Existence Of Mathematical Entities Research Articles

Mathematical Indispensability and Arguments from Design

The recognition of striking regularities in the physical world plays a major role in the justification of hypotheses and the development of new theories both in the natural sciences and in philosophy. However, while scientists consider only strictly natural hypotheses as explanations for such regularities, philosophers also explore meta-natural hypotheses. One example is mathematical realism, which proposes the existence of abstract mathematical entities as an explanation for the applicability of mathematics in the sciences. Another example is theism, which offers the existence of a supernatural being as an explanation for the design-like appearance of the physical cosmos. Although all meta-natural hypotheses defy empirical testing, there is a strong intuition that some of them are more warranted than others. The goal of this paper is to sharpen this intuition into a clear criterion for the (in)admissibility of meta-natural explanations for empirical facts. Drawing on recent debates about the indispensability of mathematics and teleological arguments for the existence of God, I argue that a meta-natural explanation is admissible just in case the explanation refers to an entity that, though not itself causally efficacious, guarantees the instantiation of a causally efficacious entity that is an actual cause of the regularity.

Why inference to the best explanation doesn’t secure empirical grounds for mathematical platonism

Proponents of the explanatory indispensability argument for mathematical platonism maintain that claims about mathematical entities play an essential explanatory role in some of our best scientific explanations. They infer that the existence of mathematical entities is supported by way of inference to the best explanation from empirical phenomena and therefore that there are the same sort of empirical grounds for believing in mathematical entities as there are for believing in concrete unobservables such as quarks. I object that this inference depends on a false view of how abductive considerations mediate the transfer of empirical support. More specifically, I argue that even if inference to the best explanation is cogent, and claims about mathematical entities play an essential explanatory role in some of our best scientific explanations, it doesn’t follow that the empirical phenomena that license those explanations also provide empirical support for the claim that mathematical entities exist.

La filosofía de las matemáticas de Aristóteles

La filosofía de las matemáticas de Aristóteles es una investigación acerca de tres asuntos diferentes pero complementarios: (1) el lugar epistemológico de las matemáticas en el organigrama de las ciencias teoréticas o especulativas; (2) el estudio del método usado por el matemático para elaborar sus doctrinas, sobre todo la geometría y la aritmética; y (3) la averiguación del estatuto ontológico de las entidades matemáticas. Para comprender lo peculiar de la doctrina aristotélica es necesario tener en cuenta que su principal interés está en poner en relación la matemática con la filosofía primera u ontología y la física, y salvaguardar el campo de conocimiento propio de cada una de ellas.Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics can be defined as the research about three different issues: (1) what is the epistemological place of mathematics inside the realm of speculative sciences; (2) what is the method of mathematics, especially the method of geometry and arithmetic; and (3) what is the ontological status or kind of existence of mathematical entities. The primary aim of Aristotle is to build a bridge between mathematics, ontology and philosophy of nature, in order to make clear what is the object of each one.

Should scientific realists be platonists?

Enhanced indispensability arguments (EIA) claim that Scientific Realists are committed to the existence of mathematical entities due to their reliance on Inference to the best explanation (IBE). Our central question concerns this purported parity of reasoning: do people who defend the EIA make an appropriate use of the resources of Scientific Realism (in particular, IBE) to achieve platonism? (§2) We argue that just because a variety of different inferential strategies can be employed by Scientific Realists does not mean that ontological conclusions concerning which things we should be Scientific Realists about are arrived at by any inferential route which eschews causes (§3), and nor is there any direct pressure for Scientific Realists to change their inferential methods (§4). We suggest that in order to maintain inferential parity with Scientific Realism, proponents of EIA need to give details about how and in what way the presence of mathematical entities directly contribute to explanations (§5).

On the Indispensability of the Distinctively Mathematical

Indispensability arguments purport to show that empirical data provide evidence for the existence of mathematical entities. In this paper we argue that indispensability arguments fail to show that empirical data bears on the mathematical. In order to show this we attempt to clarify what it is to be mathematical, and separate the question whether abstracta in general exist from whether distinctively mathematical abstracta exist. We introduce the notion of an ‘agnostified’ empirical theory as a heuristic device for clarifying the role of mathematical terminology in empirical theories. The special case of spaces is then briefly considered.

