Shared facility games are environments involving shared use of productive facilities by economic agents. We introduce the concept of generalized pricing equilibria (GPE) which exhibit such features as volume discounts, bundling, and personalized pricing. GPE are found to induce core allocations and be characterizable in terms of the maximal surplus attainable by the grand coalition. Shared facility games are revealed to exist for which none of its core allocations are induced by GPE, despite their generality. Our analysis encompasses arbitrary benefits/costs, multi-service facilities, public goods, nontransferable utility, and private ownership of facilities. Many economic environments involve a potential for the sharing of productive facilities. Examples range from the sharing of computer facilities by businesses and research institutions to the shared use of agricultural implements by farmers. We refer to such settings as shared facility games. Shared facility games with fixed utilization were studied in an important contribution by Sharkey (1990) where in effect, individual facility utilization is an all or nothing affair. We investigate a larger class of games in which variable utilization is feasible and establish a number of core and pricing equilibrium existence theorems. Our model and results are further extended by considering arbitrary benefits and costs, multi-service facilities, public goods, nontransferable utility, and private ownership of facilities. The primary focus of our analysis is on pricing equilibria and the core. We introduce the concept of generalized pricing equilibria (GPE) and show that all such equilibria induce core allocations. The pricing mechanisms in GPE are very general in nature and may include features such as membership fees, volume discounts, personalized pricing, as well as more traditional forms of competitive pricing. Nonetheless, we find there exist shared facility games such that no core allocation can be supported by pricing mechanisms, regardless of their complexity. Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of competitive equilibria are established. As a consequence, an important class of games is revealed for which the former negative result does not apply. These conditions involve a simple comparison between the maximal surplus attainable by the coalition of all agents and facilities in two settings; one being the actual game and the other being a hypothetical game in which benefits are concavified and costs convexified. It is interesting to note that the collective power of smaller coalitions is entirely irrelevant to the existence of pricing equilibria! In Section 3 we consider extensions to our basic model. Difficulties that arise in