The ethical question, What ought I to do> is inevitably related to more fundamental question. That is, What can I do> This question, in turn, leads to an inquiry concerning the nature of the self. For all ethical theories presuppose knowledge of the self. Indeed, how moral philosopher conceives of the self is significant determinant in the structure of his ethical theory. In his journals Kierkegaard said that what was needed was philosophical anthropology which would describe the essential characteristics of human existence. To some extent, he did try to provide an informal analysis of the various modes of being open to man and to raise what he called the primitive questions about the universally human. He believed that he could describe the fundamental features of human existence while being faithful to the dialectical, paradoxical nature of that existence. For Kierkegaard, it was Socrates who first related the problem of the ethical (ethisk) to the problem of the self, and who held that ethical selfknowledge was the most important kind of knowledge that an individual could acquire. He did not believe that Socrates, in strict sense, taught anything. Rather, Socrates showed what his ethical commitment was in his actual existence. Kierkegaard follows Socrates when he says that selfknowledge is the kind of knowledge which is required in order to become an ethical being. The ignorance which causes vice and immorality is not ignorance of moral principles or laws, but an ignorance of one's own self. Socratic virtue cannot be taught because it is not doctrine or subject matter, but it is a being-able, an exercising, an existing, an existential transformation.' Kierkegaard reiterated Socrates's view that one cannot know what one can do (from moral point of view) unless one has some implicit knowledge of himself. To act in ignorance of the self is to open oneself to injustice and immorality. For Socrates, the kind of ignorance
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