Platonism and the 'Epistemic Role Puzzle'

Jody Azzouni has offered the following argument against the existence of mathematical entities: if, as it seems, mathematical entities play no role in mathematical practice, we therefore have no reason to believe in them. I consider this argument as it applies to mathematical platonism, and argue that it does not present a legitimate novel challenge to platonism. I also assess Azzouni's use of the ‘epistemic role puzzle’ (ERP) to undermine the platonist's alleged parallel between skepticism about mathematical entities and external-world skepticism. I conclude that ERP fails to undermine this parallel.

Indispensability and Holism

It is claimed that the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) works in a way that allows a proponent of mathematical realism to remain agnostic with regard to how we establish that mathematical entities exist. This is supposed to be possible by virtue of the appeal to confirmational holism that enters into the formulation of IA. Holism about confirmation is supposed to be motivated in analogy with holism about falsification. I present an account of how holism about falsification is supposed to be motivated. I argue that the argument for holism about falsification is in tension with how we think about confirmation and with two principles suggested by Quine for construing a plausible variety of holism. Finally, I show that one of Quine’s principles does not allow a proponent of mathematical realism to remain agnostic with regard to how we establish that mathematical entities exist.

Can the new indispensability argument be saved from Euclidean rescues?

The traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) has been criticised due to its reliance on confirmational holism. Recently a formulation of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism has been defended. This recent formulation is meant to be superior to the traditional formulation in virtue of it not being subject to the kind of criticism that pertains to confirmational holism. I shall argue that a proponent of the version of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism will struggle to answer a challenge readily answered by proponents of a version of IA that does appeal to confirmational holism. This challenge is to explain why mathematics applied in falsified scientific theories is not considered to be falsified along with the rest of the theory. In cases where mathematics seemingly ought to be falsified it is saved from falsification, by a so called ‘Euclidean rescue’. I consider a range of possible answers to this challenge and conclude that each answer fails.

Some Uses of Logic in Rigorous Philosophy

This paper is concerned with the use of logic to solve philosophical problems. Such use of logic goes counter to the prevailing empiricist tradition in analytic circles. Specifically, model-theoretic tools are applied to three fundamental issues in the philosophy of logic and mathematics, namely, to the issue of the existence of mathematical entities, to the dispute between first- and second-order logic and to the definition of analyticity.

Mathematical Explanation in Science

Does mathematics ever play an explanatory role in science? If so then this opens the way for scientific realists to argue for the existence of mathematical entities using inference to the best explanation. Elsewhere I have argued, using a case study involving the prime-numbered life cycles of periodical cicadas, that there are examples of indispensable mathematical explanations of purely physical phenomena. In this paper I respond to objections to this claim that have been made by various philosophers, and I discuss potential future directions of research for each side in the debate over the existence of abstract mathematical objects. 1. Introduction: Mathematical Explanation2. Indispensability and Explanation3. Is the Mathematics Indispensable to the Explanation? 3.1. Object-level arbitrariness3.2. Concept-level arbitrariness3.3. Theory-level arbitrariness4. Is the Explanandum ‘Purely Physical’?5. Is the Mathematics Explanatory in Its Own Right?6. Does Inference to the Best Explanation Apply to Mathematics? 6.1. Leng's first argument6.2. Leng's second argument6.3. Leng's third argument7. Conclusions

Living in Harmony: Nominalism and the Explanationist Argument for Realism

According to the indispensability argument, scientific realists ought to believe in the existence of mathematical entities, due to their indispensable role in theorising. Arguably the crucial sense of indispensability can be understood in terms of the contribution that mathematics sometimes makes to the super‐empirical virtues of a theory. Moreover, the way in which the scientific realist values such virtues, in general, and draws on explanatory virtues, in particular, ought to make the realist ontologically committed to abstracta. This paper shows that this version of the indispensability argument glosses over crucial detail about how the scientific realist attempts to generate justificatory commitment to unobservables. The kind of role that the Platonist attributes to mathematics in scientific reasoning is compatible with nominalism, as far as scientific realist arguments are concerned.

