Existential Forgery Attack Research Articles

A Privacy-Preserving Framework With Self-Governance and Permission Delegation in Online Social Networks

With the wide use of online social networks (OSNs), the problem of data privacy has attracted a lot of attention from not only the research community but also the general public. To meet the privacy needs of OSNs, we present a new framework for protecting information published through online social network websites through encryption by taking into account special features of OSNs. In this framework, autonomous private communities, called as zones, are set up by one or a set of mutually-trusted users collaboratively without any third party intervention. Sensitive information (i.e., posts, photos, etc.) within a zone can only be accessed by authorized members of the zone. A user joins a zone by obtaining a permission from an authorized zone member and uses it along with her private key to access contents inside the zone. One striking feature about our design of permission is that it is not secret information and thus can be left in the user's account in the OSN. Compared with prior work, this design of public permission greatly reduces user-side overhead on secret key management as a user only needs to maintain one secret key and use as many public permissions as she wants to access contents in different zones. Furthermore, our framework allows efficient access permission delegation and revocation. We develop a prototype to evaluate its computation performance in an acceptable level. Meanwhile, we prove that our construction is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attack, existential forgery attack and key forgery attack.

An arbitrated quantum signature protocol using rotation and permutation operators

The existing improved arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) protocols still have some security problems. First, the security of one AQS protocol is analysed, including existential forgery attack and the signer’s disavowal attack. To resist these attacks, a novel AQS protocol using rotation and permutation operators is proposed. And the analysis shows that the protocol can resist all the known forgery attacks and the signer’s disavowal attacks.

Arbitrated Quantum Signature Protocol with Asymmetric Key Based on Qubit Block Encryption

Here, The new arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) protocol assisted by asymmetric key based on qubit block encryption algorithm is given. Interestingly, our protocol with the asymmetric key can be easily extended to multi-party verification. Unlike all previous quantum works on arbitrated quantum signature, the encryption algorithm of the pre-sented protocol is qubit block encryption. Since, the proposed protocol has a better performance in resisting existential forgery attack. In addi-tion, with the help of the arbitrator, it can be proved that our protocol is secure.

TuLP: A Family of Lightweight Message Authentication Codes for Body Sensor Networks

A wireless sensor network (WSN) commonly requires lower level security for public information gathering, whilst a body sensor network (BSN) must be secured with strong authenticity to protect personal health information. In this paper, some practical problems with the message authentication codes (MACs), which were proposed in the popular security architectures for WSNs, are reconsidered. The analysis shows that the recommended MACs for WSNs, e.g., CBC-MAC (TinySec), OCB-MAC (MiniSec), and XCBC-MAC (SenSec), might not be exactly suitable for BSNs. Particularly an existential forgery attack is elaborated on XCBC-MAC. Considering the hardware limitations of BSNs, we propose a new family of tunable lightweight MAC based on the PRESENT block cipher. The first scheme, which is named TuLP, is a new lightweight MAC with 64-bit output range. The second scheme, which is named TuLP-128, is a 128-bit variant which provides a higher resistance against internal collisions. Compared with the existing schemes, our lightweight MACs are both time and resource efficient on hardware-constrained devices.

Arbitrated quantum signature of classical messages without using authenticated classical channels

This paper points out design confusion existing in all the arbitrated quantum signatures (AQS) that require public discussions over authenticated classical channels. Instead, an AQS scheme of classical messages without using authenticated classical channels is proposed here. A cryptographic hash function is used in combine with quantum mechanics to check the existence of an eavesdropping or to verify a signature. In addition, by using only single photons, this scheme provides higher efficiency both in quantum transmissions and generations. The proposed AQS scheme is shown to be immune to several well-known attacks, i.e., the Trojan-horse attacks and the existential forgery attack.

Comments on IMBAS: identity‐based multi‐user broadcast authentication in wireless sensor networks

ABSTRACTIn 2008, Cao et al. proposed an identity‐based multi‐user broadcast authentication scheme (called IMBAS) for wireless sensor networks. The IMBAS consists of one elliptic curve‐based signature scheme, called variant of Bellare‐Namprempre‐Neven' Identity‐Based Signature (vBNN‐IBS), for user broadcast authentication; a new Schnorr signature with partial message recovery for sink broadcast authentication; and a password‐based private key protection to eliminate the threat caused by possible user device compromise. Compared with its counterparts, IMBAS owns better performance in terms of security, scalability, and efficiency. Unfortunately, this letter will show that (1) the password‐based protection scheme and the vBNN‐IBS scheme are not secure—a compromised user device will disclose the user private key—and (2) the new Schnorr signature with partial message recovery is vulnerable to existential forgery attack. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Security problem on arbitrated quantum signature schemes

Many arbitrated quantum signature schemes implemented with the help of a trusted third party have been developed up to now. In order to guarantee unconditional security, most of them take advantage of the optimal quantum one-time encryption based on Pauli operators. However, in this paper we point out that the previous schemes provide security only against a total break attack and show in fact that there exists an existential forgery attack that can validly modify the transmitted pair of message and signature. In addition, we also provide a simple method to recover security against the proposed attack.

Security Analysis of Randomize-Hash-then-Sign Digital Signatures

At CRYPTO 2006, Halevi and Krawczyk proposed two randomized hash function modes and analyzed the security of digital signature algorithms based on these constructions. They showed that the security of signature schemes based on the two randomized hash function modes relies on properties similar to the second preimage resistance rather than on the collision resistance property of the hash functions. One of the randomized hash function modes was named the RMX hash function mode and was recommended for practical purposes. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), USA standardized a variant of the RMX hash function mode and published this standard in the Special Publication (SP) 800-106.In this article, we first discuss a generic online birthday existential forgery attack of Dang and Perlner on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We show that a variant of this attack can be applied to forge the other randomize-hash-then-sign schemes. We point out practical limitations of the generic forgery attack on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We then show that these limitations can be overcome for the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes if it is easy to find fixed points for the underlying compression functions, such as for the Davies-Meyer construction used in the popular hash functions such as MD5 designed by Rivest and the SHA family of hash functions designed by the National Security Agency (NSA), USA and published by NIST in the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). We show an online birthday forgery attack on this class of signatures by using a variant of Dean’s method of finding fixed point expandable messages for hash functions based on the Davies-Meyer construction. This forgery attack is also applicable to signature schemes based on the variant of RMX standardized by NIST in SP 800-106. We discuss some important applications of our attacks and discuss their applicability on signature schemes based on hash functions with ‘built-in’ randomization. Finally, we compare our attacks on randomize-hash-then-sign schemes with the generic forgery attacks on the standard hash-based message authentication code (HMAC).

Forgery attacks on digital signature schemes without using one-way hash and message redundancy

Chang and Chang proposed a new digital signature scheme, and claimed the scheme can resist the forgery attack without using one-way hash function and any redundancy padding. This claim is very interesting to all designers, because conventionally a one-way hash function is required to resist the attacks. This article shows an existential forgery attack on the scheme, and shows that the scheme would still be insecure even if a secure one-way function were adopted in the scheme.