one's own actions and their outcomes) is fundamental to human self-perception. Four experiments explored how experienced self-agency arises from a match between nonconsciously activated outcome representations and the subsequent production of the outcome and explored specifically how implicit motivation to produce the outcome may impinge on this process. Participants stopped a rapidly presented sequence of colors on a computer screen. Subsequently, they were presented with what could be the color on which they had stopped the sequence or a color that was randomly chosen by the computer. Agency ratings after each trial revealed that priming outcomes (a specific color) just before the outcome was produced enhanced experienced self-agency. Importantly, priming outcomes relatively far in advance also augmented self-agency, but only if the outcome was attached to positive affect and thus operating as a nonconscious goal maintaining the outcome representation active over time. As such, these studies show how the mechanisms underlying nonconscious goal pursuit promote experiences of self-agency, thus integrating 2 lines of research that so far have led separate lives.

Awareness of somatic events associated with a voluntary action.

How does the brain distinguish actions that we perform from movements imposed on us? To study links between the representations of actions and their somatosensory consequences, we compared the perceived times of voluntary actions or involuntary movements and of a subsequent somatic effect (a TMS-induced twitch of the right index finger). Participants perceived voluntary actions as occurring later and their bodily effects as occurring earlier in the agency context, compared to single-event baseline conditions. When the voluntary action was replaced by a passive, involuntary movement this attraction effect reversed. In a second experiment, subjects rated the intensity of the same TMS-induced somatic effect, again following a voluntary action or a passive movement. When the somatic effect was caused by a voluntary action, it was perceived as significantly less intense than when it followed a passive movement. Our results suggest a binding mechanism integrating awareness of somatic consequences occurring in voluntary action. This 'intentional binding' mechanism might underlie the way in which the mind constructs a strong association between intentions, actions and consequences so as to generate the unique and private phenomenological experience of self-agency.