Dirac and the dispensability of mathematics

In this paper, I examine the role of the delta function in Dirac's formulation of quantum mechanics (QM), and I discuss, more generally, the role of mathematics in theory construction. It has been argued that mathematical theories play an indispensable role in physics, particularly in QM [Colyvan, M. (2001). The indispensability of mathematics. Oxford University Press: Oxford]. As I argue here, at least in the case of the delta function, Dirac was very clear about its dispensability. I first discuss the significance of the delta function in Dirac's work, and explore the strategy that he devised to overcome its use. I then argue that even if mathematical theories turned out to be indispensable, this wouldn’t justify the commitment to the existence of mathematical entities. In fact, even in successful uses of mathematics, such as in Dirac's discovery of antimatter, there's no need to believe in the existence of the corresponding mathematical entities. An interesting picture about the application of mathematics emerges from a careful examination of Dirac's work.

The Conceptual Contingency of Mathematical Objects

Platonists often allege that mathematical entities exist of conceptual necessity, so that any view that treats such entities as fictitious is simply incoherent. (Position (i).) Less often, nominalists counter that such entities are in fact impossible, so that it is platonism that is incoherent. (Position (ii).) I think that on the most obvious construals of conceptually (and conceptually possible etc.), both of these views are false: the right view (position (iii)) is that it is whether mathematical entities exist. This means that the debate between platonism and nominalism on the existence of mathematical entities cannot be straightforwardly settled on conceptual grounds: other grounds are required. In formulating positions (i)-(iii) I have used the notion of conceptual necessity (and conceptual possibility etc.), and some philosophers would reject this notion as incoherent. But I find the position that there is nothing in this notion hard to take seriously. I don't dispute that talk of conceptual possibility is unclear in important ways; consequently, it could (prima facie) turn out that which of the three positions is true depends on how this notion is to be clarified. But my claim will be that in fact there is no reasonable construal of conceptually on which the existence of mathematical entities is necessary. (I'm not sure I want to take quite so strong a line against the position that it is impossible for mathematical entities to exist: this may admit some interpretation in which it's defensible, as we'll see.) I will focus my discussion on recent work by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, especially theirjoint paper Nominalism and the Contingency ofAbstract Objects (1992). Hale and Wright are among those who hold that it is necessary that mathematical entities exist. But their joint paper is mostly directed against the nominalist alternatives: and primarily, against contingent nominalism, the view (iiib) that it is whether mathematical entities exist, and that in fact they don't. (They focus on the version of nominalism that I advanced in Realism, Mathematics and Modality (1989).) I think it is clear that if their arguments against nominalism were correct, they would also undermine contingent platonism, the view (iiia) that it is whether mathematical entities exist, and that in fact they do. The main burden of this paper will be to defend view (iiib) against their critique; but in fact almost nothing I will say bears on the choice between (iiia) and (iiib). In my view the decision between (iiia) and (iiib) turns in large part on whether the well-known indispensability arguments for the existence of mathematical entities can be undercut; or more generally, on whether we can undercut arguments for the existence

Objetos intencionais e existência objetiva

Neste artigo quero apontar para a possibilidade de uma ontologia da matemática que, mesmo mantendo alguns pontos em comum com o platonismo e com o construtivismo, desliga-se destes em outros pontos essenciais. Por objeto matemático entendo o foco referencial do discurso matemático, ou seja, aquilo sobre o qual a matemática fala. Entendo que a existência destes objetos é meramente intencional, presuntiva, mas, simultaneamente, objetiva, no sentido de ser uma existência comunalizada, compartilhada por todos aqueles engajados no fazer matemático. A existência objetiva das entidades matemáticas não está, entretanto, garantida de uma vez por todas, mas apenas enquanto o discurso matemático for consistente. Este é o espírito do critério de existência objetiva enunciado que, acredito, deve sustentar uma ontologia matemática sem o pressuposto da existência independente de um domínio de objetos matemáticos, sem o empobrecimento que lhe impõem as diferentes versões construtivistas e sem a aniquilação que lhe infringe o formalismo sem objetos.

The Problem of the Existence of Mathematical Entities

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